Com. v. Ritter, W. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM SCOTT RITTER JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 3333 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002238-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J. and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2017
William Scott Ritter, Jr., appeals, pro se, from the order entered
October 6, 2016, in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas dismissing
his first petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Ritter seeks relief from judgment of sentence of an
aggregate term of 18 to 66 months’ imprisonment imposed October 26,
2011, following his jury conviction of, inter alia, indecent exposure and three
counts of unlawful contact with a minor, based upon sexually explicit
communications he had with a police detective who was posing as a 15-
year-old female. On appeal, Ritter contends the PCRA court abused its
discretion when it failed to consider newly discovered evidence that would
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1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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have precluded the Commonwealth from presenting evidence of Ritter’s prior
arrests for similar crimes in New York state. Because we conclude Ritter is
no longer eligible for PCRA relief, we affirm.
The facts underlying Ritter’s arrest and conviction are well known to
the parties, and were summarized by a panel of this Court in the
memorandum decision affirming Ritter’s sentence on direct appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Ritter, 91 A.3d 1273 [975 EDA 2012] (Pa. Super.
2013) (unpublished memorandum). Therefore, we need not reiterate them
herein. The following facts, however, are relevant to the issues raised on
appeal:
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth uncovered information,
via a Google search, of Ritter’s prior arrests from online sex sting
operations in New York. The public internet search yielded news
articles reporting that, in April 2011, Ritter communicated online
in a chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 14–
year–old female and arranged to meet the “girl” at a local
business in Albany. Ritter arrived at the designated location and
was questioned by the authorities; however, he was released
without any charges being filed. Two months later, Ritter was
again caught in the same kind of sex sting after he tried to lure
what he thought was a 16–year–old female to a fast food
restaurant. Ritter was subsequently charged, but the Albany
District Attorney placed the case on hold.
Upon discovery of the publicly available articles regarding
Ritter’s prior engagement in internet sex stings, the
Commonwealth requested and later received copies of those
records from the Albany County District Attorney’s Office. The
Commonwealth provided Ritter with copies of the records in
compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 573. Unbeknownst to the
Commonwealth, the New York state records were sealed at the
time they were forwarded to the Commonwealth, prompting the
Commonwealth to return the records to the Albany County
District Attorney’s Office. A petition to unseal the records was
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subsequently filed and granted by the trial court in Albany
County[.]1
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1
Ritter filed a motion to vacate the order entered unsealing the
record in Albany County which was denied. Ritter then appealed
that decision to the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Appellate Division.
__________
Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a notice of prior bad
acts as well as a motion in limine seeking to introduce the New
York arrest records at trial. In response thereto, Ritter filed a
motion for dismissal/change of venue as well as a motion in
limine seeking to preclude this evidence. The trial court held a
hearing on the motions. At the hearing, the Commonwealth’s
exhibits, consisting in part of the New York arrest records, were
admitted under seal. After the hearing, the trial court entered
an order and accompanying opinion granting the
Commonwealth's motion in limine, permitting evidence of
Ritter's prior bad acts in New York to be admitted at trial.
Following a jury trial, Ritter was found guilty of all but one
count. Prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, Appellate Division reversed and vacated the
order of the Albany County court unsealing Ritter’s
records. Ritter then filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to
Rule 704(B) or in the alternative to postpone sentencing. The
trial court sentenced Ritter on October 26, 2011. At the time of
sentencing Ritter made an oral motion for extraordinary relief.
After extensive argument regarding the New York records, the
trial court denied Ritter’s request for a new trial and sentenced
Ritter to an aggregate period of 18 to 66 months’ imprisonment.
Ritter filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied.
Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
As noted supra, Ritter’s judgment of sentence was affirmed on direct
appeal. On appeal, Ritter argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in
failing to grant a new trial when the Supreme Court of New York Appellate
Division reversed the Albany County court’s order unsealing Ritter’s arrest
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records. See id. at *3. The panel determined the information regarding
Ritter’s prior arrests for internet sex crimes was relevant and its “probative
value outweighed any prejudicial effect to Ritter.” Id. Moreover, because
the records were “unsealed at the time of their production to the
Commonwealth … and at that time of Ritter’s jury trial[,]” the panel
concluded the trial court did not err in permitting the Commonwealth to
admit the records into evidence. Id. (emphasis in original). Subsequently,
on May 21, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Ritter’s petition
for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Ritter, 92 A.3d 811 (Pa.
2014).
