Trade Assocs. Grp., Ltd. v. United States , 128 F. Supp. 3d 1322 ( 2015 )


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  •                                         Slip Op. 15-145
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    TRADE ASSOCIATES GROUP, LTD.,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,                                  Before: Timothy C. Stanceu, Chief Judge
    Defendant,                Court No. 11-00397
    and
    NATIONAL CANDLE ASSOCIATION,
    Defendant-Intervenor.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Issuing a second remand order in litigation concerning the scope of an antidumping duty order
    on certain petroleum wax candles from the People’s Republic of China]
    Dated:December 28, 2015
    Thomas J. O’Donnell and Jessica R. Rifkin, Clark Hill PLC, of Chicago, IL, for plaintiff
    Trade Associates Group, Ltd.
    Antonia R. Soares, Trial Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of
    Washington, DC, for defendant United States. With her on the brief were Stuart F. Delery,
    Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr., Assistant
    Director. Of counsel on the brief was Melissa Brewer, Office of Chief Counsel for Trade
    Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
    Karen A. McGee and Teresa L. Jakubowski, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, of Washington,
    DC, for defendant-intervenor National Candle Association.
    Stanceu, Chief Judge: In this litigation, plaintiff Trade Associates Group, Ltd. (“Trade
    Associates”), a U.S. importer of candles, contested a 2011 “Final Scope Ruling” of the
    International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or the
    “Department”), which interpreted the scope of an antidumping duty order (the “Order”) on
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 2
    certain petroleum wax candles from the People’s Republic of China (“China” or the “PRC”).
    Final Scope Ruling: Antidumping Duty Order on Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s
    Republic of China (Aug. 5, 2011), (Admin.R.Doc. No. 56) (“Final Scope Ruling”). In the Final
    Scope Ruling, Commerce rejected the position taken by Trade Associates in a 2009 request
    (“Scope Ruling Request”) that Commerce should determine various specialty-shaped or
    holiday-themed candles to be outside the scope of the Order.
    Before the court is the Department’s decision on remand (“Remand Redetermination”)
    issued in response to the court’s opinion and order in Trade Assocs. Grp., Ltd. v. United States,
    38 CIT __, 
    961 F. Supp. 2d 1306
    (2014) (“Trade Associates I”). Results of Redetermination
    Pursuant to Trade Assocs. Grp., Ltd. v. United States (June 16, 2014), ECF No. 66-1 (“Remand
    Redetermination”). The court orders a second remand, concluding that the Remand
    Redetermination is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the scope language of the Order.
    I. BACKGROUND
    The court’s prior opinion in Trade Associates I, 38 CIT at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1308-09, presents background information on this case, which is summarized briefly and
    supplemented herein with developments since the issuance of that opinion.
    A. Administrative Proceedings Following Submission of the Scope Ruling Request
    Trade Associates filed the Scope Ruling Request on June 11, 2009, in which it identified
    261 Chinese-origin petroleum wax candles that Trade Associates described as having the shape
    of identifiable objects or as being associated with Christmas or other holidays. Trade Assocs.
    Grp. Application for Scope Ruling on Antidumping Duty Order A-570-504 on Petroleum Wax
    Candles from the People’s Republic of China 2 (June 11, 2009) (Admin.R.Doc. No. 1) (“Scope
    Ruling Request”). After receiving the Scope Ruling Request, Commerce published, on
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 3
    August 21, 2009, a Federal Register notice seeking “comments from interested parties on the
    best method to consider whether novelty candles should or should not be included within the
    scope of the Order given the extremely large number of scope determinations requested by
    outside parties.” Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China: Request for
    Comments on the Scope of the Antidumping Duty Order and the Impact on Scope
    Determinations, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,230, 42,230 (Int’l Trade Admin. Aug. 21, 2009) (“Request for
    Comments”). In the notice, Commerce defined the term “novelty candles” as “candles in the
    shape of an identifiable object or with holiday-specific design both being discernable from
    multiple angles.” 
    Id. Commerce proposed
    two options. Under “Option A,” only candles in
    shapes identified in the Order, which were “tapers, spirals, and straight-sided dinner candles;
    rounds, columns, pillars, votives; and various wax-filled containers” would be within the scope
    of the Order. 
    Id., 74 Fed.
    Reg. at 42,231. For purposes of Option A, candles in the specified
    shapes would be considered to be within the scope “regardless of etchings, prints, moldings or
    other artistic or decorative enhancements including any holiday-related art.” 
    Id. Under “Option
    B,” Commerce would consider all candle shapes, including novelty candles, to be within
    the scope of the Order. 
