Andrew Cantu v. State ( 2011 )

NUMBER 13-07-00723-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
ANDREW CANTU, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 319th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Vela
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
Appellant, Andrew Cantu, was charged with one count of murder and two counts
of aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02, 21.01, 22.02 (West 2003).
Cantu waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was held. The trial court found
Cantu guilty on all three counts and sentenced him to life on the murder charge and
twenty years’ confinement on each aggravated assault charge, respectively, with the
three sentences ordered to run concurrently in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice—Institutional Division. In three issues, with numerous sub-issues, Cantu
contends that: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction on all
counts; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (3) and the trial court abused
its discretion by allowing him to waive his right to a jury trial without proper
admonishment and by sentencing him to the maximum punishment for each count
without reviewing the evidence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 6, 2006, Cantu was at a pool hall called ―Hot Shots‖ with his girlfriend
(later to become his wife) Jessica Serna. A verbal altercation occurred between Cantu,
Serna, and ―Chi Chi Boy.‖ Cantu and Serna were asked to leave the premises, but they
returned and later continued their altercation with Chi Chi Boy in the parking lot. At one
point, Cantu drove his maroon Suburban into the parking lot and hit Ignacio Tamgumay,
Michael Veira, and Immanuel Garcia, all of whom were in the process of leaving the pool
hall. It is disputed whether the victims were part of the initial altercation inside the
premises, but they were not part of the continued altercation in the parking lot. All three
victims were seriously injured, and Tamgumay died as a result of his injuries.
Serna testified that she knew Chi Chi Boy and had problems with him in the past.
Serna testified that she and Cantu left the bar and picked up their friend, Daniel
Maurecio. When they returned to Hot Shots to pick up Serna’s sister and her sister’s
father-in-law who had remained at the bar, they were surrounded by at least five
individuals. These individuals were ―calling out‖ Cantu. Maurecio jumped out of the
2
vehicle and yelled, ―[W]ho is messing with my homeboy?‖, and the exchange quickly
became physical. Serna testified that she tried to get Maurecio back in the vehicle and
that Cantu also tried to get out of the Suburban, but ‖they‖ came after him, so Cantu got
back in.
Serna testified that Cantu began to drive away. She then saw him turn the
Suburban’s wheel, missing an Expedition, but hitting a Ford F-150 truck. Cantu then hit
a passenger vehicle and dragged it because it was ―stuck‖ to the Suburban. Serna
stated that Cantu did not run down anyone, that he was not driving fast, and that they
had problems with the steering wheel of the Suburban.
Maurecio testified that after jumping out of the Suburban, someone hit him. As
he was running away, he heard a commotion and saw the Suburban smashing into a
white car.
Michael Veira, a friend of the deceased, Tamgumay, testified that he and
Tamgumay went to Hot Shots to play pool with their friends Lenardo DeLejia and
Immanuel Garcia. Tamgumay was driving a silver Ford F-150 truck, and Veira was a
passenger in the truck. DeLejia was in a Chevrolet Malibu, and Garcia was his
passenger. Before Hot Shots’s closed, Veira went to the bathroom and heard the
altercation between Cantu, Serna, and Chi Chi Boy. He testified that he did not know
any of them. After about five minutes, Veira and his friends left the premises and
gathered in the parking lot to discuss what they were going to do next. The F-150 and
Malibu were parked next to each other, with Veira and his friends standing around the
two vehicles.
Veira testified that, after a fight broke out, he saw the Suburban driving away but
3
then it returned and drove straight towards his friends and him. Veira testified that there
was no hesitation on the part of the driver, and that the Suburban was going between
twenty-five and thirty-five miles per hour. Veira stated that the next thing he
remembered was a ―smack,‖ causing debris and glass to shatter. He was thrown
against other vehicles, and felt tires roll over his legs. Veira testified that he did not
know where he ended up, but that he was hit so hard that he was lifted out of his shoes.
He denied fighting with Cantu and Serna inside the premises. The other members of
Veira’s party, Garcia and DeLejia, echoed Veira’s account of the events.