On April 6, 2015, Ritter filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, again
challenging the trial court’s admission of his New York arrest records. Ritter
argued that a February 5, 2015, decision of the Albany County, New York
court, precluding any reference to the now-sealed arrest records during his
New York state Sexual Offenders Registration Act (“SORA”) hearing, must be
afforded “full faith and credit” in his Pennsylvania proceedings. See PCRA
Petition, 4/6/2015, at 12-18. By order dated January 14, 2016, the PCRA
court denied Ritter’s motion without first conducting a hearing.
Ritter filed a timely appeal. However, both the PCRA court and the
Commonwealth asked this Court to remand the matter because the PCRA
court failed to provide Ritter with the requisite notice of its intent to dismiss
the petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On July 12, 2016, this Court entered a per curium order
vacating the order denying PCRA relief and remanding for further
proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Ritter, 380 EDA 2016, Order,
7/12/2016.
On August 29, 2016, Ritter requested the PCRA court conduct a
Grazier2 hearing, so that he could continue to proceed pro se. Three days
later, Ritter filed a pro se petition for an evidentiary hearing. Thereafter, on
September 9, 2016, the PCRA court conducted a Grazier hearing, and
entered an order granting Ritter’s request to proceed pro se. Subsequently,
on September 15, 2016, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its
intent to dismiss Ritter’s petition without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing. Although Ritter filed a 44-page response, the PCRA court entered
an order dismissing Ritter’s petition on October 6, 2016. This timely appeal
follows.3
Before we may address the issues Ritter raises on appeal, we must
first determine if Ritter is statutorily eligible for PCRA relief. Although not
addressed by the PCRA court or either party, it is well-established that to be
eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must prove that at the time relief is
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2
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
3
Although the PCRA court did not direct Ritter to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Ritter,
nevertheless, filed concise statement on November 2, 2016.
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granted he is “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or
parole for the crime[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). “Case law has strictly
interpreted the requirement that the petitioner be currently serving a
sentence for the crime to be eligible for relief.” Commonwealth v.
Plunkett, 151 A.3d 1108, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, ___ A.3d
___, 2017 WL 2081583 (May 15, 2017).
This Court’s decision in Plunkett is dispositive. In that case, the
defendant filed a timely PCRA petition while on probation following a
conviction of theft by deception. See Plunkett, supra, 151 A.3d at 1109.
The PCRA court conducted a hearing on the issues raised in the petition and,
in June of 2015, entered an order denying relief. The defendant
subsequently filed a timely appeal. Thereafter, in January of 2016, while the
appeal was pending in this Court, the trial court entered an order
terminating the defendant’s probationary sentence. See id. On appeal, this
Court determined the defendant was not entitled to relief because he was no
longer serving a sentence for the conviction at issue. The panel opined:
“[W]e find the statutory requirement that a PCRA petitioner be currently
serving a sentence is applicable to the instant circumstance where the PCRA
court’s order was issued while petitioner was still serving the required
sentence, but that sentence terminated prior to the resolution of his appeal.”
Id. at 1113. See also Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013)
(“Because individuals who are not serving a state sentence have no liberty
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interest in and therefore no due process right to collateral review of that
sentence, the statutory limitation of collateral review to individuals serving a
sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole is consistent with the due
process prerequisite of a protected liberty interest.”), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct.
1771 (U.S. 2014); Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (finding appellant was no longer eligible for relief on DUI
convictions for which he had completed his sentence, but considering
collateral claims with regard to conviction of fleeing while DUI), appeal
denied, 125 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2015).
Here, Ritter was sentenced to a maximum term of 66 months’
imprisonment on October 26, 2011. The sentencing transcript reveals that
Ritter was taken into custody immediately following the hearing. See N.T.,
10/26/2011, at 225. Although, in his post-sentence motion, Ritter
requested bail pending appeal, the court denied his request. See Order,
3/20/2012. Accordingly, Ritter’s sentence expired on April 26, 2017, and he
is statutorily ineligible for PCRA relief.4
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4
In fact, Ritter acknowledged this in two prior filings. See Motion for Post-
Conviction Collateral Relief, 4/6/2015, at 5 (stating “Petitioner will complete
his period of parole on April 2[6], 2017”); Letter to PCRA court dated
8/25/2016, at 1 (requesting the court “expeditiously process” his petition
because his “parole expires on April 26, 2017”).
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Because Ritter is no longer serving a sentence for the convictions that
are the subject of this PCRA petition, he is not entitled to PCRA relief, and
we affirm the order on appeal.5
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/12/2017
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5
We note that because Ritter was still serving his sentence at the time the
PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice and accompanying opinion, the court
addressed the merits of the issues raised on appeal. However, it is well-
settled that “we may affirm a PCRA court's decision on any grounds if the
record supports it.” Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (quotation omitted).
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