O. v. Secretary of Health and Human Services ( 2018 )


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  •          In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
    Filed: April 5, 2018
    * * * * * * * * * * *                    * *          UNPUBLISHED
    S.O. and A.O., Parents and Natural         *
    Guardians of T.A.O., a Minor,              *          Chief Special Master Dorsey
    *
    *          No. 08-125V
    Petitioners,                 *
    *          Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; Autism;
    v.                                        *          Administrative Work;
    *          Duplicative Work of Co-Counsel;
    SECRETARY OF HEALTH                        *          Travel Unrelated to the Hearing.
    AND HUMAN SERVICES,                        *
    *
    Respondent.                  *
    * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    Robert J. Krakow, Law Office of Robert J. Krakow, P.C., New York, NY, for petitioners.
    Linda Sara Renzi, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.
    DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1
    On March 3, 2008, S.O. and A.O. (“petitioners”) filed a petition for compensation under
    the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program2 (“the Program”), as the Natural Guardians
    of their son, T.A.O., a minor. Petitioners alleged that multiple childhood vaccinations that
    T.A.O. received caused him to develop autism or autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”).
    1
    This decision will be posted on the website of the United States Court of Federal Claims’
    website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). This
    means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. As provided by
    42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)B), however, the parties may objection to the published Decision’s
    inclusion of certain kinds of confidential information. Specifically, Under Vaccine Rule 18(b),
    each party has 14 days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that
    party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or
    confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would
    constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the
    whole decision will be available to the public in its current form. 
    Id. 2 The
    National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is set forth in Part 2 of the National
    Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, codified as amended,
    42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012) (“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All citations in this decision
    to individual sections of the Vaccine Act are to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.
    1
    This case was part of the J.M. et al. (02-10V) omnibus case. On May 6, 2014, petitioners
    filed a status report in which they agreed to be bound by the ruling in J.M et al. The undersigned
    issued a decision dismissing both J.M. et al. and this case on August 31, 2017. J.M. et al. v.
    Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 02-10V, 
    2017 WL 7409771
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 31,
    2017).
    On August 28, 2017, petitioners filed a motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs.
    Petitioners’ Interim Application (“Pet. App.”) dated August 28, 2017 (ECF No. 105). Petitioners
    requested $91,012.40 in attorneys’ fees to compensate their attorney, Mr. Robert Krakow, and
    $10,076.37 in costs, including $450.00 in petitioners’ costs. Pet. App., Ex. 27, Tab 2 at 56.
    Petitioners filed a supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on November 5, 2017,
    requesting an additional $2,282.25 in supplemental attorneys’ fees for the winding up of the
    case. Pet. Supplemental (“Supp.”) App. dated Nov. 5, 2017 (ECF No. 112), Tab 6 at 1. Thus,
    petitioners request a total of $93,294.65 in fees and $10,076.37 in costs, for a total request of
    $103,371.02 in fees and costs.
    Respondent did not file a response to petitioners’ motion for interim fees and costs or
    petitioners’ supplemental motion for fees and costs. For the reasons discussed below, the
    undersigned GRANTS petitioners’ motion and awards $78,142.59 in attorneys’ fees and costs
    and $445.00 in petitioners’ costs.
    I.      Discussion
    Under the Vaccine Act, a special master shall award reasonable attorneys’ fees and
    costs for any petition that results in an award of compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1).
    When compensation is not awarded, the special master “may” award reasonable attorneys’
    fees and costs “if the special master or court determines that the petition was brought in good
    faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” 
    Id. at §15(e)(3).
    Respondent has not objected to petitioners’ application for fees and costs on the
    basis of a lack of good faith or reasonable basis. The undersigned finds that petitioners
    brought their petition in good faith and with a reasonable basis, and therefore will award
    reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
    a. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees
    The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable
    attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    515 F.3d 1343
    , 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Using the lodestar approach, a court first determines “an initial
    estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended
    on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” 
    Id. at 1347-58
    (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 
    465 U.S. 886
    , 888 (1984)). Then, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the
    initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. 