    Id. Approximately a
    year later, Commerce published preliminary results of its request for
    comments. Petroleum Wax Candles From the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results
    of Request for Comments on the Scope of the Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s
    Republic of China Antidumping Duty Order, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,475 (Int’l Trade Admin.
    Aug. 13, 2010) (“Preliminary Results”). Approximately a year after that, on August 2, 2011,
    Commerce published the final results of its request for comments. Petroleum Wax Candles
    From the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of Request for Comments on the Scope of
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 4
    the Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,277 (Int’l Trade Admin. Aug. 2, 2011) (“Final
    Results”). The Final Results incorporated by reference an “Issues and Decision Memorandum.”
    Issues & Decision Mem. for Final Results of Request for Comments on the Scope of the
    Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China Antidumping Duty Order,
    A-570-504, (July 26, 2011) (Admin.R.Doc. No. 54), available at
    http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/2011-19529-1.pdf (last visited Dec 18, 2015)
    (“Final Results Decision Mem.”). On August 5, 2011, Commerce issued a final determination on
    the scope request of Trade Associates (“Final Scope Ruling”) in which it incorporated by
    reference the final results of the request for comments. Final Scope Ruling 3 & n.10 (citation
    omitted). In the Final Scope Ruling, Commerce concluded that, as a general matter, “the scope
    of the Order includes candles of any shape, with the exception of birthday candles, birthday
    numeral candles, utility candles, and figurine candles.” Final Scope Ruling 3. Commerce
    described its figurine candle exception as applying to “a candle that is in the shape of a human,
    animal, or deity.” 
    Id. at 5.
    B. Initiation of this Action and the Court’s First Remand Opinion and Order
    In late 2011, Trade Associates commenced this action contesting the Final Scope Ruling.
    Summons (Oct. 5, 2011), ECF No. 1; Compl. (Nov. 2, 2011), ECF No. 13. Upon judicial review
    of the Final Scope Ruling, the court concluded that “the Final Scope Ruling applied an
    impermissible interpretation of the scope language in the Order.” Trade Associates I, 38 CIT
    at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. The court ordered Commerce “to file a remand redetermination
    comprising a new scope ruling that complies with this Opinion and Order and addresses the
    products in the Scope Ruling Request submitted by Trade Associates.” Id. at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1323.
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                         Page 5
    C. The Remand Redetermination
    In response to the court’s opinion and order in Trade Associates I, Commerce issued the
    Remand Redetermination on June 16, 2014. Remand Redetermination 1, 3. Commerce included
    an attachment to the Remand Redetermination in which it ruled individually on 269 candles, as
    identified by product number and including a photographic illustration. Attach. 1 to Remand
    Redetermination (June 16, 2014), ECF No. 66-1 (“Department’s Candle Chart”). Of the 261
    product numbers in the plaintiff’s Scope Request, Commerce concluded that 120 are within the
    scope of the Order. Remand Redetermination 20.
    Plaintiff and defendant-intervenor National Candle Association (“NCA”), the petitioner
    in the antidumping investigation resulting in issuance of the Order, submitted comments to the
    court on July 23, 2014. Pl.’s Comments on Results of Redetermination (July 23, 2014), ECF
    No. 69 (“Pl.’s Comments”); Def.-Int.’s Comments on Dep’t of Commerce Redetermination
    (July 23, 2014), ECF. No. 68 (“Def.-Int.’s Comments”). Defendant filed a response to the
    comments on September 5, 2014. Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s & Def.-Int.’s Respective Comments on
    the Remand Results (Sept. 5, 2014), ECF No. 73 (“Def.’s Reply”). Both plaintiff and defendant-
    intervenor oppose aspects of the Remand Redetermination.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction under section 201 of the Customs Courts
    Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grants jurisdiction over civil actions brought under
    section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 (“Tariff Act”). 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi). 1
    Section 516A provides for judicial review of a determination of “whether a particular type of
    1
    All statutory citations are to the 2006 edition of the United States Code.
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                            Page 6
    merchandise is within the class or kind of merchandise described in an . . . antidumping . . . duty
    order.” 
    Id. In conducting
    this review, the court must set aside “any determination, finding, or
    conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
    accordance with law.” 
    Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B).
    B. The Department’s Shifting Interpretations of the Order
    Commerce issued the Order in 1986. Antidumping Duty Order: Petroleum Wax Candles
    from the People’s Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 30,686 (Int’l Trade Admin. Aug. 28, 1986)
    (“Order”). The pertinent scope language of the Order consists of only two sentences, as follows:
    The products covered by this investigation are certain scented or unscented
    petroleum wax candles made from petroleum wax and having fiber or paper-cored
    wicks. They are sold in the following shapes: tapers, spirals, and straight-sided
    dinner candles; rounds, columns, pillars, votives; and various wax-filled
    containers.
