In re: STEPHEN WOLFEÂ , 254 N.C. App. 416 ( 2017 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA16-1217
    Filed: 18 July 2017
    Buncombe County, No. 16 SPC 898
    IN THE MATTER OF:
    STEPHEN WOLFE
    Appeal by respondent from order entered 9 June 2016 by Judge Andrea Dray
    in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 May 2017.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Andrew L.
    Hayes, for petitioner-appellee.
    Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Amanda S.
    Zimmer, for respondent-appellant.
    ELMORE, Judge.
    Respondent Stephen Wolfe, an adult incompetent, appeals from an order
    concurring in his voluntary admission to a twenty-four hour (inpatient) psychiatric
    facility and ordering he remain admitted for further inpatient treatment. Wolfe
    contends the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter its order because
    it never received his written and signed application for voluntary admission to the
    facility as statutorily required to initiate the postadmission review hearing from
    which its order arose. Because we hold the lack of a written and signed application
    for voluntary admission fails to vest a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
    IN RE S.W.
    Opinion of the Court
    concur in a patient’s voluntary admission and order continued admission for further
    treatment, we vacate the court’s order.
    I. Background
    On 25 May 2016, Wolfe presented to the emergency department at Mission
    Hospital in Buncombe County “suffering from self-reported dehydration, and
    apparent psychiatric decompensation due to treatment noncompliance.” Three days
    later Wolfe was admitted to Mission Hospital’s inpatient psychiatric unit (Copestone)
    and evaluated that same day by a staff psychiatrist, Dr. Suzanne Collier.
    On 31 May, Dr. Collier filed with the Buncombe County District Court an
    evaluation for admission, in which she noted that Wolfe had a history of bipolar
    disorder and psychiatric hospitalizations; that he had recently stopped taking his
    psychiatric medication and was exhibiting signs of paranoia, delusions, and
    sleeplessness; and opined that Wolfe was mentally ill, needed further evaluation, and
    should be admitted to Copestone for inpatient psychiatric treatment. Upon receipt of
    Dr. Collier’s evaluation, the district court scheduled an “Involuntary Commitment or
    Voluntary Admission hearing” to review Wolfe’s admission and determine if further
    inpatient psychiatric treatment was necessary. The district court never received a
    written and signed application for Wolfe’s voluntary admission to Mission Hospital
    or to its psychiatric unit at Copestone.
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    Opinion of the Court
    On 3 June, Wolfe was appointed counsel.            After interviewing Wolfe, his
    appointed counsel filed a notice with the district court requesting a hearing because
    Wolfe “does not agree with [Dr. Collier’s] recommendations.”
    At the 9 June hearing on Wolfe’s admission, Dr. Collier testified that Wolfe
    “did not present [to the emergency room] for psychiatric reasons per his report” and
    stated when she first evaluated Wolfe on 28 May, “he told me he came in for some
    other medical problem, and that he didn’t need to be at Copestone.” Dr. Collier stated
    that Wolfe was admitted to the hospital’s psychiatric unit because he had stopped
    taking his bipolar disorder medications; was currently in a manic episode; and was
    decompensating, experiencing symptoms of agitation, paranoia, delusions, and
    sleeplessness. After about a week of observation, Dr. Collier explained that Wolfe
    “generally remained calm, but argumentative about the fact that he [did not] believe
    he need[ed] to be on medication.” Wolfe initially refused to take the oral psychiatric
    medication prescribed at Copestone because he believed it was unnecessary and was
    “poisoning him.” After a few forced antipsychotic injections to which Wolfe’s guardian
    apparently consented, Wolfe started voluntarily taking his oral medication a few days
    before the hearing. Dr. Collier opined that Wolfe needed further inpatient treatment
    to stabilize him on his current medication and expressed concern that if he were
    released, Wolfe might stop taking his medication, decompensate, and become manic.
    She opined further that it would currently be medically inappropriate to discharge
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    Opinion of the Court
    Wolfe to an independent living situation and requested that the court authorize his
    continued inpatient psychiatric treatment at Copestone for thirty more days.
    Wolfe testified that he presented to Mission Hospital’s emergency department
    complaining of severe dehydration and malnourishment because he was unable to
    pay for groceries, since his payee, who receives government benefits on his behalf,
    failed to provide him funds timely for basic living expenses. Wolfe conceded that he
    did not believe he has bipolar disorder and stated he initially refused medication at
    Copestone because each of the seven or eight psychiatric medications he has been
    prescribed over the past several years have “poison[ed the] emotional state of being
    in [his] state of mind” and have “made [him] angry, irritable, and stupid.” Wolfe
    testified that he was currently receiving outpatient treatment at Family Preservation
    Services and taking psychiatric medication as needed, as prescribed by a general
    psychiatrist there. Wolfe indicated he would continue taking the medicine prescribed
    at Copestone if discharged and was currently able to return to living independently.