Vera Rodriguez was at Hot Shots with her husband, Jose Rodriguez, Jr., and her
sister, Elma Ortiz. After closing, they walked to the parking lot where they heard people
arguing. Vera then saw the Suburban hitting vehicles and then come around again and
hit a person who subsequently flew through the air. She testified that the first time the
Suburban came around, it hit vehicles and people; she recalled that it came around
again to hit the same person another time. Vera did not see the Suburban ―stuck‖ on
any vehicle. She recalled that the Suburban was travelling more than ten miles per
hour and was ―not hesitating.‖ Vera, along with her husband and sister, jumped into
their vehicle to get away and called 9-1-1.
Jose Rodriguez Jr. testified that the Suburban began hitting cars when he saw
somebody fly into the air. He witnessed the Suburban run over one person twice.
After the Suburban left, Jose saw two people on the ground and noticed that Tamgumay
was coughing up blood. He stayed with the injured men until an ambulance arrived.
Adam Herrada, another bystander, testified that the Suburban was being
swarmed by between seven and fifteen people who all appeared to be trying to attack
4
the driver, Cantu. Herrada testified that it seemed to him that Cantu was merely trying
to get away.
Jose Anthony Jacinto was one of the bouncers at Hot Shots. He testified that
after closing, someone was banging at the front door of the club. He testified that after
opening the door, several people rushed into the bar because they were scared.
Officer Anthony Sanders of the Corpus Christi Police Department testified that he
was on patrol the night of April 6, 2006. Upon arrival at the bar, he noted that the
atmosphere was chaotic with people running around and yelling different things to him.
Someone advised him that a maroon Suburban had hit the victims. Officer Daniel
Tovar assisted Officer Sanders and discovered a maroon Suburban abandoned in the
alleyway. He testified that he secured the vehicle and found no one inside the vehicle.
The Suburban was locked and had damage to the front end of the vehicle. Detective
Ralph Lee, a homicide and robbery detective with the Corpus Christi Police Department,
interviewed several witnesses on the scene. After his investigation, he obtained a
warrant for Cantu’s arrest.
Starla White, a crime scene investigator for the Corpus Christi Police Department,
conducted an investigation of the crime scene. She took photographs of the area,
vehicles, and persons, including Tamgumay. She collected all of the evidence from the
scene, including clothing and blood samples. She later documented Tangumay’s
autopsy. Her photographs were introduced into evidence and showed significant
damage to the front of the F-150 truck, along with visible blood splatters. The
windshield was also shattered. The photographs revealed that Tamgumay’s body was
lying next to the vehicles. The photos of the white Malibu also showed damage to the
5
front driver’s side. The Suburban showed damage to the front end.
Ray Fernandez, M.D., the medical examiner for Nueces County, testified that he
performed the autopsy on Tamgumay. The cause of his death was blunt chest and
abdominal trauma; these injuries were consistent with crushing from vehicle tires.
Some of the injuries resulted from the initial impact whereas others were from being run
over by a vehicle. Tamgumay was hit with enough force to lift him out of his shoes.
Dr. Fernandez matched the injuries to the photos of the damaged Suburban. He
opined that at time of impact, the Suburban was going between twenty-five to forty miles
per hour.
Abel Cantu, Cantu’s father, testified that he originally found and helped Serna
purchase the Suburban. However, he testified that between the time of purchase,
January 11, 2006, and the date of the incident, April 6, 2006, the Suburban was stolen
from an H.E.B. grocery parking lot. When the Suburban was returned, the steering did
not function properly.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Applicable Law
By his first issue, Cantu challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction on all charges. Our sufficiency review must be under ―a rigorous and
proper application‖ of the Jackson standard of review. See Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under this standard, ―the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.‖ Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks, 323
6
S.W.3d at 902 n.19. ―[T]he fact-finder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved
through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.‖ Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
(emphasis in original); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (West 1979)
(―The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of facts proved, and the weight to be given
to the testimony . . . .‖); Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)
(―The jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be
given testimony, and it is also the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in
the evidence.‖).
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). Under a hypothetically correct jury charge, in a murder case, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cantu intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02. In the
aggravated assault cases, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Cantu intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to another and
used a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. Id. §§
22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2).