    Order, 51 Fed. Reg. at 30,686. 2 The scope language at issue in this case has remained
    essentially unchanged since Commerce originally published the Order in 1986. See Trade
    Associates I, 38 CIT at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. The same cannot be said for the
    Department’s interpretation of that language, which has undergone significant shifts over the
    long history of the Order.
    According to background information it provided in its August 2009 request for
    comments, Commerce had a practice prior to November 2001, and apparently dating back to the
    1986 issuance of the Order, of interpreting the scope to include only candles in the shapes
    identified in the second sentence of the scope language. See Request for Comments, 74 Fed.
    2
    In its prior opinion, the court concluded that changes since the 1986 publication of the
    antidumping duty order at issue in this case did no more than conform the scope language to the
    1989 adoption of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) and were not
    relevant to the issues raised by this case. Trade Assocs. Grp., Ltd. v. United States,
    38 CIT __, __, 
    961 F. Supp. 2d 1306
    , 1311 (2014) (“Trade Associates I”).
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                            Page 7
    Reg. at 42,230-31. The practice, which Commerce apparently followed for fifteen years, ended
    when Commerce issued a scope ruling, the “JC Penney” scope ruling. 
    Id., 74 Fed.
    Reg.
    at 42,230 (“In November 2001, the Department changed its practice on the issue of candle
    shapes.” (citing Final Scope Ruling Antidumping Duty Order on Petroleum Wax Candles from
    the People’s Republic of China (A-570-504); JC Penney Purchasing Corporation, (November 9,
    2001))). In the JC Penney scope ruling, Commerce concluded that the scope of the Order
    included, as a general matter, candles in any shape. 
    Id., 74 Fed.
    Reg. at 42,231.
    In the JC Penney scope ruling, Commerce recognized an exclusion from the scope of the
    Order for certain types of candles that Commerce had identified as outside of the scope in
    instructions (the “CBP Notice”) it provided in 1987 to the U.S. Customs Service, which was later
    renamed “Customs and Border Protection.” 
    Id. The exclusion
    applied to “certain novelty
    candles, such as Christmas novelty candles” and “candles having scenes or symbols of other
    occasions (e.g., religious holidays or special events) depicted in their designs, figurine candles,
    and candles shaped in the form of identifiable objects (e.g., animals or numerals).” 
    Id., 74 Fed.
    Reg. at 42,230 (quoting CBP Notice). At the time it issued the CBP notice in July 1987,
    Customs apparently was adhering to an interpretation under which the scope included only
    candles in the specific shapes identified in the second sentence of the scope language.
    In the request for comments, Commerce summarized its current practice, which began
    with the issuance of the JC Penney scope ruling, as follows: “Since 2001, the Department has
    determined that if the candle is made from petroleum wax and has a fiber or paper-cored wick it
    falls within the scope of the Order regardless of shape unless the candle possesses the
    characteristics set out in the CBP notice, in which case a candle falls within the Department’s
    novelty candle exception and is not within the scope of the Order.” 
    Id., 74 Fed.
    Reg. at 42,231.
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                           Page 8
    In the preliminary results of its request for comments, published in August 2010,
    Commerce reached several conclusions. First, Commerce concluded that the intent of the
    petitioners, as expressed in the petition and as shown in other documentary evidence, was that
    Commerce limit any antidumping duty investigation to petroleum wax candles that were in the
    shapes that later were specified in the second sentence of the scope language. Preliminary
    Results, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49,479. Second, Commerce concluded that, in promulgating the Order,
    it had sought to adhere to the original intent expressed by NCA as to the scope of the
    investigation. 
    Id. Third, Commerce
    concluded that the scope language itself supports the
    interpretation that only candles of the shapes identified in the scope language are included within
    the scope. 
    Id. Finally, Commerce
    concluded that it had erred when, upon issuing the JC Penney
    scope ruling in November 2001, it abandoned its practice of limiting the scope to the specified
    candle shapes in favor of a position that the scope of the Order included, as a general matter,
    candles of any shape. 
    Id. As to
    the first conclusion, Commerce stated in the preliminary results that “[a] thorough
    review of the record clearly illustrates that NCA did not intend for the scope of the candles
    Order to include all candles” and that “[a]t the time of the LTFV [less-than-fair-value]
    investigation and the concomitant setting of the scope, NCA advocated a scope where only the
    enumerated shapes would be covered.” 