    Wolfe requested that if the court found it necessary he receive further inpatient
    treatment, it send him to another facility for an independent assessment, since
    Copestone “seem[ed] to be intent on making [him] take [bipolar] medicine and stay
    there.” Wolfe’s guardian was not present at the hearing.
    After the hearing, the court entered an order on 9 June 2016 concurring in
    Wolfe’s voluntary admission and authorizing his continued inpatient admission at
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    Opinion of the Court
    Copestone for no more than thirty days. In its order, the court found by clear, cogent,
    and convincing evidence that Wolfe was mentally ill, in need of further treatment at
    Copestone, and that lesser measures would be insufficient. Wolfe was discharged
    from Copestone on 22 June 2016. Wolfe appeals.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, Wolfe contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to concur in his
    voluntary admission and order he remain admitted for further inpatient psychiatric
    treatment because it never received a written and signed application for his voluntary
    admission to Copestone as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-232 to initiate the
    hearing. Wolfe also challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying the district
    court’s finding that his admission was voluntary, arguing no evidence presented
    showed that his admission to Mission Hospital’s inpatient psychiatric unit at
    Copestone was, in fact, voluntary.       Because we hold that the lack of Wolfe’s
    application for voluntary admission failed to vest the trial court with subject-matter
    jurisdiction to concur in his admission and authorize he remain admitted for
    additional inpatient treatment, we vacate the order and thus decline to address
    Wolfe’s second argument.
    We review de novo whether a trial court has jurisdiction over particular subject
    matter. See, e.g., McKoy v. McKoy, 
    202 N.C. App. 509
    , 511, 
    689 S.E.2d 590
    , 592
    (2010). Subject-matter jurisdiction “involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the
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    Opinion of the Court
    type of controversy presented by the action before it.” Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 
    143 N.C. App. 688
    , 693, 
    547 S.E.2d 127
    , 130, disc. rev. denied, 
    354 N.C. 217
    , 
    554 S.E.2d 338
    (2001). “A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court
    without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity,” Burgess v. Gibbs, 
    262 N.C. 462
    , 465, 
    137 S.E.2d 806
    , 808 (1964) (citing High v. Pearce, 
    220 N.C. App. 266
    , 271,
    
    17 S.E.2d 108
    , 112 (1941)), and “in its absence a court has no power to act[ and any
    resulting] ‘judgment is void,’ ” In re T.R.P., 
    360 N.C. 588
    , 590, 
    636 S.E.2d 787
    , 790
    (2006) (quoting Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 
    244 N.C. 84
    , 90, 
    92 S.E.2d 673
    , 678
    (1956)).   “When the record shows a lack of jurisdiction in the lower court, the
    appropriate action on the part of the appellate court is to . . . vacate any order entered
    without authority.” State v. Felmet, 
    302 N.C. 173
    , 176, 
    273 S.E.2d 708
    , 711 (1981)
    (citations omitted).
    “ ‘Where jurisdiction is statutory and the [l]egislature requires the [c]ourt to
    exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or
    otherwise subjects the [c]ourt to certain limitations, an act of the [c]ourt beyond these
    limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.’ ” In re 
    T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590
    , 636 S.E.2d at
    790 (quoting Eudy v. Eudy, 
    288 N.C. 71
    , 75, 
    215 S.E.2d 782
    , 785 (1975), overruled on
    other grounds by Quick v. Quick, 
    305 N.C. 446
    , 
    290 S.E.2d 653
    (1982)). Thus, for
    certain statutorily created causes of action, a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
    over the action does not fully vest unless the action is properly initiated. In re T.R.P.,
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    Opinion of the 
    Court 360 N.C. at 591
    –93, 636 S.E.2d at 790–92 (holding court lacked jurisdiction to enter
    a custody review order in an abuse, neglect, and dependency action because
    statutorily required initiating petition was defective); see also Hodges v. Hodges, 
    226 N.C. 570
    –71, 571, 
    39 S.E.2d 596
    , 597 (1946) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to enter
    order in alimony action because statutorily required initiating complaint was
    defective). This principle also applies to statutorily created involuntary commitment
    proceedings and a court’s authority to enter an involuntary commitment order. See
    In re Ingram, 
    74 N.C. App. 579
    , 580–81, 
    328 S.E.2d 588
    , 589 (1985) (vacating
    commitment order for want of jurisdiction where initiating petition lacked statutorily
    required affidavit).
