Christopher Harris v. United States ( 2021 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 19-3363
    CHRISTOPHER HARRIS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 1:18-cv-03105-JMS-DML — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED JUNE 3, 2021 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 10, 2021
    ____________________
    Before MANION, WOOD, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Christopher Harris faced federal
    drug charges. Counsel advised him that his two prior Indiana
    cocaine convictions were predicate “felony drug offenses”
    and could result in a mandatory life sentence. So, Harris en-
    tered into a plea agreement and received an agreed-upon 20-
    year sentence.
    2                                                     No. 19-3363
    Harris now seeks federal habeas corpus relief under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . He argues his counsel was ineffective by not
    challenging whether those prior drug convictions were pred-
    icates, as Indiana law defined cocaine isomers more broadly
    than federal law. Such an argument, novel then, would suc-
    ceed today.
    Although Harris forfeited this theory of ineffectiveness in
    the district court, we conclude that it is subject to plain-error
    review. But because it was objectively reasonable for Harris’s
    counsel not to advise risking a mandatory life sentence to pur-
    sue the isomer argument, the district court did not plainly err
    in ruling that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ad-
    equate.
    I
    Harris was charged in 2016 with possessing with intent to
    distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.
    See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2010). Because of his prior drug con-
    victions, Harris faced significant sentencing exposure. At the
    time, the statutory minimum sentence for this crime was 10
    years. 
    Id.
     § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2010). But under that statute, the
    government could enhance the potential sentence by arguing
    that two of Harris’s prior convictions were felony drug of-
    fenses: an Indiana conviction in 2006 for dealing cocaine,
    see IND. CODE § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006), and an Indiana conviction
    in 2001 for possessing cocaine, see id. § 35-48-4-6(a) (2001). At
    that time, one prior “felony drug offense” increased the man-
    datory minimum sentence to 20 years, while two required a
    life sentence. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(viii) (2010).
    To avoid a life sentence, Harris reached an agreement un-
    der Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) with the
    No. 19-3363                                                  3
    government to plead guilty and accept a sentence of 20 years’
    imprisonment. Pursuant to that deal, the government filed a
    notice under 
    21 U.S.C. § 851
     listing only one predicate offense,
    the 2006 Indiana conviction for dealing cocaine. At a joint
    change-of-plea and sentencing hearing in October 2017, the
    district court confirmed that “the basis” for Harris’s plea was
    his (and his counsel’s) understanding that he was avoiding a
    mandatory life sentence due to the government’s agreement
    not to introduce his 2001 Indiana cocaine possession convic-
    tion. The court also confirmed that Harris knew he was waiv-
    ing his right to challenge his conviction and sentence, except
    as to ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Harris did not appeal. Instead, acting pro se, he timely
    moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to § 2255. Harris as-
    serted his counsel had been ineffective “during plea bargain-
    ing for the failure to challenge the § 851 enhancement towards
    the prior dealing in cocaine case.” In his petition, Harris at-
    tempted to explain:
    Thomas Brodnick represented me during plea
    negotiations. My prior 2006 conviction for deal-
    ing in cocaine or narcotic was used to enhance
    my sentence under the statute from 10-years to
    20-years minimum. This conviction was from
    when I was set up to bring someone some drugs
    when in fact, I was set up to be robbed. I had to
    fight for my life were [sic] I could have died if I
    did not defend myself. The State Statute 35-48-
    4-1 was used under Indiana state laws and the
    case was converted to have me plead guilty to
    dealing in cocaine or narcotic and the posses-
    sion cocaine of [sic] narcotic and dealing in
    4                                                     No. 19-3363
    cocaine or narcotic was dismissed by the State
    for my plea of guilty.
    The government read this submission as an argument that
    Harris’s counsel should have challenged the sufficiency of the
    evidence supporting the 2006 conviction. In reply, Harris
    reiterated his initial statements and asserted that his 2006 con-
    viction “is not permissible to be used because of its unconsti-
    tutional nature in light of Descamps v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 254
     (2013).”