A defendant’s intent may be inferred from his words, acts, and conduct. Patrick
v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). ―Intent and knowledge are fact
questions for the jury, and are almost always proven through evidence of the
circumstances surrounding the crime.‖ Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984)); see Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
7
(Meyers, J., concurring).
B. Analysis
Cantu argues that he was trying to avoid an altercation by leaving the premises
and that he was assaulted after he returned but when he was trying to get away.
However, the testimony and evidence contradict this argument. Serna’s testimony
shows that Cantu participated in the argument inside Hot Shots. Cantu also voluntarily
returned to the premises after being told to leave. It was his passenger, Maurecio, who
exited the vehicle and began the argument with the other individuals. Cantu then drove
the Suburban at a dangerous speed through a parking lot, hitting several vehicles and at
least one person. He returned through the parking lot at least one more time, running
over Tamgumay. The testimony from independent witnesses, Vera and Rodriguez,
was that Cantu intentionally drove towards the people and did not try to avoid the victims
or vehicles. The damage to the vehicles was significant, and the testimony from the
medical examiner, Dr. Fernandez, indicated that Cantu hit the victims hard enough to lift
them from their shoes.
Though some of this evidence was contradicted, it was within the province of the
jury to resolve any such questions, as the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of all of
the testimony. See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 111. Additionally, Cantu’s intent to kill
and to cause bodily injury could be inferred from the manner in which he drove the
Suburban. See Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 487.
Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find
that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of murder and
aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks,
8
323 S.W.3d at 902 n. 19; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02, 29.03(a). Therefore, the
evidence was sufficient to support Cantu’s conviction and we overrule his first issue.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
By his second issue, Cantu argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel: (1) advised him to waive a jury trial, (2) failed to file a
motion for new trial, (3) failed to argue for the inclusion of lesser-included offenses in the
jury charge, and (4) failed to obtain rulings on pretrial motions.
A. Applicable Law
We apply the two-pronged Strickland analysis to determine whether counsel’s
representation was so deficient that it violated a defendant’s constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005); Jaynes v. State, 216 S.W.3d 839, 851 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, no
pet.); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). An appellant claiming a
Strickland violation must establish that: (1) ―his attorney’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but
for his attorney’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖
Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 851; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
We afford great deference to trial counsel’s ability—―an appellant must overcome
the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.‖ Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 851. The appellant must prove both
elements of the Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence. Munoz v. State, 24
S.W.3d 427, 434 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.).
B. Analysis
9
1. Waiver of Jury
Cantu argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he did
not practice in Nueces County and was not aware of the trial court’s tendency to give
lengthy sentences for violent offenses. However, there is nothing in the record to
support this allegation. Further, the record shows that Cantu’s rights were explained to
him, as he fully consented to the waiver of a jury trial by voluntarily executing said
waiver. The waiver was explained to him in open court, and Cantu was specifically
advised that if he was found guilty, he would not be eligible for probation because he
waived a jury. He also signed an affidavit indicating he understood what he was
signing. Accordingly, there is nothing in the record to show that there was deficient or
prejudicial behavior to indicate ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue. Jaynes,
216 S.W.3d at 851; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
2. Failure to File a Motion for New Trial
Cantu next argues that his counsel’s failure to file a motion for new trial
constituted ineffective assistance counsel. Certain presumptions are made when
reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims that involve the failure to file new trial
motions. First, when trial counsel did not withdraw and was not replaced by new
counsel prior to the deadline of filing new trial motions, a rebuttable presumption exists
that trial counsel continued to represent the defendant during the time for filing a motion
for new trial. Smith v. State, 17 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Oldham v.
State, 977 S.W.2d 354, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Second, if a motion for new trial is
not filed in a case, the rebuttable presumption is that the option was considered by
appellant’s counsel and rejected. Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 363. A third presumption
10
arises if the appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. In such cases, we consider the
filing as evidence that the appellant was informed of at least some of his appellate rights
and then we presume that the appellant was adequately counseled unless the record
affirmatively displays otherwise. Id.
