Trong Duc Luong Nguyen v. State of Iowa ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–0549
Filed March 22, 2013
TRONG DUC LUONG NGUYEN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,
Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge.
Appeal from the denial of an application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant
Attorney General, Patrick A. Jennings, County Attorney, and Mark A.
Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.
Trong Nguyen, a Vietnamese national, pled guilty in 2000 to
attempted burglary in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor, in
violation of Iowa Code sections 713.2 and 713.6B (1999). He received a
two-year suspended sentence and was placed on probation for two years.
In 2011, Nguyen filed an application for postconviction relief in the
Woodbury County District Court. Relying on the recent United States
Supreme Court decision of Padilla v. Kentucky, Nguyen alleged he had
received ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution because his trial counsel had failed to advise
him in 2000 that pleading guilty would result in his removal from the
United States. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, ___, 130 S. Ct.
1473, 1486, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 299 (2010) (holding that a criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to receive advice from counsel
regarding the risk of deportation before pleading guilty).
The State moved for summary judgment on Nguyen’s application.
The State argued first that the application was untimely. See Iowa Code
section 822.3 (2011) (stating that “applications must be filed within three
years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of
an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued” except for “a
ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the
applicable time period”). Alternatively, the State argued that Padilla does
not apply retroactively to convictions like Nguyen’s that became final
before the Padilla decision. The district court disagreed with the latter
argument but agreed with the former and granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment. Nguyen appealed.
On appeal, Nguyen raised various arguments as to why the three-
year limitations period in section 822.3 does not foreclose his
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application. However, in his supplemental briefing, Nguyen
acknowledged that the question of whether Padilla should apply
retroactively was before the United States Supreme Court. See Chaidez
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 867 (2012)
(granting certiorari on the question of Padilla’s retroactivity). Nguyen
further conceded that his appeal could not succeed if the Supreme Court
denied retroactive effect to Padilla in that pending case. His
supplemental brief stated, “[S]ometime in the October 2012 term, the
United States Supreme Court will decide whether Padilla is retroactive.
If it is not retroactive, Mr. Nguyen is going to lose.”
We elected to hold Nguyen’s appeal pending the United States
Supreme Court’s decision on Padilla’s retroactivity. On February 20,
2013, the United States Supreme Court rendered that decision. See
Chaidez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___
(2013). In Chaidez, the Supreme Court declared that Padilla announced
a “new rule,” and “defendants whose convictions became final prior to
Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding.” Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at
1113, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310,
109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 356 (1989) (generally denying
retroactivity when a Supreme Court decision establishes a new rule of
constitutional criminal procedure). Chaidez also noted that before
Padilla, federal and state appellate courts (including our court) had
“almost unanimously concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not
require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction’s collateral
consequences, including deportation.” Chaidez, ___ U.S. at ___ & n.8,
133 S. Ct. at 1109 & n.8, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___ & n.8.
Based on Chaidez, we hold that because Padilla announced a “new
rule” of constitutional criminal procedure, it does not apply retroactively
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to convictions—like Nguyen’s—that became final before the Padilla
decision. We, therefore, hold that Nguyen’s application for
postconviction relief was properly denied.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.
This opinion shall not be published.