United States v. Thomsin Pierre , 698 F. App'x 604 ( 2017 )


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  •            Case: 16-15335    Date Filed: 09/29/2017   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-15335
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20332-MGC-3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    THOMSIN PIERRE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 29, 2017)
    Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 16-15335         Date Filed: 09/29/2017        Page: 2 of 4
    Thomsin Pierre appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent
    to distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846. Pierre contends
    the district court erred when it denied his adopted motion to suppress evidence
    found on his cell phones seized pursuant to a non-arrest detention. After review,1
    we affirm.
    I. DISCUSSION
    Pierre argues on appeal that the plain-view doctrine did not apply in this case
    for two reasons: first, the officers did not have lawful access to his cell phones
    during the stop; and second, the incriminating nature of the cell phones was not
    immediately apparent. We need not, however, address his arguments because, as
    the Government points out, to the extent there was any error, it was harmless.
    This Court will reverse on the basis of an erroneous evidentiary ruling “only
    if the resulting error was not harmless.” United States v. Hands, 
    184 F.3d 1322
    ,
    1329 (11th Cir.), corrected by 
    194 F.3d 1186
     (11th Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 52(a). “[I]f the jury might have relied on the unconstitutional evidence in
    reaching its verdict, then the error was harmful unless the other evidence of guilt
    was so overwhelming that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the admitted
    evidence.” United States v. Khoury, 
    901 F.2d 948
    , 960 (11th Cir.), opinion
    1
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard,
    reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its application of the law to
    those facts de novo. United States v. Bervaldi, 
    226 F.3d 1256
    , 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
    2
    Case: 16-15335     Date Filed: 09/29/2017    Page: 3 of 4
    modified on denial of reh’g, 
    910 F.2d 713
     (11th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
    Drosten, 
    819 F.2d 1067
    , 1072 (11th Cir. 1987)). Here, although the jury may have
    relied in part on the cell phone evidence, the additional evidence of guilt was
    overwhelming. Both of Pierre’s co-conspirators that testified at trial stated that
    Pierre was the source of the funds for the attempted cocaine purchase, and they
    recounted at length and in detail his role. Moreover, the testimony of the arresting
    officers corroborated the co-conspirators’ stories regarding Pierre’s participation in
    the transaction: police observed Pierre at the scene of the attempted purchase
    involved in a verbal altercation with his co-conspirators after the cocaine deal fell
    through and saw him repossessing a blue bag full of cash that Pierre’s co-
    conspirators had assured an undercover agent was the purchase money. The police
    followed Pierre as he drove off with another co-conspirator; Pierre attempted to
    evade them while throwing objects out the window of the vehicle until he was
    arrested. After being read his Miranda rights, Pierre freely admitted the cash
    belonged to him. The arresting officer asked what he planned to buy with the
    money and Pierre replied that he was going to buy a “car,” which all of the
    witnesses at trial agreed is a well-known code word for cocaine. When the
    arresting officer inquired as to what kind of automobile Pierre intended to
    purchase, Pierre said he did not know, and when the officer asked whether “car”
    was in fact code for “cocaine,” Pierre merely chuckled and smirked. Finally,
    3
    Case: 16-15335     Date Filed: 09/29/2017   Page: 4 of 4
    Pierre’s banking records and employment history indicated he lied to the officers
    about where the money came from. In short, the cell phone evidence, although
    indicative of Pierre’s guilt, was merely icing on the cake. The voluminous
    additional evidence of Pierre’s guilt was so overwhelming that any error in the
    introduction of the cell phone evidence was harmless. See Khoury, 901 F.2d at
    960.
    II. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm Pierre’s conviction.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-15335

Citation Numbers: 698 F. App'x 604

Filed Date: 9/29/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023