    Id. at 1348.
    Counsel must submit fee requests that include contemporaneous and specific billing
    records indicating the service performed, the number of hours expended on the service, and the
    name of the person performing the service. See Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85 Fed.
    2
    Cl. 313, 316-18 (Fed. Cl. 2008). Counsel should not include in their fee requests hours that are
    “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    3 F.3d 1517
    , 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 434 (1983)). It is
    “well within the special master’s discretion to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her]
    experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work done.” 
    Id. at 1522.
    Furthermore, the special
    master may reduce a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by respondent and without
    providing the petitioner notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    86 Fed. Cl. 201
    , 209 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
    A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application
    when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    102 Fed. Cl. 719
    , 729
    (Fed. Cl. 2011). Special masters may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Act and its
    attorneys to determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Wasson, 
    24 Cl. Ct. 482
    , 484,
    (Fed. Cl. Nov. 19, 1991) rev’d on other grounds and aff’d in relevant part, 
    988 F.2d 131
    (Fed. Cir.
    1993). Just as “[t]rial courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the
    number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests . . . [v]accine program special masters are also
    entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    3 F.3d 1517
    , 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
    i. Hourly Rates
    Petitioners request compensation for Mr. Krakow in the amounts of $335.00 per hour for
    work performed in 2008; $345.00 per hour for work performed in 2009; $355.00 per hour for
    work performed in 2010; $365.00 per hour for work performed in 2011; $375.00 per hour for
    work performed in 2012; $385.00 per hour for work performed in 2013; $396.00 per hour for
    work performed in 2014; $413.00 per hour for work performed in 2015; $425.00 per hour for
    work performed in 2016; and $435.00 per hour for work performed in 2017. Pet. App. at 14. In
    support of these rates, Mr. Krakow states that he has 37 years of experience practicing law, 14 of
    which are in the Vaccine Program. 
    Id. Mr. Krakow
    based his most hourly rate increases on the
    Office of Special Masters’ 2015-2017 Fee Schedules, which specify hourly rate ranges for
    attorneys based on the standards set forth in McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No.
    09-293V, 
    2015 WL 5634323
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015).3
    Counsel also requests paralegal rates for paralegal work performed by Mr. Krakow. Mr.
    Krakow requests $125.00 per hour for paralegal work performed between 2008 and 2016. Pet.
    App., Tab 2 at 57. He requests $140.00 per hour for paralegal work performed in 2017. 
    Id. Mr. The
    undersigned has evaluated Mr. Krakow’s requested attorney rates in many other
    decisions regarding attorneys’ fees and costs and has awarded Mr. Krakow’s herein requested
    attorney hourly rates from 2009 to 2016. Laderer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 09-97V,
    
    2016 WL 3044838
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 20, 2016). Moreover, the undersigned finds the
    hourly rate requested for work performed in 2008 reasonable in light of the analysis set forth in
    3
    The 2015-2016 Hourly Rate Fee Schedule can be accessed at:
    www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/.../Attorneys-Forum-Rate-Fee-Schedule2015-2016.pdf. The 2017
    Fee Schedule can be accessed at:
    http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys-Forum-Rate-Fee-Schedule-2017.pdf.
    3
    Laderer.4 With respect to the requested rate of $435.00 per hour for work performed in 2017, the
    undersigned agrees with the analysis of Special Master Millman in J.O. v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 14-946V, 
    2017 WL 3165641
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 27, 2017), finding Mr.
    Krakow entitled to this rate, and the undersigned awards $435.00 per hour for Mr. Krakow’s
    work in 2017.
    With respect to the requested paralegal rates, in Laderer, the undersigned stated that a
    reasonable paralegal hourly rate for Mr. Krakow’s work was $125.00 per hour for work
    performed between 2009 and 2016. 
