Carter v. Pallito ( 2015 )


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  • Carter v. Pallito, No. 494-8-13 Wncv (Teachout, J., January 8, 2015)
    [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the
    accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]
    STATE OF VERMONT
    SUPERIOR COURT                                                                                         CIVIL DIVISION
    Washington Unit                                                                                        Docket No. 494-8-13 Wncv
    Bernard Carter
    Plaintiff
    v.
    Andrew Pallito, Commissioner,
    Vermont Department of Corrections
    Defendant
    DECISION
    Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
    Inmate Bernard Carter was convicted of a Major A4 (sexual assault) disciplinary
    violation. On Rule 75 review, he argues that the evidence in the administrative record on which
    his conviction is based lacks sufficient reliability to satisfy the “some evidence” standard and,
    hence, his due process rights.
    The disciplinary proceeding
    The record before the hearing officer consisted of several reports written by correctional
    officers and the testimony of Mr. Carter, who denied any sexual assault. According to the
    reports, an inmate alerted officers that another inmate, Stephen Messier, may have been sexually
    assaulted by Mr. Carter when Mr. Messier and Mr. Carter were cellmates. When asked about the
    allegation, Mr. Messier described having been anally raped by Mr. Carter, ostensibly while
    heavily medicated and unaware, and reported heavy bleeding as a result. Mr. Messier was
    examined by medical personnel, who diagnosed rectal bleeding but did not find injuries or other
    evidence suggestive of rape. This aspect of the medical examination was redacted from the
    report in the administrative record with a handwritten note: “Medical information – See SOS for
    unredacted if needed.” It also became clear that Mr. Messier’s medication was insufficient to
    cause him to be unaware of such a significant event.
    Confronted with the unlikeliness of his story, Mr. Messier admitted that it was untrue.
    He said instead that Mr. Carter had repeatedly requested oral sex and that, while he initially
    refused such overtures, he eventually felt compelled to assent due to Mr. Carter’s threats of
    violence. Mr. Messier described aspects of the encounters in detail (characterized by the hearing
    officer as “vivid”).
    Mr. Carter was the only witness at the hearing. Based on the reports, the hearing officer
    found Mr. Carter guilty; he was placed in administrative segregation. On appeal, the conviction
    was affirmed.
    Events following the conviction
    Subsequently, a hearing was held to determine whether administrative segregation was
    warranted. A different hearing officer found that Mr. Messier had a motive to lie and lacked
    credibility and that administrative segregation for Mr. Carter was not warranted. Thereafter, the
    superintendent ordered a new hearing, at which administrative segregation was found to be
    warranted.
    Analysis
    In a nutshell, Mr. Carter argues that Mr. Messier got caught in a lie (that he had been
    anally raped) and made up an alternative lie (the compelled oral sex) to avoid discipline for
    lying. He argues that the record does not include indicia of reliability that should be present in
    cases including confidential witnesses and that the hearing officer’s findings at the first
    administrative segregation hearing—the hearing after the conviction—bolster his position that
    the record upon which he was convicted lacks “some evidence.”
    It is not the function of this court to revisit the determinations made by the initial hearing
    officer about the credibility of different pieces of evidence. The purpose of determining—on
    judicial review—that “some evidence” of guilt is in the administrative record is to ensure that the
    conviction is not arbitrary, “without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue
    administrative burdens.” Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 
    472 U.S. 445
    , 455 (1985). “The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not
    require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.” 
    Id. at 456,
    quoted in Lafaso v. Patrissi, 
    161 Vt. 46
    , 49–50 (1993). In this case, the corrections officers’
    reports document that they investigated the original allegation, challenged Mr. Messier’s version
    of events when other evidence failed to corroborate it, questioned him extensively, and
    eventually got what they thought was the real story (the series of oral sex encounters). That
    evidence persuaded the hearing officer. Statements in reports alone can be sufficient to satisfy
    the “some evidence” standard. See McPherson v. McBride, 
    188 F.3d 784
    , 786 (7th Cir. 1999);
    Rudd v. Sargent, 
    866 F.2d 260
    , 262 (8th Cir. 1989). The administrative record does not lack
    “some evidence” of guilt. It was the role of the hearing officer to evaluate the credibility of the
    evidence, including the reports, and decide the facts. There is “some evidence” to support the
    decision.
    Mr. Carter argues that credibility standards related to confidential witnesses apply here,
    but there were no confidential witnesses in this case so such an argument does not apply. The
    court also rejects Mr. Carter’s argument that the findings of the hearing officer at the
    administrative segregation hearing should have an impact on the record at the disciplinary
    hearing. That a different hearing officer might have arrived at a different conclusion after
    consideration of the same evidence presented at a disciplinary hearing does not show that the
    record of the hearing lacks “some evidence.” The hearing officer at the disciplinary hearing had
    before him sufficient evidence to meet the “some evidence” standard applicable to judicial
    review.
    2
    ORDER
    For the foregoing reasons: Mr. Carter’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the
    Department of Corrections’ motion is granted.
    Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this ____ day of January 2015.
    _____________________________
    Mary Miles Teachout,
    Superior Judge
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