Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness , 302 Neb. 1025 ( 2019 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/28/2019 12:06 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    302 Nebraska R eports
    WEHRER v. DYNAMIC LIFE THERAPY & WELLNESS
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 1025
    A rlys Wehrer,        appellant, v. Dynamic Life Therapy
    and   Wellness, P.C., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 25, 2019.    No. S-18-648.
    1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the
    pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the
    record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or
    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that
    the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In appellate review of a sum-
    mary judgment, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable
    to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party
    the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
    3. Limitations of Actions: Negligence. In determining whether the statute
    of limitations for professional negligence applies to a plaintiff’s claim,
    the court must determine whether the defendant is a professional and
    was acting in a professional capacity in rendering the services upon
    which the claim is based.
    4. Words and Phrases. In determining whether a particular act or service
    is professional in nature, the court must look to the nature of the act or
    service itself and the circumstances under which it was performed.
    5. Limitations of Actions: Negligence: Words and Phrases. The defini-
    tion of “profession” for the purpose of determining the professional
    negligence statute of limitations under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222
     (Reissue
    2016) is (1) a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often long
    and intensive preparation including instruction in skills and methods as
    well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying
    such skills and methods; (2) maintaining by force of organization or
    concerted opinion high standards of achievement and conduct; and (3)
    committing its members to continued study and to a kind of work which
    has for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service.
    6. Licenses and Permits. A license indicates a person is a professional,
    but that is not the only prerequisite, nor is it dispositive.
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    WEHRER v. DYNAMIC LIFE THERAPY & WELLNESS
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    7. Words and Phrases. A college degree is not necessarily required in
    order for a particular occupation to constitute a “profession.”
    8. Licenses and Permits: Words and Phrases. Licensure alone is gener-
    ally unreliable in determining whether an occupation is a “profession”
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222
     (Reissue 2016), because the educational
    requisites for licensure vary widely.
    9. Limitations of Actions: Negligence: Words and Phrases. In analyz-
    ing whether a particular group or organization meets the definition of a
    “profession” for purposes of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222
     (Reissue 2016),
    each of the following principal elements must be demonstrated. The
    occupation is not a “profession” unless: (1) The profession requires
    specialized knowledge; (2) the profession requires long and intensive
    preparation; (3) preparation must include instruction in skills and meth-
    ods of the profession; (4) preparation must include scientific, historical,
    or scholarly principles underlying the skills and methods of the profes-
    sion; (5) membership in a professional organization is required; (6) a
    professional organization or concerted opinion within an organization
    regulates and enforces standards for membership; (7) the standards for
    membership include high standards of achievement; (8) the standards
    for membership include high standards of conduct; (9) its members are
    committed to continued study; (10) its members are committed to a spe-
    cific kind of work; and (11) the specific kind of work has for its primary
    purpose the rendering of a public service.
    10. Words and Phrases. A massage therapist is not a “professional” for the
    purposes of applying 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222
     (Reissue 2016).
    Appeal from the District Court for Platte County: Robert R.
    Steinke, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
    George H. Moyer, of Moyer & Moyer, for appellant.
    Karen K. Bailey and L. Paige Hall, of Engles, Ketcham,
    Olson & Keith, P.C., for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Freudenberg, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    A customer of a massage therapy establishment filed suit for
    damages incurred when an employee, a licensed massage ther-
    apist, allegedly caused the customer to become unconscious
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    WEHRER v. DYNAMIC LIFE THERAPY & WELLNESS
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    302 Neb. 1025
    by improperly compressing a nerve in the customer’s neck.
    The massage therapy establishment moved for summary judg-
    ment. The district court granted summary judgment on the
    ground that the customer’s cause of action was time barred
    by the statute of limitations for professional negligence under
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222
     (Reissue 2016).
    FACTS
    On February 17, 2017, Arlys Wehrer filed a negligence
