United States v. Moore ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-11194     Document: 00516012204         Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/13/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 13, 2021
    No. 20-11194
    Summary Calendar                    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Kevin D. Moore,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:20-CV-2900
    USDC No. 3:07-CR-125-1
    Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Kevin D. Moore, federal prisoner # 36285-177, seeks leave to proceed
    in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal so that he may challenge the district
    court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of sanctions and for
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-11194       Document: 00516012204            Page: 2      Date Filed: 09/13/2021
    No. 20-11194
    adjudication on the merits of his allegation that the Assistant United States
    Attorney (AUSA) lacked authority to act on behalf of the Government in
    obtaining the indictments against him. By moving in this court to proceed
    IFP, Moore challenges the district court’s certification that his appeal is not
    taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
    We review the district court’s certification for abuse of discretion. Carson
    v. Polley, 
    689 F.2d 562
    , 586 (5th Cir. 1982). Our inquiry into Moore’s good
    faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their
    merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th
    Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The district court concluded that it had already ruled on the merits of
    Moore’s challenge to the AUSA’s authority and ordered that it would not
    consider such a claim until Moore had obtained authorization from the
    appellate court to file a successive 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion raising the
    allegation. Contrary to Moore’s assertions, the district court’s ruling in his
    initial § 2255 proceeding that the claim was frivolous was a ruling on the
    merits. See, e.g., Rogers v. Boatright, 
    709 F.3d 403
    , 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting,
    in the civil rights context, that a complaint is frivolous if it lacks a basis in fact
    or law). Additionally, because Moore is challenging an error that occurred
    prior to his sentencing – the issuance of the indictment – the claim properly
    arises under § 2255. See Padilla v. United States, 
    416 F.3d 424
    , 425-26 (5th
    Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
    Moore’s challenge to this merits ruling absent authorization from the
    appellate court. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 
    545 U.S. 524
    , 531-32 (2005); United
    States v. Hernandes, 
    708 F.3d 680
    , 681 (5th Cir. 2013); § 2255(h).
    With respect to the imposition of sanctions, the district court had
    previously ordered that, in light of Moore’s history of filing frivolous and
    duplicative pleadings, the Clerk’s Office would file further pleadings as
    “Notices to the Court.” After the Clerk’s Office enacted this provision,
    2
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    No. 20-11194
    Moore sought reconsideration of the sanctions order, contending that it was
    inappropriate in light of his good faith efforts to obtain review of the merits
    of his claim relating to the AUSA’s authority and that the district court did
    not show that he had violated any statute or rule warranting the imposition
    of sanctions. A district court possesses an inherent power to control its
    docket, including placing limits on future filings. Qureshi v. United States,
    
    600 F.3d 523
    , 526 (5th Cir. 2010); Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 
    808 F.2d 358
    , 560 (5th Cir. 1986). Moore’s repeated refusal to accept the district
    court’s conclusion that he had received a ruling on the merits of his claim
    does not show that he was acting in good faith. See Baum v. Blue Moon
    Ventures, LLC, 
    513 F.3d 181
    , 189 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering the history of
    litigation and the good faith of the party being sanctioned). Moreover,
    Moore’s pleadings were not refused by the district court, and the court still
    reviewed and addressed his pleadings as appropriate. See 
    id.
     (considering the
    extent of the burden on the courts and the adequacy of alternative sanctions).
    Moore has not established that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying his request to reconsider the imposition of sanctions. See Qureshi,
    
    600 F.3d at 524
    .
    In light of the above, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    denying IFP certification. See Carson, 
    689 F.2d at 586
    . Therefore, we
    DENY the motion to proceed IFP on appeal. Because the merits of Moore’s
    appeal are so intertwined with the certification decision as to constitute the
    same issue, we DISMISS the appeal as frivolous. See Baugh, 
    117 F.3d at
    202
    & n.24.
    The instant appeal constitutes Moore’s fourth attempt to challenge
    the AUSA’s authorization. Moore has a history of raising this and other
    claims repeatedly in the district and appellate courts. Accordingly, he is
    CAUTIONED that future frivolous, repetitive, or abusive filings
    addressing any challenges to Moore’s criminal proceedings may result in
    3
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    No. 20-11194
    sanctions, including monetary penalties or restrictions on his ability to file
    pleadings in this court or any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction.
    4