Oliver Wood v. Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc. ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                             09/26/2017
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    April 18, 2017 Session
    OLIVER WOOD ET AL. V. JEFFERSON COUNTY ECONOMIC
    DEVELOPMENT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, INC.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Jefferson County
    No. 13-CV-212    Don R. Ash, Senior Judge1
    No. E2016-01452-COA-R3-CV
    In 2009 and 2010, the legislative bodies of Jefferson County, Jefferson City, and
    Dandridge enacted resolutions requesting that the Jefferson County Chamber of
    Commerce create a non-profit corporation to be called the Jefferson County Economic
    Development Oversight Committee (EDOC). Its purpose was to promote economic
    development in the county. In 2013, a group of citizens filed this action seeking a
    declaration that EDOC is subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Public Records Act,
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (2012), and the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-
    44-101 et seq. (2016). After a bench trial, the court denied the plaintiffs’ requested relief.
    They appealed. We find and hold that the undisputed facts establish that EDOC performs
    a governmental function, recieves a substantial amount of taxpayer funding, and is
    significantly involved with and regulated by the governing city and county legislative
    bodies. In light of our duty to broadly construe and interpret the Public Records and
    Open Meetings Acts in favor of governmental transparency and accountability, we hold
    that the EDOC is subject to these acts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
    Reversed; Case Remanded
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
    SWINEY, C.J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., joined.
    D. Scott Hurley and Ryan N. Shamblin, Knoxville, Tennessee, for appellants, John Gunn,
    Clarice Gunn, Jack Kenley, Charlotte Kenley, Steve Monroe, Carol Monroe, Charles
    Crosby, Steve Hammer, Bandi Hammer, Leroy Malone, Annette Loy, and Peggy Corbett.
    1
    Sitting by interchange.
    1
    James L. Gass and Anna C. Penland, Sevierville, Tennessee, for appellee, Jefferson
    County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc.
    Opinion
    I.
    On July 21, 2009, the Jefferson County Commission enacted “a resolution
    requesting and approving the creation of a non-profit corporation to be known as the
    Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc.” The resolution
    provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
    WHEREAS, through an extensive community planning
    process, Jefferson County, Tennessee (the “County”), along
    with other participants in the community, developed a
    strategic action plan (the “Strategic Plan”) to promote
    economic development in the County; and
    WHEREAS, the balanced growth of the economy in the
    County will help stabilize the tax base in the County and
    promote job opportunities for the citizens of the County; and
    WHEREAS, a primary governmental purpose of the County
    is to promote economic development for the benefit of its
    citizens; and
    WHEREAS, the County desires that a non-profit corporation
    be formed in order to coordinate the implementation of the
    Strategic Plan; and
    WHEREAS, the County intends to provide significant
    funding for such non-profit corporation;
    NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of
    Commissioners of the County (the “Governing Body”), as
    follows:
    Section 1. Formation of Corporation. The County hereby
    requests that the Jefferson County Chamber of Commerce
    2
    facilitate the creation of a non-profit corporation to be known
    as the Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight
    Committee, Inc. (the “Corporation”). The purpose of the
    Corporation shall be to promote economic development
    within the County and to oversee the utilization of public and
    private resources to implement the Strategic Plan.
    Section 2. Representation on the Board of Directors. The
    Chairman of the County Commission, The County Mayor and
    the Finance Director of the County shall be directors of the
    Corporation with their service as such directors to coincide
    with the terms of office of such persons.
    Section 3. Additional Authorizations. All additional acts and
    doings of the County Mayor and County Clerk of the County
    and any other representative or officer of the County which
    are in conformity with the purposes and intent of this
    Resolution shall be and the same hereby are in all respects,
    approved and confirmed.
    (Italics added; underlining in original). On December 8, 2009, the Town of Dandridge’s
    Board of Mayor and Aldermen enacted a functionally identical resolution. On January 4,
    2010, the Jefferson City Council followed suit, enacting its own, nearly identically-
    worded, resolution.
    The EDOC was incorporated as a non-profit “public benefit corporation” on July
    26, 2010. Its charter states that EDOC’s purpose is “promoting economic development
    and alleviating unemployment in Jefferson County, Tennessee and other charitable
    purposes within the meaning of §§ 501(c)(3) and 170(c)” of the Internal Revenue Code.
    EDOC’s application to the IRS for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) states, in
    pertinent part, as follows:
    The Jefferson County [EDOC] is the outgrowth of a
    comprehensive strategic planning initiative in Jefferson
    County, Tennessee to coordinate economic development
    activities among the governmental entities in the County and
    to plan and implement a new economic future for the County.
