Boim, Stanley v. Quranic Literacy , 291 F.3d 1000 ( 2002 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 01-1969 & 01-1970
    JOYCE BOIM and STANLEY BOIM,
    Individually and as Administrator of the
    ESTATE OF DAVID BOIM,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    QURANIC LITERACY INSTITUTE
    and HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR
    RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 00 C 2905--George W. Lindberg, Judge.
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001--DECIDED JUNE 5, 2002
    Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS,
    Circuit Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. In this case of
    first impression, the parents of a young
    United States citizen murdered in Israel
    by Hamas terrorists have sued several
    individuals and organizations for the
    loss of their son. Two of the
    organizational defendants moved to
    dismiss the complaint, and the district
    court denied the motion. In this
    interlocutory appeal, we are asked to
    consider the viability of a claim brought
    under the never-tested 18 U.S.C. sec.
    2333, which allows U.S. nationals who
    have been injured "by reason of an act of
    international terrorism" to sue therefor
    and recover treble damages. We affirm the
    district court’s denial of the
    defendants’ motion to dismiss.
    I.
    We derive the facts from the allegations
    of the complaint. At this stage of the
    proceedings, we must accept these
    allegations as true, extending to the
    plaintiffs the benefit of every
    reasonable inference that may be drawn
    from the complaint. Leatherman v. Tarrant
    County Narcotics Intelligence and
    Coordination Unit, 
    507 U.S. 163
    , 164
    (1993); Slaney v. The International
    Amateur Athletic Federation, 
    244 F.3d 580
    , 597 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
    
    122 S. Ct. 69
    (2001); Camp v. Gregory, 
    67 F.3d 1286
    , 1290 (7th Cir. 1995), cert.
    denied, 
    517 U.S. 1244
    (1996). We may
    affirm the dismissal of that complaint
    only if it appears beyond doubt that the
    plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in
    support of their claim that would entitle
    them to relief. 
    Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597
    .
    David Boim was the son of Joyce and
    Stanley Boim, who are United States
    citizens. David held dual citizenship in
    the United States and Israel. In 1996,
    the Boims were living in Israel, where
    seventeen-year-old David was studying at
    a yeshiva. On May 13, 1996, David was
    murdered as he waited with other students
    at a bus stop near Beit El in the West
    Bank. He was struck by bullets fired from
    a passing car, and was pronounced dead
    within an hour of the shooting. His two
    attackers were later identified as Amjad
    Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif. The
    Palestinian Authority apprehended Hinawi
    and Al-Sharif, and temporarily imprisoned
    them in early 1997. They were released
    shortly thereafter, apparently pending
    trial. Al-Sharif subsequently killed
    himself and five civilians and injured
    192 other people in a suicide bombing in
    Jerusalem on September 4, 1997. Two other
    suicide bombers joined him in this
    action. Hinawi, who confessed to
    participating in the shooting of David
    Boim, was eventually tried for David’s
    murder by a Palestinian Authority court
    and was sentenced to ten years’
    imprisonment on February 17, 1998.
    Both Hinawi and Al-Sharif were known
    members of the military wing of Hamas.
    The Boims describe Hamas as an extremist,
    Palestinian militant organization that
    seeks to establish a fundamentalist
    Palestinian state. The group is divided
    into two branches, one political and one
    military. The military branch receives
    orders and material support from the
    political branch. Hamas seeks to advance
    its political objectives through acts of
    terrorism and works to undermine the
    Middle East peace process through violent
    attacks on civilians. Hamas has a global
    presence, and terrorist operatives in
    Gaza and the West Bank receive their
    instructions, funds, weapons and
    practical support for their missions from
    Hamas organizers throughout the world.
    The Boims believe that Hamas has command
    and control centers in the United States,
    Britain and several Western European
    countries. The leaders of these control
    centers coordinate fund-raising efforts
    from sympathetic parties in these various
    countries and then launder and channel
    the money to Hamas operatives in Gaza and
    the West Bank. They also arrange for the
    purchase of weapons and for the
    recruitment and training of military
    personnel. They work with local
    commanders in the West Bank and Gaza to
    plan terrorist attacks. Hamas was
    designated a terrorist organization by
    President William Jefferson Clinton in
    1995 by Executive Order./1 In 1997,
    Hamas was desig-nated a foreign terrorist
    organization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. sec.
    1189./2
    The Boims allege that Hamas’ military
    wing depends on foreign contributions,
    with approximately one-third of its
    multi-million dollar annual budget coming
    from fund-raising in North America and
    Western Europe. The Boims believe that
    the Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI")
    and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief
    and Development ("HLF"), along with other
    defendants not involved in this appeal,
    are the main fronts for Hamas in the
    United States. They allege that these
    organizations’ allegedly humanitarian
    functions mask their core mission of
    raising and funneling money and other
    resources to Hamas operatives in support
    of terrorist activities.
    QLI is an Illinois not-for-profit
    corporation that purports to translate
    and publish sacred Islamic texts, but the
    Boims believe it is also engaged in
    raising and laundering money for Hamas.
    QLI also employed another defendant,
    Mohammed Abdul Hamid Khalil Salah,
    nominally as a computer analyst. The FBI
    has seized $1.4 million in cash and prop
    erty from Salah, who is the admitted
    United States based leader of the
    military branch of Hamas. He has been
    prosecuted for channeling money to Hamas
    and for recruiting, organizing and
    training terrorist operatives in Israel.
    Salah is named on a list of Specially
    Designated Terrorists compiled by the
    United States Treasury Department’s
    Office of Foreign Assets Control./3
    HLF is also a not-for-profit
    corporation, whose ostensible mission is
    to fund humanitarian relief and
    development efforts. HLF’s director has
    acknowledged providing money to Hamas,
    and the Boims allege that, although HLF
    purports to have a charitable purpose,
    its true function is to raise and channel
    money to Hamas for terrorist activities.
    The U.S. base of HLF’s operations is in
    Texas. HLF also has offices in Jerusalem
    and in Illinois. HLF, QLI and the other
    organizational defendants are linked by
    interlocking directorates and by ties to
    Salah and Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook,
    another individual defendant (not
    involved in this appeal) who has a
    leadership role in the military branch of
    Hamas./4
    According to the Boims, money flows from
    American contributors to Hamas in a
    three-step process: first, the front
    organizations solicit contributions;
    second, the leaders arrange for the money
    to be laundered and wired overseas; and
    third, Hamas operatives in Gaza and the
    West Bank use the money to finance
    terrorist activities. Because it is
    illegal to provide financial support to
    recognized terrorist groups, the money
    flows through a series of complicated
    transactions, changing hands a number of
    times, and being commingled with funds
    from the front organizations’ legitimate
    charitable and business dealings. The
    funds are laundered in a variety of ways,
    including through real estate deals and
    through Swiss bank accounts. The Boims
    allege that money raised by HLF and QLI
    was transferred to Hamas terrorists using
    these various methods in order to finance
    terrorist activities. Hamas used the
    money raised in this way to purchase
    weapons to carry out terrorist attacks,
    including the attack on David Boim. Hamas
    regularly drew money from a pool of
    laundered funds in order to finance
    training, weapons purchases, lodging,
    false identification, communications
    equipment, lethal substances, explosives,
    personnel, transportation and other
    material support for terrorist
    operations. The Boims believe that
    expenditures from this pool of funds paid
    for the vehicle, machine guns and
    ammunition used to kill David Boim, and
    also paid for the training of Hinawi, Al-
    Sharif and other Hamas operatives
    involved in the attack on David Boim. The
    funds were also used to provide a stipend
    for Al-Sharif’s family, as it is a common
    practice to pay the families of suicide
    bombers in order to encourage others to
    volunteer for these activities.
    The Boims bring their suit against HLF,
    QLI and other organizational and
    individual defendants pursuant to 18
    U.S.C. sec. 2333. They charge that all of
    the defendants are civilly liable for
    David’s murder. They name Hinawi and Al-
    Sharif as the persons who actually killed
    David, but allege that the other
    defendants aided, abetted and financed
    Hinawi and Al-Sharif. They assert that
    the organizational defendants provided
    material support or resources to Hamas as
    those terms are defined in 18 U.S.C.
    secs. 2339A and 2339B. The Boims seek
    compensation for the extreme physical
    pain David suffered before his death, and
    for the cost of his funeral and the loss
    of accretion to his estate due to his
    death at age seventeen. They also seek
    damages for their own extreme mental
    anguish and loss of the society of their
    son. They ask for $100,000,000
    compensatory damages, $100,000,000
    punitive damages, plus costs and
    attorney’s fees, and request the trebling
    of damages pursuant to the statute.
    In the district court, QLI and HLF moved
    to dismiss the complaint for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted. In particular, the defendants
    argued that section 2333 does not support
    a cause of action for aiding and abetting
    acts of international terrorism, and that
    the suit is foreclosed by the Supreme
    Court’s ruling in Central Bank of Denver,
    N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
    N.A., 
    511 U.S. 164
    , 
    114 S. Ct. 1439
    (1994). Because the defendants believed
    that aiding and abetting was the sole
    basis for the Boims’ cause of action,
    they maintained that the complaint should
    be dismissed. The Boims argued to the
    district court that their section 2333
    complaint could be sustained under any
    one of three different theories of
    liability. First, they maintained that
    providing material support to a terrorist
    organization was itself an act of
    international terrorism as defined in
    section 2331. Second, they argued that
    the defendants could be held civilly
    liable under section 2333 because they
    violated sections 2339A and 2339B, the
    criminal statutes prohibiting the
    provision of material support to
    terrorists./5 Third, they contended that
    the defendants could be held liable under
    section 2333 on an aiding and abetting
    theory, and that the Supreme Court’s
    holding in Central Bank, which addressed
    civil liability for aiding and abetting
    in the context of securities fraud
    claims, was distinguishable.
    The district court denied the motion to
    dismiss. Boim v. Quranic Literacy
    Institute, 
    127 F. Supp. 2d 1002
    , 1021
    (N.D. Ill. 2001). Addressing the Boims’
    first theory, the court found that
    funding, without more, does not "involve
    violent acts or acts dangerous to human
    life." The court began with the statutory
    language, which sweepingly defines acts
    of international terrorism to include
    "activities involving violent acts or
    acts dangerous to human life," and found
    that this phrase was so broad that it
    provided little guidance concerning where
    to draw limits on the conduct Congress
    sought to 
    curb. 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1013
    -
    14. Instead, "[c]ontributions to a
    foreign organization . . . without a
    further allegation of participation by
    the contributor, appear too far removed
    to constitute direct acts of
    international terrorism." 
    Id. The district
    court concluded that Congress
    meant to reach beyond the persons
    directly involved in the violent act, but
    that liability should be limited to
    persons or organizations that knew about
    the violent act and participated in the
    preparation of the plan to commit the
    violent 
    act. 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15
    .
    Thus, as a matter of statutory
    interpretation, the Boims’ allegations of
    funding terrorist organizations, without
    more direct dealing with the group, did
    not constitute activity involving violent
    acts or acts dangerous to human 
    life. 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1015
    . Relying on a Fourth
    Circuit case, the court noted that where
    funding a terrorist group was the main
    allegation, the plaintiffs must also be
    able to show that the defendants
    providing the funds knew about the
    violent act and participated in the
    preparation of the plan to commit the
    violent act. See United States v. Wells,
    