    action against Dynamic Life Therapy and Wellness, P.C.
    (Dynamic Life). The lawsuit was related to a neck massage
    Wehrer received from a licensed masseuse, Nicole Jones, at
    Dynamic Life on September 2, 2014.
    Dynamic Life is a licensed massage therapy establish-
    ment in Columbus, Nebraska, and has been in practice since
    2010. Dynamic Life passed an inspection conducted by the
    Division of Public Health of the Department of Health and
    Human Services in 2011 and was issued a license to engage
    in the practice of massage therapy. Jones completed the
    required course of study and training, including 1,000 hours
    of hands-on training, and graduated from the Omaha School
    of Massage Therapy, an approved massage therapy school, in
    2000. Later that year, Jones passed the examination required
    by the Board of Massage Therapy and became a licensed mas-
    sage therapist. She has been a licensed massage therapist since
    2001 and has been employed by Dynamic Life since 2014.
    At the time of Wehrer’s massage therapy appointment, Jones
    had completed the continuing competency education credits
    required of each licensed massage therapist who is in active
    practice in the State of Nebraska.
    During the appointment, Wehrer alleged that she became
    unconscious and fell out of the massage chair, hitting her head
    and shoulder on a wall, after Jones left to get Wehrer water
    15 minutes into the appointment. Wehrer alleged this occurred
    because Jones compressed the vagus nerve in Wehrer’s neck,
    causing her to become unconscious, fall out of the massage
    chair, and sustain injuries.
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    Wehrer filed a lawsuit against Dyanmic Life, alleging that
    Wehrer’s injuries were caused by Dynamic Life’s negligence
    as Jones’ employer. Wehrer argued that Jones knew or should
    have known that compressing the vagus nerve while perform-
    ing a neck massage could cause Wehrer to faint, fall, and sus-
    tain injuries. Dynamic Life filed an answer, denying Wehrer’s
    allegations and asserting affirmative defenses, including that
    Wehrer’s claim was time barred by the 2-year statute of limita-
    tions set forth in § 25-222.
    Dynamic Life filed a motion for summary judgment. At
    some point before the summary judgment hearing, the court
    permitted Wehrer to file a reply to Dynamic Life’s answer.
    Within her reply, Wehrer denied Dynamic Life’s suggestion
    that Jones was providing professional services under § 25-222.
    Alternatively, Wehrer alleged that § 25-222 was unconstitu-
    tional, because it is vague and it improperly delegates legisla-
    tive power to the courts by allowing appellate courts to classify
    who “professionals” are under the statute.
    The district court sustained Dynamic Life’s motion for sum-
    mary judgment and entered a judgment dismissing Wehrer’s
    complaint. The court found that based on Nebraska’s Massage
    Therapy Practice Act and relevant Nebraska Administrative
    Code provisions, massage therapy requires specialized knowl-
    edge and skill. The court then concluded that a massage thera-
    pist was a “professional” under § 25-222. As a consequence,
    the court found that there was no dispute of material fact that
    Wehrer’s claim was time barred by the application of § 25-222.
    Having dismissed the suit as time barred, the district court did
    not address Wehrer’s constitutional arguments.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Wehrer assigns that the district court erred by (1) finding
    that massage therapy is a “profession” and that a massage
    therapist could claim the benefit of § 25-222, (2) failing to
    consider the constitutionality of § 25-222, and (3) sustaining
    Dynamic Life’s motion for summary judgment.
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    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Summary judgment is proper only when the plead-
    ings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the
    record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from
    those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
    a matter of law.1 In appellate review of a summary judgment,
    the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such
    party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from
    the evidence.2
    ANALYSIS
    Wehrer contends that the district court erred in finding that
    the statute of limitations for actions in professional negligence
    under § 25-222 applied in this matter. Wehrer argues that the
    work of a massage therapist does not meet the educational
    or high standards of achievement and conduct requirements
    of “professional services” under our jurisprudence. As such,
    Wehrer contends that the general statute of limitations for neg-
    ligence actions under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207
     (Reissue 2016)
    applies. We agree.
    Section 25-222 provides in relevant part:
    Any action to recover damages based on alleged pro-
    fessional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty
    in rendering or failure to render professional services
    shall be commenced within two years next after the
    alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to ren-
    der professional services providing the basis for such
    action[.]
    The Legislature has not provided a general statutory defini-
    tion of “professional” or specifically stated which occupations
    provide professional services.
    1
    Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 
    256 Neb. 442
    , 
    590 N.W.2d 380
     (1999).
    2
    
