United States v. Arthur Ramirez Merino , 545 F. App'x 867 ( 2013 )


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  •           Case: 10-14722   Date Filed: 11/13/2013   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 10-14722
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00079-MCR-12
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ARTHUR RAMIREZ MERINO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    No. 10-14729
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00079-MCR-3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    EUGENE JOSEPH CASTERNOVIA,
    a.k.a. Gino,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Case: 10-14722   Date Filed: 11/13/2013   Page: 2 of 7
    ________________________
    No. 10-15253
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00079-MCR-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MARK STEVEN HIRMER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    No. 10-15285
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00079-MCR-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CLAUDIA CONSTANCE HIRMER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    2
    Case: 10-14722        Date Filed: 11/13/2013       Page: 3 of 7
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (November 13, 2013)
    Before HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ,* District Judge.
    PER CURIAM:
    This case involves an appeal of their convictions and sentences in connection
    with a tax and wire fraud conspiracy by four Appellants: Claudia Hirmer, Mark
    Hirmer, Arthur Ramirez Merino, and Eugene Joseph Casternovia. After careful
    consideration of the briefs and relevant parts of the record, and with the benefit of
    oral argument, we conclude that the judgment of the district court should be
    affirmed. We address the several arguments of the Appellants in turn.
    Defendants Claudia Hirmer, Casternovia and Merino 1 challenge the
    sufficiency of the evidence to convict each of them on Count One, the dual object
    conspiracy to impede the government’s knowledge and collection of taxes and to
    defraud PQI customers. We summarily reject the challenges by Claudia Hirmer
    and Casternovia to sufficiency of the evidence to convict them on Count I. The
    1
    In his initial brief on appeal, Mark Hirmer purported to adopt these sufficiency challenges
    by the other three Appellants. Because such challenges are necessarily individualized, such
    adoption cannot preserve the issue for our review. Moreover, in any event, the record reveals
    ample evidence to support the verdict with respect to Mark Hirmer.
    3
    Case: 10-14722        Date Filed: 11/13/2013       Page: 4 of 7
    evidence is overwhelming with respect to each. We also reject Merino’s
    sufficiency challenge. 2 There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
    conclude that he entered into an agreement with the principles of PQI whose
    salesmen marketed his products. The jury could find that one of Merino’s products
    (Corporation Sole) was intended to conceal assets and income from the IRS. Even
    if no such product was actually sold, the jury could properly find he and his co-
    conspirators conspired to market and sell same. And the jury could properly find
    that he and his co-conspirators conspired to commit wire fraud by defrauding the
    customers of his debt elimination program. 3
    With respect to defendant Mark Hirmer’s argument that he received
    ineffective assistance of counsel because of his trial attorney’s joint representation
    2
    We do not believe Merino fairly presented a multiple conspiracy argument in his initial
    brief on appeal.
    3
    These three Defendants argue that the evidence is similar to that in United States v.
    Adkinson, 
    158 F.3d 1147
    (11th Cir. 1998). We disagree. The sparse evidence there consisted
    only of evidence that each of four defendants who received proceeds from a fraudulent bank loan
    failed to properly report same on their separate tax returns and that the related entity through
    which the payments were funneled failed to report same to the IRS as taxable income. We held:
    A conspiracy to conceal the source of illegally obtained money is not
    automatically a Klein conspiracy, even if it collaterally impedes the IRS in
    the collection of taxes. Unless concealment is explainable only in terms of a
    motivation to impede the IRS, no tax conspiracy may be inferred from that
    act 
    alone. 158 F.3d at 1159
    (citations omitted). By contrast, there is strong evidence here that each
    of these defendants knowingly joined a conspiracy to promote and market tax evasion
    schemes to third parties. In stark contrast to the evidence in Adkinson, there is strong
    evidence here of a tax evasion conspiracy – i.e., to market to taxpayers products that
    would help those taxpayers to evade their taxes.
    4
    Case: 10-14722       Date Filed: 11/13/2013      Page: 5 of 7
