STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMES D. DIXON (10-03-0358, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0418-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES D. DIXON,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________
Submitted February 2, 2017 – Decided February 23, 2017
Before Judges Lihotz and O'Connor.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment
No. 10-03-0358.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Joie
Piderit, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For the
reasons that follow, we remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-
degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree burglary,
N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(7); fourth-degree false imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-
3; fourth-degree resisting arrest by flight, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
2(a)(1)(3); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). The court granted the State's motion to
sentence defendant to an extended term, see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3,
and imposed an aggregate term of twenty-five years in prison.
Defendant filed a direct appeal from his convictions and
sentence. We affirmed his convictions, but remanded for
resentencing because defendant was sentenced to a five-year
consecutive term for third-degree criminal restraint, when the
conviction on that count was for the lesser-included offense of
false imprisonment, a disorderly persons offense. See State v.
Dixon, No. A-1798-10 (App. Div. Jan. 25, 2013) (slip op. at 40-
42). The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for
certification. State v. Dixon, 215 N.J. 486 (2013). On remand,
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defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty years in
prison.
To put the issues in context, we briefly recount the
pertinent evidence adduced at trial. There was uncontroverted
evidence defendant entered the home of the victim, J.R., to
commit a burglary.1 In a statement to the police, defendant
noted J.R. was coming down the stairs when he first saw
defendant. J.R. attempted to run upstairs but slipped and fell,
hitting and injuring his face against the stairs. Defendant
admitted he took J.R.'s wallet while J.R. lay on the stairs, but
denied assaulting him at any time. A neighbor who saw defendant
enter the home and suspected a crime was underway contacted the
police, who arrived minutes later. The police apprehended
defendant while still inside J.R.'s home.
The victim sustained trauma to the brain and facial
fractures; he has no memory of the incident. A physician who
treated him in the emergency room testified his injuries were
caused by blunt force trauma, most likely caused by someone
"fisting" J.R in the head or face, as indicated by a depression
in his face over one of the fractures. The doctor noted the
depression "cannot come from falling. That has to come from
. . . somebody hitting you."
1
We use initials to protect the victim's identity.
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In making its findings of fact, the court rejected
defendant's claim he had not assaulted J.R., determining the
medical testimony established he purposely or knowingly caused
J.R. bodily injury. Because defendant injured J.R. with this
specific intent, the court noted the robbery and burglary
convictions were properly graded as second-degree crimes. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(b)(1).
In June 2014, defendant filed a PCR petition and brief on
his own behalf. In those pleadings, defendant claimed trial
counsel's performance was deficient in a number of respects, but
only one allegation is pertinent to the issues on appeal. That
particular allegation is trial counsel advised defendant to
reject a plea offer in which he would serve only a ten-year term
of imprisonment. Defendant contends counsel advised that,
because J.R. cannot recall the events in his home, the State
will not be able to prove defendant assaulted, threatened, or
put J.R. in fear of immediate bodily injury. Thus, the State
will be unable to show all of the elements necessary to
establish robbery or second-degree burglary. Accordingly,
counsel reasoned, if he went to trial, at worst defendant would
be convicted of a third-degree crime.
Defendant made two additional claims in his petition
pertinent to the issues on appeal. First, he asserted the trial
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judge should not have presided over the bench trial, because he
had heard and decided a motion to suppress defendant's statement
to the police. During the suppression motion, the judge learned
of incriminating statements defendant made while in police
custody. In addition, defendant was concerned the judge was
aware he had eleven prior convictions, many of which resulted in
prison terms.
Second, defendant also claimed in his petition the judge
erred for failing to "to charge himself on theft, with respect
to the alleged robbery." Defendant was apparently under the
impression a trial judge must charge himself or herself at the
end of a bench trial, just as a court would charge a jury
following a jury trial.
The PCR court denied defendant's petition without an
evidentiary hearing. In its decision, the court did not address
any of the above three contentions.
II
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our
consideration:
POINT I – THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE DEFENDANT
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR MISADVISING
HIM REGARDING CAUSATION OF THE ASSAULT,
THEREBY PROMPTING DEFENDANT TO REJECT THE
STATE'S PLEA OFFER.
