Com. v. Jordan, C. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • J-S08024-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    CHARLES JORDAN,
    Appellant                No. 990 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 13, 2017,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-25-CR-0003263-2016.
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E,*
    MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                       FILED MARCH 27, 2018
    Charles Jordan appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after
    he pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver (cocaine), a firearm
    violation, and receiving stolen property.1     Jordan’s counsel has filed a
    petition to withdraw, in which she alleges that this direct appeal is wholly
    frivolous.   Agreeing with counsel’s assessment, we grant her petition to
    withdraw and affirm Jordan’s judgment of sentence.
    The Commonwealth originally charged Jordan with multiple drug,
    firearm, and receiving stolen property charges following the execution of a
    ____________________________________________
    135 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), and 3925(a),
    respectively.
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S08024-18
    search warrant at his residence. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress,
    which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing.
    On February 27, 2017, Jordan entered a guilty plea to one count of
    each charge as part of a negotiated guilty plea, in which the Commonwealth
    agreed to withdraw the remaining charges. There was no agreement as to
    the sentence to be imposed, although Jordan acknowledged he was facing
    and aggregate maximum term of thirty years of imprisonment.
    On April 13, 2017, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of
    eight to sixteen years of imprisonment. Jordan filed a timely post-sentence
    motion in which he raised challenges to his sentence. The trial court denied
    Jordan’s post-sentence motion on May 5, 2017. Jordan filed a pro se notice
    of appeal, and the trial court appointed counsel following this Court’s remand
    for a Grazier hearing.2          Thereafter, Jordan’s counsel filed a Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b) statement in which she stated her intention to file an Anders3 brief
    with this Court.
    “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
    merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to
    withdraw.”     Commonwealth v. Daniels, 
    999 A.2d 590
    , 593 (Pa. Super.
    2010).    In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009), the
    ____________________________________________
    2Commonwealth         v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
     (Pa. 1998).
    3Anders    v. California, 
    368 U.S. 738
     (1967).
    -2-
    J-S08024-18
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained what is required to be contained
    within an Anders brief:
    [T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
    counsel’s petition to withdraw . . . must (1) provide a
    summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
    to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set
    forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal
    is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
    have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
    “While    the   Supreme   Court   in   Santiago,   set   forth   the   new
    requirements for an Anders brief, which are quoted above, the holding did
    not abrogate the notice requirements set forth in [Commonwealth v.
    Millisock, 
    873 A.2d 748
    , 751 (Pa. Super. 2005)] that remain binding
    precedent.     Daniels, 
    999 A.2d at 594
    . Thus, counsel seeking to withdraw
    on direct appeal must meet the following obligations to his or her client:
    Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to
    his client. Attending the brief must be a letter that advises
    the client of his right to: (1) retain new counsel to pursue
    the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
    points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s
    attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the
    Anders brief.
    Commonwealth v. Orellana, 
    86 A.3d 877
    , 880 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted). Jordan has not filed a response.
    -3-
    J-S08024-18
    Our review reveals that Jordan’s counsel substantially complied with
    the requirements of Anders and Santiago. “Once counsel has satisfied the
    above requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of
    the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to
    whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.”       Commonwealth v.
    Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    , 291 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (citation
    omitted). Stated differently, this Court must conduct an independent review
    of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues
    overlooked by counsel. Commonwealth v. Flowers, 
    113 A.3d 1246
    , 1250
    (Pa. Super. 2015).
    Counsel identified the following claims that Jordan indicated he wished
    to raise on appeal:
    1. Did [Jordan] enter a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
    plea?
    2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion when it
    imposed consecutive sentences for possession with
    intent to deliver and persons not to possess firearms?
    3. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence?
    4. Did the trial court err in denying [Jordan’s] motion to
    suppress?
    Jordan’s Brief at 8.