    2016 WL 3044838
    , at *3. In this case, Mr. Krakow requests
    a rate of $125.00 per hour for paralegal work performed between 2008 and 2016, and he requests
    a rate of $140.00 per hour for paralegal work performed in 2017. Pet. App. at 17. Several other
    special masters have raised Mr. Krakow’s paralegal rate to $140.00 per hour in 2017, and the
    undersigned follows the reasoning set forth in those cases and awards a paralegal rate of $140.00
    per hour in 2017. See Webb v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 15-1387V, 
    2017 WL 22009902
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 24, 2017) (Special Master Sanders); J.O., 
    2017 WL 3165641
    (Special Master Millman).
    ii. Reduction of Billable Hours
    While the undersigned agrees that petitioners are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, a
    reduction in the number of hours billed by Mr. Krakow is appropriate for four reasons. First,
    much of the time that Mr. Krakow billed is duplicative with the time billed by Mr. John
    McHugh, the lead counsel for the J.M. et al. omnibus. Second, counsel requests compensation
    for multiple hours of administrative work, including filing documents, scheduling status
    conferences, and organizing files. Third, petitioners’ counsel billed excessive time for travel that
    was not related to the hearing in the case. Finally, counsel billed for time spent attempting to
    gain access to the Vaccine Safety Datalink (“VSD”), despite the fact that two earlier motions for
    access to the VSD were denied.
    For all of these reasons, each of which is explained in further detail below, the
    undersigned reduces the number of billable hours for which petitioners’ counsel is entitled to
    compensation by 20 percent, or $18,658.93.5
    4
    The undersigned noted in Laderer that historically, Mr. Krakow and respondent negotiated and
    filed stipulations for attorneys’ fees awards. The undersigned was unable to find any fee
    decisions discussing Mr. Krakow’s hourly rate prior to 2014. 
    2016 WL 3044838
    , at *3.
    5
    In her decision awarding Mr. McHugh interim attorneys’ fees and costs, the undersigned
    reduced Mr. McHugh’s requested fees from $465,060.00 to $305,492.75, resulting in an
    approximately 39 percent cut. See J.M. et al. v Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 02-10V, 
    2016 WL 720969
    . In the decision awarding final fees and costs, the undersigned reduced Mr.
    McHugh’s fees from the requested $343,231.80 to $202,993.80, a reduction of over 40 percent.
    Mr. McHugh did not file a motion for review of either of those decisions. J.M. et al. v. Sec’y of
    Health & Human Servs., 02-10V, 
    2018 WL 1514433
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 13, 2018); see
    also Raymo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 11-654V, 
    2016 WL 7212323
    (Fed Cl. Spec.
    4
    1. Duplicative Billing with Work Performed by Co-Counsel
    As explained by Mr. McHugh in his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in the J.M. et al.
    case, Mr. McHugh acted as lead counsel for petitioners in the omnibus case. 
    2018 WL 1514433
    .
    Mr. Krakow described his work in the omnibus case as “co-counsel to the lead counsel, John F.
    McHugh,” and stated that “[s]ince approximately September 2016[,] petitioners’ counsel has
    been required to engage only in a limited amount of work in this case.” Pet. App. at 2. Mr.
    Krakow further explained that much of the work he performed in the case from 2012 forward
    was split between this case and the P.R. et al. (10-96V) case, which was also part of the J.M. et
    al. omnibus. 
    Id. at 2.
    Additionally, Mr. Krakow stated that he “participated in all aspects of the
    proceeding,” including the hearings that were held in March and May 2016. 
    Id. Due to
    the nature of Mr. Krakow’s work as co-counsel, the undersigned finds that much
    of the work in performed by Mr. Krakow in this case is duplicative of the work performed by
    Mr. McHugh in the J.M. et al. omnibus. For example, Mr. Krakow billed numerous hours in this
    case to review scheduling orders, medical literature, and the expert reports filed by both
    petitioners’ and respondent’s experts.6 However, Mr. McHugh, as lead counsel, also billed time
    in the J.M. et al. case for reviewing all of the same articles, expert reports, and scheduling orders.