    Id.
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    [3,4] We have held that in determining whether the statute
    of limitations for professional negligence applies to a plain-
    tiff’s claim, the court must determine whether the defendant
    is a professional and was acting in a professional capacity
    in rendering the services upon which the claim is based.3 In
    determining whether a particular act or service is professional
    in nature, we must look to the nature of the act or service itself
    and the circumstances under which it was performed.4
    We have previously determined that a physician,5 an
    attorney,6 a physical therapist,7 an accountant,8 an engineer,9
    an architect,10 and a land surveyor11 were professionals for the
    purposes of the statute of limitations described in § 25-222. We
    have held, in contrast, that a real estate broker12 and a licensed
    general securities agent13 were not professionals for the pur-
    poses of § 25-222. It is an issue of first impression whether a
    massage therapist is a professional for the purposes of applying
    this statute.
    3
    See, Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 
    285 Neb. 759
    , 
    830 N.W.2d 53
    (2013); Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, 
    268 Neb. 499
    , 
    684 N.W.2d 543
     (2004);
    Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Hayes, 
    supra note 1
    .
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    See Casey v. Levine, 
    261 Neb. 1
    , 
    621 N.W.2d 482
     (2001).
    6
    See Egan v. Stoler, 
    265 Neb. 1
    , 
    653 N.W.2d 855
     (2002).
    7
    Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 
    supra note 3
    .
    8
    See World Radio Labs. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 
    251 Neb. 261
    , 
    557 N.W.2d 1
     (1996).
    9
    Gering - Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist. v. Baker, 
    259 Neb. 840
    , 
    612 N.W.2d 897
    (2000); Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 
    230 Neb. 675
    , 
    433 N.W.2d 478
     (1988).
    10
    Board of Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, 
    supra note 9
    .
    11
    Bixenmann v. Dickinson Land Surveyors, 
    294 Neb. 407
    , 
    882 N.W.2d 910
    (2016).
    12
    Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    226 Neb. 476
    , 
    412 N.W.2d 438
     (1987).
    13
    Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, supra note 3.
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    [5] The definition of “profession”14 for the purpose of
    determining the professional negligence statute of limita-
    tions under § 25-222 is (1) a calling requiring specialized
    knowledge and often long and intensive preparation includ-
    ing instruction in skills and methods as well as in the scien-
    tific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying such skills
    and methods; (2) maintaining by force of organization or
    concerted opinion high standards of achievement and con-
    duct; and (3) committing its members to continued study
    and to a kind of work which has for its prime purpose the
    rendering of a public service.15 The Legislature, having not
    attempted to modify this definition for purposes of § 25-222,
    has acquiesced in our interpretation and determination of
    the definition of “profession” for the purpose of applying
    the statute.16
    [6] We have emphasized that this definition does not rely
    solely on the possession of a license.17 To do so would dis-
    tort the definition, as it would include many occupations that
    were traditionally not considered to be professions.18 A license
    indicates a person is a professional, but that is not the only
    ­prerequisite, nor is it dispositive.19
    [7] The definition of “profession” adopted for purposes
    of § 25-222 instead “stresses the long and intensive program
    of preparation to practice one’s chosen occupation tradition-
    ally associated only with professions.”20 It does not stress
    14
    See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
    Unabridged 1811 (1993).
    15
    See, Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, supra note 3; Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    .
    16
    See Heckman v. Marchio, 
    296 Neb. 458
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 296
     (2017).
    17
    Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    .
    18
    