    Jordan first asserts that his entry of the negotiated plea was not
    knowing, voluntary and intelligent.    As noted by counsel, Jordan failed to
    challenge the validity of his plea before the trial court in open court or in a
    post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B). Accordingly this issue is
    -4-
    J-S08024-18
    waived for purposes of appellate review.       Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d 606
    , 610 (Pa. Super. 2013). Absent waiver, we would find any such
    challenge refuted by our review of Jordan’s written and oral plea colloquies.
    Thus, we agree that this issue is meritless.
    In his second issue, Jordan claims that the trial court abused its
    discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences for possession with intent
    to deliver and the firearms violation. This claim challenges the discretionary
    aspects of sentence.      There is no absolute right to an appeal when
    challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Appellant must satisfy a
    four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.   See Commonwealth v.
    Griffin, 
    65 A.3d 932
    , 935 (Pa. Super. 2013). An appeal is permitted only
    after this Court determines that there is a substantial question that the
    sentence was not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth
    v. Tobin, 
    89 A.3d 663
    , 666 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). Further,
    in order to properly preserve such a claim for appellate review, the
    defendant must present the issue in either a post-sentence motion or raise
    the claim during the sentencing proceedings, and preserve the issue in a
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. 
    Id.
    “Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing court, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
    manifest abuse of discretion, which in this context, is not shown merely to
    be an error in judgment; rather the appellant must establish by reference to
    the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
    -5-
    J-S08024-18
    exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Shull,
    
    148 A.3d 820
     (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
    Even if Jordan met all of the above requirements, his claim is refuted
    by our review of the record.          In his post-sentence motion, Jordan cited to
    the court’s statement during the sentencing hearing, that the sentences it
    imposed for these charges “are separate and distinct crimes, I have to make
    them consecutive.” N.T., 4/13/17, at 12. Jordan then reminded the court
    that   it   had   the   option   of    running   the   sentences   concurrently   or
    consecutively.     At argument on the post-sentence motion, the trial court
    explained:
    THE COURT: Okay. All right.
    You know, your second point in here, when I said they
    must be run consecutive, I didn’t mean that in a legal
    sense that they were required, that was my feeling about
    the - -
    ***
    THE COURT: [T]hat’s just a question of semantics, that
    was my opinion that they had to be run consecutively
    because of the nature of the charges, the fact that they
    were separate, distinct crimes, not because they had to be
    run consecutive, you know. I know that much.
    N.T., 5/5/17, at 5-6.
    With these comments, the trial court clearly explained that, even
    though it was aware of its sentencing options, the sentences were imposed
    consecutively because it believed the separate crimes deserved separate
    -6-
    J-S08024-18
    punishments. Moreover, although the trial court did impose these sentences
    consecutively, it specifically told Jordan that each sentence it imposed fell
    within the mitigated range of the Sentencing Guidelines. See N.T., 4/13/17,
    at 12.   Once again, we agree with appellate counsel that this issue is
    meritless.
    In his third issue, Jordan challenges the legality of his sentence. We
    agree with appellate counsel’s determination that this issue is meritless
    because, at the time of entering his plea, Jordan acknowledged that he was
    facing a maximum aggregate sentence of thirty years. See N.T., 2/17/17 at
    8. The aggregate maximum sixteen-year sentence he actually received fell
    within the applicable statutory maximum for each charge.
    Finally, in his fourth issue, Jordan claims that the trial court erred in
    denying his suppression motion. We agree with appellate counsel that this
    claim is meritless.    “A plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all non-
    jurisdictional defects and defenses, and waives the right to challenge
    anything but the legality of sentence and the validity of the plea.”
    Commonwealth v. Dixon, 
    161 A.3d 949
    , 951 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
    omitted).
    In sum, we agree with counsel’s assessment that each issue Jordan
    wished to raise is meritless.    Furthermore, our independent review of the
    record reveals no other non-frivolous bases for appeal.      Flowers, 
    supra.
    Thus, this appeal is “wholly frivolous.”
    Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -7-
    J-S08024-18
    Judge Lazarus joins the Memorandum.
    P.J.E. Stevens concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/27/2018
    -8-