    Petitioners have not provided a sufficient explanation as to why it was necessary for Mr. Krakow
    to extensively review medical articles, orders, and other documents in the omnibus, in addition to
    the time billed by MR. McHugh for extensive time spent adjudicating the cases.7 The
    undersigned does not intend to discourage petitioners’ counsel from working with other counsel.
    However, in this case, the amount of duplicative entries is particularly concerning, especially in
    light of Mr. Krakow’s concession that Mr. McHugh acted as lead counsel in the case.
    Mstr. Nov. 2, 2016); aff’d 
    129 Fed. Cl. 691
    (Fed. Cl. Dec. 14, 2016) (Judge Lettow upheld the
    undersigned’s decision reducing counsel’s fee request by 48%).
    6
    In 2015 alone, nearly all of Mr. Krakow’s billing entries are in some way duplicative of those
    of Mr. McHugh. For example, on January 29, 2015, Mr. Krakow billed time for reviewing
    medical literature. Pet. App., Tab 2 at 23. On April 2, April 5, and May 15, 2015, he billed time
    for reviewing case orders filed in the omnibus cases. 
    Id. at 23-24.
    On August 1 and August 3,
    2015, Mr. Krakow billed time for reviewing the expert report of Dr. Deisher, and on August 4,
    2015, he billed time for reviewing medical literature and planning for the hearing. 
    Id. at 26.
    On
    August 6 and August 10, August 14, August 19, and August 21, 2015, Mr. Krakow billed time
    for further review of Dr. Deisher’s materials and the medical literature submitted by petitioners.
    
    Id. at 26-27.
    During this time, Mr. Krakow also billed time for reviewing submissions from
    respondent’s experts. Throughout the remainder of 2015, and indeed, during the duration of the
    case, Mr. Krakow billed time for reviewing medical literature, expert reports, scheduling orders,
    and other documents, all of which McHugh, as lead counsel, would have also reviewed.
    7
    In total, the undersigned awarded petitioners’ lead counsel, John McHugh, $508,936.55 in
    attorneys’ fees for the prosecution of the J.M. et al. omnibus cases. See J.M. et al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    ; J.M. et al., 
    2016 WL 720969
    .
    5
    The undersigned has previously found it reasonable to reduce attorneys’ fees awards due
    to duplicative billing. See Lord v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-255V, 
    2016 WL 3960445
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 2016); Ericzon v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No.
    10-103V, 
    2016 WL 447770
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 15, 2016); Sexton v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., No. 99-453V, 
    2015 WL 7717209
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 9, 2015); J.M. et al.,
    
    2016 WL 720969
    ; Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    86 Fed. Cl. 201
    , 214-15 (2009)
    (affirming the special master’s reduction of fees for overstaffing where three attorneys from two
    different firms worked on a case together).
    2. Excessive Communication with Co-Counsel
    The undersigned further reduces petitioners’ fee award for the excessive number of hours
    billed by Mr. Krakow to communicate with co-counsel, Mr. McHugh, and petitioners’ expert,
    Dr. Deisher. Mr. Krakow billed approximately 22 hours, totaling nearly $10,000.00, to discuss
    the case with lead counsel, John McHugh, as well as with other omnibus attorneys.8 The
    undersigned finds these entries excessive and duplicative, as Mr. McHugh’s application for
    attorneys’ fees in the J.M. et al. case was similarly replete with entries for communicating with
    Mr. Krakow and other co-counsel. The undersigned has previously reduced a petitioner’s fee
    application when counsel bills for meetings between each other, as such billing is excessive and
    duplicative. Bondi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 12-476V, 
    2017 WL 1046526
    (Fed. Cl.
    Spec. Mstr. Feb. 23, 2017) (reducing counsel’s invoice for three law firm partners each billing
    time for case meetings and emails with each other). Petitioners have not provided a sufficient
    explanation of why it was necessary for Mr. Krakow to spend over 22 hours discussing the case
    with Mr. McHugh, and the undersigned finds this communication to be particularly excessive.
