RUI-RU JI VS. HANSON SHUEN LO (FM-18-0631-10, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NOS. A-2376-16T11
    A-4260-16T1
    A-1800-17T1
    RUI-RU JI,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    HANSON SHUEN LO,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Submitted February 26, 2019 – Decided June 27, 2019
    Before Judges Fisher and Suter.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,
    Docket No. FM-18-0631-10.
    Rui-Ru Ji, appellant pro se.
    Hanson S. Lo, respondent pro se.
    PER CURIAM
    1
    These are back-to-back appeals consolidated for the purpose of this opinion.
    In three separate appeals, plaintiff Rui-Ru Ji asks to reverse selected
    paragraphs from post-matrimonial orders entered by the Family Part.          We
    dismiss appeal A-2376-16 and a portion of appeal A-4260-16 on procedural
    grounds. We affirm the other orders she has appealed in A-4260-162 and A-
    1800-173.
    Plaintiff and defendant Hanson Shuen Lo were married in 1998. They
    have two daughters, Annie and May, 4 who were twelve and eight at the time of
    the divorce. Following a sixty-two day trial, the Family Part judge entered a
    dual judgment of divorce (DJOD) on May 31, 2013. Because we write for
    parties who are familiar with the procedural and factual history of their
    litigation, we discuss only such portions of the challenged orders as relate to
    these appeals.
    2
    Plaintiff's September 27, 2017 amended notice of appeal in A-4260-16
    involved the following orders: July 17, 2017, paragraphs 3, 11, 13, 19, 20, 22,
    23, 24, 26, 27; August 21, 2017, paragraphs 1, 8, 24, 28, 29; and September 13,
    2017, "order of dismissal."
    3
    Plaintiff's December 13, 2017 notice of appeal in A-1800-17 involved the
    following orders: October 12, 2017 paragraphs 1 through 8; November 2, 2017,
    paragraphs 2 through 7; December 4, 2017, paragraphs 1 and 2.
    4
    We have used fictitious names to preserve the children's privacy.
    A-2376-16T1
    2
    I
    In A-4260-165 and A-1800-176, plaintiff appeals a number of orders, all
    of which are related to a requirement in the DJOD for reunification therapy in
    order to foster defendant's relationship with his older daughter, Annie. In the
    five years since the parties divorced, defendant has had two therapeutic
    reunification sessions with Annie—that plaintiff interfered with—despite a
    series of orders entered since then to enforce the DJOD's reunification
    requirement. The parties blame each other for the lack of any progress on this
    issue, and the record amply supports that blame. Along the way, a number of
    therapists have been appointed and then withdrew. A plenary hearing was held
    in October 2017, where the court found it was plaintiff who primarily thwarted
    reunification efforts. The findings there have substantial support in the record
    5
    Plaintiff filed appeal A-4260-16, listing three orders in her notice of appeal.
    She amended it on September 27, 2017 to include three other orders, but did not
    list any of the prior orders. The orders that were removed are not properly before
    us. See R. 2:5-1(e)(3) (a notice of appeal shall "designate the judgments,
    decisions, action or rule, or part thereof appealed from").
    6
    Plaintiff filed A-1800-17 on December 13, 2017. Her notice of appeal listed
    portions of three multi-part orders. Plaintiff's appeal of the October 12, 2017
    order was out of time because more than forty-five days elapsed before the
    appeal was filed. See R. 2:4-1(a). We decline to consider her appeal of any part
    of that order.
    A-2376-16T1
    3
    and, when reviewed in context with the other orders that plaintiff has appealed,
    show there was no abuse of discretion by the judges who entered those orders.
    Annie was twelve when the parties divorced; she now is eighteen.
    Defendant's regular parenting time with her was suspended by the DJOD in
    2013, until such time as he and Annie could "attend therapy together concerning
    their relationship issues." The parties were ordered to cooperate with Dr. Robert
    Rosenbaum, who was appointed to conduct the therapy and tasked with making
    a recommendation to the court about the resumption of parenting time.