    163 F.3d 889
    (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
    denied, 
    528 U.S. 841
    (1999). Because
    Salah was alleged to have participated in
    recruiting and training terrorists as
    well as channeling money to Hamas for
    terrorist activities, the court found
    that the claim against him could 
    stand. 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1015
    . The court found
    the allegations of funding alone against
    the organizational defendants inadequate
    on a straight reading of the statute
    because, although the Boims alleged that
    HLF and QLI knew about Hamas’ plans for
    terrorist activities, they did not allege
    that these groups participated in the
    preparation of the planning for the
    violent acts. 
    Id. The court
    then considered whether the
    action could be sustained under the
    Boims’ second theory, that violations of
    18 U.S.C. secs. 2339A and 2339B
    sufficed to create civil liability under
    section 2333. Sections 2339A and 2339B
    created criminal liability for persons
    providing material support to terrorists.
    The court agreed that conduct prohibited
    by sections 2339A and 2339B constituted
    "international terrorism" as that term
    was defined in section 2333. 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1016. The court noted that sections
    2339A and 2339B require that support
    provided to terrorists be both knowing
    and material, but that civil liability
    for violations of sections 2339A or 2339B
    was limited to the period of time after
    sections 2339A and 2339B became law (1994
    for section 2339A and 1996 for section
    2339B). 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1016-17.
    The court also addressed the Boims’
    closely related theory that Congress
    clarified the meaning of "acts of
    international terrorism" when it passed
    sections 2339A and 2339B. According to
    the district court, these criminal
    provisions demonstrated Congress’ intent
    to include the provision of material
    support to terrorists in its definition
    of conduct involving violent acts under
    section 2331. If Congress imposed
    criminal liability for the provision of
    material support to terrorists, the
    district court reasoned, it surely meant
    for civil liability to reach at least
    that far. The court found further support
    for the proposition that Congress viewed
    the provision of material support to
    terrorists as an act of international
    terrorism in the repeal of jurisdictional
    immunity of a foreign state that has been
    designated a state sponsor of terrorism
    when the state is sued for personal
    injury or death caused by the state’s
    provision of material support or
    resources to terrorists as defined in
    section 2339A. See 28 U.S.C. sec.
    1605(a)(7). "Considering Congress has
    permitted foreign states that have been
    designated state-sponsors of terrorism to
    be sued in United States courts for
    violating sec. 2339A, it is hard to argue
    that Congress did not intend to include
    such violations in its definition of
    ’terrorism’ under the statutory scheme."
    
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1016.
    Because section 2339A was enacted in
    1994 and section 2339B was enacted in
    1996, the court found that the plaintiffs
    would have to rely on their third theory
    of liability, aiding and abetting in
    order to reach conduct that occurred
    before 1994. 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1017. The
    court rejected the defendants’ contention
    that the Supreme Court generally
    precluded aiding and abetting liability
    in federal civil causes of action in the
    Central Bank decision. 
    Id. Rather, the
    district court found that aiding and
    abetting liability was available when a
    statute provided for it. Section 2333
    relies on section 2331(1) for its
    definition of "international terrorism,"
    and the court found that any action that
    falls under the definition of section
    2331(1) may be the basis for a civil
    action under section 2333. Noting that
    aiding and abetting an act of
    international terrorism is itself a
    criminal violation, the court concluded
    that aiding and abetting terrorism is an
    activity that involves violent acts or
    acts dangerous to human life. The court
    sustained the Boims’ cause of action on
    the theory that they had sufficiently
    alleged that the defendants aided and
    abetted international terrorism. 127 F.
    Supp. 2d at 1017-18. The court relied on
    the liberal standards of pleading under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to find
    that the Boims had alleged their claim
    sufficiently, reasoning that the
    complaint provided the defendants with
    adequate notice of the charges against
    them. 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1018.
    The district court also rejected the
    defendants’ claim that the Boims had
    inadequately alleged causation. HLF and
    QLI argued that the Boims had shown no
    connection between the defendants’
    provision of money to Hamas and the
    murder of David Boim. The defendants
    characterized the Boims’ complaint as
    alleging funding only through 1993, and
    maintained the funding was too remote in
    time to have proximately caused David’s
    murder in 1996. The court first noted
    that the Boims alleged the defendants’
    funding extended beyond 1993, contrary to
    the defendants’ characterization. The
    court also found that Congress indicated
    by its passage of sections 2339A and
    2339B its belief that funding terrorism
    causes the harm of the terrorists’ subse
    quent actions. 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1019.
    According to the court, sections 2339A
    and 2339B required that the aid to the
    terrorists be "material," a term that
    provides the causal link between the
    provision of funds and the injury from
    the terrorist action. The court found the
    complaint sufficient and stated that the
    plaintiffs would have to prove the
    funding at issue here was material to
    David Boim’s murder. 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at
    1019-20.
    Finally, the court rejected the
    defendants’ First Amendment challenge,
    finding that the complaint was not
    seeking to impose liability for mere
    political association or belief but
    rather for knowing and intentional
    support of the illegal aims of the
    defendant organizations. 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1020-21. Because the Boims are
    required to prove that HLF and QLI
    intended to further Hamas’ illegal
    activities, either by aiding and abetting
    the terrorist action or by violating
    sections 2339A or 2339B, the district
    court found that the claim survived First
    Amendment scrutiny. 
    Id. HLF and
    QLI
    appeal.
    II.
    The district court granted HLF and QLI’s
    motion for a certificate of
    appealability, and we subsequently
    granted them leave to file an
    interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. sec.
    1292(b). Interlocutory appeal is
    appropriate when (1) the appeal presents
    a question of law; (2) it is controlling;
    (3) it is contestable; (4) its resolution
    will expedite the resolution of the
    litigation, and (5) the petition to
    appeal is filed in the district court
    within a reasonable amount of time after
    entry of the order sought to be appealed.
    Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees of the
    University of Illinois, 
    219 F.3d 674
    , 675
    (7th Cir. 2000). We have interpreted
    "question of law" to refer to a question
    regarding the meaning of a statutory or
    constitutional provision, regulation or
    common law doctrine. 
    Id., 219 F.3d
    at
    676. In this case, the district court
    correctly certified three issues for
    appeal:
    (1) Does funding, simpliciter, of an
    international terrorist organization
    constitute an act of terrorism under 18
    U.S.C. sec. 2331?
    (2) Does 18 U.S.C. sec. 2333 incorporate
    the definitions of international
    terrorism found in 18 U.S.C. secs.
    2339A and 2339B?
    (3) Does a civil cause of action lie
    under 18 U.S.C. secs. 2331 and 2333
    for aiding and abetting international
    terrorism?
    See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute,
    et al., Case No. 00 C 2905, Order (N.D.
    Ill. February 22, 2001). The
    interpretation of sections 2331 and 2333
    presents questions of law which will
    control the outcome of this case. As
    these are questions of first impression,
    the application of these statutes to the
    facts alleged here is certainly
    contestable, and the resolution of these
    issues will facilitate the conclusion of
    the litigation. The defendants filed
    their motions for certificates of
    appealability in the district court
    within a reasonable amount of time after
    entry of the district court’s order
    denying their motion to dismiss (the
    district court’s order was docketed
    January 10, 2001, QLI filed its motion on
    February 14, 2001 and HLF filed its
    motion on February 15, 2001). A panel of
    this Court granted the defendants’
    subsequent petitions for interlocutory
    appeal on April 6, 2001, and we now
    consider the issues certified by the
    district court.
    We review de novo a district court’s
    ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
    complaint for failure to state a claim on
    which relief may be granted. 
    Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597
    . At this stage of the
    proceedings, we accept all factual
    allegations in the complaint and draw all
    reasonable inferences from those facts in
    favor of the Boims, the plaintiffs here.
    
    Id. We examine
    the complaint as a whole,
    and we will allow the case to proceed
    unless it appears beyond doubt that the
    Boims can prove no set of facts in
    support of their claim which would
    entitle them to relief. Id.; Pokuta v.
    Trans World Airlines, Inc., 
    191 F.3d 834
    ,
    839 (7th Cir. 1999). Federal Rule 8(a)(2)
    requires only that a complaint include a
    "short and plain statement of the claim
    showing that the pleader is entitled to
    relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
    
    Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168
    . The Boims
    thus need not set out in detail all of
    the facts upon which they base their
    claim. Rule 8(a) requires only that the
    complaint give the defendants fair notice
    of what their claim is and the grounds
    upon which it rests. 
    Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168
    . With these standards in mind, we
    turn to the statutes at issue here.
    The Boims seek to recover against HLF
    and QLI pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 2333,
    which provides, in relevant part:
    Any national of the United States injured
    in his or her person, property, or
    business by reason of an act of
    international terrorism, or his or her
    estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
    therefor in any appropriate district
    court of the United States and shall
    recover threefold the damages he or she
    sustains and the cost of the suit,
    including attorney’s fees.
    18 U.S.C. sec. 2333(a). "International
    terrorism," in turn, is a defined term:
    [T]he term "international terrorism"
    means activities that--
    (A) involve violent acts or acts
    dangerous to human life that are a
    violation of the criminal laws of the
    United States or of any State, or that
    would be a criminal violation if
    committed within the jurisdiction of the
    United States or of any State;
    (B) appear to be intended--
    (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
    population;
    (ii) to influence the policy of a
    government by intimidation or coercion;
    or
    (iii) to affect the conduct of a
    government by assassination or
    kidnapping; and
    (C) occur primarily outside the
    territorial jurisdiction of the United
    States, or transcend national boundaries
    in terms of the means by which they are
    accomplished, the persons they appear
    intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
    locale in which their perpetrators
    operate or seek asylum.
    18 U.S.C. sec. 2331(1). These provisions
    became law in 1992./6 We turn now to
    the Boims’ three theories of liability
    under section 2333: (1) that funding
    Hamas, without more, is an act of
    international terrorism because it is
    conduct that involves violent acts or
    acts dangerous to human life; (2) that
    funding Hamas constitutes the provision
    of material support or resources to a
    terrorist organization in violation of
    the criminal provisions set forth in
    sections 2339A and 2339B, and that
    violations of these criminal provisions
    give rise to civil liability under
    section 2333; and (3) that aiding and
    abetting an act of terrorism gives rise
    to civil liability under section
    2333./7
    A.
    The plaintiffs’ first theory is that the
    simple provision of funds to Hamas by QLI
    and HLF constitutes an act of
    international terrorism because it
    "involve[s] violent acts or acts
    dangerous to human life." The Boims liken
    payments to Hamas to murder for hire: the
    person who pays for the murder does not
    himself commit a violent act, but the
    payment "involves" violent acts in the
    sense that it brings about the violent
    act and provides an incentive for someone
    else to commit it. The Boims urge us to
    adopt a very broad definition of
    "involves" that would include any
    activity that touches on and supports a
    violent act. They argue that David’s
    murder was indisputably a violent act,
    and we have no quarrel with that premise.
    But they further argue that the provision
    of money or in-kind services to persons
    outside the country who set up the
    infrastructure used to recruit and train
    David’s murderers, buy their weapons, and
    compensate their families also "involves"
    violent acts. The defendants, in turn,
    urge us to read the statute to hold
    liable only those who actually commit a
    violent act.
    No court has yet considered the meaning
    or scope of sections 2331 and 2333, and
    so we write upon a tabula rasa. The
    starting point in all statutory analysis
    is the plain language of the statute
    itself. United States v. Wagner, 
    29 F.3d 264
    , 266 (7th Cir. 1994). We look to the
    language in order to determine what
    Congress intended, and we also look to
    the statute’s structure, subject matter,
    context and history for this same
    purpose. Almendarez-Torres v. United
    States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 228 (1998) ("We
    therefore look to the statute before us
    and ask what Congress intended. . . . In
    answering this question, we look to the
    statute’s language, structure, subject
    matter, context, and history--factors
    that typically help courts determine a
    statute’s objectives and thereby
    illuminate its text."). The controversy
    here centers on the definition of
    international terrorism, and in
    particular on the definition of the word
    "involve," which is susceptible to many
    meanings. The statutory definition of
    international terrorism in section
    2331(1) is drawn verbatim from the
    Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50
    U.S.C. sec. 1801(c) ("FISA"). No court
    has yet expounded on the meaning or scope
    of "international terrorism" as it is
    used in FISA either, so we are not aided
    by that origin./8 A dictionary
    definition of "involve" demonstrates the
    many levels of participation that could
    constitute involvement. To involve is: to
    enfold or envelop so as to encumber; to
    engage as a participant; to oblige to
    take part; to occupy (as oneself)
    absorbingly; to commit emotionally; to
    relate closely; to have within or as part
    of itself; to require as a necessary
    accompaniment; to have an effect on.
    Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
    (1983). Because of these many
    possibilities, we agree with the district
    court that we must look to the structure,
    context and legislative history of the
    statute to determine what Congress
    intended.
    The government, in its very helpful
    amicus curiae brief, delineates some of
    the legislative history of sections 2331
    and 2333. That history, in combination
    with the language of the statute itself,
    evidences an intent by Congress to codify
    general common law tort principles and to
    extend civil liability for acts of
    international terrorism to the full
    reaches of traditional tort law. See 137
    Cong. Rec. S4511-04 (April 16, 1991)
    ("The [antiterrorism act] accords victims
    of terrorism the remedies of American
    tort law, including treble damages and
    attorney’s fees."); Antiterrorism Act of
    1990, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
    Courts and Administrative Practice of
    Committee on the Judiciary, United States
    Senate, 101st Congress, Second Session,
    July 25, 1990 (hereafter "Senate
    Hearing"), Testimony of Joseph Morris, at
    136 ("[T]he bill as drafted is powerfully
    broad, and its intention . . . is to . .
    . bring [in] all of the substantive law
    of the American tort law system."). In
    particular, the statute itself contains
    all of the elements of a traditional
    tort: breach of a duty (i.e., committing
    an act of international terrorism);
    injury to the person, property or
    business of another; and causation
    (injured "by reason of"). Although the
    statute defines the class of plaintiffs
    who may sue, it does not limit the class
    of defendants, and we must therefore look
    to tort law and the legislative history
    to determine who may be held liable for
    injuries covered by the statute.
    The legislative record is replete with
    references to the then-recent decision in
    Klinghoffer v. Palestinian Liberation
    Organization, 
    739 F. Supp. 854
    (S.D.N.Y.
    1990), vacated, 
    937 F.2d 44
    (2d Cir.
    1991). See Senate Hearing at 1, 12, 17,
    79, 83, 122, 133; H.R. Rep. 102-1040, at
    5 (1992); 137 Cong. Rec. S4511-04 (April
    16, 1991); 136 Cong. Rec. S4568-01
    (1990)./9 Leon Klinghoffer was a U.S.
    citizen who was murdered in a terrorist
    attack on a cruise ship in the Mediterra
    nean Sea. The district court found that
    his survivors’ claims were cognizable in
    federal court under federal admiralty
    jurisdiction and the Death on the High
    Seas Act because the tort occurred in
    navigable 
    waters. 739 F. Supp. at 858-59
    .
    The repeated favorable references to
    Klinghoffer indicate a desire on the part
    of Congress to extend this liability to
    land-based terrorism that occurred in a
    foreign country. See Senate Hearing at
    12, Testimony of Alan Kreczko, Deputy
    Legal Advisor, Department of State ("This
    bill . . . expands the Klinghoffer
    opinion."); H.R. Rep. 102-1040, at 5
    (1992) ("Only by virtue of the fact that
    the [Klinghoffer] attack violated certain
    Admiralty laws and the organization
    involved--the Palestinian Liberation
    Organization--had assets and carried on
    activities in New York, was the court
    able to establish jurisdiction over the
    case. A similar attack occurring on an
    airplane or in some other locale might
    not have been subject to civil action in
    the U.S. In order to facilitate civil
    actions against such terrorists the
    Committee [on the Judiciary] recommends
    [this bill]."); 137 Cong. Rec. S4511-04
    (April 16, 1991), Statement of Senator
    Grassley (section 2333 would "codify [the
    Klinghoffer] ruling and makes the right
    of American victims definitive"); 136
    Cong. Rec. S4568-01 (1990).
    The statute clearly is meant to reach
    beyond those persons who themselves
    commit the violent act that directly
    causes the injury. The Senate report on
    the bill notes that "[t]he substance of
    [an action under section 2333] is not de
    fined by the statute, because the fact
    patterns giving rise to such suits will
    be as varied and numerous as those found
    in the law of torts. This bill opens the
    courthouse door to victims of
    international terrorism." S. Rep. 102-
    342, at 45 (1992). This same report also
    remarks that the legislation, with "its
    provisions for compensatory damages,
    treble damages, and the imposition of
    liability at any point along the causal
    chain of terrorism," would "interrupt, or
    at least imperil, the flow of money." 
    Id. at 22
    (emphasis added). See also
    Statement of Senator Grassley, 136 Cong.
    Rec. S4568-01 at S4593 ("With the
    enactment of this legislation, we set an
    example to the world of how the United
    States legal system deals with
    terrorists. If terrorists have assets
    within our jurisdictional reach, American
    citizens will have the power to seize
    them."); Senate Hearing at 17, Statement
    of Alan Kreczko ("[F]ew terrorist
    organizations are likely to have cash
    assets or property located in the United
    States that could be attached and used to
    fulfill a civil judgment. The existence
    of such a cause of action, however, may
    deter terrorist groups from maintaining
    assets in the United States, from
    benefitting from investments in the U.S.
    and from soliciting funds within the
    U.S."); Senate Hearing at 79, Statement
    of Joseph Morris ("[A]nything that could
    be done to deter money-raising in the
    United States, money laundering in the
    United States, the repose of assets in
    the United States, and so on, would not
    only help benefit victims, but would also
    help deter terrorism."). All of this his
    tory indicates an intent by Congress to
    allow a plaintiff to recover from anyone
    along the causal chain of terrorism.
    But to the extent that the Boims urge a
    reading of the statute that would lead to
    liability for merely giving money to
    Hamas, a group which then sponsored a
    terrorist act in the manner the Boims
    have alleged, we agree with the district
    court, the defendants and the government
    that those allegations would be
    inadequate. To say that funding
    simpliciter constitutes an act of
    terrorism is to give the statute an
    almost unlimited reach. Any act which
    turns out to facilitate terrorism,
    however remote that act may be from
    actual violence and regardless of the
    actor’s intent, could be construed to
    "involve" terrorism. Without also
    requiring the plaintiffs to show
    knowledge of and intent to further the
    payee’s violent criminal acts, such a
    broad definition might also lead to
    constitutional infirmities by punishing
    mere association with groups that engage
    in terrorism, as we shall discuss later
    in addressing the First Amendment
    concerns raised here.
    Additionally, the statute itself
    requires that in order to recover, a
    plaintiff must be injured "by reason of"
    an act of international terrorism. The
    Supreme Court has interpreted identical
    language to require a showing of
    proximate cause. See Holmes v. Securities
    Investor Protection Corp., 
    503 U.S. 258
    ,
    265-68 (1992) (interpreting "by reason of"
    language in civil RICO provision to
    require a showing that the defendant’s
    conduct proximately caused the
    plaintiff’s injury). Foreseeability is
    the cornerstone of proximate cause, and
    in tort law, a defendant will be held
    liable only for those injuries that might
    have reasonably been anticipated as a
    natural consequence of the defendant’s
    actions. Suzik v. Sea-Land Corp., 
    89 F.3d 345
    , 348 (7th Cir. 1996); Restatement
    (2d) of Torts, secs. 440-447. In the
    circumstances of this case, the Boims
    cannot show that David Boim was injured
    "by reason of" the defendants’ payments
    to Hamas in the traditional tort sense of
    causation unless they can also show that
    murder was the reasonably foreseeable
    result of making the donation. To hold
    the defendants liable for donating money
    without knowledge of the donee’s intended
    criminal use of the funds would impose
    strict liability. Nothing in the language
    of the statute or its structure or
    history supports that formulation. The
    government, in its amicus brief,
    maintains that funding may be enough to
    establish liability if the plaintiff can
    show that the provider of funds was
    generally aware of the donee’s terrorist
    activity, and if the provision of funds
    substantially assisted the terrorist act
    in question. See Halberstam v. Welch, 
    705 F.2d 472
    , 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
    (describing the standards for joint
    liability for tortious acts). We will
    consider the government’s proposed
    standard separately in our discussion of
    aiding and abetting liability. For now we
    note only that the complaint cannot be
    sustained on the theory that the
    defendants themselves committed an act of
    international terrorism when they donated
    unspecified amounts of money to Hamas,
    neither knowing nor suspecting that Hamas
    would in turn financially support the
    persons who murdered David Boim. In the
    very least, the plaintiffs must be able
    to show that murder was a reasonably
    foreseeable result of making a
    donation./10 Thus, the Boims’ first
    theory of liability under section 2333,
    funding simpliciter of a terrorist
    organization, is insufficient because it
    sets too vague a standard, and because it
    does not require a showing of proximate
    cause.
    B.
    The Boims’ second theory of liability is
    that the defendants’ violation of
    sections 2339A and 2339B, the criminal
    counterparts to section 2333, gives rise
    to civil liability under section 2333.
    The Boims further contend that sections
    2339A and 2339B demonstrate Congress’
    intent to include the provision of
    material support to terrorist
    organizations in the definition of
    international terrorism for the purposes
    of section 2333. The district court
    concluded that Congress viewed violations
    of sections 2339A and 2339B as
    "activities involving violent acts or
    acts dangerous to human life," and
    therefore found that violations of
    sections 2339A and 2339B gave rise to
    civil liability under section 2333.
    Because much of the conduct the Boims
    alleged occurred before the passage of
    sections 2339A and 2339B, however, the
    district court ruled that the Boims would
    have to rely primarily on their aiding
    and abetting theory.
    In 1994, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. sec.
    2339A, which criminalizes the provision
    of material support to terrorists:
    Whoever, within the United States,
    provides material support or resources or
    conceals or disguises the nature,
    location, source, or ownership of
    material support or resources, knowing or
    intending that they are to be used in
    preparation for, or in carrying out, a
    violation of section 32, 37, 81, 175,
    351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i),
    930(c), 956, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361,
    1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156,
    2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332c, or
    2340A of this title or section 46502 of
    title 49, or in preparation for, or in
    carrying out, the concealment or an
    escape from the commission of any such
    violation, shall be fined under this
    title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
    or both.
    18 U.S.C. sec. 2339A(a)./11 "Material
    support or resources" is a defined term:
    In this section, the term "material
    support or resources" means currency or
    other financial securities, financial
    services, lodging, training, safehouses,
    false documentation or identification,
    communications equipment, facilities,
    weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
    personnel, transportation, and other
    physical assets, except medicine or
    religious materials.
    18 U.S.C. sec. 2339A(b). Two years later,
    Congress extended criminal liability to
    those providing material support to
    foreign terrorist organizations:
    Whoever, within the United States or
    subject to the jurisdiction of the United
    States, knowingly provides material
    support or resources to a foreign
    terrorist organization, or attempts or
    conspires to do so, shall be fined under
    this title or imprisoned not more than 10
    years, or both.
    18 U.S.C. sec. 2339B(a)(1). Section 2339B
    adopts the definition of "material
    support or resources" provided in section
    2339A, and looks to 8 U.S.C. sec. 1189
    for the definition of "terrorist
    organization."/12
    HLF and QLI, of course, protest the
    district court’s conclusion that funding
    may form the basis for a section 2333
    civil action if the funding meets the
    standards for criminal liability under
    sections 2339A or 2339B. The defendants
    also fault the district court for relying
    on Congress’ repeal of the jurisdictional
    immunity of a foreign state that has been
    designated a state sponsor of terrorism
    as evidence of Congressional intent to
    allow a section 2333 civil action against
    persons who violate sections 2339A and
    2339B. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(7). HLF
    and QLI present a number of puzzling
    arguments against the Boims’ theory of
    civil liability through violations of
    these criminal statutes. According to HLF
    and QLI, Congress neither expressly nor
    impliedly amended the definition of
    "international terrorism" when it enacted
    section 2339A and 2339B because (1) these
    sections set forth criminal offenses
    separate from the statute making violent
    acts of international terrorism illegal
    under U.S. law;/13 (2) these sections
    provide for relatively minor criminal
    penalties compared to the penalties for
    violent terrorist acts; (3) nothing in
    the text of either sections 2339A or
    2339B suggests that violations of these
    provisions are acts of international
    terrorism remediable under section 2333;
    (4) the inclusion of sections 2339A and
    2339B in the terrorism section of Title
    18 alone does not mean that Congress
    intended for violations of these
    provisions to constitute acts of
    international terrorism for the purposes
    of section 2333; and (6) section 2339B
    contains a separate remedial scheme that
    does not include a private right of
    action but instead provides for civil
    enforcement by the United States. The
    defendants also argue that even if
    violations of sections 2339A and 2339B
    create civil liability under section
    2333, the Boims have insufficiently
    alleged violations of those criminal
    statutes.
    Most of these arguments are tautologous.
    For example, sections 2339A and 2339B
    certainly do proscribe different conduct
    than sections 2332, 2332a, 2332b and
    2332d. These latter provisions address
    the primary perpetrators of violent acts
    of terrorism, while sections 2339A and
    2339B apply to those persons who provide
    material support to the primary
    perpetrators of violent acts of
    terrorism. When it passed sections 2339A
    and 2339B, Congress undoubtedly intended
    that the persons providing financial
    support to terrorists should also be held
    criminally liable for those violent acts.
    Indeed, as we have already noted, the
    Congressional record for section 2333
    indicates an intention to cut off the
    flow of money in support of terrorism
    generally. S. Rep. 102-342 at 22 (1992).
    Sections 2339A and 2339B further this
    goal by imposing criminal liability for
    financial support of terrorist activities
    and organizations. The fact that Congress
    imposed lesser criminal penalties for the
    financial supporters indicates perhaps
    that they found the financiers less
    dangerous or less culpable than the
    terrorists they finance, but it does not
    in any way indicate that Congress meant
    to limit civil liability to those who
    personally committed acts of terrorism.
    On the contrary, it would be
    counterintuitive to conclude that
    Congress imposed criminal liability in
    sections 2339A and 2339B on those who
    financed terrorism, but did not intend to
    impose civil liability on those same
    persons through section 2333.
    Section 2339A prohibits the provision of
    material support for an extensive list of
    violent crimes associated with terrorism-
    -assassination, kidnapping, arson,
    destruction of aircraft--that make clear
    what types of conduct Congress had in
    mind when it defined "international
    terrorism" in section 2331(1) as not just
    the violent acts themselves, but also
    "activities that involve violent acts or
    acts dangerous to human life." There is
    no textual, structural or logical
    justification for construing the civil
    liability imposed by section 2333 more
    narrowly than the corresponding criminal
    provisions. Because Congress intended to
    impose criminal liability for funding
    violent terrorism, we find that it also
    intended through sections 2333 and
    2331(1) to impose civil liability for
    funding at least as broad a class of
    violent terrorist acts. If the plaintiffs
    could show that HLF and QLI violated
    either section 2339A or section 2339B,
    that conduct would certainly be
    sufficient to meet the definition of "in
    ternational terrorism" under sections
    2333 and 2331. Such acts would give rise
    to civil liability under section 2333 so
    long as knowledge and intent are also
    shown, as we shall discuss shortly in the
    context of aiding and abetting.
    We hasten to add that, although proof of
    a criminal violation under sections 2339A
    or 2339B might satisfy the definition of
    international terrorism under section
    2333, such proof is not necessary to
    sustain a section 2333 claim. As we
    discuss in the context of aiding and
    abetting, we believe Congress intended
    for civil liability for financing
    terrorism to sweep more broadly than the
    conduct described in sections 2339A and
    2339B. We also note that the district
    court seems to have inadvertently
    redefined the term "material" in the
    context of sections 2339A and 2339B as
    meaning substantial or considerable. The
    statute itself defines "material support
    or resources" as "currency or other
    financial securities, financial services,
    lodging, training, safehouses, false
    documentation or identification,
    communications equipment, facilities,
    weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
    personnel, transportation, and other
    physical assets, except medicine or
    religious materials." 18 U.S.C. sec.
    2339A(b). Thus, the term relates to the
    type of aid provided rather than whether
    it is substantial or considerable. For
    civil liability, section 2333 requires
    that the plaintiff be injured "by reason
    of" the act of international terrorism.
    Because we believe Congress intended to
    import standard tort law into section
    2333, causation may be demonstrated as it
    would be in traditional tort law.
    Congress has made clear, though, through
    the criminal liability imposed in
    sections 2339A and 2339B, that even small
    donations made knowingly and
    intentionally in support of terrorism may
    meet the standard for civil liability in
    section 2333. Congress’ goal of cutting
    off funding for terrorism would be
    seriously compromised if terrorist
    organizations could avoid liability by
    simply pooling together small donations
    to fund a terrorist act.
    We turn finally to 28 U.S.C. sec.
    1605(a)(7). In relevant part, the statute
    provides:
    A foreign state shall not be immune from
    the jurisdiction of courts of the United
    States or of the States in any case . .
    . in which money damages are sought
    against a foreign state for personal
    injury or death that was caused by an act
    of torture , extrajudicial killing,
    aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
    provision of material support or
    resources (as defined in section 2339A of
    title 18) for such an act if such act or
    provision of material support is engaged
    in by an official, employee, or agent of
    such foreign state while acting within
    the scope of his or her office,
    employment, agency[.]
    Contrary to the defendants’
    characterization, the district court did
    not rely solely on the passage of section
    1605(a)(7) in finding that Congress
    viewed the provision of material support
    and resources as an act of international
    terrorism. After finding support in both
    the text and the structure of sections
    2333 and 2331 for this proposition, the
    court found further reasons in section
    1605(a)(7). As the district court noted,
    "Considering that Congress has permitted
    foreign states that have been designated
    state sponsors of terrorism to be sued in
    United States courts for violating sec.
    2339A, it is hard to argue that Congress
    did not intend to include such violations
    in its definition of ’terrorism’ under
    the statutory scheme." Boim, 
    127 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1016. We take the district court to
    mean that section 1605(a)(7) implies a
    foreign state may be sued in the United
    States for acts that would give rise to
    criminal liability under section 2339A,
    not that section 2339A itself has a civil
    provision. The mechanism for suing a
    foreign state for these acts that would
    give rise to criminal liability under
    section 2339A is section 2333. The
    defendants complain that Congress did not
    specifically mention section 2333 as the
    device by which plaintiffs might sue
    foreign governments for violations of
    section 2339A, but they fail to point to
    any other source of civil liability. We
    agree that Congress made clear in section
    1605(a)(7) its intent to characterize
    violations of section 2339A as acts of
    international terrorism under section
    2333.
    The district court believed there was a
    timing problem for the Boims in making
    their case under these criminal
    provisions because much of the funding
    conduct allegedly committed by HLF and
    QLI occurred prior to the passage of
    sections 2339A and 2339B. Indeed, Hamas
    was not designated a terrorist
    organization under section 1189 until
    1997, after David’s murder. Certainly HLF
    and QLI could not be held criminally
    liable for conduct that occurred before
    the statutes were enacted, but that
    argument misses the point. We are using
    sections 2339A and 2339B not as
    independent sources of liability under
    section 2333, but to amplify what
    Congress meant by "international
    terrorism." Sections 2339A and 2339B
    merely lend further support to our
    finding that Congress considered the
    provision of material support to
    terrorists an act of international
    terrorism. This reading simply amplifies
    the conclusion we have already reached by
    examining the language and legislative
    history of section 2333. Sections 2339A
    and 2339B provide criminal liability for
    the provision of material support, and
    section 2333 provides civil liability.
    The Boims may thus show that QLI and HLF
    committed an act of international
    terrorism subject to civil liability
    under section 2333 by proving that QLI
    and HLF provided material support to
    terrorist organizations. No timing
    problem arises because sections 2339A and
    2339B merely elucidate conduct that was
    already prohibited by section 2333.
    C.
    We turn next to the Boims’ theory that
    HLF and QLI may be held civilly liable
    under section 2333 for aiding and
    abetting an act of international
    terrorism. Under this theory, the Boims
    urge us to find that aiding and abetting
    a violent act is conduct that "involves"
    a violent act as that word is used in
    section 2331(1). HLF and QLI contend that
    section 2333 does not provide for aiding
    and abetting liability, and that the
    Supreme Court in Central Bank held that
    aiding and abetting liability is
    available only when a statute expressly
    provides for it. See Central Bank of
    Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
    Denver, N.A., 
    511 U.S. 164
    (1994);
    Alexander v. Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. 275
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 1511
    (2001). The Boims counter
    that neither Central Bank nor Sandoval
    apply to malum in se torts such as the
    murder alleged here. The Boims also
    contend that section 2333 explicitly
    extends liability to aiders and abettors
    because it extends civil liability to
    "activities that involve violent acts . .
    . that are a violation of the criminal
    laws of the United States." Because 18
    U.S.C. sec. 2 criminalizes aiding and
    abetting the commission of a felony, the
    Boims maintain there is no doubt Congress
    intended to include liability for aiding
    and abetting in section 2333. The
    government, in its amicus brief, adds
    that the language and legislative history
    of section 2333 indicate an intent by
    Congress to import into section 2333
    civil tort law principles as expressed in
    the Restatement Second of Torts, and as
    applied in the cases. Under that
    jurisprudence, according to the
    government, aiding and abetting liability
    should be applied under section 2333, and
    that result is in no way inconsistent
    with Central Bank and Sandoval. Because
    of Central Bank’s pivotal importance to
    our analysis, we will begin by reviewing
    the Court’s reasoning there.
    In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held
    that a private plaintiff may not maintain
    an aiding and abetting suit under section
    10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    
    1934. 511 U.S. at 177-78
    . As the Court
    has interpreted it, section 10(b) imposes
    private civil liability on those who
    commit a manipulative or deceptive act in
    connection with the purchase or sale of
    