    Other special masters as well as the undersigned have reduced fee awards for excessive
    and duplicative intraoffice communication. See Lord, 
    2016 WL 3960445
    , at *7; Ericzon, 
    2016 WL 447770
    , at *4; Austin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-362V, 
    2013 WL 659574
    , at *14 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 31, 2013) (Special Master Vowell deducted fees for
    excessive intra-office communication in a case where seven attorneys at CHCC billed for
    attending conferences and drafting memoranda about the case); Soto v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., No. 09-897V, 
    2011 WL 2269423
    , at *6-8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 7, 2011)
    (Special Master Millman reduced CHCC’s fees for intra-office communications and
    meetings); Carcamo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 97-483V, 
    2011 WL 2413345
    , at
    *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 20, 2011) (Special Master Millman reduced fees when two
    attorneys at the Law Offices of Dale K. Galipo billed for the same meetings with a client).
    3. Administrative Work
    The undersigned also finds it reasonable to reduce petitioners’ fee award due to the
    excessive amount of administrative work billed by counsel. Mr. Krakow billed more than 60 hours
    of attorney and paralegal time between 2008 and 2017, totaling over $10,000.00, for performing
    administrative tasks such as setting up meetings, organizing exhibits, bates stamping records, filing
    8
    This estimate does not include the duplicative time Mr. Krakow billed for working with Mr.
    McHugh and/or Dr. Deisher to prepare for the trial.
    6
    records, burning discs, mailing documents, completing case inventory, receiving docket notices,
    organizing files, and updating calendars.9 It is well established that billing for clerical and other
    secretarial work is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States, 
    18 Cl. Ct. 379
    , 387 (1989) (denying an award of fees for time billed by a secretary and finding that “[these]
    services … should be considered as normal overhead office costs included within the attorneys’
    fee rates”). Other attorneys participating in the J.M. et al. omnibus were previously warned that
    administrative time would not be compensated, and the undersigned reduces petitioners’ fee
    application for administrative time. J.M. et al., 
    2016 WL 720969
    , at *5 (reducing Mr. McHugh’s
    time for administrative work).
    4. Travel Time
    The undersigned also finds it reasonable to reduce Mr. Krakow’s fee award for the five
    hours of time he billed for traveling from New York to Baltimore, Maryland in July 2014. Pet.
    App., Tab 2 at 22. This travel was unrelated to travel for the hearings held in March and May
    2016. Petitioners stated that the purpose of the travel was for a “meeting of petitioners’ counsel
    for [J.M. et al.] omnibus.” 
    Id. at 54.
    Petitioners have not provided any explanation as to why it
    was necessary for such a meeting to take place in person, rather than over the phone. Indeed,
    petitioners’ invoice otherwise reflects that counsel communicated over the phone at length with
    co-counsel and experts. The undersigned thus finds the time billed by Mr. Krakow for traveling
    to Baltimore, Maryland, in July 2014, travel which was unrelated to the hearing, to be
    unreasonable and excessive.
    9
    Mr. Krakow’s billing records for both his attorney and paralegal time contain numerous entries
    for time that is best characterized as administrative in nature. Some administrative time was
    billed along with other attorney or paralegal work. The following is a non-exhaustive list of
    dates on which Mr. Krakow billed at an attorney or paralegal rate for performing administrative
    work: September 18, 2008; April 6, 2009; September 24, 2010; September 25, 2010; October 15,
    2010; October 24, 2010; October 26, 2010; June 1, 2011; September 23, 2011; November 10,
    2011; November 28, 2011; December 11, 2011; December 13, 2011; April 12, 2012; April 14,
    2012; May 3, 2012; October 17, 2012; November 3, 2012; November 26, 2012; January 23,
    2013; April 15, 2013; April 23, 2013; May 2, 2013; June 12, 2013; June 29, 2013; July 31, 2013;
    August 19, 2013; September 27, 2013; January 6, 2014; January 8, 2014; January 19, 2014;
    March 2, 2014; March 10, 2014; April 20, 2014; May 7, 2014; May 8, 2014; July 24, 2014;
    December 8, 2014; April 2, 2015; April 5, 2015; May 15, 2015; May 18, 2015; July 9, 2015; July
    20, 2015; September 11, 2015; October 22, 2015; October 29, 2015; November 1, 2015;
    November 3, 2015; November 16, 2015; November 17, 2015; November 19, 2015; December 6,
    2015; December 17, 2018; December 21, 2015; January 6, 2016; January 8, 2016; January 9,
    2016; January 11, 2016; January 12, 2016; January 13, 2016; January 13, 2016; January 14,
    2016; January 15, 2016; January 18, 2016; January 19, 2016; January 20, 2016; January 22,
    2016; February 11, 2016; February 18, 2016; February 24, 2016; February 25, 2016; February
    29, 2016; March 1, 2016; March 2, 2016; March 3, 2016; March 4, 2016; March 8, 2016; March
    10, 2016; March 12, 2016; March 13, 2016; March 14, 2016; March 16, 2016; March 28, 2016;
    April 15, 2016; May 4, 2016; and June 11, 2017. See Pet. App., Tab 2.
