Ellis v. United States ( 2018 )


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    3Jn tbe mtniteb ~tates Id. Although the 
    remainder of his complaint is highly unusual, it appears that
    plaintiff suffered an injury during a medical procedure. See 
    Id. at 28.
    He alleges
    that he suffers from a failed spinal implant and is "permanently physically
    disabled" as a result. Compl. at 3. A doctor's letter describes plaintiff's medical
    history as "complex," and explains that, some time ago, plaintiff had a "fusion"
    operation on his back "with screws, rods, and cages," and has been suffering
    continued pain since that time. Pl.'s Response to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, at
    67. This letter also states that Mr. Ellis more recently had a neurosurgical
    operation to deal with a cystic mass which had caused "mischiefintracranially," as
    well as cephalgia and seizures. 
    Id. It appears
    that plaintiff wishes to sue the
    doctors who he believes are responsible for some of his medical issues. Compl. at 3,
    28.
    The government has moved to dismiss Mr. Ellis's complaint for lack of
    subject-matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(l). The government argues that Mr.
    Ellis's tort and criminal claims, Mot. to Dismiss at 4-5, contract claims, 
    id. at 6-7,
    and other miscellaneous claims, 
    id. at 7-10,
    are outside of this court's jurisdiction.2
    The clerk's office received a further document from plaintiff on March 26,
    2018, which was filed as a response to the government's motion. This document is
    also highly irregular, and consists mainly of plaintiff's disquisition on esoteric legal
    theories, as well as several of his medical records. The government filed a reply on
    March 28, 2018, briefly reiterating the arguments from its motion.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
    Whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that
    may be brought up at any time, either by the parties or by the court sua sponte.
    Folden v. United States, 
    379 F.3d 1344
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Pursuant to RCFC
    12(h)(3), "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
    jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." In making this determination, "the
    allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and jurisdiction is decided on
    the face of the pleadings." 
    Folden, 379 F.3d at 1354
    .
    The Tucker Act provides this court with jurisdiction over "any claim against
    the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or
    any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
    with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
    2 Mr. Ellis also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The government
    has not opposed this motion. Accordingly, it is hereby GRANTED.
    -2-
    sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(l). The provision of the Constitution or Act of
    Congress cited as the basis for the claim must be money-mandating to place the
    matter within our jurisdiction. See Smith v. United States, 
    709 F.3d 1114
    , 1116
    (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("To be cognizable under the Tucker Act, the claim must be for
    money damages against the United States, and the substantive law must be money-
    manda ting.").
    B. Analysis
    Assuming that Mr. Ellis's allegations are true and taking into consideration
    Mr. Ellis's prose status by broadly construing his arguments, the Court
    nevertheless finds that none of his claims falls within our jurisdiction. This court
    cannot entertain this case unless a jurisdictional basis has been properly invoked.
    See RCFC 12(h)(3).
    The gravamen of Mr. Ellis's complaint appears to be allegations of tort claims
    for professional malpractice and battery. Compl. at 3. The Tucker Act expressly
    places within our jurisdiction only matters "not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C.
    § 149l(a)(l). Fraud and malpractice claims sound in tort and are not within the
    Court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sellick v. United States, 
    222 Ct. Cl. 679
    , 681 (1980)
    (fraud); McCullough v. United States, 
    76 Fed. Cl. 1
    , 4 (2006) (malpractice).
    Furthermore, plaintiff appears to be asserting claims against private parties, see
    Compl. at 28. The federal government, however, is the only proper defendant in our
    court. Stephenson v. United States, 
    58 Fed. Cl. 186
    , 190 (2003) (citing United States
    v. Sherwood, 
    312 U.S. 584
    , 588 (1941)).
    Insofar as plaintiff's mentions of "abuse" and "torture," see Compl. at 3, can
    be construed as criminal allegations, this court also has no jurisdiction over such
    claims. See Stanwyck v. United States, 
    127 Fed. Cl. 308
    , 314 (2016). The
    government notes possible allegations of violations of the Eighth Amendment, the
    Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 3 the Social Security Act, 4 and
    the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 but these claims would also lie outside our
    jurisdiction. See Mot. to Dismiss at 7-9 (citing Marcus v. United States, 
    909 F.2d 1470
    , 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Graves v. United States, No. 16-535C, 
    2016 WL 3660488
    , at *1 (Fed. Cl. July 5, 2016) (citing Trafny v. United States, 
    503 F.3d 1339
    ,
    1390 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); Searles v. United States, 
    88 Fed. Cl. 801
    , 805 (2009); Agee v.
    United States, 
    72 Fed. Cl. 284
    , 289-90 (2006)).
    Although his complaint contains language concerning "violation of contract,"
    see Compl. at 3, plaintiff has failed to adequately plead a contract with the United
    a Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg, 29 U.S.C. § 1181 et
    seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1320d et seq.).
    4 42 U.S.C. ch. 7.
    5 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
    -3-
    States which would give the Court jurisdiction to hear his case. Plaintiff has pled
    no allegations concerning any federal officers with apparent authority to bind the
    United States, given no details about the terms of any alleged contract, and given
    no information beyond the bare words "violation of contract." See Trauma Serv.
    Grp., Ltd. v. United States, 
    33 Fed. Cl. 426
    , 430 (1995) (citing Modern Sys. Tech.
    Corp. v. United States, 979 F .2d 200, 201 (Fed. CiT. 1992)). In his response, Mr.
    Ellis mentions federal contractors, Response at 11, but then goes on to discuss "the
    uniform bonding code" and his theories of public finance. It may be that the
    Wyoming Medical Center, see Compl. at 28, the Houston Clinic, see Response at 76,
    the Kansas Institute of Medicine, see Response at 67, or Mr. Ellis's doctors were in
    some manner contractors of the federal government, but his filings do not contain
    sufficient information to allow the Court to conclude that any contract ever existed
    between plaintiff and the United States.
    It is clear from reading plaintiff's submissions that he has undergone serious
    medical problems and considerable suffering. But, like many pro se litigants,
    plaintiff misunderstands the nature of our court's jurisdiction, which does not
    encompass any of the claims which he wishes to bring.
    III. CONCLUSION
    Because plaintiff's allegations do not raise a matter within this court's
    jurisdiction, the defendant's motion to dismiss this case is hereby GRANTED. The
    Clerk is directed to close the case .
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-14

Judges: Victor J. Wolski

Filed Date: 4/30/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/30/2018