    *      *       *
    3
    [EDOC’s] primary purpose is to serve as the entity that will
    centralize the economic development activities of Jefferson
    County, the City of Jefferson City and Town of Dandridge in
    order to undertake those activities in the most efficient
    manner so that public funds are efficiently utilized while
    leveraging private support. The Chair of the County
    Commission and the Finance Director of Jefferson County are
    members of the Board of Directors of [EDOC], and the
    Mayors of the City of Jefferson City and the Town of
    Dandridge also serve on the Board of Directors. Therefore,
    public officials make up half of the members of the Board of
    Directors of [EDOC]. The bylaws of [EDOC] provide that
    these public officials serve ex officio on the Board of
    Directors of [EDOC]. The governing bodies of Jefferson
    County, the City of Jefferson City and the Town of Dandridge
    each adopted resolutions acknowledging that economic
    development is a primary governmental purpose and
    requesting the formation of [EDOC] in order to promote
    economic development on their behalves. . . . It is expected
    that the governmental entities referenced above will provide
    approximately 60% of the funding for [EDOC] to undertake
    its activities.
    The specific activities that [EDOC] will undertake in order to
    fulfill its economic development mission on behalf of the
    County are several. First, [EDOC] will coordinate business
    recruitment efforts on behalf of the County. . . . Second,
    [EDOC] will provide support for existing local companies
    through counseling and technical assistance. Third, [EDOC]
    will make efforts to improve the retail climate in the County
    so that the County will be an attractive location for retail
    establishments. . . . Finally, [EDOC] will seek to enhance
    recognition of the County as a tourist destination.
    *      *       *
    [EDOC’s] purpose is not to provide services to specific
    members. In fact, [EDOC] will have no members. Rather,
    [EDOC’s] mission is to coordinate the strategic economic
    development efforts of the entire County, including the public
    entities therein.
    4
    *      *         *
    [EDOC’s] charitable mission is therefore at least twofold.
    First, it is lessening the burdens of government by
    undertaking the economic development activities on behalf of
    Jefferson County, the City of Jefferson City and the Town of
    Dandridge. This type of coordinated governmental effort is
    precisely what is needed is this time of limited resources, and
    through such coordination, [EDOC] is substantially lessening
    the burdens of government. Secondly, [EDOC] is promoting
    the social welfare of the community by reducing poverty
    through job growth and combating community deterioration
    by addressing the decline in the County’s tax base.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Plaintiffs filed their complaint on October 24, 2013. Following discovery and the
    trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment to EDOC, which plaintiffs have not
    appealed, a trial was conducted on May 24 and 25, 2016. Several public officials
    testified: Darrell Helton, CEO of the Chamber of Commerce and former Jefferson City
    Mayor and Jefferson County Finance Director; David Seal, County Commissioner;
    George Gantte, Mayor of Dandridge; Marty Mills, former County Commission
    Chairman; and Mark Potts, Mayor of Jefferson City. Several plaintiffs also testified, as
    did Jay Moser, a member of the EDOC Board of Directors since its inception. The trial
    court ruled that “the EDOC: (1) is not a ‘public body’ so as to qualify as a ‘governing
    body’ subject to the Open Meetings Act and (2) is not the functional equivalent of a
    government agency subject to the Public Records Act.” Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of
    appeal.
    II.
    The issues presented are as quoted from plaintiffs’ brief:
    1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that EDOC is
    not the functional equivalent of a government agency subject
    to the Public Records Act.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that EDOC is
    not a “public body” subject to the Open Meetings Act.
    5
    III.
    The facts pertinent to this appeal are generally not in dispute. The interpretation
    and application of the Public Records Act and the Open Meetings Act involve questions
    of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Memphis Publ’g
    Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 
    87 S.W.3d 67
    , 79 (Tenn. 2002).
    IV.
    A.
    The Tennessee Public Records Act provides that “[a]ll state, county and municipal
    records shall, at all times during business hours . . . be open for personal inspection by
    any citizen of this state, and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such right of
    inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
    10-7-503(a)(2)(A). The Act further states that “[a]ny citizen of Tennessee who shall
    request the right of personal inspection of any state, county or municipal record as
    provided in § 10-7-503, and whose request has been in whole or in part denied . . . shall
    be entitled to petition for access to any such record and to obtain judicial review of the
    actions taken to deny the access.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a).
    In the seminal Memphis Publ’g Co. case, the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed
    the Act and observed as follows:
    The Tennessee Public Records Act “governs the right of
    access to records of government agencies in this state.” Cole
    v. Campbell, 
    968 S.W.2d 274
    , 275 (Tenn. 1998). Through its
    provisions, the Act serves a crucial role in promoting
    accountability in government through public oversight of
    governmental activities.