    7
    5. Time Spent Working on Motions to Access the Vaccine
    Safety Datalink and the SEED Database
    As was discussed in J.M. et al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *5, the undersigned finds that
    petitioner’s fee application should be further reduced for the time that counsel spent working on
    additional motions to compel access to the Vaccine Safety Datalink (“VSD”), as well as the time
    counsel billed in May 2016 for a motion to gain access to information contained in the Study to
    Explore Early Development (“SEED”) database. Mr. Krakow billed over six hours of time in
    2015 related to preparing and filing a third motion to access the VSD,10 and he billed over 7.5
    hours of time in 2016 related to a motion to access information contained in the SEED database.
    Petitioners in the J.M. et al. case made several attempts throughout the life of the
    omnibus cases to access information in the VSD and other government databases. Mr. McHugh
    filed motions to compel access to the VSD and motions to compel documents from other
    government sources in February and March 2012. In an extensive and well-reasoned Order
    issued on June 12, 2013, then-presiding Chief Special Master Patricia Campbell-Smith denied
    petitioners’ motions to compel access to the VSD. J.M. et al. v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    Servs., No. 02-10V, 
    2013 WL 3368236
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 12, 2013). Shortly thereafter,
    the case was transferred to Special Master George Hastings for further adjudication. On July 12,
    2013, the omnibus petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of Chief Special Master
    Campbell-Smith’s Order, and Special Master Hastings denied petitioners’ motion for
    reconsideration in a second well-reasoned and detailed order. J.M. et al. v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., No. 02-10V, 2013 WL6038670 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 12, 2013).
    Despite two extensive and detailed orders denying the omnibus petitioners access to the
    VSD, petitioners filed a third motion to compel access to the VSD in the J.M. et al. case on October
    1, 2015, for which Mr. Krakow has billed time in this case. The undersigned denied the motion to
    compel on August 30, 2016. J.M. et al. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 02-10V, 
    2016 WL 5362878
    (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 30, 2016).11 Similarly, on May 5, 2016, petitioners filed a
    motion to subpoena a government employee to “testify as to the composition and research use of
    data collected by … SEED.” Pet. Mot. dated May 5, 2016 (ECF No. 261) at 1. Petitioners further
    wished to subpoena Dr. William Thompson of the Centers for Disease Control to testify regarding
    matters unrelated to the theory of causation in the case. See 
    id. Two extensive,
    detailed, and well-reasoned orders were issued denying petitioners’
    motions for access to the VSD, and an explanation was provided as to why the Vaccine Program
    could not give petitioners access to the information they sought to subpoena or otherwise compel.
    10
    These entries include but are not limited to the following dates: September 2, 2015; September
    4, 2015; September 8, 2015; September 11, 2015; September 12, 2015; September 30, 2015;
    October 1, 2015; October 15, 2015; October 23, 2015; and October 26, 2015. See Pet. App., Tab
    2 at 28-30.