    Defendant was to pay sixty percent of his fees and plaintiff, forty percent.
    Defendant also was to undergo a psychological assessment about his parenting
    skills and to provide that report to the court.
    On July 2, 2014, after defendant provided the report—that favorably
    assessed his ability to parent the children—the trial court ordered that defendant
    could begin reunification therapy with Annie, directing that it start immediately.
    Plaintiff was ordered to cooperate and to facilitate the therapy sessions by
    making Annie available for therapy sessions and by providing her calendar to
    defendant so he could schedule appointments.
    Dr. Rosenbaum appointed Ms. Christine Heer to conduct the therapy, but
    she withdrew from that appointment in September 2015, citing "insurmountable
    A-2376-16T1
    4
    concerns about communication patterns in this matter." She also noted that
    Annie was emotionally fragile. On October 7, 2016, the court ordered defendant
    to pay all of the reunification therapy cost, subject to reallocation after a plenary
    hearing. It also ordered that a therapist would be appointed from a list of three
    "acceptable" reunification therapists to "immediately start the reunification
    therapy" between defendant and Annie.
    On February 3, 2017, Dr. Marcy Pasternak was appointed as the
    reunification therapist but she withdrew shortly after because, by then, the
    children lived in Massachusetts and it was "logistically impossible" for her to
    conduct therapy. 7 In March 2017, the court appointed Dr. Jonathan Wall. On
    April 20 and April 22, 2017, defendant had the only reunification sessions with
    Annie that are documented in the record before us. Other therapy sessions were
    court ordered for June 3, June 17, June 27, July 1 and the week of July 2, but
    did not occur.
    On June 15, 2017, the court vacated the therapy sessions scheduled for
    June 27 and early July because defendant had scheduled them in conflict with
    plaintiff's pre-planned trip to China with Annie. The court ordered plaintiff to
    7
    Plaintiff and the children moved to Massachusetts in September 2016 without
    obtaining permission from the court.
    A-2376-16T1
    5
    pay defendant $1000 for the sessions missed on June 3 and June 17, consistin g
    largely of cancellation fees. It ordered plaintiff to pay for "intensive treatment"
    going forward because of her "history of interference with reunification therapy
    and her refusal to heed the [c]ourt's warnings about her continued interference
    with reunification therapy set forth in its April 2017 order." The court stated
    that plaintiff had "monopolized" the appointment on April 20 and her friend
    repeatedly interrupted the session on April 22. Citing a letter from Dr. Wall, the
    court stated that "it has been very difficult to schedule these re-unification
    therapy sessions and it has been extraordinarily difficult to . . . even move
    forward." By then, Dr. Wall had withdrawn from his appointment, but the court
    ordered that the "intensive re-unification therapy" would be undertaken by Drs.
    Marcy Pasternak and Sharon Ryan Montgomery beginning in August 2017 after
    "intake."
    Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the June 15 order. On August 21,
    2017, the court ruled that plaintiff's objection to Dr. Wall's involvement was
    denied as moot because he no longer was the therapist. Plaintiff objected to
    intensive therapy with Dr. Pasternak because she said it was for families
    involved in high conflict divorces and not appropriate for defendant who she
    referred to as an "abuser." Her request to reconsider Dr. Pasternak's appointment
    A-2376-16T1
    6
    for intensive therapy was denied, however, because plaintiff had not provided
    the court with any facts to support the request for reconsideration.
    On October 12, 2017, in response to a request by Dr. Pasternak for
    clarification of an order, the court directed that plaintiff would pay for the
    intensive treatment program, and that other family members shall be permitted
    to attend the sessions as the doctors deemed appropriate. The court's statement
    of reasons clarified that the parties would be given questionnaires to fill out for
    the doctors to determine whether the intensive therapy program was appropriate
    for them.
    At the end of October 2017, the court conducted a hearing 8 where it made
    "findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding parental alienation and
    reunification therapy." The court found that plaintiff was not credible regarding
    her testimony about the sessions with Dr. Wall on April 20 and April 22, 2017.
