Ryan Price v. Nancy Berryhill ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SEP 12 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
RYAN S. J. PRICE, No. 17-35621
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 9:16-cv-00123-JCL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 30, 2018
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Ryan Price (“Price”) appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of
his application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, §§ 1381-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1383(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s order de novo. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). We
affirm.
In May 2013, Price, who suffers from schizoaffective disorder, applied for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Price’s
applications were denied, and he requested reconsideration and a hearing. On June
5, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding Price was not disabled. Price’s request
for review from the Appeals Council was denied, and the district court affirmed the
ALJ’s decision.
Price argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that he did not meet a listed
disability. At step three of the Social Security sequential disability assessment, an
ALJ is required to determine whether a claimant’s impairments meet or are
medically equivalent to any of a number of listed impairments that are so severe
they compel a per se finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). Substantial evidence, including medical testimony “consistent
with other independent evidence in the record,” supported the ALJ’s determination
that Price did not meet a listing or combination of listings. Tonapetyan v. Halter,
242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the ALJ was not required to
credit Price’s testimony regarding the severity of his disabilities because the record
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contained evidence from treating sources questioning the severity of Price’s
symptoms, and indicating that his symptoms improved with treatment. See
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the ALJ’s
determination that Price’s impairment did not match a listed disability was
supported by substantial evidence.
Price also challenges the ALJ’s finding that he was capable of performing
other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The ALJ’s finding relied on testimony
from a vocational expert (“VE”). Because the ALJ’s hypothetical accurately
reflected Price’s functional limitations, the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s
testimony in concluding that Price was capable of performing other work existing
in significant numbers in the national economy, and therefore was not disabled.
Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988).
AFFIRMED.
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