    Id. The August
    2010 publication analyzed, in particular,
    the petition by which the NCA sought an antidumping duty investigation (the “Petition”),
    concluding that “[t]he Petition illustrates that, contrary to its current assertions, NCA advocated
    for an exhaustive scope where those candles not specifically enumerated in the scope language,
    as well as figurine candles, ‘household,’ ‘utility,’ or ‘emergency’ candles, were to be excluded
    from the investigation.” 
    Id., 75 Fed.
    Reg. at 49,476-77 (footnote omitted). Among the reasons
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                              Page 9
    Commerce cited for reaching this conclusion was that “the Petition’s like product definition
    itself indicates exclusivity.” 
    Id., 75 Fed.
    Reg. at 49,477. The August 2010 issuance quoted text
    from the petition that was presented as a description of the imported merchandise. That text, as
    presented in the August 2010 issuance, reads as follows:
    The imported PRC candles are made from petroleum wax and contain
    fiber or paper-coated wicks. They are {emphasis added} sold in the following
    shapes: tapers, spirals, and straight-sided dinner candles; rounds, columns, pillars,
    votives; and various wax-filled containers. These candles may be scented or
    unscented. While manufactured in the PRC, these candles are marketed in the
    United States and are generally used by retail customers in the home or yard for
    decorative or lighting purposes.
    
    Id. (quoting Petition
    at 6-7 (emphasis in original)). In the August 2010 issuance, Commerce also
    described various scope clarifications Commerce issued to the U.S. Customs Service, both
    before and after the August 28, 1986 publication of the Order, concluding that communications
    with NCA indicating NCA’s apparent concurrence with those clarifications “further indicate[s]
    that the scope was originally intended to include only those candle shapes described in the
    scope . . . .” 
    Id., 75 Fed.
    Reg. at 49,479.
    According to the August 2010 issuance, Commerce intended to promulgate scope
    language in the Order that reflected NCA’s intent that the investigation include only candles in
    the specified shapes. As noted above, Commerce stated in the issuance that “[a]t the time of the
    LTFV investigation and the concomitant setting of the scope, NCA advocated a scope where
    only the enumerated shapes would be covered.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Commerce added that
    “[f]or instance, NCA’s agreement in the Memorandum Dated April 30, 1986, that ‘figurine’
    candles were not within the scope of the Order indicates that candles in shapes other than those
    enumerated in the scope language were not included within the scope of the investigation.” 
    Id. Court No.
    11-00397                                                                          Page 10
    In addition to the petitioner’s intent, the Department’s August 2010 issuance relied on the
    scope language of the Order in defending the Department’s previous, fifteen-year practice of
    confining the scope to the shapes mentioned therein. Quoting the two operative sentences of the
    scope language, Commerce concluded that “the language of the scope is overt in its exclusivity.”
    
    Id. (“For instance,
    the scope of the Orders covers ‘{c}ertain scented or unscented petroleum wax
    candles’ that ‘are sold in the following shapes: tapers, spirals, and straight-sided dinner candles;
    rounds, columns, pillars, votives; and various wax-filled containers’ (emphasis added).”)
    The scope language in the Order and the intent of the petitioner, NCA, as shown in the
    record of the investigation were the bases for the Department’s conclusion that the JC Penney
    ruling was incorrect. The August 2010 issuance concluded as follows:
    However, a close review of the investigation record shows that,
    although addressing a key enforcement concern, the JC Penney methodology
    did not fully take into account record evidence from the investigation. While
    JC Penney stated that the scope of the Order was inclusive, the language of
    the Order indicates that the scope is exclusive, whereby only those candles in
    the enumerated shapes are considered inside the scope.
    
    Id. Based on
    the petitioner’s original intent, as shown in “a close review of the investigation
    record,” and its construction of the scope language to exclude candles in other than the specified
    shapes, Commerce concluded that it had erred in changing its practice in November 2001. 
    Id. The August
    2010 issuance proposed, for a second round of public comments, a scope
    interpretation that reversed the position taken in the JC Penney scope ruling in favor of one
    similar to the practice the Department had followed from the inception of the Order until that
    scope ruling was issued. Under this new interpretation, only candles of the specific shapes and
    types identified in the Order (which the August 2010 issuance defined in a series of footnotes)
    would be considered to be within the scope of the Order. 
    Id., 75 Fed.
    Reg. at 49,480 & nn.12-21.
    The proposal was basically the scope interpretation of “Option A” as set forth in the request for
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 11
    comments. Consistent with Option A, Commerce proposed that candles in the identified shapes
    and types would be considered to be within the scope “regardless of etchings, prints, texture,
    moldings or other artistic or decorative enhancements including any holiday-related art.” 