    The court stated there were "continued disruptions, obstructions, objections and
    everything else that could be put in the way of that reunification therapy and,
    Ms. Ji, it falls at your feet." The court noted that when plaintiff first met with
    Dr. Wall, she wanted the doctor to write to the court to vacate all of the
    8
    The parties have provided two transcripts: one for October 31, 2017, and
    another from November 2, 2017.
    A-2376-16T1
    7
    reunification orders. The court found "there has been interference with this . . .
    reunification therapy in the past." Referring to plaintiff and her friend, the court
    found "as a fact that they engaged in a pattern of activities meant to specifically
    disrupt this reunification . . . process."    However, defendant also was not
    blameless in the delay. The court noted that defendant "seem[ed] to have
    disappeared from this reunification therapy for substantial periods of time."
    Following the hearing, the court ordered intensive therapy with Drs.
    Pasternak and Montgomery. The parties were ordered to attend on the dates
    selected by the doctors. The court threatened to impose sanctions for non -
    attendance. Plaintiff's friend was not to have any role in the process. No party
    was to videotape or record the sessions. None of the parties was to contact the
    doctors. The court stated there could be "major repercussions" for plaintiff if
    she interfered.
    Dr. Pasternak wrote to the court for clarification. The court's December
    4, 2017 order clarified that the parties were to comply with the intake process
    and that they were to follow the doctor's instructions to move forward with the
    intensive treatment program. (Pa106).
    Plaintiff argues in A-4260-16 that neither the April 19, 2017 nor June 15,
    2017 orders should have been entered because nothing was emergent about the
    A-2376-16T1
    8
    scheduling of the therapy sessions. She contends the penalties set forth in the
    June 15, 2017 order were entered without due process and relied on hearsay.
    Plaintiff argues that the orders were entered without conducting a best interest
    analysis, appropriate fact-finding and violated due process.
    In A-1800-17, plaintiff argues that the October 12, 2017 order, and
    subsequent orders regarding "intensive" reunification therapy, must be vacated
    because they were entered without a finding of changed circumstances, without
    consideration of the child's best interest and without appropriate fact -finding.
    She contends that the orders require new parties to participate in court -ordered
    therapy. We reject these arguments.
    II
    We accord "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part
    judges," Milne v. Goldenberg, 
    428 N.J. Super. 184
    , 197 (App. Div. 2012), in
    recognition of the "family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family
    matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 
    201 N.J. 328
    , 343
    (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 413 (1998)). This deference is
    grounded in the understanding that trial judges are in the best position to hear
    and see witnesses and to get a feel for the case, which a reviewing court cannot
    do. See State v. Watts, 
    223 N.J. 503
    , 516 (2015); see also State v. Nash, 212
    A-2376-16T1
    
    9 N.J. 518
    , 540 (2013). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
    consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
    deference."   Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 
    218 N.J. 8
    , 26 (2014) (quoting
    Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378
    (1995)).
    The therapy sessions from April, June and July 2017 that plaintiff
    challenged as not being emergent are long since passed. It is moot whether the
    necessity for therapy on those dates was emergent. We conclude that plaintiff's
    arguments on this point are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
    written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Plaintiff contends the court did not make findings of fact or conclusions
    of law as required by Rule 1:7-4. The record belies this. In November 2017,
    the court made factual findings that plaintiff obstructed and interfered with the
    reunification. She was found not to be credible in her testimony about the only
    two therapy sessions that occurred in five years. We afford great deference to
    those findings because the trial court had the opportunity to conduct a hearing
    and hear and see witnesses. See Nash, 212 N.J. at 540 ("An appellate court's
    reading of a cold record is a pale substitute for a trial judge's assessment of
    credibility of a witness he has observed firsthand."). We are satisfied that there
    A-2376-16T1
    10
    was adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the record for these findings,
    and the findings in other orders that she obstructed the process. Watts, 223 N.J.
    at 516; Costa v. Costa, 
    440 N.J. Super. 1
    , 4 (App. Div. 2015).