    Article 5 of Chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes governs the
    procedures for admitting or committing persons into inpatient psychiatric facilities.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-211(a) (2015) provides that for a competent adult to seek
    voluntary admission to a facility, “a written application for evaluation or admission,
    signed by the individual seeking admission, is required.” For incompetent adults
    seeking voluntary admission, the written application must be completed and signed
    by his or her guardian. 
    Id. § 122C-231
    (“The provisions of G.S. 122C-211 shall apply
    to admissions of an incompetent adult . . . except that the legally responsible person
    shall act for the individual, in applying for admission to a facility . . . .”); 
    id. § 122C-
    3(20) (“ ‘Legally responsible person’ means . . . when applied to an adult, who has
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    Opinion of the Court
    been adjudicated incompetent, a guardian . . . .”). Accordingly, for Wolfe to have been
    voluntarily admitted to Copestone, his guardian was required to complete and sign a
    written application for Wolfe’s admission.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 112C-232 (2015) empowers a district court to review an
    incompetent adult’s voluntary admission into an inpatient psychiatric facility and
    order he or she remain admitted for further inpatient treatment.                         The statute
    mandates that the district court must hold a hearing within ten days after an
    incompetent adult’s voluntary admission to “determine whether the incompetent
    adult is mentally ill . . . and is in need of further treatment at the facility.” 
    Id. §§ 122C-232(a),
    (b). If the court determines by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
    that the patient is mentally ill, in need of further treatment, and that lesser measures
    would be insufficient, the court may concur with the voluntary admission and
    authorize further treatment. 
    Id. § 122C-232(b).
    If further inpatient treatment is
    authorized, “only the facility or the court may release the incompetent adult” upon a
    determination that such treatment is no longer needed. 
    Id. § 122C-233(b).1
    Significantly here, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 112C-232(b) provides that “[i]n any case
    requiring [this] hearing . . . , no petition is necessary; the written application for
    voluntary admission shall serve as the initiating document for the hearing.”
    (Emphasis added.) This limitation conditions subject-matter jurisdiction: a district
    1Additionally, if the facility refuses a legal guardian’s request to discharge an incompetent adult, the
    guardian may apply to the court for a discharge hearing. 
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    Opinion of the Court
    court’s N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-232 jurisdiction to concur in an incompetent adult’s
    voluntary admission and order that he or she remain admitted for further inpatient
    treatment does not vest absent the statutorily required written application for
    voluntary admission signed by the incompetent adult’s legal guardian.
    Here, the district court entered an order purporting to concur in Wolfe’s
    voluntary admission to Copestone and ordering he remain admitted for an additional
    thirty days of inpatient psychiatric treatment. Yet the appellate record contains no
    written application for Wolfe’s voluntary admission signed by his guardian. Rather,
    as an amendment to appellate record reflects, Wolfe’s “application was not filed in
    the court file for this case,” and the Buncombe County District Court calendared the
    hearing upon receipt of Dr. Collier’s evaluation for admission. Because a written and
    signed application for voluntary admission never initiated the hearing, the district
    court failed to comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-232(b).
    Because the district court never received this required application for voluntary
    admission, its subject-matter jurisdiction to concur in Wolfe’s voluntary admission to
    Copestone and order he remain admitted for further inpatient psychiatric treatment
    never vested.   The district court thus lacked authority to enter its voluntary
    admission order and it must be vacated. See In re 
    Ingram, 74 N.C. App. at 580
    –81,
    328 S.E.2d at 589 (vacating commitment order for want of jurisdiction where petition
    to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings lacked statutorily required
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    Opinion of the Court
    affidavit); cf. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 
    591–93, 636 S.E.2d at 790
    –92 (affirming this
    Court’s decision to vacate a custody review order because lower court’s subject-matter
    jurisdiction never vested where initiating petition lacked statutorily required
    verification).
    III. Conclusion
    The lack of a required written application for Wolfe’s voluntary admission
    signed by his guardian failed to vest the district court with subject-matter jurisdiction
    to concur in his voluntary admission to Copestone and order he remain admitted for
    further inpatient treatment. We therefore vacate its voluntary admission order.
    VACATED.
    Judges INMAN and BERGER concur.
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