    *      *          *
    The General Assembly has declared that the Act “shall be
    broadly construed so as to give the fullest possible public
    access to public records.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10–7–505(d)
    (1999). “Our . . . cases reflect the broad construction of
    ‘record’ under the Act and a consistent adherence to the
    policy of full public access.” Tennessean v. Electric Power
    Bd., 
    979 S.W.2d 297
    , 301 (Tenn. 1998). Accordingly, we . . .
    interpret the terms of the Act liberally to enforce the public
    6
    interest in open access to the records of state, county, and
    municipal governmental 
    entities. 87 S.W.3d at 74
    . Addressing the issue of “whether [a] private entity’s records should be
    subject to public access,” 
    id. at 78,
    the High Court stated as follows:
    [P]rivate entities that perform public services on behalf of a
    government often do so as independent contractors.
    Nonetheless, the public’s fundamental right to scrutinize the
    performance of public services and the expenditure of public
    funds should not be subverted by government or by private
    entity merely because public duties have been delegated to an
    independent contractor. When a private entity’s relationship
    with the government is so extensive that the entity serves as
    the functional equivalent of a governmental agency, the
    accountability created by public oversight should be
    preserved.
    Consequently, in light of our duty to construe the Tennessee
    Public Records Act liberally in favor of “the fullest possible
    public access to public records,” we follow the Connecticut
    Supreme Court and interpret records “made or received . . . in
    connection with the transaction of official business by any
    governmental agency” to include those records in the hands
    of any private entity which operates as the functional
    equivalent of a governmental agency. In making this
    determination, we look to the totality of the circumstances in
    each given case, and no single factor will be dispositive. The
    cornerstone of this analysis, of course, is whether and to what
    extent the entity performs a governmental or public function,
    for we intend by our holding to ensure that a governmental
    agency cannot, intentionally or unintentionally, avoid its
    disclosure obligations under the Act by contractually
    delegating its responsibilities to a private entity. Beyond this
    consideration, additional factors relevant to the analysis
    include, but are not limited to, (1) the level of government
    funding of the entity; (2) the extent of government
    involvement with, regulation of, or control over the entity;
    and (3) whether the entity was created by an act of the
    legislature or previously determined by law to be open to
    public access.
    7
    
    Id. at 78-79
    (footnotes omitted); see also City Press Commc’ns, LLC v. Tenn.
    Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
    447 S.W.3d 230
    , 235, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014)
    (holding “the TSSAA serves as the functional equivalent of a governmental agency, the
    Tennessee State Board of Education, by directing and managing the extracurricular
    sporting activities of almost every high school in the state”); Gautreaux v. Internal Med.
    Educ. Foundation, Inc., 
    336 S.W.3d 526
    , 529 (Tenn. 2011) (holding a non-profit
    internal medicine education corporation was not the functional equivalent of a
    governmental agency where its duties were “merely ministerial” and it “merely acted as a
    bookkeeper” for a state university); Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 
    310 S.W.3d 366
    ,
    375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (Corrections Corporation of America is the functional
    equivalent of a state agency because it provided prison services that the state is required
    to provide); Allen v. Day, 
    213 S.W.3d 244
    , 246 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (privately held
    LLC that provided management services to run day-to-day operations of the Gaylord
    Entertainment Center is the functional equivalent of a governmental agency).
    Our initial inquiry is “whether and to what extent [EDOC] performs a
    governmental or public function.” Memphis Publ’g 
    Co., 87 S.W.3d at 79
    . The
    resolutions passed by Jefferson County, Jefferson City, and Dandridge each state that “a
    primary governmental purpose of the County [or Municipality] is to promote economic
    development for the benefit of its citizens.” (Emphasis added.) EDOC was incorporated
    at the request of these respective legislative bodies and tasked with that very “primary
    governmental purpose.” The testimony of various witnesses at trial confirmed that
    EDOC has been the primary agency promoting economic development on behalf of
    Jefferson County and its municipalities since its incorporation. Moreover, both former
    Mayor Helton and Mayor Potts testified that they agreed that the promotion of economic
    development is a primary governmental purpose. No one testified that it was not a
    governmental function. Both EDOC’s bylaws and its statement of purpose in the IRS
    application state that its economic development activities are undertaken “on behalf of”
    the county and municipal governments. We find that EDOC performs a governmental or
    public function, and that this factor weighs in favor of a finding that EDOC is subject to
    the Public Records Act as the functional equivalent of a governmental agency.