    Id., 75 Fed.
    Reg. at 49,480. Finally, the proposal was that two types of candles would be excluded:
    candles identified as “household,” “emergency,” or “utility” candles (which the issuance defined
    and grouped under the term “utility” candles), and “birthday” and “birthday numeral” candles
    (also defined and grouped under the term “birthday” candles). 
    Id. In the
    final results of the request for comments, which Commerce issued approximately a
    year later (on August 2, 2011), Commerce abandoned its August 2010 proposal as to candle
    shapes and types and adopted essentially the position on candle shapes and types that it had taken
    in the November 2001 JC Penney scope ruling. Commerce stated its reasoning as follows:
    “[e]vidence on the record indicates that contrary to the Department’s position in the Preliminary
    Results, the Order is not limited only to the enumerated shapes/types listed in the scope of the
    Order.” Final Results, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,278 (footnote omitted). “Rather,” the final results
    continued, “the most reasonable interpretation pursuant to the factors established in 19 CFR
    351.225(k)(1) is that the enumerated shapes/types serve as an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of
    candles included within the scope of the Order.” 
    Id. (citing Final
    Results Decision Mem. at
    Comment 1). Commerce recognized specific exclusions for the birthday and utility candles
    addressed in the preliminary results and, further, recognized an exception for “figurine” candles,
    stating that “the term ‘figurine’ is narrowly defined as a candle in the shape of a human, animal,
    or deity.” 
    Id. (citing Final
    Results Decision Mem. at Comment 3). The August 2011 final results
    of the request for comments announced, in conclusion, that “the Department hereby adopts an
    inclusive interpretation of the scope of the Order, whereby all candles are included within, with
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                            Page 12
    the exception of the three candle types that are excluded: Birthday, utility, and figurine (i.e.,
    human, animal, or deity shaped) candles.” 
    Id. The Final
    Scope Ruling adopted the position
    taken in the final results of the request for comments, concluding “that the scope of the Order
    includes candles of any shape, with the exception of birthday candles, birthday numeral candles,
    utility candles, and figurine candles.” Final Scope Ruling 3.
    C. The Court’s Opinion and Order in Trade Associates I
    Applying the principle established by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    (“Court of Appeals”) in Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 
    296 F.3d 1087
    (Fed. Cir. 2002)
    (“Duferco”), the court rejected the Department’s conclusion that the scope of the Order included,
    as a general matter, candles of any shape, reasoning that “nothing in the scope language
    reasonably supports this interpretation.” Trade Associates I, 38 CIT at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1312. The first sentence of the relevant scope language, the court noted, could not reasonably
    be so interpreted because “it provides that not all, but only ‘certain,’ i.e., unspecified, petroleum
    wax candles with fiber or paper-cored wicks are included in the scope.” 
    Id. Nor could
    the
    second sentence, the court reasoned, because it identifies candles in specific shapes, not candles
    in any shape. Id. at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1313.
    The court also found several faults with the Department’s construction of the word
    “certain” in the first sentence of the scope language. Addressing the Department’s explanation
    that Commerce had given effect to this word by excluding those types of candles for which there
    was evidence in the record of the investigation that the NCA had intended such exclusions, id.
    at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1312-13, the court responded that “[b]ecause the relevant scope
    language consists of only the two sentences, any reasonable construction of the term
    ‘certain . . . petroleum wax candles’ as used in the first sentence must find meaning in the second
    sentence,” which lists specific candle types and shapes. Id. at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1313.
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                           Page 13
    Having noted the Department’s construction of the second sentence as offering only an
    illustrative list of examples of common candle shapes rather than as limiting the scope, id. at __,
    961 F. Supp. 2d at 1312, the court considered the Department’s construction of the word
    “certain” in the first sentence to be “impermissible not only in failing to give effect to one of the
    two sentences that comprise the scope language but also in leaving only the first sentence to
    function as the entire operative scope language.” Id. at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1313. The first
    sentence, according to the court’s reasoning, could not reasonably be so interpreted, because by
    such an interpretation “the Final Scope Ruling adopts an interpretation resulting in ‘scope’
    language that makes no meaningful attempt to define the scope.” 
    Id. Trade Associates
    I also
    concluded that Commerce unreasonably construed the term “certain” to refer to matters entirely
    outside the scope language, i.e., the “‘record evidence’ from which Commerce concludes that the
    petitioner intended that certain candle types would be outside the scope of the investigation.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    The court viewed this not only as an unreasonable interpretation but also as
    an impermissible one in light of the statute, which charges Commerce, not the petitioner, with
    the responsibility for defining the scope of an antidumping duty order. 