    11
    On May 11, 2017, petitioners made a fourth attempt to renew their motion for access to the
    VSD during the rebuttal testimony for Dr. Deisher, which the undersigned denied from the
    bench.
    8
    The special masters adjudicating those motions also made clear that neither the information
    contained in the VSD nor the SEED database was relevant to petitioners’ medical theory of
    causation and was not needed to go forward with the omnibus. Thus, the undersigned finds that
    the additional hours billed by Mr. Krakow, totaling over $5,000.00, for preparing additional VSD
    motions and the motion to compel information from SEED, are unreasonable.
    b. Costs
    Petitioners request $9,631.37 in attorneys’ costs and $445.00 in petitioners’ out-of-pocket
    costs, for a total of $10,076.37. Pet. App. at 4. Like attorneys’ fees, attorneys’ costs must also be
    reasonable. 
    Sabella, 86 Fed. Cl. at 206
    . After carefully considering petitioners’ application and
    for the reasons discussed below, the undersigned awards a total of $3,506.87 in costs and $450.00
    in petitioners’ costs.
    i. Expert Costs for Dr. Deisher and Research Assistants
    Petitioners request a total of $7,300.00 to compensate Dr. Theresa Deisher and her
    assistants for work they billed on the case between 2013 and 2014. Dr. Deisher billed 12 hours
    of time at a rate of $500.00 per hour, and her research assistants billed 9 hours of work at a rate
    of $125.00 per hour. Pet. App., Tab 3 at 43. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned
    awards a total of $480.00 in costs for work performed by Dr. Deisher.
    1. Hourly Rates
    The undersigned has previously found that $300.00 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate
    for Dr. Deisher’s work, and she will compensate Dr. Deisher at this rate. J.M. et al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *9.
    With regard to the work performed by Dr. Deisher’s research assistants, Ms. Angelica
    Omaiye and Ms. Katie Doan, the undersigned declines to award for work performed in this case,
    as the work they performed was research based and was not related to the medical theory of
    causation in the case. For the same reasons set forth in J.M. et al., the undersigned will not award
    fees for Ms. Omaiye and Ms. Doan in this case. J.M. et al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *13-16.
    2. Reductions
    Petitioners filed an invoice from Dr. Deisher and her team reflecting the work they
    performed in the case. Pet App., Tab 3 at 43. However, much of the time billed by Dr. Deisher
    is duplicative of time which she billed and for which she was compensated in the J.M. et al. case.
    J.M. et al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *12-14 For example, on April 22, 2013, Dr. Deisher billed 45
    minutes for reviewing her expert report, and on September 23, 2013, she billed 4 hours of time to
    “write opinion.” An expert report from Dr. Deisher was not filed in this case, and Dr. Deisher
    already received compensation for drafting the expert reports which were filed in the J.M. et al.
    omnibus. 
    Id. Similarly, on
    September 18, 2013, Dr. Deisher billed 1 hour and 15 minutes of
    time to discuss a “detailed explanation of plan,” with Mr. Krakow. The undersigned has already
    9
    compensated Dr. Deisher for work of this nature in J.M. et al., and thus finds these additional
    entries duplicative. See 
    id. As discussed
    above, both Dr. Deisher and her research assistants also billed time in this
    case for research and other work that was unrelated to the medical theory of causation in the J.M.
    et al. omnibus. 12 For example, on January 23 and February 6, 2013, Dr. Deisher billed time to
    discuss a genetic report with Mr. Krakow, and on February 6, 2013, Ms. Doan and Ms. Omaiye
    collectively billed 9 hours of time to “transcribe[] DNA,” and perform “molecular modeling.”
    Pet. App., Tab 3 at 43. These entries do not appear to be related to the medical theory of
    causation as discussed in J.M. et al., and the undersigned finds that they are not compensable.