    Id.
    19
    Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 
    supra note 3
    ; Jorgensen v. State Nat.
    Bank & Trust, 
    255 Neb. 241
    , 
    583 N.W.2d 331
     (1998).
    20
    Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    , 
    226 Neb. at 480
    , 
    412 N.W.2d at 441
    .
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    the difference between manual and intellectual labor; which,
    while a trademark of the traditional professions, would seem
    to exclude some occupations commonly considered to be pro-
    fessions even though manual or physical.21 Accordingly, a col-
    lege degree is not necessarily required in order for a particular
    occupation to constitute a “profession.”22 Still, we have placed
    great emphasis on college degrees in considering whether a
    particular occupation is a profession.23 This emphasis recog-
    nizes that other jurisdictions hold that a “profession” requires
    at a minimum a college degree in a specific field—though a
    college degree does not automatically designate the occupation
    as a professional practice.24
    Thus, in Georgetowne Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs.,25
    we held that architects and engineers are professionals under
    § 25-222, emphasizing that the engineers were registered and
    licensed civil engineers, who had college degrees. We stated
    that based on this, “[t]here can be no doubt that [the engi-
    neers were] rendering professional services as defined by this
    court.”26 In Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp.,27 we likewise
    found that physical therapists were professionals under the
    statute, because the Physical Therapy Practice Act required
    physical therapists to be licensed and, in order to obtain a
    21
    Id.
    22
    Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., 
    supra note 3
    ; Cooper v. Paap, 
    10 Neb. App. 243
    , 
    634 N.W.2d 266
     (2001).
    23
    See, Jorgensen v. State Nat. Bank & Trust, 
    supra note 19
    ; Georgetowne
    Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs., 
    230 Neb. 22
    , 
    430 N.W.2d 34
     (1988).
    24
    See, e.g., Chase Scientific Research v. NIA Group, 
    96 N.Y.2d 20
    , 
    749 N.E.2d 161
    , 
    725 N.Y.S.2d 592
     (2001); New York & Presbyterian Hosp. v.
    Tishman, 
    180 Misc. 2d 193
    , 
    688 N.Y.S.2d 424
     (1999); Kuntz v. Muehler,
    