    Id. (citing 19
    U.S.C.
    §§ 1673(1), 1673e(a)(2) and 
    Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1096
    ).
    Due to the Department’s unreasonable interpretation of the scope language of the Order
    as including, in general, candles of any shape, under which Commerce subjected to the Order
    candles in the shapes of various identifiable objects, Trade Associates I remanded the Final
    Scope Ruling to Commerce for reconsideration. Id. at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1322-23.
    D. In Applying the Term “Common Candle Shapes and Types,” the Remand Redetermination
    Unlawfully Defines, Rather than Interprets, the Scope of the Order and Must Be Remanded
    Commerce stated in the Remand Redetermination that it “respectfully disagrees with the
    Court’s Remand Opinion and Order and is conducting this remand under protest.” Remand
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                           Page 14
    Redetermination 3 (citing Viraj Group Ltd. v. United States, 
    343 F.3d 1371
    (Fed. Cir. 2003)). In
    the Remand Redetermination, Commerce, under protest, took an approach to the scope of the
    Order that differs markedly from any it has followed previously.
    To summarize briefly the past history, for the first fifteen years under the Order,
    Commerce followed a practice of interpreting the outer boundary of the scope as defined by the
    candle shapes and types listed in the second sentence of the scope language. Beginning with the
    JC Penney scope ruling in November 2001, Commerce abandoned that practice and interpreted
    the outer boundary as encompassing, in general, candles in any shape, subject to specific and
    limited exclusions not mentioned in the scope language of the Order itself. In the August 2010
    preliminary response to comments, Commerce proposed returning to its prior, fifteen-year
    practice upon concluding that its analysis in the JC Penney scope ruling was inconsistent with
    the scope language itself and the investigative record. In the August 2011 final response to
    comments and the Final Scope Ruling contested in this litigation, Commerce reversed its
    preliminary position, reverted to an interpretation under which the outer boundary of the scope
    encompassed generally candles in any shape, and recognized specific exclusions for three
    categories of candles (nowhere mentioned in the scope language) that it identified as “birthday,”
    “utility,” and “figurine” candles.
    In contrast to either of the two approaches to the general scope of the Order that
    Commerce took previously, the Remand Redetermination places the outer boundary of the scope
    of the Order in the term “common candle shapes or types.” See Remand Redetermination 3-4.
    This is a term or concept that is not found anywhere within the scope language of the Order.
    Instead, the scope language Commerce actually chose when it formulated the Order refutes any
    contention that Commerce, in formulating the language of the scope in 1986, intended to base
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 15
    the decision as to whether a particular candle is within, or outside of, the scope of the Order on
    whether that candle is described by the term “common candle shape or type.” The Remand
    Redetermination, however, would now make individual scope decisions according to that very
    inquiry. In this way, the Remand Redetermination defines, rather than interprets, the scope of an
    Order that Commerce formulated nearly three decades ago.
    The Court of Appeals repeatedly has held that once Commerce has issued an
    antidumping or countervailing duty order, it may interpret the scope of the order but, absent
    resort to its anti-circumvention authority, may not modify it. 
    Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1095
    ; see also
    Fedmet Resources Corp. v. United States, 
    755 F.3d 912
    , 921-22 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Tak Fat
    Trading Co. v. United States, 
    396 F.3d 1378
    , 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As the court stated in
    Trade Associates I, “[t]he logic of the rule in Duferco is straightforward: were Commerce
    empowered in a scope ruling to place merchandise within the scope of an order that cannot
    reasonably be interpreted to include that merchandise, Commerce would be altering the scope,
    not interpreting it.” Trade Associates I, 38 CIT at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (citing 
    Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1097
    ). In this litigation, Commerce has attempted to use a remand proceeding as the
    mechanism for adopting a new definition of the scope of an existing antidumping duty order,
    even though the new definition bears no relationship to the scope language it used in
    promulgating the Order.
    According to the Remand Redetermination, the scope of the Order includes a candle,
    “even if it is not one of the enumerated candle shapes or types in the second sentence,” if “it is a
    common candle shape or type.” Remand Redetermination 4. The Remand Redetermination
    explains that “[f]or example, if a candle is in the shape of a cone, we considered that to be a
    common candle shape or type.” 
    Id. It also
    states that “we find that the list of shapes and types in
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    the second sentence of the scope of the Order is illustrative, because it does not specify that only
    those specifically enumerated are covered by the scope language.” 