    Regarding the level of public funding, the governments of Jefferson County,
    Jefferson City, and the municipalities of Dandridge, White Pine, and Baneberry have
    voted each year to provide funding to EDOC amounting to between 60.1% and 67.6% of
    its budget. In 2012, EDOC received public funding of $276,156, which was 67.6% of its
    total budget of $412,844. In 2013, its public funding was $279,156, 62.8% of the total; in
    2014, it was $275,653 (60.1%); in 2015, it was $283,653 (60.9%). Commissioner Seal
    testified at trial in May 2016 that the county commission had recently voted to allocate
    $299,999.99 to EDOC. Thus, over a quarter of a million dollars in public funds per year
    8
    has been allocated to EDOC. Generally speaking, the expenditure of taxpayer revenues
    in these amounts can fairly be said to be a governmental function.
    The remainder of EDOC’s budget is comprised of contributions from private
    individuals and business entities. Former Mayor Helton, who stated that he was serving
    as the “chief operating officer” of EDOC at the time of trial, testified that these
    contributors were referred to as “investors.” Helton and others testified that traditionally,
    four seats on EDOC’s Board of Directors were held by representatives of the four largest
    investors, i.e., those four contributors giving the most money to EDOC. The other four
    members of the Board of Directors are public officials, as provided by EDOC’s bylaws:
    The initial Board of Directors shall consist of eight (8)
    Directors . . . The persons serving in the following capacities
    from time to time shall be ex officio, voting Directors of the
    Company: the Chair of the County Commission of Jefferson
    County, the Finance Director of Jefferson County (or such
    other County officer or employee designated by County
    Commission), the Mayor of the Town of Dandridge and the
    Mayor of the City of Jefferson City.
    (Underlining in original.) There is no procedure to break a 4-4 voting deadlock, so the
    four public officers voting together can block a proposed action by EDOC. We find that
    there is a substantial amount of government involvement with the operations of the
    EDOC.
    Regarding the level of governmental control or influence over the EDOC’s
    activities, Commissioner Seal testified as follows:
    Each month EDOC and chamber of commerce send
    representatives to our work sessions and to our voting
    meetings. They make presentations to us. They explain to us
    what they’re planning to do with the funding that we give
    them.
    *      *       *
    By the structure of their organization, our county commission
    chairman serves on their board, our finance director serves on
    their board, two of our city mayors serve on their board. As
    far as interaction between the county commission and EDOC,
    that’s every month at every meeting.            They have a
    9
    representative there. They field questions. They make
    recommendations. They answer our questions. There’s
    monthly interaction.
    *      *        *
    Q. When they make such a recommendation and the county
    makes a determination to fund it, how does that happen?
    Does the commission vote on it or how does that logistically
    happen?
    A. A majority of budget committee has to hear that
    recommendation from EDOC or chamber or any other
    nonprofit or any other county department, take a vote on it in
    budget committee after a motion is made to provide that
    funding. Assuming that it passes in budget committee, then it
    moves up to the floor of county commission for the entire
    body to consider as a recommendation from the budget
    committee.
    *      *        *
    In my service on the budget committee during this budget
    cycle, I proposed that EDOC and chamber of commerce both
    provide a written business plan and a return on investment as
    a condition of their funding, and that passed for the ‘15/16
    budget cycle. That is in existence until June 30th I believe
    when our fiscal year ends.2
    (Footnote added.) As an additional level of governmental oversight, no check written by
    or on behalf of EDOC is valid unless it bears two signatures, one of which is that of the
    county finance director. Helton also testified that in 2015, the county commission
    directed EDOC “to change the organizational structure or organizational flow chart of
    EDOC,” which it did.
    EDOC argues that it cannot be held to be performing a governmental function
    under this Court’s analysis in 
    Allen, 213 S.W.3d at 253-54
    , wherein we stated as follows:
    2
    Commissioner Seal testified that the county commission did not impose the requirement
    on EDOC to provide a written business plan and return on investment analysis for fiscal year
    2016/2017, and that he was “very much opposed to” that decision.
    10
    In 2001, the Connecticut legislature expressly defined
    “governmental function” as applied to Connecticut’s Freedom
    of Information Act, an Act substantively similar to
    Tennessee’s Public Records Act. The statute provides:
    (11) “Governmental function” means the
    administration or management of a program of
    a public agency, which program has been
    authorized by law to be administered or
    managed by a person, where (A) the person
    receives funding from the public agency for
    administering or managing the program, (B) the
    public agency is involved in or regulates to a
    significant extent such person’s administration
    or management of the program, whether or not
    such involvement or regulation is direct,
    pervasive, continuous or day-to-day, and (C) the
    person participates in the formulation of
    governmental policies or decisions in
    connection with the administration or
    management of the program and such policies
    or decisions bind the public agency.
