Com. v. Ferrara, D. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S43036-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    :
    DAVID EUGENE FERRARA                     :
    :
    Appellant             :    No. 186 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order January 2, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-33-CR-0000278-2002,
    CP-33-CR-0000279-2002, CP-33-CR-0000486-2005,
    CP-33-CR-0000493-1999, CP-33-CR-0000570-2000
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
    Pro se Appellant David Eugene Ferrara appeals from the order denying
    his “Nunc Pro Tunc, Motion to ‘Estoppel By Judgment’ to Return All Monies
    Collected By, Clerk of Court.” Appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition
    of fines, costs, and restitution. We affirm.
    We briefly state the following as background:
    This case arises from incidents that occurred over ten years ago.
    While Appellant initially pled nolo contendere in 2002 to three
    counts of incest and guilty to one count of indecent assault, he
    petitioned to withdraw his plea, but the court denied his petition.
    This Court reversed his judgment of sentence and in 2004, after
    the reinstatement of the charges against him, Appellant again
    entered the same plea. He subsequently pursued a direct appeal
    with this Court and we affirmed his judgment of sentence.
    J-S43036-18
    Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 1094 WDA 2016, at 1-2 (Pa. Super. June 8,
    2017) (unpublished memo.). Appellant has filed numerous unsuccessful PCRA
    petitions and various other motions.
    In relevant part, on February 11, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to
    compel the clerk of court and Pennsylvania Department of Corrections to
    refund money he contended was improperly deducted from his inmate
    account.   Appellant’s Mot. to Compel, 2/11/17, at 1.         The essence of his
    twenty-four page motion was that the court improperly or illegally imposed
    fines, costs, and restitution.    
    Id. On February
    22, 2017, the trial court
    dismissed Appellant’s motion to the extent original jurisdiction was with the
    Commonwealth Court and denied the remainder of the motion.                  Order,
    2/22/17. Appellant did not appeal.
    On December 29, 2017, the trial court docketed the underlying motion
    on appeal. Substantially similar to Appellant’s February 11, 2017 motion, the
    gist of his December 29, 2017 motion was that the trial court did not
    appropriately impose fines, costs, or restitution.        Mot., 12/29/17, at 1.
    Appellant reiterates the bases he raised in his prior motion, including that the
    court failed to (1) explicitly order the fines, costs, or restitution at the time of
    his sentencing hearing; (2) specify a monetary amount; and (3) ascertain his
    ability to pay the imposed amounts. See 
    id. at 3-5.
    On January 2, 2018, the
    trial court denied the motion, reasoning that only the Commonwealth Court
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    J-S43036-18
    had jurisdiction. Order, 1/2/18 (citing Commonwealth v. Danysh, 
    833 A.2d 151
    (Pa. Super. 2003)).
    Appellant filed a petition to continue leave to file in forma pauperis,
    which claimed the court had previously granted Appellant in forma pauperis
    status on March 23, 2016, and August 7, 2017. Appellant’s Pet. to Continue
    Leave to File In Forma Pauperis, 1/20/18, at 1. The court granted the petition
    on January 31, 2018.
    Appellant timely appealed only from the trial court’s January 2, 2018
    order and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Appellant
    raises five issues on appeal:
    1. Is the final court (resentencing orders), April 12, 2004, on case
    docket nos. CR-493-1999, CR-570-2000, CR-278-2002, CR-279-
    2002, illegal, charging petitioner, in error, fines, court cost and
    restitution, without having a hearing, within thirty (30) days of
    sentencing order, to find if he had the ability to pay costs and
    fines?
    2. Did the trial court (Jefferson County) as a matter of law, (erred)
    by not holding a hearing on [Appellant’s] ability to pay fines, court
    cost, sheriff’s transportation costs, or restitution, prior to entering
    an order at sentencing for collection of said court costs?
    3. Did the clerk of court . . . Jefferson County, erred when she sua
    sponte added additional cost, on or about December 5th 2017,
    sent to accounting officer . . . according to DC-ADM-005, dated
    December 7th 2017, SCI-Mahanoy, in the amount of $484.00 that
    is erroneous, from September 14th 2016 DC-ADM-005 on the
    same docket no. CR-493-1999, after sentencing; to be collected
    from inmate’s account, without a hearing, and new court order
    issued by a judge, that violates due process of law?
    4. Can the Department of Corrections, as an administrative
    agency, be given authority to deduct monies from inmate account
    without authorization by the inmate or a court order?
