A.R. VS. R.H. (FV-16-001387-16, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )


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  •                           RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3443-15T2
    A.R.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    R.H.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________________________________________
    Submitted June 19, 2017 – Decided July 10, 2017
    Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
    Passaic County, Docket No. FV-16-001387-16.
    Banks   Law Offices, LLC,             attorneys      for
    appellant (James Harrison            Banks, on       the
    brief).
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff commenced this action, pursuant to the Prevention
    of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on an
    allegation that defendant threatened her on Valentine's Day in
    2016. At the conclusion of a final hearing at which only the
    parties testified,1 the judge rendered findings of fact and entered
    a final restraining order (FRO).
    Defendant appeals, arguing:
    I.   PLAINTIFF   FAILED   TO   PROVE   BY   A
    PREPONDERANCE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT
    [DEFENDANT] ENGAGED IN TERRORISTIC THREATS.
    II. AN [FRO] IS NOT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
    PROTECT [PLAINTIFF].
    We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion
    in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following
    brief comments.
    Our standard of review requires deference to findings of fact
    that are based on "adequate, substantial, credible evidence"; that
    is "especially" true when, as here, "'the evidence is largely
    testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare v.
    Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 412 (1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons
    of J.W.D., 
    149 N.J. 108
    , 117 (1997)). Such findings become binding
    on appeal because it is the trial judge who "sees and observes the
    witnesses,"   thereby   possessing       "a   better   perspective   than    a
    reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Pascale
    v. Pascale, 
    113 N.J. 20
    , 33 (1988) (quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 
    65 N.J. Super. 1
    , 5 (App. Div. 1961)). We, therefore, will not disturb
    1
    Plaintiff represented herself; defendant was represented by
    counsel.
    2                               A-3443-15T2
    a judge's factual findings unless convinced "they are so manifestly
    unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
    reasonably     credible     evidence     as   to    offend    the   interests      of
    justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 
    78 N.J. Super. 154
    , 155 (App. Div. 1963)).
    After considering the parties' testimony, the judge found
    plaintiff    to   be   a   "very    credible"      witness;   he    did   not   find
    defendant credible. The judge determined – not only because of
    plaintiff's credible testimony about defendant's threat but also
    because   of   the     illumination      provided      by   defendant's    earlier
    menacing accusations in other arguments between the parties that
    were   recorded    and     played   at   trial     –   that   defendant's       angry
    exclamation to plaintiff on February 14, 2016, that he would "fuck
    her up," constituted a terroristic threat within the meaning of
    N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). We find no principled reason for second-
    guessing this determination.
    After careful examination of the record, we also are satisfied
    that this same evidence more than amply supported the judge's
    determination that plaintiff was in need of an FRO to protect her
    3                                  A-3443-15T2
    from further domestic violence. Silver v. Silver, 
    387 N.J. Super. 112
    , 126-27 (App. Div. 2006).2
    Affirmed.
    2
    With the finding of a predicate act, there could be no dispute
    that plaintiff met the definition of "victim of domestic violence,"
    N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), because the parties had a child in common.
    In fact, the threat in question, as well as prior arguments
    described in the record, arose from disputes about parenting time.
    4                          A-3443-15T2