    The decisions to impose sanctions for this obstruction were an appropriate
    means to enforce plaintiff's compliance with the court's orders. A court may
    impose sanctions as a coercive measure to effectuate the enforcement of a prior
    order. R. 1:10-3. Monetary sanctions are a "proper tool to compel compliance
    with a court order." Ridley v. Dennison, 
    298 N.J. Super. 373
    , 381 (App. Div.
    1997). A Family Part judge may order "economic sanctions, including but not
    limited to the award of monetary compensation for the costs resulting from a
    parent's failure to appear for scheduled parenting time or visitation such as child
    care expenses incurred by the other parent." R. 5:3-7(a)(2).
    In this case, plaintiff was ordered to pay for reunification therapy and was
    required to pay a modest sanction for missed sessions. Her finances already
    were thoroughly established in the divorce trial with which the trial court was
    familiar and relied upon. We discern no abuse of discretion by the court in the
    steps taken to implement reunification therapy or the sanctions imposed.
    Plaintiff argued that the "intensive" therapy with Drs. Pasternak and
    Montgomery was not reunification therapy, and that it required a showing of
    A-2376-16T1
    11
    changed circumstances and an analysis of the child's best interest before it could
    be ordered. However, the orders make clear that the "intensive" therapy was
    part of the ongoing efforts to implement reunification. After years of failed
    efforts, with one false start, it was entirely reasonable, and not an abuse of any
    discretion, to implement an intensive program with plaintiff as a participant,
    because she was found to have obstructed reunification efforts. Plaintiff did not
    show any change of circumstances; she did not satisfy the court that therapy
    should not be implemented. In fact, plaintiff objected to the intake process
    where the therapists could determine what was best, who could be involved or
    even whether to proceed with the program.
    Plaintiff contends in A-1800-17 that the proposed intensive therapy was
    not tailored to the child's needs.    However, she frustrated the process of
    determining that, by not participating in the intake process as the court had
    ordered. Plaintiff was incorrect that other family members were ordered to
    participate; the order provided that they were not precluded from participating
    if the therapist permitted that. There also was no indication the intensive
    reunification therapy was being used as a sanction. Plaintiff presented no
    evidence of this.
    A-2376-16T1
    12
    Plaintiff contends the June 15, 2017 9 order was entered without due
    process, and she appeals the denial in August 2017 of her motion for
    reconsideration. A trial court's reconsideration decision will not be disturbed
    "unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v.
    ABC Caging Fulfillment, 
    440 N.J. Super. 378
    , 382 (App. Div. 2015) (citing
    Housing Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 
    135 N.J. 274
    , 283 (1994)).
    Reconsideration is only appropriate in circumstances where: "1) the [c]ourt has
    expressed its decision based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it
    is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the
    significance of probative, competent evidence." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 
    242 N.J. Super. 392
    , 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). We agree with the trial court that plaintiff did
    not present any evidence that was new or that the court did not consider. She
    did not show that the court's decision was made on an irrational basis. She was
    not denied due process because she had ample opportunity to express her
    concerns about the June 15, 2017 order.
    9
    The June 15, 2017 order was not included in plaintiff's September 27, 2017
    notice of appeal; it is not properly before us. If it were, we would reject
    plaintiff's argument that it was entered improperly. The court found that
    plaintiff interfered with reunification. There was authority to sanction her for
    that interference.
    A-2376-16T1
    13
    After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable legal principles,
    we conclude that plaintiff's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    III
    In A-2376-16, plaintiff appeals portions of an order entered on October 7,
    2016,10 and portions of another order entered on February 3, 2017. 11 She
    appealed the October 7, 2016 order on February 13, 2017, which was more than
    forty-five days after its entry. Her appeal of this order was filed out of time.
    See R. 2:4-1(a). As such, we decline to consider her appeal of any part of that
    order.
    Plaintiff also appealed the February 3, 2017 order. Paragraph 1 denied
    plaintiff's motion to reconsider various paragraphs of the October 7, 2016 order.