All these presumptions apply to the procedural history of this case. The
judgment was signed on November 29, 2007. A pro se notice of appeal was filed on
December 5, 2007. A motion to withdraw was filed on May 5, 2008, and a new attorney
appointed on May 8, 2008. Cantu was represented during the time period that a motion
for new trial should have been filed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b (motions for new trial
must be filed prior to or within thirty days after the judgment is signed). Because the
record contains no motion for new trial, we presume that Cantu considered and rejected
having his attorney file one. Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 363. The record contains no
contrary evidence. Finally, because the record shows that Cantu filed a timely pro se
notice of appeal, we consider the filing as evidence that he was informed of his appellate
rights and presume that he was adequately counseled. Id. Again, the record contains
no contrary evidence. Under Smith and Oldham, we conclude that Cantu failed to
overcome the presumption that he had adequate counsel during the post-trial window of
time when a new trial motion could have been filed. See id.; Smith, 17 S.W.3d at 662.
3. Failure to Seek a Lesser-Included Offense in the Charge
Cantu further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel failed to request the lesser-included offense of either manslaughter
or criminally negligent homicide. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.04, 19.05 (West
2003). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if two
11
conditions are satisfied. Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672–73 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993). First, the lesser-included offense must be included within the proof necessary to
establish the offense charged. Id. at 672. Second, there must be some evidence in
the record that would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is
guilty of only the lesser offense. Id. at 673. It is not enough that the jury may
disbelieve crucial evidence pertaining to the greater offense. Skinner v. State, 956
S.W.2d 532, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Rather, there must be some evidence
germane to a lesser-included offense for the fact-finder to consider before an instruction
on a lesser-included offense is warranted. Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21, 24
(Tex.Crim.App. 1994).
In this case, however, we need not address whether Cantu would have been
entitled to a lesser-included offense because it was within the reasonable zone of
professional conduct for Cantu’s counsel not to seek such an instruction. For example,
his counsel may have made a strategic decision that Cantu would be more likely to be
acquitted all together if no lesser offense was given to the jury. Such strategic
decisions, even if they fail to produce the desired outcome, are not necessarily
unreasonable. Therefore, we cannot say that Cantu’s attorney’s actions in this regard
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Jaynes, 216 S.W.3d at 851;
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
4. Failure to Obtain Rulings on Pretrial Motions
Finally, Cantu argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain rulings on
pretrial motions. However, he fails to show that any of the pretrial motions were
meritorious. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (to prevail
12
on ineffective assistance claim based on failure to file a motion to suppress evidence,
appellant must show motion would have been granted); Roberson v. State, 852 S.W.2d
508, 510–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (appellant must show pretrial motions had merit and
that rulings would have changed the outcome of the case before counsel will be
considered ineffective in failing to assert the motion). Without a showing that rulings on
the motions would have changed the outcome of the case, an appellant cannot establish
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain a ruling on pretrial motions. Magic
v. State, 217 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
The only pretrial motion specifically argued by Cantu was a motion concerning
prior bad acts. However, this testimony was only elicited in the punishment stage of the
trial. There is no argument on whether the motion was meritorious or if and how it
would have changed the outcome of the case. By simply arguing that his counsel did
not obtain rulings, Cantu fails to to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Cantu’s
second issue is overruled.
IV. BENCH TRIAL
In his final issue, Cantu seems to argue that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing him to proceed with a bench trial and not taking time between evidence and
making his ruling.
Article 1.13(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a criminal
defendant may waive the right of trial by jury, upon entering a plea, but requires that the
waiver be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and
approval of the court and the approval of the attorney representing the State. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13(a) (West 2005). The provision further provides that the
13
trial court’s consent and approval of the waiver must be entered of record on the minutes
of the court and the approval of the State’s attorney must be in writing, signed, and filed
in the papers of the cause before the defendant enters his plea. Id. The requirements
of this article were followed by the trial court. No further admonishments were required,
and accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion.
Additionally, there was no abuse of discretion in the timing of the trial court’s
ruling. The trial court was present throughout the testimony of all the witnesses and the
introduction of all the evidence. The trial court need not take any further time to review
the evidence at the punishment stage when he was the fact-finder in the guilt/innocence
phase. Cantu cited no authority, and we find none, in support of the argument that
additional review of the evidence must occur between a trial court’s finding of guilt and its
determination of punishment. Cantu’s third issue is overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Cantu’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed the
30th day of August, 2011.
14