    603 N.W.2d 43
     (N.D. 1999); Garden v. Frier, 
    602 So. 2d 1273
     (Fla. 1992);
    Pierce v. AALL Ins. Inc., 
    531 So. 2d 84
     (Fla. 1988).
    25
    Georgetowne Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs., supra note 23.
    26
    Id., 230 Neb. at 27, 
    430 N.W.2d at 38
    .
    27
    Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., supra note 3.
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    license, the physical therapists were required to complete an
    approved educational program that generally includes some
    form of college degree and an examination.28 We found that
    these requirements indicate that physical therapists complete
    the “‘long and intensive program of preparation’” that is
    required of professionals.29 We additionally considered the fact
    that physical therapists render a public service and are subject
    to both mandatory continuing education requirements and pro-
    fessional discipline.30
    [8] In contrast, in Tylle v. Zoucha,31 we held that a real
    estate agent was not a professional under § 25-222, despite
    the fact that he was required to complete approved post­
    secondary coursework and pass a licensing examination
    before obtaining his license, as well as the fact that the
    State Real Estate Commission was authorized to investigate
    and discipline license holders for unfair trade practices. We
    held that these factors did not transform a licensed occupa-
    tion into a licensed profession for purposes of § 25-222.32
    Similarly, in holding in Parks v. Merrill, Lynch,33 that a
    licensed general securities agent was not a professional under
    § 25-222, we focused on the fact that the requisite train-
    ing from employers in providing services for clients did
    not require long and intensive training or preparation on
    a par with a college degree—or even preparation equiva-
    lent to that required for a real estate broker license. We
    again observed that licensure alone is generally unreliable in
    determining whether an occupation is a “profession” under
    28
    See, generally, id.
    29
    Id. at 766, 830 N.W.2d at 58, quoting Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    .
    30
    Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., supra note 3.
    31
    Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    . See, also, Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, supra
    note 3.
    32
    See Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    .
    33
    Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, supra note 3.
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    § 25-222, because the educational requisites for licensure
    vary widely.34
    We consider each of the elements set forth in the Tylle defi-
    nition of “profession” to be necessary and not merely possible
    factors for consideration.35 Therefore, to constitute a “profes-
    sion” within the meaning of § 25-222, a particular type of
    endeavor must meet all of the principal elements.
    [9] Our case law has discussed many specific factors to
    be considered in determining whether a particular occupa-
    tion constitutes a profession.36 Though the list of factors set
    forth in Churchill is not necessarily complete, we conclude
    that in analyzing whether a particular group or organiza-
    tion meets the definition of a “profession” for purposes of
    § 25-222, each of the following principal elements must be
    demonstrated. The occupation is not a “profession” unless:
    (1) The profession requires specialized knowledge; (2) the
    profession requires long and intensive preparation; (3) prepa-
    ration must include instruction in skills and methods of the
    profession; (4) preparation must include scientific, historical,
    or scholarly principles underlying the skills and methods of
    the profession; (5) membership in a professional organization
    is required; (6) a professional organization or concerted opin-
    ion within an organization regulates and enforces standards
    for membership; (7) the standards for membership include
    high standards of achievement; (8) the standards for member-
    ship include high standards of conduct; (9) its members are
    committed to continued study; (10) its members are com-
    mitted to a specific kind of work; and (11) the specific kind
    34
    Id.
    35
    See Tylle v. Zoucha, 
    supra note 12
    .
    36
    See, e.g., Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., supra note 3 (listing
    factors to consider in “profession” determination, including college
    degree, licensing, protection of citizens, public service, board to enforce
    standards, written examination, verified experience, continuing education
    requirements, and professional disciplinary authority).
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    of work has for its primary purpose the rendering of a pub-
    lic service.
    When analyzing whether a particular group or organization
    meets the definition of a “profession” for purposes of § 25-222,
    one should be able to affirmatively answer each element set
    forth above. If this cannot be accomplished, then, one should
    anticipate that the group or organization does not fall within
    the scope of § 25-222.
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-1709
     (Reissue 2016) of the Massage
    Therapy Practice Act requires that any person engaging in
    the practice of massage therapy must have a license. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-1710
     (Reissue 2016) requires that in order for
    a massage therapist to become licensed to practice, “[e]very
    applicant for an initial license to practice massage therapy
    shall (1) present satisfactory evidence that he or she has
    attained the age of nineteen years, (2) present proof of gradua-
    tion from an approved massage therapy school, and (3) pass an
    examination prescribed by the board.” To receive a credential
    to practice massage therapy, an individual must have “com-
    pleted a course of study and training in massage therapy not
    less than 1,000 hours, distributed over a term of not less than
    9 months.”37
    Additionally, pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-906.05
    (Reissue 2014), we take judicial notice of the regulations of
    the Nebraska Administrative Code relevant to the regulation
    of massage therapy, as the district court did.38 Agency regula-
    tions, properly adopted and filed with the Secretary of State
    of Nebraska, have the effect of statutory law,39 and the par-
    ties do not dispute that the contents of the current regulations
    37
    172 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 81, § 003.01(3) (2010).
    38
    See, Merie B. on behalf of Brayden O. v. State, 
    290 Neb. 919
    , 
    863 N.W.2d 171
     (2015); JCB Enters. v. Nebraska Liq. Cont. Comm., 
    275 Neb. 797
    , 
    749 N.W.2d 873
     (2008).
    39
    City of Lincoln v. Central Platte NRD, 
    263 Neb. 141
    , 
    638 N.W.2d 839
    (2002).
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    denoting the massage therapist licensure requirements are
    controlling. The Nebraska Administrative Code requires that
    “[e]ach person holding an active credential within the state
    must, on or before the date of expiration of the credential,
    comply with the continuing competency requirements for his/
    her profession.”40 Specifically, a licensed massage therapist
    in Nebraska must complete 24 hours of approved continu-
    ing competency hours/credits during the preceding 24-month
    period on or before November 1 of each odd-numbered year.41
    The licensure and discipline of massage therapists in Nebraska
    is overseen broadly by the Division of Public Health of the
    Department of Health and Human Services.42
    [10] These licensing requirements to become a massage
    therapist do not require long and intensive training or prepa-
    ration, including instruction in skills and methods as well as
    in the scientific, historical, or scholarly principles underlying
    such skills and methods, which would be comparable to that
    of a college degree. Nor does the record show the standards
    for membership in the occupation of massage therapy include
    high standards of achievement. Based on the record before
    us, Dynamic Life has failed to show that the requirements to
    become a licensed massage therapist demand high standards of
    training, preparation, and achievement sufficient to render mas-
    sage therapy a “profession” under the statute.43 We therefore
    hold that a massage therapist is not a “professional” for the
    purposes of applying § 25-222.
    The district court erred in concluding that a massage thera-
    pist is a professional under § 25-222 and in granting summary
    judgment in favor of Dynamic Life on that ground. Having
    found that massage therapists are not “professionals” under
    40
    Neb. Admin. Code, supra note 37, § 006.
    41
    Id., § 006.01.
    42
    See, id., §§ 002(14) and 008; 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-1715
     (Reissue 2016).
    43
    See Parks v. Merrill, Lynch, supra note 3.
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    § 25-222, we need not address Wehrer’s alternative assign-
    ment of error and argument that the district court erred in fail-
    ing to consider whether § 25-222 is unconstitutional.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court
    erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Dynamic Life
    and reverse the decision and remand the cause to the district
    court accordingly.
    R eversed and remanded.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: S-18-648