    The district court denied Harris’s § 2255 motion. To that
    court, Harris had raised two theories of ineffective assistance:
    that his counsel should have (1) challenged the sufficiency of
    the evidence underlying his prior state conviction, and (2)
    argued that conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense
    after Descamps. The first theory failed because a defendant
    cannot collaterally attack a state conviction during federal
    sentencing unless it was obtained in a proceeding where the
    defendant was denied his right to counsel, which Harris did
    not allege. See Custis v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 485
    , 496–97
    (1994). On the second theory, the district court decided that a
    Descamps-based argument would have failed at sentencing
    because Harris’s 2006 Indiana conviction for dealing cocaine
    fell within the definition of a “felony drug offense.” That con-
    viction was based “on conduct relating to narcotic drugs” and
    was punishable by a minimum of six years in prison.
    Soon after judgment, two legal developments clarified
    whether Harris’s prior convictions fit the definition of a “fel-
    ony drug offense.” First, in United States v. De La Torre,
    
    940 F.3d 938
    , 952 (7th Cir. 2019), this court held that a different
    Indiana drug crime was not a “felony drug offense” because
    the state’s definition of the controlled substance involved—
    No. 19-3363                                                   5
    including, among other terms, its definition of an “isomer”—
    applied more broadly than federal law. Less than a year later,
    this court decided in United States v. Ruth, 
    966 F.3d 642
    , 647,
    650 (7th Cir. 2020), that an Illinois conviction for possession
    with intent to deliver cocaine was not a “felony drug offense”
    because Illinois’s definition of cocaine—like Indiana’s—in-
    cluded optical, positional, and geometric isomers, and there-
    fore was broader than federal law.
    Harris requested a certificate of appealability, which this
    court granted, as to whether his counsel was ineffective for
    failing to argue that his prior conviction did not qualify as a
    predicate “felony drug offense” because IND. CODE §§ 35-48-
    1-7 and 35-48-2-8(b) (2006) defined cocaine more broadly than
    the federal code, 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 802
    (17)(C)(D). The parties were
    also asked to address whether Harris waived this theory of
    ineffectiveness by insufficiently developing it in the district
    court.
    II
    A
    Section 2255 provides relief for a federal prisoner if their
    sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
    laws of the United States, or [if] the court was without juris-
    diction to impose such sentence, or [if] the sentence was in
    excess of the maximum authorized by law.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (a). “Relief under § 2255 is available ‘only in extraordi-
    nary situations, such as an error of constitutional or jurisdic-
    tional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has occurred
    which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” United
    States v. Coleman, 
    763 F.3d 706
    , 708 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
    Blake v. United States, 
    723 F.3d 870
    , 878–79 (7th Cir. 2013)).
    6                                                    No. 19-3363
    When considering the denial of a federal prisoner’s § 2255
    motion, we typically review the district court’s legal conclu-
    sions de novo. Reyes v. United States, 
    998 F.3d 753
    , 757 (7th Cir.
    2021). But in the district court, Harris did not properly present
    the theory of ineffective assistance that he pursues before us.
    His opening motion was barely comprehensible; at most, it
    asserted that counsel was ineffective because he should have
    challenged his 2006 conviction, but it provided no clear basis
    for a challenge.
    Harris did raise the Descamps-based argument in his reply
    brief, however. He says his citation to Descamps—which re-
    quires that a state predicate offense fall within the federal def-
    inition—simply “clarified” the claim he raised initially in his
    § 2255 motion. But that did not preserve the issue for appeal.
    A movant must present his specific theory of ineffectiveness
    in the district court, see Rittenhouse v. Battles, 
    263 F.3d 689
    ,
    694–95 (7th Cir. 2001), with enough detail to allow the gov-
    ernment to respond to it, see Wright v. United States, 
    139 F.3d 551
    , 553 (7th Cir. 1998). Harris’s opening motion did not alert
    the government that he wished his counsel had raised a cate-
    gorical challenge to his 2006 conviction’s predicate-offense
    status. So, unsurprisingly, the government did not respond as
    to whether Harris’s prior conviction fit the federal definition
    of a “felony drug offense.”
    Just so, the government is incorrect to argue that Harris
    did not raise this issue in reply. Construing Harris’s pro se
    briefing liberally as we must, see McNeil v. United States,
    
    508 U.S. 106
    , 113 (1993), the citation to Descamps sufficiently
    raised the claim that counsel should have made a categorical
    challenge. And a categorical challenge requires comparing
    not just the elements of a statute but also “the provisions it
    No. 19-3363                                                     7
    cross-referenc[es].” Brock-Miller v. United States, 
    887 F.3d 298
    ,
    310 (7th Cir. 2018). Here, that includes the drug definition.