    of him and his co-defendant wife, Claudia, we cannot conclude that the district
    court abused its broad discretion. The district court gave fully adequate warnings
    and advice pursuant to United States v. Garcia, 
    577 F.2d 272
    (5th Cir. 1975), 4 and
    found that Mark Hirmer made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his
    right to conflict-free counsel. Mr. Hirmer made the waiver both orally and in
    writing. In addition to the Garcia warnings and advice, the court even asked Mr.
    Hirmer if he wanted a court-appointed lawyer to discuss the conflict issue with and
    Mr. Hirmer declined. We cannot conclude that the district court abused its
    discretion in accepting the waiver.
    With respect to the argument by Claudia and Mark Hirmer that the district
    court erred in permitting the jury to treat the gross receipts from the wire fraud as
    the “proceeds” of unlawful activity which were the subject of their money
    laundering convictions in Count Two, we conclude that this argument is foreclosed
    by our decisions in United States v. Tobin, 
    676 F.3d 1264
    (11th Cir. 2012), United
    States v. Hill, 
    643 F.3d 807
    (11th Cir. 2011), United States v. Jennings, 
    599 F.3d 1241
    (11th Cir. 2010), and United States v. Demarest , 
    570 F.3d 1232
    (11th Cir.
    2009).
    We reject summarily the sufficiency challenges by the Hirmers and
    4
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court
    adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
    October 1, 1981.
    5
    Case: 10-14722     Date Filed: 11/13/2013    Page: 6 of 7
    Casternovia to their money laundering conspiracy convictions. There was ample
    evidence to support each conviction. Mark Hirmer also argues for the first time on
    appeal that his money laundering indictment was deficient, and that there was
    insufficient evidence thereof, because emails are not wire transmissions for
    purposes of wire fraud. We review pursuant to the plain error analysis; and error, if
    any, is not plain or obvious because no court has interpreted the law as Mark
    Hirmer urges. Moreover, traditional wire transmissions of cash were both alleged
    and amply proved.
    We also reject the sufficiency challenge by both Hirmers to their tax evasion
    convictions in Count Three. The evidence was overwhelming.
    All four Appellants argue that the district court erred in admitting evidence of
    prosecutions of persons connected to Global Prosperity. The evidence was
    admitted not to show propensity or guilt by association but to prove that the
    Defendants had knowledge that the similar products sold by the Global defendants
    were fraudulent. The district court gave limiting instructions in language that was
    approved by the Defendants. Each Defendant remained entirely free to argue to the
    jury that he had not been aware of those arrests, prosecutions, and convictions. We
    agree with the district court that, under the facts of this case, the evidence was
    highly probative. The primary defense was that Defendants did not believe their
    schemes violated legitimate laws; to the extent the jury found that the instant
    6
    Case: 10-14722       Date Filed: 11/13/2013       Page: 7 of 7
    Defendants’ schemes were similar to those employed by the Global defendants, it
    was highly probative for the jury to hear that federal courts had found that the
    similar Global schemes were fraudulent and that the Defendants were aware of that.
    We agree with the district court that the highly probative evidence outweighed the
    prejudice. Admission of the evidence certainly was not plain error.
    Only the Hirmers mount any challenge to their sentences. We cannot
    conclude there was clear error in the district court’s loss calculation. The
    Sentencing Guidelines provide for a measurement of loss in a fraudulent services
    case as “the amount paid for the property, services or goods transferred.” U.S.S.G.
    § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(F)(v)). Thus, the court properly considered the amounts
    paid to PQI. Similarly, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in finding at
    least 250 victims. At the very least, the purchasers of Merino’s debt elimination
    product were all victims and the Government proved that there were at least 360 of
    them. Thus, there is no error.
    Finally, Claudia Hirmer’s challenge to her enhancement for obstruction of
    justice is wholly without merit.
    For the foregoing reasons, 5 the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    Other arguments not addressed in this opinion are rejected without need for further
    discussion.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-14722, 10-14729, 10-15253, 10-15285

Citation Numbers: 545 F. App'x 867

Judges: Anderson, Hull, Motz, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 11/13/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023