    For these reasons, the undersigned reduces Dr. Deisher’s invoice by $5,620.00.
    ii. Other Costs
    In addition to expert fees, Mr. Krakow also requests reimbursement for other expenses
    incurred during the hearings in March and May 2016, as well as incidental expenses during these
    trips. Mr. Krakow also seeks reimbursement for a trip to Baltimore in July 2014 to meet with
    experts and other co-counsel in the J.M. et al. omnibus. The undersigned reimburses Mr. Krakow
    for all of his requested expenses, with the exception of the following items discussed below.
    Mr. Krakow requests reimbursement for costs related to traveling from his office in New
    York, New York, to Baltimore, Maryland in July 2014. These costs include $231.00 in mileage
    for driving from New York to Baltimore, $35.55 in highway tolls, $30.90 in meals, and $154.47
    in hotel costs.13 Pet. App., Tab 2 at 54-55; Pet. App., Tab 3 at 8-11. The undersigned finds these
    costs unreasonable, as they were not related to the hearing in the omnibus case. The undersigned
    similarly denied travel expenses for Mr. McHugh in the J.M. et al. omnibus when the travel was
    not related to the hearings in the cases in March and May 2016 and when petitioners did not
    otherwise provide an explanation of why such expenses were reasonable or necessary. J.M. et al.,
    
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *6. The undersigned thus reduces petitioners’ costs by the $451.922 spent
    on the trip to Baltimore.
    Additionally, Mr. Krakow requests reimbursement for office supplies, which the
    undersigned finds unreasonable. Mr. Krakow requests $97.05 in reimbursement for office supplies
    purchased at FedEx Office. Pet. App., Tab 3 at 30. As explained by the undersigned in J.M. et
    12
    In her decision awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to the J.M. et al. petitioners, the undersigned
    also extensively discussed the rationale for why the Program does not compensate experts for
    research they perform that is not related to drafting their expert opinions. See J.M. et al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *14-15.
    13
    The total cost of Mr. Krakow’s trip to Baltimore was $872.94, which Mr. Krakow split
    between this case and the P.R. et al. case, which was also part of the J.M. et al. omnibus. Thus,
    the undersigned reduces Mr. Krakow’s application in this case for one half of this cost, or
    $451.92.
    10
    al., 
    2018 WL 1514433
    , at *19, office supplies are considered overhead expenses and are not
    billable to the Program. The undersigned thus reduces petitioners’ costs request by $48.53.14
    iii. Petitioners’ Out-of-Pocket Costs
    Petitioners’ out-of-pocket costs include payment of the filing fee and photocopying costs.
    Pet. App. at 4. The undersigned finds these costs reasonable and reimburses them in full.
    II.    Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that petitioners are entitled to an
    award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The amount of the award is computed as follows:
    Total Fees and Costs Requested:                                    $103,371.02
    Attorneys’ Fees:
    Total Requested:                                             $93,294.65
    20 % Reduction:                                              ($18,658.93)
    Total Awarded:                                               $74,635.72
    Total Attorneys’ Fees Awarded:                                     $74,635.72
    Costs:
    Total Requested                                           $9,631.37
    Dr. Theresa Deisher:                                      $7,300.00
    Reductions                                          ($5,620.00)
    Other Costs
    Reduction for travel                                ($436.47)
    Reduction for wine/office supplies                  ($68.03)
    Petitioners’ Costs
    Requested                                          $445.00
    Reductions                                         ($0.00)
    Awarded                                            $445.00
    Total Costs Awarded:                                      $3,506.87
    Accordingly, the Court awards:
    14
    Mr. Krakow split the total cost of his meals and the FedEx charges between this case and the
    P.R. et al. case, which was also part of the J.M. et al. omnibus. Thus, the undersigned only
    reduces one half of the total requested costs.
    11
    (1) $78,142.59 in attorneys’ fees and costs, in the form of a check payable jointly to
    petitioners and petitioners’ attorney, Mr. Robert Krakow; and
    (2) $445.00 in petitioners’ costs, in the form of a check payable to petitioners.
    In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of
    court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.15
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/Nora Beth Dorsey
    Nora Beth Dorsey
    Chief Special Master
    15
    Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by each party, either
    separately or jointly, filing a notice renouncing the right to seek review.
    12