    Harris urges that any failure by him to preserve this issue
    is a forfeiture, not waiver. “Forfeiture results from ‘inadvert-
    ence, neglect, or oversight.’” Bourgeois v. Watson, 
    977 F.3d 620
    ,
    631 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Henry v. Hulett, 
    969 F.3d 769
    , 786
    (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). Harris contends his failure in the
    district court was inadvertent because there he proceeded pro
    se. The government counters that the delay was strategic, cit-
    ing cases that bar litigants from raising an argument for the
    first time in a reply brief on appeal to prevent sandbagging.
    Harris did not gain any advantage in this delay. The gov-
    ernment asserts in its brief that it could have introduced ad-
    ditional evidence “to cast scientific doubt upon the veracity of
    the isomer arguments.” But the “isomer argument” is about
    the plain language of two statutes and thus purely legal. See
    Ruth, 966 F.3d at 648. Further, the government does not argue
    that it can show the isomers at issue are “unquestionably non-
    existent.” Id. Thus, the government was not prejudiced by its
    inability to develop a theoretical factual challenge in the dis-
    trict court and has now fully briefed the legal issue. So, Har-
    ris’s conduct here constituted a forfeiture, not a waiver, of this
    issue.
    The next question is whether to forgive the forfeiture. In
    earlier civil appeals, forfeited issues have been considered
    where, as here, “failure to present a ground to the district
    court has caused no one—not the district judge, not us, not
    the appellee—any harm of which the law ought to take note.”
    Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 
    2 F.3d 746
    , 749 (7th Cir.
    1993). More recently we clarified that, in the context of a col-
    lateral attack on a criminal sentence, a forfeited issue may be
    8                                                          No. 19-3363
    reviewed for plain error “where a party can demonstrate that:
    ‘(1) exceptional circumstances exist; (2) substantial rights are
    affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice will occur if plain er-
    ror review is not applied.’” Bourgeois v. Watson, 
    977 F.3d 620
    ,
    629 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v.
    Mick, 
    886 F.3d 626
    , 636 (7th Cir. 2018)). In Bourgeois, only the
    first element was assessed. 
    Id.
     at 631–32. That decision ex-
    plained that exceptional circumstances “include when a for-
    feited ground is ‘founded on concerns broader than those of
    the parties,’” such as comity, federalism interests, and the
    conservation of judicial resources. 
    Id. at 631
     (quoting United
    States v. Ford, 
    683 F.3d 761
    , 768 (7th Cir. 2012)). And we con-
    cluded that those considerations alone could compel us to
    look past forfeiture. 
    Id.
     at 631–32.
    Similar considerations induce us to look past Harris’s for-
    feiture. Despite his failure to raise the issue in his initial § 2255
    motion, we are not acting as a court “of first view” in this mat-
    ter. Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 
    889 F.3d 378
    , 383 (7th Cir.
    2018). The district court did address this theory of ineffective
    assistance on appeal, albeit imperfectly—the court cited to
    our past cases denying categorical challenges to some ele-
    ments of Indiana’s dealing cocaine law without considering
    whether a categorical challenge to the definition of an isomer
    would succeed. Thus, “to dismiss the case on a procedural
    ground at this juncture” risks “effectively discount[ing]” the
    district court’s generous efforts to make sense of Harris’s pro
    se filings. 
    Id. at 384
    ; see also Anderson v. United States, 
    981 F.3d 565
    , 572 (7th Cir. 2020). 1
    1 We considered whether the district court viewed Harris’s reply brief
    as an amendment to his petition, as in Perrone v. United States, 
    889 F.3d 898
    , 909 (7th Cir. 2018). There is some support for such a reading. The
    No. 19-3363                                                               9
    This case also presents a rare circumstance. Two weeks af-
    ter the district court rejected Harris’s motion, this court ruled
    in De La Torre that “the plain language chosen by the Indiana
    legislature” for the definition of isomers, incorporated in the
    state law definition of cocaine, “dictates that the Indiana
    statute is categorically broader than the federal definition of
    felony drug offense.” 940 F.3d at 952. We do not blame the
    district court for not monitoring our docket, and it was not
    that court’s duty to imagine every possible argument for Har-
    ris, even when liberally construing his pro se filings. At the
    same time, had the district court held off on its decision, it
    likely would have become aware of and addressed De La
    Torre. Few if any other federal prisoners face the same di-
    lemma as Harris. His motion to vacate his sentence was de-
    cided immediately before De La Torre, and he timely appealed
    shortly thereafter. Therefore, this decision does not risk open-
    ing the floodgates to forfeited issues.