    Paragraph 2—also part of her motion for reconsideration—denied her request to
    enforce paragraph 32 of the October 7, 2016 order.
    10
    In the October 7, 2016 order, plaintiff appeals paragraphs 1, 12, 13, 17b, 23,
    27, 29, 34, 35, 43, 62, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75.
    11
    The portions of the February 3, 2017 order that were appealed include
    paragraph 1, 2, 6a, 14 and 15.
    A-2376-16T1
    14
    Plaintiff's appendix filed with her brief included a copy of the court's
    February 3, 2017 order, but it did not include the judge's lengthy statement of
    reasons in support of that order.12 Plaintiff also failed to include a copy of her
    motion for reconsideration or to identify what exhibits she submitted with that
    motion. She did not include a copy of the opposition that was filed. Instead,
    plaintiff included copies of motions and cross-motions that were decided by the
    October 7, 2016 order.
    Because she failed to include documents crucial for the court's review, we
    cannot address the issues in this appeal 13 that relate to her motion for
    reconsideration. See Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst., 
    179 N.J. 45
    , 55 (2004)
    (refusing to address issues on appeal where plaintiff failed to submit the relevant
    final order); Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Soc'y Hill Assocs., 
    347 N.J. Super. 163
    , 177 (App. Div. 2002) (explaining that a party's failure to include documents
    which are essential to proper consideration of the issues on appeal "render[ed]
    review impossible"); Newman v. Isuzu Motors Am., Inc., 
    367 N.J. Super. 141
    ,
    145 (App. Div. 2004) (finding plaintiff to have violated Rules 2:6-1(a) and 2:5-
    3(b) for failing to include the motion papers or transcript of the hearing on the
    12
    She included it in the appendix of A-4260-16.
    13
    We are referencing paragraphs 1 and 2 of the February 3, 2017 order.
    A-2376-16T1
    15
    motion below). Accordingly, we dismiss her appeal of paragraphs 1 and 2 of
    the February 3, 2017 order.
    After the divorce, plaintiff relocated to Massachusetts with the children.
    In the October 7, 2016 order, the court ordered a plenary hearing to address the
    issues that were raised by her relocation. Paragraph 6a of the February 3, 2017
    order, which is part of the current appeal, required plaintiff to be solely
    responsible to transport May to and from New Jersey for defendant's parenting
    time. Because paragraph 6a of the February 3, 2017 order was entered prior to
    the plenary hearing, plaintiff's appeal of paragraph 6a was interlocutory.14
    Plaintiff did not request, nor was she granted, leave to appeal this issue. We
    dismiss plaintiff's appeal of paragraph 6a of the February 3, 2017 order as
    interlocutory.
    Plaintiff's notice of appeal included paragraphs 14 and 15 of the February
    3, 2017 order. Paragraph 14 was a discovery order that granted defendant's
    request to require plaintiff to provide information in thirty days about
    investment accounts that were set up for both children. Paragraph 15 ordered a
    14
    In another appeal filed by defendant, A-1141-16, we found that much of the
    October 7, 2016 order was interlocutory in nature because of the pending plenary
    hearing. In an order dated January 30, 2017, we concluded that only paragraphs
    10, 16, 17 and 67 of the October 7, 2016 order were "final" for purposes of
    appeal.
    A-2376-16T1
    16
    $500 per day sanction if plaintiff did not comply. Because plaintiff's brief did
    not address either of these paragraphs, she waived her appeal of them and we
    dismiss this part of her appeal. See Drinker Biddle v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub.
    Safety, Div. of Law, 
    421 N.J. Super. 489
    , 496 n.5 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that
    claims not addressed in merits brief are deemed abandoned); see also Gormley
    v. Wood-El, 
    218 N.J. 72
    , 95 n.8 (2014); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
    Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2019). In light of our opinion herein, we dismiss
    appeal A-2376-16.
    Dismissed in part and affirmed.
    A-2376-16T1
    17