    securities. 511 U.S. at 167
    . Yet, that
    section contains no express cause of
    action giving private plaintiffs a right
    to sue. Nonetheless, through judicial
    interpretation of the securities laws, an
    implied right of action was created
    allowing private parties to sue for
    damages for violations of section 10(b).
    Prior to Central Bank, some lower courts
    had interpreted the statute to create a
    private right of action not only against
    those who violate section 10(b), but also
    against those who aid and abet a
    violation of section 10(b); other courts
    had found that there was no private right
    of action for aiding and abetting
    liability. The Court granted certiorari
    to resolve the continuing confusion in
    the circuit courts over the existence and
    scope of an aiding and abetting action
    under section 
    10(b). 511 U.S. at 170
    .
    The securities laws contain a number of
    provisions creating an extensive scheme
    of civil liability. The 1933 and 1934
    Acts contain express private rights of
    action, and the courts have also found
    private rights of actions to be implied
    by the terms of sections 10(b) and 14(a)
    of the 1934 
    Act. 511 U.S. at 171
    . The SEC
    adopted Rule 10b-5 to further describe
    the conduct prohibited, and it is under
    this rule that plaintiffs often brought
    their actions. The Court noted that
    determining the elements of rule 10b-5
    private action claims had posed
    difficulty because Congress had not
    expressly provided for a private 10(b)
    action and thus had no occasion to offer
    guidance about the elements of a private
    liability 
    scheme. 511 U.S. at 172
    . The
    courts thus had to infer how the 1934
    Congress would have addressed the issue
    had the 10b-5 action been included as an
    express provision of the 1934 
    Act. 511 U.S. at 173
    . Because adherence to the
    statutory language is the starting point
    of any case involving construction of a
    statute, the Supreme Court refused to
    allow 10b-5 liability for conduct not
    prohibited by the text of section 
    10(b). 511 U.S. at 174
    . In view of the fact that
    section 10(b) made no mention of aiding
    and abetting liability, the Court found
    that there could be no private right of
    action for aiding and abetting a 10(b)
    violation.
    The Court rejected a claim that language
    in the statute imposing liability on any
    person who "directly or indirectly"
    employs a deceptive practice meant that
    Congress intended to cover aiding and
    abetting:
    The problem, of course, is that aiding
    and abetting liability extends beyond
    persons who engage, even indirectly, in a
    proscribed activity; aiding and abetting
    liability reaches persons who do not
    engage in the proscribed activities at
    all, but who give a degree of aid to
    those who 
    do. 511 U.S. at 175-76
    . Citing section 876(b)
    of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
    Court acknowledged that aiding and
    abetting a wrongdoer ought to be
    actionable in certain other
    circumstances, but the issue here was
    whether aiding and abetting was covered
    by the statute. The Court stated that it
    was inconsistent with settled methodology
    in section 10(b) cases to extend
    liability beyond the scope of conduct
    prohibited by the statutory text. The
    Court found that the statute prohibited
    only the making of a material
    misstatement (or omission) or the
    commission of a manipulative act. Because
    the statute did not proscribe giving aid
    to a person who commits a manipulation or
    deceptive act, the Court declined to
    extend liability to aiders and 
    abettors. 511 U.S. at 177-78
    .
    The Court further noted that it could
    reach the same result by examining the
    express causes of action identified in
    the 1933 and 1934 Acts as models for
    implied rights of action under those same
    sections. None of the express causes of
    actions in the 1934 Act imposed liability
    on aiders and abettors, and the Court
    found it would be "anomalous to impute to
    Congress an intention in effect to expand
    the defendant class for 10b-5 actions
    beyond the bounds delineated for
    comparable express causes of 
    action." 511 U.S. at 180
    . This analysis was bolstered
    by the conclusion that an action against
    aiders and abettors would allow liability
    when at least one element critical for
    recovery under rule 10b-5 is absent:
    reliance. 
    Id. An aiding
    and abetting
    action would allow a defendant to be held
    liable without the usual requisite
    showing that the plaintiff relied on the
    defendant’s statements or actions, in
    contravention of the careful limits on
    10b-5 recovery mandated by earlier cases.
    
