Com. v. Baldwin, L. ( 2017 )

J-S37010-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LESTER EMANUEL BALDWIN
Appellant No. 1271 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered July 19, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at No: CP-35-CR-0000813-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MOULTON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2017
Appellant, Lester Emmanuel Baldwin, appeals pro se from the July 19,
2016 order denying his motion for release on nominal bail pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(2). We affirm.
Appellant was arrested and charged with possession with, among other
things, intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(30), in connection with an April 16, 2015 controlled drug buy. The
Commonwealth filed its criminal complaint against Appellant and arrested
him on April 17, 2015. Appellant was not released on bail. On May 31,
2016, Appellant filed a motion for release on nominal bail, asserting that he
had been incarcerated for more than 400 days without being brought to trial
and thus was entitled to release under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(B)(1) and (D)(2).
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The trial court conducted a hearing on July 19, 2016 and denied the motion
at the conclusion of that hearing.
Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal ten days later. The trial court
determined, pursuant to this Court’s remand order, that Appellant’s waiver
of counsel was knowing, intentional, and voluntary. See Commonwealth
v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Appellant committed two procedural
errors in filing a pro se notice of appeal. First, he proceeded pro se while
represented by counsel in violation of the prohibition on hybrid
representation articulated in Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137 (Pa.
1993). We will overlook this mistake in light of our remand for a Grazier
hearing. Second, rather than file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
interlocutory order, Appellant should have filed a petition for review under
Pa.R.A.P. 1762(b)(2). That rule governs Appellate review of orders relating
to bail. In Commonwealth v. Jones, 899 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. 2006), this
Court treated the appellant’s notice of appeal from an order denying bail as
a petition for review filed under Rule 1762(b)(2). Id. at 354 n.1. We will
follow Jones here. We therefore turn to the merits of Appellant’s argument
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for release on nominal bail.
We conduct our review as follows:
Our standard of review in evaluating Rule [600] issues is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.... The proper scope
of review in determining the propriety of the trial court’s ruling is
limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule [600]
evidentiary hearing and the findings of the lower court. In
reviewing the determination of the hearing court, an appellate
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court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party.
Id. at 354
We have reviewed the applicable law, the parties’ briefs, the record,
and the trial court’s opinion. We conclude that the trial court’s opinion
accurately addresses the merits of Appellant’s arguments. In particular, we
observe that this case proceeded with several defense continuances and
other significant delays occasioned by Appellant’s inability to get along with
appointed counsel. Appellant’s first two lawyers withdrew due to conflicts
with Appellant, and Appellant elected to proceed pro se in this appeal after
parting ways with his third appointed counsel. The record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that most of the delay in this case is attributable to
Appellant. We affirm the trial court’s order based on the trial court’s October
5, 2016 opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/15/2017
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Circulated 07/31/2017 04:06 PM