    Accordingly, the standard of review here is stringent and
    for plain error, as any error in the district court’s conclusion
    must be “clear or obvious.” Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). As a practical matter, though, our conclusion
    here would be the same under de novo review. Harris has not
    shown any constitutional error with counsel’s performance,
    let alone a “clear or obvious” one.
    district court said, for instance, that Harris’s reply brief “clarifies” his
    claim of ineffective assistance. Although a district court may not accept
    amendments to a § 2255 motion sub silentio, the similarities between this
    case and Perrone further support our conclusion that review here is appro-
    priate.
    10                                                  No. 19-3363
    B
    Under Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984),
    collateral relief is not available unless “counsel’s performance
    was deficient” and “the deficient performance prejudiced the
    defense.” The parties agree here that if counsel should have
    challenged Harris’s predicate offenses, then Harris was prej-
    udiced. See Missouri v. Frye, 
    566 U.S. 134
    , 147 (2012) (prejudice
    occurs when there is a “reasonable probability” that “the end
    result of the criminal process would have been … a sentence
    of less prison time”). Without the 2001 and 2006 Indiana
    crimes involving cocaine as predicate offenses, Harris’s sen-
    tencing guidelines range would have been 121 to 151 months,
    substantially shorter than his 240-month prison sentence. So,
    we turn to whether counsel’s performance was sufficient de-
    spite his failure to raise this challenge.
    To show deficient performance, it is not enough to rely on
    hindsight about whether a proposed challenge would have
    succeeded. See Bridges v. United States, 
    991 F.3d 793
    , 802
    (7th Cir. 2021). Rather, the reasonableness of counsel’s perfor-
    mance must be assessed “in the context of the law” at the time.
    Lilly v. Gilmore, 
    988 F.2d 783
    , 786 (7th Cir. 1993).
    At the time of Harris’s sentencing, his counsel should have
    known about a possible categorical challenge to the predicate
    offenses. “In some circumstances, defense counsel may be re-
    quired to anticipate arguments foreshadowed but not yet
    adopted by existing case law.” Bridges, 991 F.3d at 803. By
    2017, when Harris was negotiating his guilty plea, the cate-
    gorical approach was well-established. See id. at 804 (citing
    Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
     (1990)). One circuit court
    had already applied the categorical approach to the federal
    “felony drug offense” definition. See United States v. Ocampo-
    No. 19-3363                                                   11
    Estrada, 
    873 F.3d 661
    , 667 (9th Cir. 2017). Further, this court
    has stated repeatedly that comparing statutory definitions is
    part of competent representation. See Bridges, 991 F.3d at 805;
    Brock-Miller, 887 F.3d at 311 (“Reading statutes and discern-
    ing their plain meaning is neither convoluted nor sophisti-
    cated; it is what lawyers must do for their clients every day.”).
    The government argues that a categorical challenge to In-
    diana’s definition of an isomer was somehow more complex
    than a categorical challenge to any other term in the state
    code, and thus too obscure for a competent lawyer to contem-
    plate. That is not convincing, though. Even minimally compe-
    tent attorneys know how to raise complex legal arguments.
    See Bridges, 991 F.3d at 805 (citing cases). And the analysis
    called for here was not complex; as the government admits,
    counsel only had to compare the plain language of statutes.
    Moreover, “[s]entencing advocacy, both during plea negotia-
    tions and before a district court, is in most cases the most im-
    portant task of a federal criminal defender,” requiring close
    attention. Id. at 804. Finally, even though no cases had then
    adopted the view on isomers that this court has since em-
    braced in Ruth and De La Torre, at least one court had consid-
    ered the issue before Harris’s sentencing hearing. See United
    States v. Jimenez-Ibarra, 695 Fed. App’x 767, 770–72 (5th Cir.
    2017).