    Id. The Court
    also examined the history of
    aiding and abetting liability, noting
    first that Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
    sec. 2, a general aiding and abetting
    statute applicable to all federal crimes,
    in 1909. The statute provides that
    persons who provide knowing aid to those
    committing federal crimes, with the
    intent to facilitate the crime, are
    themselves committing a 
    crime. 511 U.S. at 181
    . The Restatement (Second) of Torts
    similarly provides for civil liability
    for aiders and abettors by holding an
    actor liable for harm resulting to a
    third person from the tortious conduct of
    another if the actor knows the other’s
    conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
    the actor gives substantial assistance or
    encouragement to the other. Restatement
    (Second) of Torts, sec. 876(b). But
    Congress did not enact a general aiding
    and abetting statue covering civil
    actions, either for suits by the
    government or suits by private parties.
    Thus, when Congress enacts a statute
    under which a person may sue and recover
    damages from a private defendant for the
    defendant’s violation of some statutory
    norm, there is no general presumption
    that the plaintiff may also sue aiders
    and abettors.
    Central 
    Bank, 511 U.S. at 182
    .
    Instead, the Court found, Congress had
    taken a statute-by-statute approach to
    civil aiding and abetting liability. In
    sum, the Court found that there was no
    reason to attach aiding and abetting
    liability in all federal civil statutes,
    that Congress had not expressed any
    intent to extend aiding and abetting
    liability in this particular statute, and
    that none of the express causes of action
    in the 1934 Act extended aiding and
    abetting liability. Even considering the
    history of aiding and abetting liability
    in the criminal and the civil context,
    the Court found no reason to extend that
    liability to private causes of action in
    the securities statutes. Indeed, Congress
    had expressly provided for another type
    of secondary liability in the 1934 Act--
    "controlling person" liability--and thus
    the absence of aiding and abetting
    liability appeared to have been a
    deliberate 
    choice. 511 U.S. at 183-84
    .
    The Central Bank analysis provides
    guidance but is not determinative here
    for a number of reasons. First, Central
    Bank addressed extending aiding and
    abetting liability to an implied right of
    action, not an express right of action as
    we have here in section 2333. Second,
    Congress expressed an intent in the terms
    and history of section 2333 to import
    general tort law principles, and those
    principles include aiding and abetting
    liability. Third, Congress expressed an
    intent in section 2333 to render civil
    liability at least as extensive as
    criminal liability in the context of the
    terrorism cases, and criminal liability
    attaches to aiders and abettors of
    terrorism. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 2. Fourth,
    failing to extend section 2333 liability
    to aiders and abettors is contrary to
    Congress’ stated purpose of cutting off
    the flow of money to terrorists at every
    point along the chain of causation.
    Although we have found no support in the
    cases for the Boims’ argument that
    Central Bank does not apply to malum in
    se torts, we also have found no support
    for the defendants’ claim that Central
    Bank eliminates all aiding and abetting
    liability in federal civil cases except
    when the words "aid and abet" appear in a
    statute./14 The Court care-fully
    crafted Central Bank’s holding to clarify
    that aiding and abetting liability would
    be appropriate in certain cases, albeit
    not under 10(b). Central 
    Bank, 511 U.S. at 177
    . The first significant factor
    distinguishing section 2333 from section
    10(b) is that section 2333 provides for
    an express civil right of action by
    private parties whereas the courts have
    created an implied right of action under
    section 10(b). Thus, the courts were
    already inferring an intent by Congress
    to create a private civil cause of action
    with section 10(b), and they would have
    been stacking another inference on top of
    that one in extending liability to aiders
    and abettors in rule 10b-5 actions. The
    Court was understandably reluctant to
    pile inference upon inference in
    determining Congressional intent. But no
    such stacking is required in section
    2333, which expressly creates a private
    right of action for plaintiffs who are
    injured by reason of an act of
    international terrorism. Sandoval is
    distinguishable for the very same reason;
    it addressed an implied right of action
    founded on a regulation promulgated under
    Title VI. Here we have an express private
    right of action, where Congress’ intent
    is clear from the language and structure
    of the statute itself as well as from the
    legislative history. As we will discuss
    below, although the words "aid and abet"
    do not appear in the statute, Congress
    purposely drafted the statute to extend
    liability to all points along the causal
    chain of terrorism. It is not much of a
    leap to conclude that Congress intended
    to extend section 2333 liability beyond
    those persons directly perpetrating acts
    of violence. Indeed, the statute itself
    defines international terrorism so broad
    ly--to include activities that "involve"
    violent acts--that we must construe it
    carefully to meet the
    constitutionalstandards regarding
    vagueness and First Amendment rights of
    association.
    The next distinguishing factor is that
    the language and legislative history of
    section 2333 evidence an intent to import
    general tort law principles into the
    statute, a factor glaringly absent from
    section 10(b). See 137 Cong. Rec. S4511-
    04 (April 16, 1991); Senate Hearing at
    136. Nothing in section 10(b) reflects an
    intent to incorporate general tort law
    principles, and a careful review of that
    statute demonstrates to the contrary that
    Congress intended to limit liability in
    certain instances. As the Supreme Court
    noted, Congress imposed some forms of
    secondary liability in section 10(b)
    (such as controlling person liability),
    but not others, manifesting a deliberate
    choice to exclude aiding and abetting
    liability. In contrast, the language of
    section 2333 tracks the traditional
    elements of tort law as expressed in the
    Restatement, and the legislative history
    expressly references tort principles in
    setting out the perimeters of Congress’
    intent.
    Unlike section 10(b), Congress also
    expressed an intent in section 2333 to
    make civil liability at least as
    extensive as criminal liability. The
    statute defining "international
    terrorism" includes activities that
    "involve violent acts or acts dangerous
    to human life that are a violation of the
    criminal laws of the United States or of
    any State, or that would be a criminal
    violation if committed within the
    jurisdiction of the United States or of
    any State." 18 U.S.C. sec. 2331(1). This
    language, embracing activities that
    "involve" violent acts, taken at face
    value would certainly cover aiding and
    abetting violent acts. Remember, too, the
    criminal laws include 18 U.S.C. sec. 2,
    which creates liability for aiding and
    abetting violations of any other criminal
    provisions. By incorporating violations
    of any criminal laws that involve violent
    acts or acts dangerous to human life,
    Congress was expressly including aiding
    and abetting to the extent that aiding
    and abetting "involves" violence. As we
    discussed earlier, "involve" is a rather
    broad word. If we were to interpret
    "involve" literally, we would be
    attributing almost unlimited liability to
    any act that had some link to a terrorist
    act. Congress could not have meant to
    attach unlimited liability to even remote
    acts; it must have meant something else.
    As we have seen from the language and
    legislative history of section 2333, that
    something else is traditional tort and
    criminal liability. Aiding and abetting,
    which is surely subsumed in the
    definition of acts that "involve" certain
    criminal violations, is a well known and
    well defined doctrine. See Damato v.
    Hermanson, 
    153 F.3d 464
    , 472 n.10 (7th
    Cir. 1998) (in the criminal context, the
    aider and abettor knowingly assists the
    principal in the attainment of the
    illegal objective and therefore is
    sanctioned as the principal); United
    States v. Zafiro, 
    945 F.2d 881
    , 887 (7th
    Cir. 1991), aff’d, 
    506 U.S. 534
    (1993)
    (the crime of aiding and abetting
    requires knowledge of the illegal
    activity that is being aided and abetted,
    a desire to help that activity succeed,
    and some act of helping). See also
    Halberstam v. Welch, 
    705 F.2d 472
    , 477and
    481-84 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (setting forth
    the elements for civil liability for
    aiding and abetting). That Congress did
    not use the words "aid and abet" in the
    statute is not determinative when it did
    use words broad enough to include all
    kinds of secondary liability. See Harris
    