Citation Numbers: 302 Neb. 1025

Filed Date: 4/25/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/15/2019

Authorities (20)

Garden v. Frier , 602 So. 2d 1273 ( 1992 )

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City of Lincoln v. Central Platte Natural Resources District , 263 Neb. 141 ( 2002 )

Churchill v. Columbus Comm. Hosp. , 285 Neb. 759 ( 2013 )

Casey v. Levine , 261 Neb. 1 ( 2001 )

Jorgensen v. State National Bank & Trust Co. , 255 Neb. 241 ( 1998 )

Egan v. Stoler , 265 Neb. 1 ( 2002 )

JCB Enterprises, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission , 275 Neb. 797 ( 2008 )

Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska v. Wilscam ... , 230 Neb. 675 ( 1988 )

Parks v. MERRILL, LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER , 268 Neb. 499 ( 2004 )

Bixenmann v. Dickinson Land Surveyors , 294 Neb. 407 ( 2016 )

Heckman v. Marchio , 296 Neb. 458 ( 2017 )

Wehrer v. Dynamic Life Therapy & Wellness , 302 Neb. 1025 ( 2019 )

Cooper v. Paap , 10 Neb. Ct. App. 243 ( 2001 )

World Radio Laboratories, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand , 251 Neb. 261 ( 1996 )

Georgetowne Ltd. Partnership v. Geotechnical Services, Inc. , 230 Neb. 22 ( 1988 )

Reinke Manufacturing Co. v. Hayes , 256 Neb. 442 ( 1999 )

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New York & Presbyterian Hospital v. Tishman Construction Co. , 688 NYS2d 424 ( 1999 )

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