State v. Seals ( 1997 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE              FILED
    OCTOBER SESSION, 1996            April 28, 1997
    Cecil Crowson, Jr.
    STATE OF TENNESSEE,             )    C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9512-CC-00396Clerk
    Appellate C ourt
    )
    Appellee,                 )
    )
    )    ROANE COUNTY
    VS.                             )
    )    HON. E. EUGENE EBLEN
    ALBERT SEALS, JR.,              )    JUDGE
    )
    Appellant.                )    (Direct Appeal)
    FOR THE APPELLANT:                   FOR THE APPELLEE:
    HAROLD D. BALCOM, JR.                CHARLES W. BURSON
    350 E., Race St., Suite 1            Attorney General and Reporter
    P. O. Box 487
    Kingston, TN 37763                   HUNT S. BROWN
    Assistant Attorney General
    450 James Robertson Parkway
    Nashville, TN 37243
    CHARLES HAWK
    District Attorney General
    D. ROGER DELP
    Assistant District Attorney
    Ninth Judicial District
    P. O. Box 703
    Kingston, TN 37763
    OPINION FILED ________________________
    AFFIRMED
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    OPINION
    Appellant Albe rt Seals Jr. pled gu ilty in the Roane C ounty Crimina l Court
    to driving under the influence of an intoxicant. He received a sentence of eleven
    months and twenty-nine days . The trial court ordere d that he serve fou r days in
    the county jail with the balance of the sentence served on probation. Pursuant
    to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Appellant
    reserved the following certified question of law: whether the investigatory stop of
    his vehicle was b ased upon a reas onab le suspicion supported by specific and
    articulable facts.
    After a revie w of the re cord, we affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    The proof shows that, on October 23 , 1994, Dep uty Herbert Ba rnard and
    Depu ty Steve Bryant, both of the Roane County Sheriff's Departme nt, were called
    to investigate a disturbance in which three allegedly intoxicated individuals, two
    males and a female, were arguing outside the Huddle House on Gallaher Road
    near K ingston, T ennes see.
    When the deputies arrived at the scene, they were told that the individu als
    had left in a brown Ford Thunderbird and a blue Nissan Maxima, traveling in the
    direction of the interstate. After looking for the vehicles for app roximately five
    minutes with no succe ss, the depu ties stopped at a local store to discuss the
    situation.   Wh ile there and a pprox imate ly twenty minutes after the original
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    dispatch, the deputies observed a blue car that appeared to match the
    description of the blue Nissan Maxima. As a result, the deputies followed the car,
    which traveled a t a speed well below the spee d limit. Based upon the information
    received from witnesses at the Huddle House and recognizing that an extrem ely
    low rate of speed often indicates drunk driving, Deputy Barnard engaged his blue
    lights. However, despite the blue lights, Appellant drove on for another quarter
    mile, entered his driveway, and parked beside his house.
    When Appellant exited his vehicle, Deputy Barnard detected a strong odor
    of alcohol and noticed that Appellant was unsteady on his feet.            He then
    conducted field so briety te sts an d con clude d that A ppella nt was legally
    intoxicated.
    II. REASONABLE STOP
    Appellant claims that the stop was unreasonable because he did not break
    any traffic laws and because his car was a different make than that described by
    the witnesses at the Huddle House. Appe llant do es no t ques tion the trial cou rt's
    findings of fact but rather questions the trial court's conclusions of law drawn from
    the facts.
    Stopping an autom obile and deta ining its occupan ts constitutes a seizu re
    within the meaning of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Binion, 
    900 S.W.2d 702
    , 705 (Ten n. Crim. App . 1994).         How ever, a police officer may
    conduct an inves tigatory s top of a vehicle when the offic er has a reas onab le
    suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a crime has been or
    is about to be com mitted. Terry v. Ohio , 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21 (196 8); Griffin v. State ,
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    604 S.W.2d 40
    , 42 (Tenn. 1980). An investigatory stop based on re ason able
    suspicion requires a lower q uantum of proof tha n proba ble caus e. State v.
    Pulley, 863 S.W .2d 29, 31 (Tenn . 1993). In determ ining w hethe r reaso nable
    suspicion exists, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the
    circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 417 (1981). These
    circumstances include, but are not limited to, objective observations and the
    rational inferences and deductions of trained police office rs. State v. Watkins,
    827 S.W .2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 199 2).
    In analyzing the reasonableness of an investigatory stop, this Court is not
    bound or limited in its consideration of the facts. Instead, th is Court is e ntitled to
    draw its own conclusions from the facts as fo und. State v. Mars hall, 
    870 S.W.2d 532
    ,538 (T enn. Crim. A pp. 1993).
    Mindful of the fo regoin g principles of law, we conclude that, given the
    unique circumstances of this case, no investigatory stop occurre d. Not all contact
    between the police and a citizen constitutes a seizure. Terry v. Ohio , 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 20 n.16 (19 68); see, e.g., State v. Moore , 776 S.W .2d 933, 935 (Tenn. 198 9).
    According to Appellant’s own testimony, he was on his way home when he
    noticed the blue lights approximately one hundred yards from his driveway.
    Instead of responding, he drove the remaining one hundred yar ds to h is
    driveway, proceeded another three hundred yards up his driveway, and parked
    next to his house. Presumably Appellant would not have done anything any
    differen tly had no police car been following him. It was only at this point that the
    officers interacte d with A ppella nt. Th e stron g odo r of alco hol an d App ellant’s
    unsteadiness then gave the officers probab le cause to condu ct field sobrie ty
    tests. It is our opinion that Appellant stopped his vehicle not because Officer
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    Barnard engaged his blu e lights , but be caus e App ellant h ad arriv ed at h is
    predetermined destination. Appellant’s decision to stop his vehicle was not
    based upon the coercive effect of police conduct; therefore, there was no
    restraint on his liberty. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 
    486 U.S. 56
     7, 573 (1987 ).
    Even assuming that an investigatory stop did occur, the officers’ actions
    were reasonable based upon the following facts: (1 ) App ellant’s car matched the
    general descriptio n given b y witnesse s at the H uddle H ouse; (2) only a short
    period of time transpired between the original dispatch and the observation of the
    vehicle; and (3) Appellant was operating his vehicle at an extremely slow rate of
    speed given the time of night and the posted speed limit. These specific and
    articula ble facts are sufficient to warra nt an investigatory stop. Therefore, the trial
    court pro perly den ied App ellant's m otion to su ppress .
    Accord ingly, the jud gmen t of the trial cou rt is affirmed .
    ____________________________________
    JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    ___________________________________
    GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
    ___________________________________
    DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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