    “Governmental function” shall not include the
    mere provision of goods or services to a public
    agency without the delegated responsibility to
    administer or manage a program of a public
    agency.
    Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–200(11).
    (Emphasis added.) EDOC points out that it undisputedly cannot make policies or
    decisions that bind a public agency. It routinely makes recommendations to the county
    commission, which is free to accept, modify, or reject them. EDOC also makes binding
    decisions with regard to how to spend the public money allocated to it each year, an
    amount averaging $278,654.50 for the years reported. While we do not disagree with the
    Allen decision, we reject EDOC’s proposed interpretation that Allen imposed a new
    requirement that an entity must be able to make binding decisions in order to be held to
    be performing a governmental function. First, Allen quoted a Connecticut statute, which
    it noted was similar to the Public Records Act, but obviously is not the law in Tennessee.
    Second, the Allen Court stated that it was “[a]pplying the factors that the Connecticut
    legislature found relevant” in concluding “that Powers performs a governmental function
    11
    in its management of the 
    Arena.” 213 S.W.3d at 254
    (emphasis added). This statement
    indicates that whether an entity participates in the formulation of policies or decisions
    that bind a public agency is a factor to be considered along with “the totality of the
    circumstances in each given case, and no single factor will be dispositive.” Memphis
    Publ’g 
    Co., 87 S.W.3d at 79
    . This interpretation comports with the Supreme Court’s
    formulation of the test in Memphis Publ’g Co. Third, both the Supreme Court and this
    Court have returned to the question of what constitutes a “governmental function” since
    Allen was decided, and neither Court referred to that opinion as establishing a
    requirement that an entity must make binding decisions in order to be held the functional
    equivalent of a governmental agency. See Gautreaux, 
    336 S.W.3d 526
    ; City Press
    Commc’ns, 
    447 S.W.3d 230
    ; Friedmann, 
    310 S.W.3d 366
    . Fourth, Allen rejected the
    argument of the privately held LLC in that case that it could not be “the functional
    equivalent of a public agency because it does not govern or regulate,” stating that the
    Supreme Court “never referred to a requirement that an organization govern or 
    regulate.” 213 S.W.3d at 256
    .
    The fourth relevant factor identified by the Supreme Court is “whether the entity
    was created by an act of the legislature or previously determined by law to be open to
    public access.” Memphis Publ’g 
    Co., 87 S.W.3d at 79
    . The plaintiffs argue that EDOC
    was created by the county and municipal legislative bodies here, citing a dictionary
    definition of “create” as “to produce or bring about by a course of action or behavior.”
    Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (8th ed. 1977). While we see some logic in this
    semantical argument, technically what the legislatures did, as stated in their resolutions,
    was to “request[] that the Jefferson County Chamber of Commerce facilitate the creation
    of” EDOC. We cannot say that the County Commission, Jefferson City Council, or
    Dandridge Board of Mayor and Aldermen, which officially speak and act through their
    resolutions, “created” the EDOC through the resolutions enacted in this case.
    EDOC itself has not been previously determined by law to be open to public
    access. However, our inquiry on this factor is informed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-114
    (2015), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
    (b) There shall be established in each county a joint economic
    and community development board, which shall be
    established by interlocal agreement pursuant to § 5-1-113.
    The purpose of the board is to foster communication relative
    to economic and community development between and
    among governmental entities, industry, and private citizens.
    (c) Each joint economic and community development board
    shall be composed of representatives of county and city
    12
    governments, private citizens, and present industries and
    businesses. The final makeup of the board shall . . . at a
    minimum, include the county mayor and the city mayor or
    city manager, if appropriate, of each city lying within the
    county and one (1) person who owns land qualifying for
    classification and valuation under title 67, chapter 5, part 10;
    ...
    *       *        *
    (f) The board shall meet, at a minimum, four (4) times
    annually, and the executive committee of the board shall meet
    at least four (4) times annually. . . . Minutes of all meetings of
    the board and the executive committee shall be documented
    by minutes kept and by certification of attendance. Meetings
    of the joint economic and community development board and
    its executive committee are subject to the open meetings law.
    (g)(1) The activities of the board shall be jointly funded by
    the participating governments. . . .
    *       *        *
    (3) The board may accept and expend donations, grants and
    payments from persons and entities other than the
    participating governments. The board is authorized to
    transfer or to donate funds from participating governments or
    outside sources to other public or nonprofit entities within the
    county to be used for economic or industrial development
    purposes.
    *       *        *
    (i) When applying for any state grant a city or a county shall
    certify its compliance with the requirements of this section.