    We do not know whether counsel was aware of a possible
    categorical challenge to Indiana’s definition of an isomer. But
    remand for a factual hearing is not necessary because coun-
    sel’s subjective assessment is not central to the legal analysis
    here. Even if counsel’s failure to challenge the predicate of-
    fenses had been “inadvertent,” rather than strategic, “relief is
    not automatic.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 
    540 U.S. 1
    , 8 (2003).
    12                                                  No. 19-3363
    Rather, “Strickland … calls for an inquiry into the objective
    reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s sub-
    jective state of mind.” Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 110
    (2011). And Strickland makes clear that even under this objec-
    tive standard, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance
    must be highly deferential.” 
    466 U.S. at 689
    .
    We must assess counsel’s performance by considering the
    options available to the defense when Harris pleaded guilty
    and was sentenced. The record shows that regardless of
    whether counsel was aware of it, he had two choices. Counsel
    could advise Harris to accept the government’s plea offer to
    drop one potential predicate offense, thereby significantly re-
    ducing Harris’s sentencing exposure to a guarantee of 20
    years (given a FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) binding agreement).
    Or, counsel could advise Harris to challenge his predicate of-
    fenses. If the challenge was successful, Harris would not have
    a mandatory minimum sentence. But if the challenge was un-
    successful, Harris would face a mandatory life sentence. And
    if counsel raised the challenge, the government might have
    withdrawn its plea offer.
    Significantly, the challenge would have required counsel
    to “ask[] the court to break new legal ground.” Bridges,
    991 F.3d at 808. At the time of sentencing, no case law held
    that any state defined isomers more broadly than the federal
    government. At that point, the only circuit court to compare
    state to federal definitions of “isomers” rejected the argument
    that the state’s definition was too broad. See Jimenez-Ibarra,
    695 Fed. App’x at 770–72. The next circuit-level case, and the
    first to accept the isomer argument, was not decided until al-
    most one year after Harris’s sentencing. See Lorenzo v. Sessions,
    
    902 F.3d 930
    , 935–56 (9th Cir. 2018), superseded on denial of
    No. 19-3363                                                     13
    rehearing on other grounds as Lorenzo v. Whitaker, 752 Fed.
    App’x 482 (9th Cir. 2019).
    Harris presses that counsel should have at least consulted
    with him about the option of a novel challenge to the predi-
    cate offenses. He correctly points out that, “[i]n the plea bar-
    gaining context,” counsel must “make an estimate of a likely
    sentence” and “communicate the results of that analysis be-
    fore allowing his client to plead guilty.” Gaylord v. United
    States, 
    829 F.3d 500
    , 506 (7th Cir. 2016). In Gaylord, this court
    determined that defense counsel may have been ineffective
    because he failed to consult with the defendant about a poten-
    tial challenge to a sentence enhancement, thus failing to pro-
    vide him “with the information necessary for a knowing and
    voluntary guilty plea.” 
    Id. at 507
    . But in Gaylord, the potential
    challenge was based on established law. Counsel advised the
    defendant to plead guilty in 2011, without mentioning a via-
    ble challenge to his sentence enhancement that had been es-
    tablished more than a year prior, in United States v. Hatfield,
    
    591 F.3d 945
    , 948 (7th Cir. 2010). It would stretch Gaylord too
    far to read it as requiring counsel to raise with their client
    every potential sentencing challenge. Counsel are not re-
    quired “to obtain the defendant’s consent to ‘every tactical de-
    cision,’” particularly those within an attorney’s expertise.
    Florida v. Nixon, 
    543 U.S. 175
    , 187 (2004) (quoting Taylor v. Illi-
    nois, 
    484 U.S. 400
    , 417–18 (1988)). And the “isomer” challenge
    at issue here was too unprecedented to warrant discussion
    with the client.
    In sum, the defense essentially had a bird in the hand—the
    plea offer with a set 20-year sentence—with a possibility of
    two in the bush—the novel challenge to the predicate offenses
    with the risk of a mandatory life sentence. Faced with these
    14                                                 No. 19-3363
    options, it was objectively reasonable for Harris’s counsel to
    pursue the plea deal. See Harris v. United States, 
    366 F.3d 593
    ,
    596 (7th Cir. 2004) (ruling counsel not deficient for declining
    to press an unsettled legal question when doing so would
    have detracted from defendant’s efforts to obtain a lesser sen-
    tence).
    The district court did not plainly err in denying Harris’s
    § 2255 petition, so that court’s decision is AFFIRMED.