Myles C. Crenshaw v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                       Jul 19 2017, 5:51 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                     Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Laura A. Raiman                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    R. Patrick Magrath                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLC
    Madison, Indiana                                         Laura R. Anderson
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Myles C. Crenshaw,                                       July 19, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    03A01-1612-CR-2803
    v.                                               Appeal from the Bartholomew
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable James D. Worton,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    03D01-1509-F3-4662
    03D01-1601-CM-535
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1612-CR-2803 | July 19, 2017       Page 1 of 6
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Myles Crenshaw appeals his sentence after he pleaded guilty to intimidation, as
    a Level 5 felony, and two counts of invasion of privacy, as Class A
    misdemeanors. Crenshaw raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether
    his aggregate sentence of seven years and ten months is inappropriate in light of
    the nature of the offenses and his character. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In September of 2015, Crenshaw attacked his girlfriend, Jessica Berry, at her
    home while her children were asleep. Crenshaw threatened to murder Berry
    and her children and forced Berry to engage with him in sexual acts. During
    the episode, Crenshaw hit Berry multiple times; he put a cigarette out on
    Berry’s body; he urinated in Berry’s mouth and made her swallow it; he choked
    her; he stabbed her in the back with scissors; and he held a knife against her
    chest.
    [3]   The State charged Crenshaw in cause number 03D01-1509-F3-4662 (“Cause
    F3-4662”) with criminal confinement, as a Level 3 felony; intimidation, as a
    Level 5 felony; and two counts of domestic battery, as Level 6 felonies. The
    State also sought and obtained a no-contact order that prohibited Crenshaw
    from contacting Berry.
    [4]   While in jail awaiting trial in Cause F3-4662, Crenshaw called Berry more than
    200 times and wrote numerous letters to her over the course of several months.
    Among other things, in those communications Crenshaw instructed Berry to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1612-CR-2803 | July 19, 2017   Page 2 of 6
    “drop the charges and retract your statement.” Tr. Vol. II at 42. Thereafter,
    Berry retracted her statements to police. In light of those communications in
    violation of the no-contact order, in cause number 03D01-1601-CM-535
    (“Cause CM-535”) the State charged Crenshaw with six counts of invasion of
    privacy, each as a Class A misdemeanor.
    [5]   Thirteen months after the initial charges, Crenshaw pleaded guilty to
    intimidation, as a Level 5 felony, in Cause F3-4662 and, simultaneously, to two
    counts of invasion of privacy, as Class A misdemeanors, in Cause CM-535. In
    exchange for his guilty plea in both causes, the State agreed to drop the
    remaining counts as well as a pending petition to revoke Crenshaw’s probation
    in a third cause. The State had filed that petition to revoke probation in a cause
    of action in which Crenshaw had been convicted of a prior domestic battery
    against Berry.
    [6]   The trial court accepted Crenshaw’s guilty plea. At the conclusion of the
    ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following aggravating
    factors: (1) Crenshaw’s criminal history; (2) Crenshaw’s prior failures to abide
    by the conditions of probation; (3) Crenshaw’s violation of a term of probation
    that had been entered in a conviction of domestic battery involving the same
    victim, which the court expressly found to be a “significant aggravator”; (4) the
    September 2015 incident occurred in the presence of children; (5) with respect
    to his conviction in Cause F3-4662, Crenshaw violated the protective orders
    entered against him; (6) Crenshaw directed Berry to change her story with
    police; and (7) Crenshaw’s lack of remorse and, instead, “plac[ing] a significant
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1612-CR-2803 | July 19, 2017   Page 3 of 6
    amount of the blame towards the victim.” 
    Id. at 130-31.
    The court found as a
    “slight mitigator” that Crenshaw had sought and obtained “family wellness
    treatment.” 
    Id. at 131.
    The court found that Crenshaw’s guilty plea was not
    entitled to mitigating weight in light of the “substantial deal” he had received in
    exchange for his plea. 
    Id. The court
    then found that the aggravators
    outweighed the mitigators, and it ordered Crenshaw to serve an aggregate term
    of seven years and ten months executed. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   Crenshaw argues that his sentence is inappropriate. As we have explained:
    Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an Indiana appellate court
    to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
    consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
    sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
    the character of the offender.” We assess the trial court’s
    recognition or nonrecognition of aggravators and mitigators as an
    initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
    inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 
    856 N.E.2d 142
    , 147 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2006). The principal role of appellate review is to “leaven
    the outliers.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind.
    2008). A defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or
    her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.
    Roush v. State, 
    875 N.E.2d 801
    , 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
    Robinson v. State, 
    61 N.E.3d 1226
    , 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
    [8]   According to Crenshaw, his sentence is inappropriate for the following reasons:
    (1) he was employed at the time of his arrest; (2) he had employment and
    housing prospects in place pending his release; (3) he sought and obtained the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1612-CR-2803 | July 19, 2017   Page 4 of 6
    assistance of community resources; (4) he had the support of numerous family
    members; (5) he completed a course on parenting skills while in prison; (6)
    while he has three prior misdemeanor convictions, he has no prior felonies; (7)
    his prior battery of Berry was “attenuated in both time and manner”; and (8) he
    has no history of substance abuse. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Crenshaw then
    continues as follows:
    Berry . . . admitted that she and Crenshaw role[-]played a
    dominant-submissive relationship involving rough sex. . . .
    . . . The nature of [their] sexual relationship was not and is not
    offered as an excuse . . . . However, the fact that Crenshaw’s
    threat was made close in time to the couple’s shocking sexual
    practices affected the trial court in consideration of the nature of
    the offense. The scandalous nature of [their] relationship did not
    warrant the imposition of a nearly maximum sentence.
    
    Id. at 12.
    And Crenshaw further alleges that “Berry’s consensual participation
    in the invasion of privacy crimes was significantly more pronounced.” 
    Id. [9] We
    reject Crenshaw’s arguments, which largely ignore the heinousness of his
    offenses or blame Berry for them. Whatever their prior relationship, Berry did
    not consent to the events that occurred during the September 2015 incident, and
    Berry’s participation in any of the more-than-200 times Crenshaw violated the
    no-contact order is neither here nor there to the fact that Crenshaw
    continuously and knowingly violated that order. Moreover, we are not
    persuaded that any of the eight facts numbered above bear in any significant
    way on the nature of the offenses or Crenshaw’s character.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1612-CR-2803 | July 19, 2017   Page 5 of 6
    [10]   In sum, the nature of the offenses was extreme. In Cause F3-4662, Crenshaw
    repeatedly physically assaulted Berry and threatened her and her children while
    the children were nearby. In Cause CM-535, Crenshaw violated the protective
    order more than 200 times. And the nature of Crenshaw’s character is no
    better. He had a prior conviction for domestic battery against Berry and
    committed the instant offenses while on probation for that conviction. Further,
    the facts underlying the instant convictions also demonstrate Crenshaw’s poor
    character. Thus, in light of the nature of the offenses and his character, we
    cannot say that Crenshaw’s sentence of seven years and ten months is
    inappropriate. We affirm.
    [11]   Affirmed.
    Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A01-1612-CR-2803 | July 19, 2017   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03A01-1612-CR-2803

Filed Date: 7/19/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/20/2017