    (Emphasis added.) As can be seen, the Tennessee legislature required each county to
    establish a joint economic and community development board as a condition of receiving
    a state grant of funds. Although it cannot escape notice that EDOC bears many
    similarities to such a mandated board, it is not the “joint economic and community
    development board” created by Jefferson County to comply with the statute. That is a
    13
    separate body, referred to as the “1101 Board” or the “monthly mayors’ meeting” by all
    the testifying witnesses. Helton, who was on the 1101 Board during his ten years as
    Jefferson City Mayor, testified:
    Well, the 1101 Board does not deal directly with recruiting
    particularly particular businesses into the area. They’re
    primarily kind of an oversight board. They meet and, of
    course, they have reports. In other words, I would on part of
    the chamber would go to their monthly meetings and give
    them the report that I give to county commission. Just give
    them information, but they did not act on any economic
    growth or development. They were more of an informational
    type board.
    In his deposition, Helton further explained that the 1101 Board “can actually have a
    budget and kind of rule on some things like that [economic development projects], but
    they don’t.” He said that “they really don’t have any authority” and “I don’t ever
    remember us taking any really official action.”
    The 1101 Board is, however, subject to the Open Meetings Act by the express
    terms of the statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-114(f). Regarding the application of the
    Public Records Act to such a board, the Tennessee Attorney General has opined that:
    with the L[oudon] C[ounty] E[conomic] D[evelopment]
    A[gency]’s certification as a joint economic and community
    development board pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-58-114,
    it is likely to be found to be performing a governmental or
    public function as defined by the Court of Appeals in Allen v.
    Day. Furthermore, the LCEDA receives the majority of its
    funding from governmental entities and it is governed by a
    board of directors which includes officials of those same
    governmental entities.       Accordingly, based upon the
    definition of “governmental function” and the factors outlined
    in the Memphis Publishing Co. case, we think that the
    LCEDA would be held to be the functional equivalent of a
    government agency and, therefore, its records would be
    subject to inspection under the Public Records Act.
    Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 07-170, 
    2007 WL 4800789
    (Dec. 21, 2007). Although EDOC
    is not subject to the Public Records and Open Meetings Acts under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-
    58-114, the statute supports a pair of pertinent conclusions: that economic development is
    14
    generally considered a proper governmental function, and that the Tennessee legislature
    has determined a joint economic and community development board to be subject to the
    transparency and accountability provided by the Open Meetings Act.
    At trial, the primary example of how EDOC interacted with government to
    promote economic development programs was presented by testimony regarding
    EDOC’s efforts to develop a large commercial and industrial park in Dandridge, referred
    to by all the witnesses as the “megasite” development. The plan involved governmental
    acquisition of about 1,860 acres of privately-owned farmland for the industrial megasite.
    Helton testified that “the decision to go forward with the planning and the
    recommendation of the megasite was one of the largest economic decisions potentially
    ever made for Jefferson County.” The other public officials in their testimony generally
    agreed with this assessment.         EDOC recommended that the Jefferson County
    Commission authorize funds to be used for the certification process of the megasite.
    These costs included the hiring of several firms: McCallum-Sweeney, a consultant with
    ties to the automotive industry; Blanchard & Calhoun, a real estate acquisition firm; and
    Moxley Carmichael, a public relations firm. Former Mayor and EDOC executive Helton
    testified as follows regarding the public relations efforts to persuade county commission
    to support the proposed development:
    Q. Moxley Carmichael, the public relations firm, did they ‒
    what role, if any, did they play in attempting to make
    recommendations or persuade county commission to take
    actions related to the Megasite?
    A. Well, they’re a public relations firm and the reason they
    were hired was to help the EDOC board promote or how to do
    it from a public relations standpoint. That’s why they were
    hired.
    Q. And did they use public relations efforts to attempt to
    persuade county commission?
    A. Well, they recommended to the EDOC board what they
    should do, yes.
    Q. Did Moxley Carmichael write comments for public
    officials and recommend that those comments be made at
    public meetings?
    A. They assisted in writing them, yes.
    15
    Garrett Wagley was the director of economic development for Jefferson County.
    He was employed by the Jefferson County Chamber of Commerce, but EDOC
    reimbursed the chamber for one hundred percent of Wagley’s salary. Mayor Gantte
    testified as follows regarding an email he received from Wagley shortly before the
    commission voted to proceed with the megasite development:
    Q: [H]e was writing an email here to you, Don Cason, who
    was president of the chamber and kind of the chief operating
    officer of EDOC; is that correct?
    A: That is correct.
    Q: Also to Alan Carmichael, who is a PR representative from
    Moxley Carmichael out of Knoxville?
    A: Correct.