    Trust, 530 U.S. at 246
    (holding that
    ERISA reaches farther than the immediate
    wrongdoer because the statute focuses not
    on the class of possible defendants but
    rather on redressing a particular act or
    practice which violates the statute).
    Indeed, limiting the term "involve" to
    the familiar definitions of aiding and
    abetting (or even conspiracy, for that
    matter) provides the necessary
    clarification that saves the statute from
    vagueness. Central Bank is thus
    distinguishable on this ground as well.
    Finally, if we failed to impose
    liability on aiders and abettors who
    knowingly and intentionally funded acts
    of terrorism, we would be thwarting
    Congress’ clearly expressed intent to cut
    off the flow of money to terrorists at
    every point along the causal chain of
    violence. S. Rep. 102-342, at 22 (by
    imposing "liability at any point along
    the causal chain of terrorism, it would
    interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow
    of money."). Unlike section 10(b) where
    Congress’ intent could be met without
    imposing liability on aiders and
    abettors, Congress’ purpose here could
    not be met unless liability attached
    beyond the persons directly involved in
    acts of violence. The statute would have
    little effect if liability were limited
    to the persons who pull the trigger or
    plant the bomb because such persons are
    unlikely to have assets, much less assets
    in the United States, and would not be
    deterred by the statute. See Central
    
    Bank, 511 U.S. at 188
    (policy
    considerations may be used to interpret
    the text and structure of a statute when
    a literal reading would lead to a result
    so bizarre that Congress could not have
    intended it). Also, and perhaps more
    importantly, there would not be a trigger
    to pull or a bomb to blow up without the
    resources to acquire such tools of
    terrorism and to bankroll the persons who
    actually commit the violence. Moreover,
    the organizations, businesses and nations
    that support and encourage terrorist acts
    are likely to have reachable assets that
    they wish to protect. The only way to
    imperil the flow of money and discourage
    the financing of terrorist acts is to
    impose liability on those who knowingly
    and intentionally supply the funds to the
    persons who commit the violent acts. For
    all of these distinguishing reasons, we
    do not think Central Bank controls the
    result here, but that aiding and abetting
    liability is both appropriate and called
    for by the language, structure and
    legislative history of section 2333.
    D.
    The defendants raise two First Amendment
    objections to this section 2333 action
    against them. First, they argue that the
    Boims seek to hold them liable for their
    mere association with Hamas. Harking back
    to a line of cases involving the
    Communist party, HLF and QLI contend
    that, when an organization has both legal
    and illegal aims, a person may not be
    punished for mere membership in or
    association with that organization, but
    may be held civilly liable only if he or
    she possesses the specific intent to
    further the organizations’ illegal
    purposes. Second, they contend that, to
    the extent the Boims’ claim is founded on
    a violation of section 2339B, it cannot
    withstand First Amendment scrutiny
    because section 2339B fails to account
    for the intent and the associational
    rights of the contributors who donate
    money for humanitarian purposes. The
    National Coalition to Protect Political
    Freedom and the Center for Constitutional
    Rights have jointly filed an amicus brief
    in support of the defendants’ First
    Amendment arguments, and we will consider
    their contentions as well.
    1.
    HLF and QLI begin their argument with
    the well-established proposition that the
    Constitution protects against the
    imposition of liability based solely upon
    association with a group. See NAACP v.
    Claiborne Hardware Co., 
    458 U.S. 886
    , 920
    (1982) ("[c]ivil liability may not be
    imposed merely because an individual
    belonged to a group, some members of
    which committed acts of violence.");
    Healy v. James, 
    408 U.S. 169
    , 185-86
    (1972) ("the Court has consistently
    disapproved governmental action imposing
    criminal sanctions or denying rights and
    privileges solely because of a citizen’s
    association with an unpopular
    organization."); United States v. Robel,
    
    389 U.S. 258
    , 265 (1967) (where a statute
    establishes guilt by association alone,
    the inhibiting effect on First Amendment
    rights is clear); Scales v. United
    States, 
    367 U.S. 203
    , 229 (1961) (a
    blanket prohibition of association with a
    group having both legal and illegal aims
    presents a real danger that legitimate
    political expression or association would
    be impaired). We have no quarrel with
    that general proposition or with its
    corollary, that in order to impose
    liability on an individual for
    association with a group, it is necessary
    to establish that the group possessed
    unlawful goals and that the individual
    held a specific intent to further those
    illegal aims. Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920-21
    ; National Organization for
    Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 
    267 F.3d 687
    ,
    703 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 
    122 S. Ct. 1604
    and 
    122 S. Ct. 1605
    (2002).
    HLF and QLI protest that the Boims have
    not alleged their specific intent to
    further the illegal activities of Hamas,
    and that the claim does not, therefore,
    survive First Amendment scrutiny. Rather,
    HLF complains, the Boims have simply
    alleged that HLF has admitted providing
    funds to Hamas, that HLF functions as a
    front organization for Hamas, that HLF
    raises and channels funds to Hamas to
    finance terrorist activities in Israel,
    and that HLF solicits donations over the
    internet. HLF protests that even if these
    allegations suffice to show a present
    intent to further terrorist acts, they do
    not show that HLF had that intent prior
    to David Boim’s murder. Rather, HLF
    believes the Boims are lumping their
    organization in with other groups that
    may have had an intent to commit illegal
    acts, and that the Boims are seeking to
    hold them liable for their mere
    association with these other
    organizations. QLI similarly argues that
    the Boims have not alleged a specific
    intent on the part of QLI to further the
    illegal goals of Hamas, and that they may
    not be held liable for merely associating
    with organizations that might have
    intended to aid the illegal operations of
    Hamas.
    Amici also emphasize that individuals
    may not be penalized for their
    association with a political organization
    that engages in both lawful and unlawful
    ends, absent a showing of specific intent
    to further the organization’s illegal
    goals. Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 919-20
    . The arguments of the defendants
    and amici beg the question, though,
    because section 2333 does not seek to
    impose liability for association alone
    but rather for involvement in acts of
    international terrorism. The defendants
    nonetheless object that the definition of
    acts of international terrorism is so
    broad that they might be held liable for
    involvement in terrorist activity when
    all they intended was to supply money to
    fund the legitimate, humanitarian mission
    of Hamas or other organizations. To
    resolve the tension that arises when a
    group engages in both protected advocacy
    and unprotected criminal acts, we look to
    Claiborne Hardware and to earlier cases
    that arose out of the McCarthy era, when
    the government sought to impose liability
    on persons for their association with the
    Communist Party.
    In Claiborne Hardware, a group of white
    merchants and business owners sued the
    National Association for the Advancement
    of Colored People ("NAACP") for engaging
    in a boycott of white-owned businesses.
    The merchants alleged that, in enforcing
    the boycott, some of the members of the
    defendant NAACP had engaged in acts of
    physical force and violence, and that the
    NAACP should therefore be held liable for
    the merchants’ losses. The Court first
    held that speeches and nonviolent
    picketing in support of the boycott were
    activities normally entitled to
    protection under the First 
    Amendment. 458 U.S. at 907
    . The Court noted that the
    right of association, the right to join
    many voices together to strengthen a
    message and make certain it is heard, is
    an important constitutional 
    guarantee. 458 U.S. at 908
    . That right "to associate
    does not lose all constitutional
    protection merely because some members of
    the group may have participated in
    conduct or advanced doctrine that is
    itself not 
    protected." 458 U.S. at 908
    .
    At the same time, "[t]he First Amendment
    does not protect 
    violence." 458 U.S. at 916
    .
    Certainly violence has no sanctuary in
    the First Amendment, and the use of
    weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not
    constitutionally masquerade under the
    guise of "advocacy."
    Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916
    (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 
    401 U.S. 66
    ,
    75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)). The
    Court concluded that no federal rule of
    law restricts a state from imposing tort
    liability for business losses caused by
    violence or the threat of violence, but
    that when such conduct occurs in the
    context of constitutionally protected
    activity, precision of regulation is
    required. Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 916
    . When activity protected by the First
    Amendment is present, damages are
    restricted to the direct consequences of
    the illegal violent conduct and may not
    include the consequences resulting from
    associated peaceful picketing or other
    protected First Amendment 
    activity. 458 U.S. at 918
    (citing United Mine Workers
    of America v. Gibbs, 
    383 U.S. 715
    , 729
    (1966)). Citing Scales, Healy and Noto,
    the Court summarized the rule to be
    applied:
    Civil liability may not be imposed merely
    because an individual belonged to a
    group, some members of which committed
    acts of violence. For liability to be
    imposed by reason of association alone,
    it is necessary to establish that the
    group itself possessed unlawful goals and
    that the individual held a specific
    intent to further those illegal aims.
    Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920
    .
    We have already held that the Boims may
    prevail on their claim by showing, among
    other things, that the defendants aided
    and abetted David’s murder. This requires
    them to prove that the defendants knew of
    Hamas’ illegal activities, that they
    desired to help those activities succeed,
    and they engaged in some act of helping
    the illegal activities. See 
    Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 887
    . If the Boims are able to
    prove the defendants aided and abetted
    terrorist acts, liability would not
    offend the principles announced in
    Claiborne Hardware. The Boims have
    alleged that HLF and QLI supplied money
    to Hamas to fund terrorist operations,
    that they are "front" organizations with
    ostensibly legitimate purposes which are
    actually engaged in fund-raising and
    money laundering in support of terrorist
    activities. They have alleged that HLF
    and QLI provided the money to purchase
    the weapons and train the men who killed
    David Boim. HLF and QLI, of course, deny
    these allegations and argue that as a
    factual matter, Hamas is primarily a
    humanitarian organization, and that any
    money supplied to Hamas by QLI and HLF
    was intended to fund humanitarian
    efforts, not terrorism. This is a classic
    factual dispute, not suitable for
    resolution on a motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim. If the Boims
    are able to prove their allegations, that
    HLF and QLI provided legitimate-looking
    fronts for raising money to support the
    terrorist operation that resulted in
    David Boim’s murder, their claim will not
    run afoul of the First Amendment. The
    Boims are not seeking to hold HLF and QLI
    liable for their mere association with
    Hamas, nor are they seeking to hold the
    defendants liable for contributing money
    for humanitarian efforts. Rather, they
    are seeking to hold them liable for
    aiding and abetting murder by supplying
    the money to buy the weapons, train the
    shooters, and compensate the families of
    the murderers. That Hamas may also engage
    in legitimate advocacy or humanitarian
    efforts is irrelevant for First Amendment
    purposes if HLF and QLI knew about Hamas’
    illegal operations, and intended to help
    Hamas accomplish those illegal goals when
    they contributed money to the
    organization. Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 932
    ; 
    Scales, 367 U.S. at 229
    ;
    
    Noto, 367 U.S. at 298
    ; 
    Healy, 408 U.S. at 186
    ; 
    Scheidler, 267 F.3d at 703
    .
    Moreover, we believe the Boims’
    allegations lend adequate support to
    their claims against QLI and HLF. Rule
    8(a) requires only a short and plain
    statement of the claim showing that the
    Boims are entitled to relief. The
    defendants repeatedly confuse what must
    be alleged with what must be proved. The
    plaintiffs need not set out in detail all
    of the facts upon which they base their
    claim. They need only give QLI and HLF
    fair notice of what their claim is and
    the grounds upon which it rests.
    
    Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168
    . This they
    have done.
    They allege that QLI and HLF violated
    section 2333 by aiding and abetting
    Hinawi and Al-Sharif in committing the
    murder of David Boim. An aiding and
    abetting claim will require the Boims to
    prove that QLI and HLF knew about Hamas’
    illegal operations and provided aid to
    Hamas with the intent to facilitate those
    illegal activities. In support of the
    claim that HLF and QLI aided and abetted
    the terrorists who murdered David, the
    Boims allege that HLF and QLI were
    engaged in raising and laundering money
    for Hamas; that HLF and QLI functioned as
    fronts for Hamas in the United States;
    that HLF raised and channeled funds to
    Hamas to finance terrorist activities in
    Israel; that David’s attackers were Hamas
    terrorists; that Hamas’ central purpose
    is to advance its political goals through
    terrorism; that HLF and QLI’s purportedly
    humanitarian functions masked their core
    mission of raising and funneling money
    and other resources to Hamas in support
    of its terrorist campaigns; that HLF and
    QLI comingled money destined for
    terrorist causes with funds from their
    legitimate charitable and business
    dealings in order to avoid laws against
    providing financial support to
    terrorists; that money gathered in this
    way was sent by the front organizations
    (including HLF and QLI) from the United
    States to Hamas to buy weapons and carry
    out terrorist attacks, including the
    murder of David Boim; and that money pro
    vided by the front organizations to
    finance terrorist activities was in fact
    used for that purpose and in particular
    was used to purchase the vehicle, machine
    guns, and ammunition used to kill David,
    as well as to train his killers and to
    provide a stipend for the family of one
    of his murderers. That is more than
    sufficient to notify the defendants of
    the nature of the claims against them.
    These allegations also implicitly assert
    that the defendants had the intent to
    further the illegal aims of Hamas prior
    to David’s murder, contrary to the
    defendants’ characterization. The Boims’
    theory of the case, that QLI and HLF
    aided and abetted Hamas in murdering
    David Boims, does not offend the First
    Amendment because they seek to hold QLI
    and HLF liable not for their associations
    or speech but for their knowing and
    intentional financial support of illegal
    activities. We also note that discovery
    will certainly clarify the Boims’ theory
    of the case, and we will not dismiss a
    complaint before discovery unless it
    appears beyond doubt that the Boims can
    prove no set of facts in support of their
    claim which would entitle them to relief.
    
    Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597
    . Although the
    defendants claim to have been supporting
    only the humanitarian mission of Hamas,
    that is a fact question that cannot be
    resolved at this early stage of the
    litigation.
    2.
    We turn next to the defendants’
    contention that any section 2333 claim
    founded on a violation of section 2339B
    must fail because section 2339B violates
    the First Amendment. As we noted above,
    section 2339B subjects to criminal
    liability anyone who, within the United
    States or subject to the jurisdiction of
    the United States, knowingly provides
    material support or resources to a
    foreign terrorist organization, or
    attempts or conspires to do so. 18 U.S.C.
    sec. 2339B(a)(1). The defendants complain
    that, because section 2339B imposes
    liability without regard to the intent of
    the donor, it violates the First
    Amendment. They maintain that section
    2339B unnecessarily interferes with the
    associational rights of contributors who
    donate money solely for humanitarian
    purposes by failing to limit liability to
    those who intend to support the illegal
    goals of an organization. They contend
    that section 2339B will chill legitimate
    fund-raising for humanitarian purposes if
    a charitable organization could be
    prosecuted for providing food for the
    needy in the Middle East that happens to
    make its way into the mouths of the
    families of terrorists. They urge us to
    reject the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
    in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 
    205 F.3d 1130
    (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
    
    532 U.S. 904
    (2001), in upholding the
    constitutionality of section 2339B
    against a First Amendment challenge. They
    argue that Humanitarian Law Project is
    inconsistent with Claiborne Hardware, and
    that even if it is not, it is factually
    distinguishable from the instant case.
    These arguments miss the mark because
    the constitutionality of section 2339B is
    not before us. The defendants have not
    been charged with a criminal violation of
    section 2339B. As we discussed above,
    section 2339B is relevant to the Boims’
    claim only to the extent that it helps
    define what conduct Congress intended to
    include in its definition of
    "international terrorism." Section 2339B
    provides further support to the Boims’
    theory that Congress meant to include
    funding terrorism as an act "involving"
    violence. It is the constitutionality of
    section 2333 that concerns us today, and
    as we have just found, funding that meets
    the standard for aiding and abetting
    terrorist acts does not offend the First
    Amendment. We take the defendants’
    argument to be that a section 2333 claim
    founded solely on conduct that would
    render a person criminally liable under
    section 2339B would violate the First
    Amendment. With this refinement to the
    question, we turn to the Ninth Circuit’s
    analysis of section 2339B.
    The plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law
    Project were organizations and
    individuals who wished to provide money
    to two groups that had been designated as
    foreign terrorist organizations under 8
    U.S.C. sec. 1189. They sought a
    preliminary injunction barring
    enforcement of section 2339B against
    them, and maintained that they intended
    only to support the nonviolent
    humanitarian and political activities of
    the designated groups. They argued, as
    HLF and QLI do here, that 2339B violates
    the First Amendment because it imposes
    liability on persons who provide material
    support to terrorist organizations
    regardless of whether the donor intends
    to further the unlawful goals of the
    organization. The plaintiffs relied on
    Claiborne Hardware for the proposition
    that "[f]or liability to be imposed by
    reason of association alone, it is
    necessary to establish that the group
    itself possessed unlawful goals and that
    the individual held a specific intent to
    further those illegal aims." Humanitarian
    Law 
    Project, 205 F.3d at 1133
    (quoting
    Claiborne 
    Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920
    ).
    Claiborne Hardware and the similar cases
    we have 
    discussed supra
    apply to
    situations where the government seeks to
    impose liability on the basis of
    association alone, i.e., on the basis of
    membership alone or because a person
    espouses the views of an organization
    that engages in illegal activities.
    Conduct giving rise to liability under
    section 2339B, of course, does not
    implicate associational or speech rights.
    Humanitarian Law 
    Project, 205 F.3d at 1133
    . Under section 2339B, and indeed
    under section 2333, HLF and QLI may, with
    impunity, become members of Hamas, praise
    Hamas for its use of terrorism, and
    vigorously advocate the goals and
    philosophies of Hamas. Section 2339B
    prohibits only the provision of material
    support (as that term is defined) to a
    terrorist organization. There is no
    constitutional right to provide weapons
    and explosives to terrorists, nor is
    there any right to provide the resources
    with which the terrorists can purchase
    weapons and 
    explosives. 205 F.3d at 1133
    .
    Advocacy is always subject to the
    highest levels of scrutiny under the
    First Amendment, but donations are not
    always equivalent to advocacy and are
    subject to greater government regulation.
    In Buckley v. Valeo, 
    424 U.S. 1
    (1976),
    the Supreme Court upheld the $1000 limit
    on political contributions to candidates
    for federal offices by individual donors.
    The Court acknowledged the expressive
    element of a contribution to a political
    campaign, noting that a contribution
    serves as a general expression of support
    for a candidate and the candidate’s
    views, but does not communicate the
    underlying basis for the 
    support. 424 U.S. at 21
    . Because the expression
    involved in donating money "rests solely
    on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
    contributing," the size of the donation
    provides only a very rough estimate of
    the intensity of the contributor’s
    support for the 
    candidate. 424 U.S. at 21
    . The Court concluded that a limitation
    on the amount of money a person may
    contribute thus involved little direct
    restraint on the donor’s political
    communication. Any size contribution will
    permit a symbolic expression of support,
    but a limitation on the size does not
    infringe the contributor’s freedom to
    discuss issues. The Court acknowledged
    that the funds might be used by the
    candidate to present views to voters, but
    "the transformation of contributions into
    political debate involves speech by
    someone other than the 
    contributor." 424 U.S. at 21
    . The Court found that
    associational interests were also
    implicated because making a contribution
    affiliates a person with a candidate, and
    enables like-minded people to pool their
    resources to further political 
    goals. 424 U.S. at 22
    . Setting the standard for
    reviewing governmental regulation in this
    context, the Court held that "[e]ven a
    significant interference with protected
    rights of political association may be
    sustained if the State demonstrates a
    sufficiently important interest and
    employs means closely drawn to avoid
    unnecessary abridgement of associational
    
    freedoms." 424 U.S. at 25
    (internal quote
    marks omitted).
    Applying the Buckley standard to section
    2333 claims founded on conduct that would
    give rise to criminal liability under
    section 2339B, we conclude that the
    government’s interest in preventing
    terrorism is not only important but
    paramount. Humanitarian Law 
    Project, 205 F.3d at 1135
    . Although that interest has
    been made all the more imperative by the
    events of September 11, 2001, the
    terrorist threat to national security was
    substantial in 1992 when Congress passed
    section 2333 and in 1996 when Congress
    passed section 2339B. That interest is
    unrelated to suppressing free expression.
    A section 2333 suit founded on conduct
    violating section 2339B does not punish
    membership in a designated terrorist
    organization, or penalize the expression
    of views held by these organizations.
    Rather, such a suit is aimed at
    prohibiting the funding of violent acts
    that these organizations wish to carry
    