    Id. In reaching
    that
    conclusion, the Remand Redetermination echoes the Final Results. See Trade Associates I,
    38 CIT at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (“Regarding the second sentence, Commerce further
    reasoned that ‘the shapes listed in the scope of the Order’ do not constitute ‘an exhaustive list of
    shapes, but simply an illustrative list of common candle shapes.’” (quoting Final Results, 76 Fed.
    Reg. at 46,278)).
    As the court has discussed, the Final Results and the Final Scope Ruling interpreted the
    second sentence of the scope language as merely “illustrative,” i.e., in such a way as to give it no
    effect. But the Remand Redetermination goes beyond the Final Scope Ruling in placing upon
    the second sentence the definition of the entire general scope of the Order. The language of the
    second sentence will not bear this construction. Instead of speaking of “common” candle shapes,
    the second sentence speaks of specific candle shapes: “tapers, spirals, and straight-sided dinner
    candles; rounds, columns, pillars, votives; and various wax-filled containers.” Order, 51 Fed.
    Reg. at 30,686. The sentence prefaces the list with an introductory clause: “[t]hey are sold in the
    following shapes.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The subject of the second sentence, the pronoun
    “[t]hey,” must be read to have as its antecedent the subject of the first sentence: “[t]he products
    covered by this investigation.” The second sentence contains no language connoting an intent to
    provide a list of candle shapes that are “illustrative” of those candle shapes that are “common.”
    Instead, the plain meaning of the second sentence is that the identified shapes are “shapes” in
    which the subject merchandise “is sold.”
    In summary, the Remand Redetermination adopts an unreasonable, and therefore
    impermissible, interpretation of the scope language. By placing the outer boundary of the scope
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 17
    according to a concept that Commerce describes using the term “common candle shapes and
    types,” Commerce impermissibly attempts to use its redetermination upon remand to establish a
    new definition of the scope of the Order. This new definition lacks any foundation in the scope
    language that Commerce is charged to interpret.
    E. Trade Associates I Did Not Hold that Commerce Permissibly Could Construe the Second
    Sentence of the Scope Language as Illustrative of “Common Candle Shapes or Types”
    The Remand Redetermination bases the Department’s decision, at least in part, on the
    premise that Trade Associates I held that the second sentence of the scope language permissibly
    may be interpreted as an illustrative list of common candle shapes that the Order includes. The
    court did not so hold. In part B.1 of the Opinion and Order, under the title “The Final Scope
    Ruling Unreasonably Interprets the Scope Language of the Order,” the court held, instead, that
    the scope language of the Order may not reasonably be interpreted to include generally all
    petroleum wax candles without regard to shape. See Trade Associates I, 38 CIT at __, 961 F.
    Supp. 2d at 1311-13. As summarized earlier, the court gave several reasons for so holding.
    Were the court to have ruled that an interpretation such as that adopted by the Remand
    Redetermination were permissible, it necessarily would have ruled that the scope language need
    not be interpreted to confine the scope to the candle shapes specified in the second sentence of
    the scope language. But in deciding Trade Associates I, the court declined to decide that
    question. See id. at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (“The court need not decide, and does not
    decide, whether the second sentence of the scope language at issue in this case expressly limits
    the scope of the Order to the specified candle shapes and types.”). It was not necessary for the
    court to decide that question in order to resolve the issue of whether the Final Scope Ruling was
    based on a reasonable interpretation of the scope language, for before the court was a decision
    under which Commerce had interpreted the Order to include, as a general matter, candles in any
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                           Page 18
    shape. That was the only general interpretation of the scope language that was before the court,
    and the court rejected it. Trade Associates I did not approve any alternate interpretation of the
    scope language, leaving it to Commerce to reconsider the Final Scope Ruling in the entirety and
    submit a new decision that, unlike the Final Scope Ruling, interprets the scope language
    reasonably.
    The court’s discussion in Trade Associates I of a “common candle shape” interpretation
    was in a hypothetical context. In short, the court posited that even if, arguendo, it were
    presumed that the second sentence of the scope language reasonably could be interpreted as an
    illustrative list of common candle shapes, the court still could not sustain the interpretation
    adopted by the Final Scope Ruling. See Trade Associates I, 38 CIT at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1315-16. The discussion was in the context of the court’s explaining why the Final Scope
    Ruling could not be sustained on the basis of ambiguity in the scope language. Id. at __, 961 F.
    Supp. 2d at 1315-17. Another reference to a hypothetical “common candle shape” interpretation
    was in the context of the court’s explaining why certain arguments made by defendant and
    defendant-intervenor in favor of the Final Scope Ruling were not convincing to the court. See id.
    at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
    F. Trade Associates I Did Not Apply the Scope Language to Any Specific Candle Identified in
    the Scope Ruling Request
    In their comment submissions, plaintiff and defendant-intervenor disagree as to whether,
    and to what extent, the court ruled that specific candles identified in the Scope Ruling Request
    are outside the scope of the Order. Plaintiff, for example, contends that Trade Associates I ruled
    in such a way that Commerce must determine that all the candles identified in the Scope Ruling
    Request are outside the scope of the Order. Pl.’s Comments 2-7.