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    J-S43036-18
    5. Did the court (Jefferson County) commit harmful error after
    granting “in forma pauperis” (i.e. cases in caption) to “petitioner”
    multiple times, and then (sua sponte) without any hearing, is
    seeking withdrawal of “monies” out of inmate account, at
    Department of Corrections, at present, SCI-Mahanoy, by clerk of
    court . . . (Jefferson County) to recover, court cost, fines and
    restitution, when financial ability, of petitioner, hasn’t changed,
    since granting, “in forma pauperis” throughout the years of prison,
    (10 years at present), and without a “hearing” or new “court
    order”, by a judge?
    Pa.R.A.P.   1925(b)    Statement,   2/14/18,   at   1-2   (some   citations   and
    capitalization omitted) (issues reordered to facilitate disposition).
    We need not summarize Appellant’s arguments for his first three issues,
    as we explain below.
    The law of the case doctrine expresses the practice of courts
    generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided. The doctrine
    is composed of a collection of rules that not only promote the goal
    of judicial economy but also operate (1) to protect the settled
    expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions;
    (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4)
    to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice;
    and (5) to bring litigation to an end.
    The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has embraced this doctrine
    most specifically with respect to adherence to prior decisions in
    the same case by a higher court or by another judge of coordinate
    jurisdiction. But . . . the considerations that underlie the doctrine
    also strongly weigh in favor of adherence by a trial judge to a
    decision by that same judge earlier in the case:
    Law of the case doctrine saves both litigants and the courts from
    duplications of effort. If permitted to argue and brief the same
    issue repeatedly during the course of the same litigation, some
    litigants would be indefatigable in their efforts to persuade or to
    wear down a given judge in order to procure a favorable ruling. .
    ..
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    J-S43036-18
    . . . Once a matter has been decided by a trial judge the decision
    should remain undisturbed, unless the order is appealable and an
    appeal therefrom is successfully prosecuted.        As a general
    proposition, a court should not revisit questions it has already
    decided.
    Bienert v. Bienert, 
    168 A.3d 248
    , 254-55 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations,
    quotation marks, and brackets omitted); Commonwealth v. Gacobano, 
    65 A.3d 416
    , 419-20 (Pa. Super. 2013) (applying “law of the case” doctrine to
    preclude appellate review of issue raised in current PCRA petition that was
    previously raised in prior PCRA petition and resolved with finality). We may
    affirm on any basis. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 
    185 A.3d 364
    , 373 (Pa.
    Super. 2018).
    Here, in his December 29, 2017 motion, Appellant is raising issues
    identical to those presented in his prior February 11, 2017 motion. The trial
    court had denied Appellant’s February motion, and he did not appeal.
    Appellant cannot now—similar to the defendant in Gacobano—re-raise the
    issues previously ruled on by the trial court, particularly given his failure to
    appeal from that prior order. See 
    Bienert, 168 A.3d at 254-55
    ; 
    Gacobano, 65 A.3d at 419-20
    . Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to re-litigate his first
    three issues and we therefore affirm, albeit on different grounds.           See
    
    Bethea, 185 A.3d at 373
    .1
    ____________________________________________
    1 To the extent Appellant properly challenged the legality of his sentences, we
    also conclude Appellant failed to plead and prove any timeliness exception to
    the Post Conviction Relief Act’s time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543; see, e.g.,
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    J-S43036-18
    Appellant’s    fourth     issue   challenges   whether   the   Pennsylvania
    Department of Corrections has authority to deduct money from his inmate
    account. The trial court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction. See Danysh,
    833 A.2d at153 (vacating trial court’s order denying, on the merits, motion to
    prevent the Department of Corrections from withdrawing money from his
    inmate account because the claim was solely within the Commonwealth
    Court’s original jurisdiction).
    Lastly, Appellant challenges the court’s January 31, 2018 order granting
    him in forma pauperis status.2 Appellant, however, did not file a notice of
    appeal from that order. Therefore, we cannot address his last issue.3 For
    these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s January 2, 2018 order.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 
    749 A.2d 502
    , 504 (Pa. Super. 2000) (holding
    motion to correct illegal sentence was properly construed as PCRA petition,
    but it was untimely filed).
    2 We acknowledge Appellant’s apparent challenge to prior orders granting him
    in forma pauperis status. The thirty-day period to file an appeal from those
    prior orders, however, has long passed. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
    3 Regardless, to the extent Appellant’s last issue is duplicative of his other
    claims on appeal, we would affirm based on our reasoning herein.
    -6-
    J-S43036-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/18/2018
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 186 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 9/18/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/18/2018