United States v. David Benton , 671 F. App'x 741 ( 2016 )


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  •               Case: 15-13056     Date Filed: 11/29/2016   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-13056
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00040-CAR-CHW-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DAVID BENTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (November 29, 2016)
    Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    David Benton pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess methamphetamine
    with intent to distribute, and the district court sentenced him to 227 months’
    Case: 15-13056        Date Filed: 11/29/2016   Page: 2 of 4
    imprisonment. He appeals his sentence. After careful consideration of the parties’
    briefs and the record, we affirm.
    I
    Benton first argues that the district court erred in applying § 3B1.1(c) of the
    United States Sentencing Guidelines to him. We review the district court’s §
    3B1.1(c) determination for clear error. See United States v. Jiminez, 
    224 F.3d 1243
    , 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2000). Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two-level
    increase to a defendant’s offense level if the government proves by a
    preponderance of the evidence that “the defendant was an organizer, leader,
    manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c); United
    States v. Martinez, 
    584 F.3d 1022
    , 1026–27 (11th Cir. 2009).
    The district court did not clearly err in applying § 3B1.1(c) to Benton; the
    record supports a finding that Benton had a leadership role in the
    methamphetamine conspiracy. In his plea agreement, Benton admitted that, while
    he was serving a sentence for a state conviction, he “conspired with [his girlfriend]
    to retrieve . . . methamphetamine from [a] hidden location and . . . told [his
    girlfriend] to sell the methamphetamine on his behalf.” Benton also stipulated that
    he told his girlfriend (1) where to find the hidden stash of methamphetamine, (2)
    he would “write [her] and tell [her] what to do with” the methamphetamine, and
    (3) that, “we’ll be rich, just sell [the methamphetamine] and put the money in the
    2
    Case: 15-13056        Date Filed: 11/29/2016       Page: 3 of 4
    bank.” One “permissible view[] of th[is] evidence” is that Benton recruited his
    girlfriend into the conspiracy, planned the conspiracy, and exercised decision-
    making authority over his girlfriend. See United States v. Rodriguez De Varon,
    
    175 F.3d 930
    , 945 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Benton served a
    leadership role in the conspiracy, thus triggering § 3B1.1(c). See United States v.
    Suarez, 
    313 F.3d 1287
    , 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming a § 3B1.1 adjustment
    because the record “support[ed] the conclusion that [the defendant] had decision-
    making authority and exercised control”).
    II
    Benton also argues that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32 of
    the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because the court did not resolve two
    disputes related to his sentencing range. 1 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (“At
    sentencing, the [district] court . . . must—for any . . . controverted matter—rule on
    the dispute.”). Benton complains that the court did not resolve his fact-based
    objections to (1) the § 3B1.1(c) adjustment and (2) an assessment of three criminal
    history points for a prior drug conviction. However, at Benton’s sentencing
    hearing, the district court considered and ruled on both objections.
    1
    Benton appears to further assert that, to the extent the district court did resolve the
    disputes, it erred because it did not attach its resolution of the disputes to the presentence
    investigation report. However, Benton makes only a cursory reference to this argument in his
    initial brief and therefore we consider the argument abandoned. See United States v. Jernigan,
    
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003).
    3
    Case: 15-13056   Date Filed: 11/29/2016   Page: 4 of 4
    AFFIRMED.
    4