    *     *        *
    Q: [The email] references a list of action items that come out
    of the call. And the first of those is under your name, Mayor
    Gantte, and there’s a bullet point that says there will be and I
    quote, “Contact the EDOC board and encourage each member
    to bring at least five people to the February 11 commission
    meeting in support of the Megasite.” Do you see that?
    A: That’s what it says.
    Q: And then at the next bullet point “at the same time
    encourage the members to contact county commissioners to
    answer questions and insure that each commissioner has a
    firm idea of where we are in the process.” I believe you
    specifically mentioned Commissioner Maples as a target to
    follow up with?
    A: That’s what it says.
    Q: Now, here, Mayor Gantte, what we had was an organized
    effort through Mr. Wagley, the economic director, yourself,
    16
    the PR folks, and Mr. Cason to contact the commissioners
    prior to their February 11 meeting to encourage their support?
    A: That was what the email said from Mr. Wagley.
    At that time, both Cason and Mayor Gantte were members of EDOC’s Board of
    Directors.
    EDOC also hired the firm of Younger Associates to prepare an economic impact
    analysis of the proposed megasite development, as attested by Helton as follows:
    Q. Before county commission voted in February 2013 to
    provide funding for the Megasite, was there an economic
    impact analysis that was put together at the request of the
    Jefferson County EDOC?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Can you tell the Court who it was that EDOC hired to put
    together that report?
    A. Younger and Associates.
    *      *        *
    Q. The purpose of this economic impact analysis was to
    provide some information to EDOC about the prospects of the
    Megasite?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And was this economic impact analysis used at least to
    some extent by EDOC in attempting to make the case for the
    Megasite that it was recommending?
    A. Yes.
    Q. To county commission?
    A. Yes.
    17
    Q. In fact, this economic impact analysis was discussed at
    county commission meetings, was it not?
    A. I ‒ I think so, yes.
    Q. And we see from the face page of this document that it
    was put together apparently ‒ at least it’s dated on the face
    page January of 2013?
    A. Correct.
    Q. That would be the month before county commission voted,
    correct?
    A. I think that’s correct. I don’t have the dates in front of me,
    but I believe that’s right.
    The analysis, which was distributed in January of 2013, states:
    Public Investment
    Jefferson County plans to invest an estimated $60 million to
    secure privately held land for the park and for infrastructure
    and site development. Additional public fund[s] provided by
    TVA and the State of Tennessee bring the total investment to
    $306.6 million.
    (Bold font in original.) At the time the analysis was released, the county commission had
    not voted to allocate any money for the megasite development project. The public,
    including the landowners whose property would be impacted by the proposed
    development, was informed of the proposal in January of 2013. Mayor Gantte testified
    that “EDOC, by the time it got to that announcement [to the landowners] in January of
    2013 and its request for funding in February ’13, had already decided those things and
    was making specific recommendations to county commission.”
    The megasite development proposal came before the county commission on
    February 11, 2013. Based upon EDOC’s recommendation, the commission voted to
    allocate $442,311 for the initial phases of certification of the megasite. Plaintiff Steve
    Hammer, who was present at the commission meeting, testified that “[t]here was no
    discussion. It was dictated. . . I saw a vote that passed with no questions, no discussion.”
    The commission also voted not to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire any
    18
    of the land for the development. At its April 15, 2015 meeting, the county commission
    voted to rescind the funding for the megasite, a decision made again upon EDOC’s
    recommendation.
    EDOC, in support of its argument that it is not the functional equivalent of a
    public agency, cites the following provision of its charter:
    No Legislative or Political Activity. No substantial part of
    the activities of the Corporation shall be for the carrying on of
    propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation;
    and the Corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in
    (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
    political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
    candidate for public office.
    (Underlining in original.) The testimony of various public officials, quoted and discussed
    above, establishes that EDOC played a significant role in promoting the megasite
    development, which was described as one of the most important economic decisions ever
    made by the county, and which involved a large expenditure of public funds. Bearing in
    mind “our duty to construe the Tennessee Public Records Act liberally in favor of the
    fullest possible public access to public records,” Memphis Publ’g 
    Co., 87 S.W.3d at 79
    (internal quotation marks omitted), we hold that EDOC is the functional equivalent of a
    governmental agency subject to the Public Records Act.
    B.
    The Open Meetings Act, also known as the Sunshine Law, provides that “[a]ll
    meetings of any governing body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at
    all times, except as provided by the Constitution of Tennessee.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-
    44-102(a). The principles applicable to our interpretation and application of the Act have
    been stated by this Court as follows, in pertinent part:
    Tennessee’s Sunshine Law prevents government bodies from
    conducting the public’s business in secret. See Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 8–44–101(a).