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POINT II – THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR
A NEW PCR HEARING BECAUSE PCR COUNSEL FAILED
TO ADVANCE ALL OF THE ISSUES DEFENDANT
RAISED IN HIS PETITION.
POINT III – THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS NOT ADDRESSED
BY THE PCR COURT.
Specifically, defendant asserts, as he did before the PCR
court, trial counsel was ineffective because he recommended
defendant spurn the State's plea offer and urged defendant to go
to trial. Defendant also complains PCR counsel failed to argue
the trial judge erred for presiding over the bench trial and for
failing to charge himself on the issue of theft.
We readily dispose of defendant's argument the trial judge
should not have presided over the trial because he heard and
decided the motion to suppress and was aware of defendant's
criminal history. First, this argument could and should have
been asserted on direct appeal; therefore, it is now barred.
See R. 3:22-4; State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 50 (1997).
Second, even if this argument were not precluded under the
aforementioned authority, as we observed in State v. Medina:
[E]xposure to inadmissible evidence in the
course of pretrial proceedings generally
does not require disqualification of the
judge even where the judge is to serve as
the factfinder. "A judge sitting as the
factfinder is certainly capable of sorting
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through admissible and inadmissible evidence
without resultant detriment to the decision-
making process . . . ." State v. Kern, 325
N.J. Super. 435, 444 (App. Div. 1999).
Trained judges have the ability "to exclude
from their consideration irrelevant or
improper evidence and materials which have
come to their attention." State v. Kunz, 55
N.J. 128, 145 (1969).
[State v. Medina, 439 N.J. Super. 108, 130
(App. Div. 2002).]
Third, during argument on defendant's application to waive
his right to a jury trial, defendant stated he did not have any
objection to this particular judge presiding over the bench
trial, and even commented, "Your Honor, I honestly believe that
you would be fair." The contention the trial judge erred by
failing to charge himself is utterly without merit and does not
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
We turn next to defendant's claim trial counsel was
ineffective because he recommended defendant spurn the plea
offer and go to trial. For a defendant to obtain relief based
on ineffective assistance grounds, he is obliged to show not
only the particular manner in which counsel's performance was
deficient, but also the deficiency prejudiced his right to a
fair disposition of the charges. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693
(1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
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There is no question "plea bargaining is a critical stage
of the criminal proceeding at which the right of representation
attaches." State v. Taccetta, 351 N.J. Super. 196, 200 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002); see also State v.
Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557, 564 (App. Div. 1996); United States
v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). During this stage, "a
defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision
whether to accept a plea offer." Day, supra, 969 F.2d at 43;
see also State v. Nichols, 71 N.J. 358, 361 (1976). "Prior to
trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an
independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings
and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to
what plea should be entered." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 721, 68 S. Ct. 316, 322, 92 L. Ed. 309, 319 (1948).
"If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the
right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether
to accept it." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1387, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398, 410 (2012). In Lafler, defendant
contended ineffective advice from counsel caused him to reject a
plea offer and to go to trial instead. The Court held to
establish prejudice in this context, a defendant must show a
reasonable probability he or she would have accepted the plea,
the court would have found the plea acceptable, and the result
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would have been less severe than that imposed upon conviction
after trial. Id. at 164, 132 S. Ct. at 1385, 182 L. Ed. 2d at
407. Here, the PCR judge overlooked deciding defendant's claim
counsel was ineffective on the ground counsel informed defendant
the State would not be able to establish he assaulted or
threatened J.R., because of J.R.'s inability to recall how he
had been injured. Counsel assumed the State would not be able
to prove an element of burglary that would elevate this offense
to a second-degree crime, see N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(b), or prove
robbery, see N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), but apparently failed to
consider the impact of the physician's testimony. During
colloquy between the PCR judge and counsel, the judge touched
upon but never decided this issue. Thus, we are constrained to
remand this matter to the PCR judge, so he can fully address and
decide this claim.
Accordingly, we remand this matter to the PCR judge so he
may supplement his findings as directed in this opinion. The
trial court shall have forty-five days to issue a supplemental
opinion. The parties shall have ten days from the day they
receive the supplemental opinion to file a letter brief, not to
exceed ten pages, on the PCR court's findings.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We retain jurisdiction.
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