    out. 205 F.3d at 1135
    .
    The only remaining question is whether
    a section 2333 action based on conduct
    that violates section 2339B employs means
    closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
    abridgement of associational freedoms.
    Section 2339B forbids the provision of
    any amount of "material support or
    resources" to a foreign terrorist
    organization. "Material support or
    resources" includes, among other things,
    money, training, weapons, lethal
    substances, explosives and personnel.
    Congress determined that "foreign
    organizations that engage in terrorist
    activity are so tainted by their criminal
    conduct that any contribution to such an
    organization facilitates that conduct."
    Pub. L. 104-132, Section 301. Terrorist
    organizations use funds for illegal
    activities regardless of the intent of
    the donor, and Congress thus was
    compelled to attach liability to all
    donations to foreign terrorist
    organizations. In order to be designated
    a terrorist organization, a group must
    engage in terrorist activity that
    threatens the security of United States
    nationals or the national security of the
    United States. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1189(a).
    "Terrorist activity" is defined, in
    relevant part, as unlawful activity which
    involves any of the following: the
    hijacking or sabotage of any aircraft,
    vessel or vehicle; the seizing, detaining
    or threatening to kill, injure or
    continue detaining an individual in order
    to compel a third person to do or abstain
    from doing any act as a condition for the
    release of the individual detained; a
    violent act upon an internationally
    protected person; an assassination; the
    use of any biological agent, chemical
    agent, nuclear weapon or device, or
    explosive or firearm, with intent to
    endanger the safety of one or more
    individuals or cause substantial damage
    to property. 8 U.S.C. sec.
    1182(a)(3)(B)(ii). Given the stringent
    requirements that must be met before a
    group is designated a foreign terrorist
    organization, Congress carefully limited
    its prohibition on funding as narrowly as
    possible in order to achieve the
    government’s interest in preventing
    terrorism. We note that Congress did not
    attach liability for simply joining a
    terrorist organization or zealously
    espousing its views. By prohibiting
    funding alone, Congress employed means
    closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
    abridgement of associational freedoms. A
    section 2333 action founded on conduct
    violating section 2339B is sufficiently
    tailored to achieve an important
    government interest and does not run
    afoul of the First Amendment.
    Humanitarian Law 
    Project, 205 F.3d at 1136
    .
    III.
    In short, we answer the three questions
    certified by the district court as
    follows: funding, simpliciter, of a
    foreign terrorist organization is not
    sufficient to constitute an act of
    terrorism under 18 U.S.C. sec. 2331.
    However, funding that meets the
    definition of aiding and abetting an act
    of terrorism does create liability under
    sections 2331 and 2333. Conduct that
    would give rise to criminal liability
    under section 2339B is conduct that
    "involves" violent acts or acts dangerous
    to human life, and therefore may meet the
    definition of international terrorism as
    that term is used in section 2333.
    Finally, as we have set forth the
    elements of an action under section 2333,
    civil liability for funding a foreign
    terrorist organization does not offend
    the First Amendment so long as the
    plaintiffs are able to prove that the
    defendants knew about the organization’s
    illegal activity, desired to help that
    activity succeed and engaged in some act
    of helping. The plaintiffs have not yet
    had an opportunity to develop the facts
    of their case. Today we hold that
    dismissal would be premature at this
    stage of the litigation because we can
    envision a set of facts in support of the
    claim they have alleged that would
    entitle them to relief.
    AFFIRMED.
    FOOTNOTES
    /1 Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (January
    23, 1995). President Clinton invoked 50 U.S.C.
    sec. 1701, et seq. (the International Emergency
    Economic Powers Act), 50 U.S.C. 21 1601 et seq.
    (the National Emergencies Act), and 3 U.S.C. sec.
    301 (authorizing the President to delegate cer-
    tain functions) to label Hamas and eleven other
    groups as "terrorist organizations which threaten
    to disrupt the Middle East peace process."
    /2 Section 1189 provides a procedure by which the
    Secretary of State, in consultation with the
    Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney Gener-
    al, may designate certain organizations as "for-
    eign terrorist organizations." In order to be so
    designated, a foreign organization must "engage
    in terrorist activity" as defined in 8 U.S.C.
    sec. 1182(a)(3)(B). "Terrorist activities" in-
    clude a number of illegal acts such as sabotaging
    or highjacking a vessel, aircraft or vehicle;
    detaining a person and threatening to kill,
    injure or further detain that person in order to
    compel a third person to do something; violently
    attacking an internationally protected person;
    assassinating any person; using a biological
    agent, chemical agent, nuclear device, explosive
    or firearm with intent to endanger the safety or
    one or more persons or to cause substantial
    damage to property; or threatening, attempting or
    conspiring to do any of these things. 8 U.S.C.
    sec. 1882(a)(3)(B)(ii). "Engage in terrorist activity"
    is further defined to include providing material
    support to anyone conducting a terrorist act,
    where material support includes: preparation and
    planning of a terrorist activity; gathering of
    information on potential targets for terrorist
    activity; providing a safe house, transportation,
    communications, funds, false documentation or
    identification, weapons, explosives, or training
    to any individual the actor knows or has reason
    to believe has committed or plans to commit a
    terrorist activity; soliciting funds or other
    things of value for any terrorist organization;
    or soliciting any individual for membership in a
    terrorist organization or to engage in terrorist
    activity. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
    Afternotifying Congress of the designation, the
    Secretary of the Treasury may require United
    States financial institutions to freeze the
    assets of a foreign terrorist organization. The
    statute provides that Congress may revoke the
    designation in certain circumstances and also
    provides that any foreign terrorist organization
    may seek judicial review of the designation. 8
    U.S.C. sec. 1189.
    /3 The United States has proceeded against Salah and
    Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook in an unrelated action
    to seize funds used in terrorism. See United
    States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van VIN
    1FBJS31L3VHB70844, 
    50 F. Supp. 2d 789
    (N.D. Ill.
    1999). In that action, the United States has
    alleged that Salah and Marzook employed a number
    of charitable organizations in the United States
    to raise and launder money for Hamas. The FBI
    presented evidence in that action that Salah
    actively recruited Hamas terrorists, arranged for
    and financed their training, served as a finan-
    cial conduit for Hamas operations directed from
    the U.S., paid for plane tickets to transport
    terrorists from the U.S. to the Middle East, and
    gave approximately $100,000 to another Hamas
    operative for the express purpose of procuring
    weapons.
    /4 According to the Boims, Marzook has admitted in
    an extradition proceeding filed against him that
    he is the leader of the political wing of Hamas
    and he has raised money for Hamas. Evidence
    presented in his extradition proceeding estab-
    lished that he transferred funds to Salah, re-
    cruited Salah to raise funds for the Hamas mili-
    tary activities, knew that Hamas operatives were
    carrying out terrorist activities in Israel, and
    gave one of the organizers of these terrorist
    activities a book of blank, signed checks to fund
    Hamas operations. The United States has also
    proceeded against Marzook in the Ford Van forfei-
    ture action referenced in note 
    3, supra
    .
    /5 The Boims also argued in the district court that
    Congress clarified section 2331(1) in its later
    passage of sections 2339A and 2339B. According to
    the Boims, Congress demonstrated in sections
    2339A and 2339B that the provision of material
    support or resources to terrorists is an activity
    that involves violent acts or acts dangerous to
    human life. The Boims’ argument on this point is
    thus two-fold: first, they claim that violations
    of sections 2339A and 2339B give rise to civil
    liability under section 2333. Second, they main-
    tain that sections 2339A and 2339B clarify the
    meaning of "involve" in section 2331(1). In
    particular, sections 2339A and 2339B demonstrate
    that providing material support or resources is
    an activity that "involves" violent acts. We will
    address both prongs of the Boims’ argument infra.
    /6 Sections 2331 and 2333 were initially enacted in
    1990 as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L.
    No. 101-519, sec. 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990), but
    were repealed as the result of a technical defi-
    ciency. They were subsequently re-enacted as part
    of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,
    Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).
    /7 Because the questions presented in the appeal
    implicate, at least in part, the relation between
    section 2333 and two criminal statutes, sections
    2339A and 2339B, we asked the United States to
    file a brief amicus curiae. The United States
    accepted our invitation and the plaintiffs and
    defendants were afforded an opportunity to re-
    spond to the views presented by the United
    States.
    /8 A few courts, however, have touched on the appli-
    cation of the term "international terrorism" in
    the context of FISA. See United States v. Sarkis-
    sian, 
    841 F.2d 959
    , 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (investi-
    gation of "international terrorism" by definition
    requires investigation of activities that consti-
    tute crimes); United States v. Duggan, 
    743 F.2d 59
    (2d Cir. 1984) (asking a court to apply the
    definition of "international terrorism" does not
    embroil the court in a political question and
    thereby violate the separation of powers doc-
    trine).
    /9 One of Mr. Klinghoffer’s surviving daughters
    testified before both the House and the Senate in
    favor of the passage of the Antiterrorism Act of
    1990. See Senate Hearing; H.R. Rep. 102-1040 at
    4.
    /10 The defendants have also argued that Congress
    listed exhaustively in section 2333(b) all of the
    offenses which could give rise to liability under
    section 2333(a). We reject this contention be-
    cause "international terrorism" is a defined term
    that includes conduct much broader than the
    offenses listed in section 2333(b). See 18 U.S.C.
    sec. 2331. Reading the statute as the defendants
    urge would require us to disregard Congress’
    express definition of the term "international
    terrorism."
    /11 The crimes covered by this diverse and extensive
    list include, in Title 18: sec. 32, destruction
    of aircraft or aircraft facilities; sec. 37,
    violence at international airports; sec. 81,
    arson within special maritime and territorial
    jurisdiction; sec. 175, prohibitions with respect
    to biological weapons; sec. 351, Congressional,
    Cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination, kidnap-
    ping, and assault; sec. 831, prohibited transac-
    tions involving nuclear materials; sec. 842(m),
    importing and exporting certain plastic explo-
    sives; sec. 842(n), shipping, transporting,
    transferring, receiving or possessing certain
    plastic explosives; sec. 844(f), maliciously
    damaging or destroying personal or real property
    belonging to the United States; sec. 844(i),
    maliciously damaging or destroying personal or
    real property used in interstate or foreign
    commerce; sec. 930(c), killing or attempting to
    kill a person in a federal facility while ille-
    gally possessing a firearm or other dangerous
    weapon in that facility; sec. 956, conspiracy to
    kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons or damage
    property in a foreign country; sec. 1114, protec-
    tion of officers and employees of the United
    States; sec. 1116, murder or manslaughter of
    foreign officials, official guests or interna-
    tionally protected persons; sec. 1203, hostage
    taking; sec. 1361, injuries to government proper-
    ty or contracts; sec. 1362, injury to communica-
    tion lines, stations or systems; sec. 1363,
    damaging buildings or property within the special
    maritime and territorial jurisdiction; sec. 1366,
    destruction of an energy facility; sec. 1751,
    Presidential and Presidential staff assassina-
    tion, kidnapping, and assault; sec. 1992, wreck-
    ing trains; sec. 2155, destruction of national
    defense materials, premises or utilities; sec.
    2156, production of defective national defense
    material, premises or utilities; sec. 2280,
    violence against maritime navigation; sec. 2281,
    violence against maritime fixed platforms; sec.
    2332, killing of a United States national outside
    the United States; sec. 2332a, use of certain
    weapons of mass destruction; sec. 2332b, acts of
    terrorism transcending national boundaries; or
    sec. 2340A, torture outside the United States.
    Section 2332c has been repealed. Title 49, sec.
    46502 prohibits aircraft piracy.
    /12 See note 
    2, supra
    .
    /13 Presumably, they are referring to 18 U.S.C.
    secs. 2332, 2332a, 2332b and 2332d. These
    sections proscribe murder, physical violence, the
    use of weapons of mass destruction, acts of
    terrorism transcending national boundaries, and
    engaging in financial transactions with designat-
    ed terrorist countries. These provisions apply to
    the person directly engaged in the prohibited
    activity, as opposed to persons providing materi-
    al support to those directly engaged in the
    prohibited activity.
    /14 The Fourth Circuit, in Rice v. Paladin Enterpris-
    es, Inc., 
    128 F.3d 233
    , 252-53 (4th Cir. 1997),
    considered the First Amendment implications of a
    civil suit seeking to hold liable the publishers
    of a book for a murder committed by a reader. The
    book, entitled "Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
    Independent Contractors," detailed how to commit
    murder-for-hire, and the publisher stipulated
    that it both knew and intended that its readers
    would use the book to commit murder. Under those
    circumstances, the court held that liability for
    aiding and abetting a malum in se crime such as
    murder via speech intended to assist and encour-
    age others in that crime would not run afoul of
    the First Amendment. Although the Rice court did
    not expressly reference Central Bank, its holding
    is consistent with the Boims’ reading of that
    case.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1969

Citation Numbers: 291 F.3d 1000

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/5/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

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