United States v. Alonzo Gardner , 554 F. App'x 165 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4501
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALONZO GARDNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00228-FL-1)
Submitted: January 28, 2014 Decided: February 7, 2014
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua W. Willey, Jr., MILLS & WILLEY, New Bern, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alonzo Gardner pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2012), but reserved his right to appeal the district
court’s partial denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
seized from a storage room that was part of a family member’s
house where he was residing. 1 On appeal, Gardner contests the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Assuming,
without deciding, that Gardner had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in a storage room at the residence, we affirm.
This court reviews a district court’s legal
conclusions on a motion to suppress de novo. United States v.
Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the district
court denied the motion, we construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below.
United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Government bears the burden of proof in justifying a
warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Watson, 703
F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2013).
Gardner first argues that his cousin lacked actual
authority to consent to a search of the storage room and that
1
The propriety of the district court’s order granting a
portion of his motion and suppressing evidence found in a duffel
bag is not before us.
2
the officers could not reasonably conclude that she had such
authority. While the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
warrantless searches, an exception exists for searches conducted
pursuant to valid consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973). Consent may be given by the owner of the
property, or by third-party possessing common authority over the
place or articles to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Common authority is determined based on
the parties’ mutual use of and access to the property. Id. at
171 n.7. Even if the consenting party lacks actual authority
over the property, a search will be upheld when the officer
reasonably believed that such authority existed. Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
Here, Gardner’s cousin had actual and apparent
authority to consent to a search. 2 She was a permanent resident
of the house and had the permission of the owner to access the
storage room, though Gardner was the primary user of the space.
The room, which was only accessible from outside the home, did
not appear to be a private area used exclusively by one resident
nor did Gardner’s cousin indicate to officers that it was such a
place. The door was locked to prevent theft, not by Gardner to
2
Gardner has not challenged on appeal the district court’s
factual determination that she consented to the search.
3
prevent other residents from entering. Thus, the district court
did not err in finding the consent search valid.
Next, Gardner argues that the incriminating nature of
the rifle case was not immediately apparent and thus its seizure
and subsequent search was unlawful. Under the plain view
doctrine, law enforcement officers may seize an object without a
warrant if “(1) the officer was lawfully in a place from which
the object could be viewed; (2) the officer had a lawful right
of access to the seized items; and (3) the incriminating
character of the items was immediately apparent.” United
States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). “[A]lthough
the plain view doctrine may support the warrantless seizure of a
container believed to contain contraband, any subsequent search
of its concealed contents must either be accompanied by a search
warrant or justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement.” United States v. Williams, 41 F.3d 192, 197 (4th
Cir. 1994). But, a search of a container is permissible “when
its distinctive configuration proclaims its contents,” because
“the contents can be said to be in plain view.” Id. “[T]he
circumstances under which an officer finds the container may add
to the apparent nature of its contents.” Id. The Supreme Court
has specifically cited a gun case as an example of a container
with a “distinctive configuration.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (plurality opinion), overruled on
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other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)
(“[S]ome containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun
case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable
expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance.”).
The officers here lawfully entered the storage room
pursuant to the consent given by Gardner’s cousin. While
searching the room for Gardner, officers discovered the rifle
case. The case was found in close proximity to drug
paraphernalia, making its incriminating nature immediately
apparent. The officer immediately recognized that the case
likely contained a weapon. We therefore conclude that the rifle
case was lawfully seized in plain view, and was properly
searched under the plain view doctrine. The district court
therefore did not err in denying this portion of the motion to
suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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