James Robinson v. Dungarvin Nevada, LLC ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 20 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES E. ROBINSON, No. 18-15312
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00902-JAD-PAL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DUNGARVIN NEVADA, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
James E. Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his employment action alleging federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Zetwick v. County of
Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s
race, age, and disability discrimination claims, as well as on Robinson’s retaliation
claim, because Robinson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for defendant’s actions were
pretextual. See Curley v. City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir.
2014) (burden-shifting framework applies to disability discrimination claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 932 (9th
Cir. 2008) (burden-shifting framework applies to age discrimination claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419
F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2004) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII
retaliation claims); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115,
1123-24 (9th Cir. 2000) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII race
discrimination claims ); see also Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d
1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and
substantial).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s
genetic information discrimination claim because Robinson failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant terminated or
discriminated against Robinson because of Robinson’s genetic information. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (noting that employer cannot “fail or refuse to hire, or to
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discharge, any employee” based on genetic information).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s
tortious discharge claim because Robinson’s Title VII retaliation claim provided
him with an “adequate, comprehensive, statutory remedy.” Ozawa v. Vision
Airlines, Inc., 216 P.3d 788, 791 (Nev. 2009) (Nevada does “not recognize an
action for tortious discharge when a plaintiff has an adequate, comprehensive,
statutory remedy”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim because Robinson failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct. See Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141,
1145 (Nev. 1983) (elements of IIED claim under Nevada law).
We do not consider Robinson’s contention regarding violations of the Fair
Credit Report Act because Robinson failed to allege such a claim in his operative
complaint. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (court
does not consider allegations raised for the first time on appeal).
AFFIRMED.
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