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                         Page 19
    As discussed previously in this Opinion and Order, Trade Associates I held that the Final
    Scope Ruling was impermissible, and must be reconsidered upon remand, because it was based
    on an unreasonable interpretation of the scope language. The result of the application of that
    interpretation to the Scope Ruling Request, the court concluded, was the placement within the
    scope of “various candles made to resemble identifiable objects.” Trade Associates I, 38 CIT
    at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. The court reached that conclusion based on its holding that the
    Department’s interpretation of the scope language, under which Commerce considered candles
    of any shape to be, as a general matter, within the scope of the Order, was an impermissible one.
    It did not reach that conclusion based on any application by the court of the scope language of
    the Order to any individual candle. Rather than rule on any specific candle, the court in Trade
    Associates I left any individualized determinations as issues to be resolved by Commerce on
    remand. See 
    id., 38 CIT
    at __, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
    To avoid any confusion that its previous opinion may have caused, the court now clarifies
    that, upon remand, Commerce is directed to: (1) submit a new decision upon a second remand
    that is based on a reasonable interpretation of the scope language of the Order; and (2) consistent
    with a reasonable interpretation of the scope language, identify the individual candles in the
    Scope Ruling Request that Commerce considers to be within the scope of the Order and those
    that it considers to be outside the scope of the Order. 3 In doing so, Commerce should interpret
    3
    Defendant-intervenor contends that the Remand Redetermination inadvertently omitted
    the Large Candy Corn candle, Product Number 610170. Def.-Int.’s Comments 20 n.35.
    Additionally, the parties differ in their description and physical portrayal of the Peppermint
    Candy candles, Product Number 710101. Compare Attach. 1 to Remand Redetermination 18
    (June 16, 2014), ECF No. 66-1 (“Department’s Candle Chart”) (describing the candle as a
    “circle or oval”) with Attach. 1 to Pl.’s Comments on Results of Redetermination
    (July 23, 2014), ECF No. 69-1. The court instructs Commerce, on remand, to resolve these
    issues.
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 20
    Trade Associates I as holding that the scope language interpretation upon which Commerce
    based the Final Scope Ruling, i.e., that the scope of the Order includes, as a general matter,
    candles of any shape, is an impermissible one. Similarly, it must apply on remand the holding
    the court has put forth in this Opinion and Order, which is that the general interpretation of the
    scope language upon which the Remand Redetermination is based, as described herein, is also
    unreasonable and therefore impermissible. For purposes of the second remand proceeding,
    Commerce should not interpret the holding of Trade Associates I or of this Opinion and Order as
    an application of the scope language by the court to any specific candle identified in the Scope
    Ruling Request.
    III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
    The Remand Redetermination applied to the candles at issue in this litigation an
    unreasonable, and therefore legally impermissible, interpretation of the scope language of the
    Order. Because the Remand Redetermination did so, Commerce must reconsider this decision in
    the entirety. The new decision must address the specific candles for which Trade Associates
    Group sought a determination. Therefore, upon consideration of the Remand Redetermination,
    the comments in response thereto, and all papers and proceedings had herein, it is hereby
    ORDERED that the Remand Redetermination be, and hereby is, remanded to
    Commerce; it is further
    ORDERED that Commerce, on remand, shall submit a second redetermination upon
    remand (“Second Remand Redetermination”) that adopts a reasonable interpretation of the scope
    language of the Order in accordance with the above Opinion and applies a reasonable
    interpretation of the scope language to the candles at issue in this litigation; it is further
    ORDERED that Commerce shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Opinion and
    Order to file the Second Remand Redetermination; and it is further
    Court No. 11-00397                                                                          Page 21
    ORDERED that plaintiff and defendant-intervenor shall have thirty (30) days from the
    date of the Department’s filing of the Second Remand Redetermination in which to file
    comments on the Second Remand Redetermination; and defendant shall have fifteen (15) days
    after the filing of the last comment in which to file a reply to the comments of the other parties.
    /s/ Timothy C. Stanceu
    Timothy C. Stanceu
    Chief Judge
    Dated: December 28, 2015
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-00397

Citation Numbers: 2015 CIT 145, 128 F. Supp. 3d 1322

Judges: Stanceu

Filed Date: 12/28/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023