    The Sunshine Law is remedial. Dorrier v. Dark, 
    537 S.W.2d 888
    , 891 (Tenn. 1976). It should, therefore, be construed
    broadly to promote openness and accountability in
    government, and to protect the public against closed door
    meetings at every stage of a government body’s deliberations.
    19
    Metro. Air Research Testing Auth., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson
    Cnty., 
    842 S.W.2d 611
    , 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (internal citations omitted). As we
    observed in Metro. Air Research,
    Public knowledge of the manner in which governmental
    decisions are made is an essential part of the democratic
    process. The public
    must be able to “go beyond and behind” the
    decisions reached and be appraised of the “pros
    and cons” involved if they are to make sound
    judgments on questions of policy and to select
    their representatives intelligently.
    Id.; accord Souder v. Health Partners, Inc., 
    997 S.W.2d 140
    , 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
    The Sunshine Law applies to any “governing body,” which is defined as follows:
    (b)(1) “Governing body” means:
    (A) The members of any public body which consists of two
    (2) or more members, with the authority to make decisions for
    or recommendations to a public body on policy or
    administration . . .
    *      *        *
    (E)(i) The board of directors of any association or nonprofit
    corporation authorized by the laws of Tennessee that:
    (a) Was established for the benefit of local government
    officials or counties, cities, towns or other local governments
    or as a municipal bond financing pool;
    (b) Receives dues, service fees or any other income from
    local government officials or such local governments that
    constitute at least thirty percent (30%) of its total annual
    income; and
    20
    (c) Was authorized as of January 1, 1998, under state law to
    obtain coverage for its employees in the Tennessee
    consolidated retirement system.
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-102.        EDOC does not fall within section 102(b)(1)(E)(i)
    because it technically does not have any employees, although it reimburses the chamber
    of commerce for one hundred percent of the salaries of two of the chamber’s employees,
    and additionally for an undisclosed fraction of the salaries of several others.
    Consequently, the issue at trial was whether EDOC is a “public body” under section
    102(b)(1)(A).
    The Supreme Court, in Dorrier, observed that the statute does not define “public
    body” and provided the following guidance:
    We cannot say that “public body” as used in the context of
    this Act, without definition, is so uncertain that men of
    common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning
    and differ as to its application.
    It is clear that for the purpose of this Act, the Legislature
    intended to include any board, commission, committee,
    agency, authority or any other body, by whatever name,
    whose origin and authority may be traced to State, City or
    County legislative action and whose members have authority
    to make decisions or recommendations on policy or
    administration affecting the conduct of the business of the
    people in the governmental 
    sector. 537 S.W.2d at 892
    .
    We are of the opinion that EDOC’s origin and authority may be traced to county
    and city legislative action. The resolutions “requested” and “approved” the creation of
    EDOC, and stated that the county and municipalities “desired that a non-profit
    corporation be formed,” for which they “intend[] to provide significant funding.” If the
    creation of EDOC was privately-driven, as it argues, it is unclear why all three legislative
    bodies voted on and approved written resolutions that were clearly designed to effectuate
    its creation. EDOC argues that the chamber of commerce could have refused to comply
    with the resolutions, a postulation that may be correct in theory, but highly unlikely in
    reality.
    21
    As for the second prong of the inquiry, the proof in the record is abundantly clear
    that EDOC’s “members have authority to make decisions or recommendations on policy
    or administration affecting the conduct of the business of the people in the governmental
    sector.” 
    Id. at 892.
    Several of the public officials testified that EDOC made
    recommendations to county commission on a regular basis.                  None of these
    recommendations were binding, but they do not have to be in order for EDOC to be a
    public body for purposes of the Sunshine Law. The Supreme Court specified that the test
    is whether “the members have authority to make decisions or recommendations.”
    (Emphasis added.) Much of what we have said in Section IV(A) on the Public Records
    Act is also pertinent to this Open Meetings Act analysis. The above-discussed example
    of the interaction between EDOC and county commission regarding the megasite
    development plan illustrates that EDOC has had a significant role in not only expending
    substantial public funds, but also in making decisions and recommendations of enormous
    economic importance to the people of Jefferson County. In light of our duty to construe
    the Open Meetings Act “broadly to promote openness and accountability in government,”
    Metro. Air 
    Research, 842 S.W.2d at 616
    , we hold that it applies to EDOC.
    V.
    The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial
    court for such further proceedings as may be necessary, consistent with this opinion.
    Costs on appeal are assessed to the Appellee, Jefferson County Economic Development
    Oversight Committee.
    _______________________________
    CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
    22