United States v. William Elijah Trailer , 827 F.3d 933 ( 2016 )


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  •            Case: 15-14583   Date Filed: 06/30/2016   Page: 1 of 9
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-14583
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00251-WHA-TFM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    WILLIAM ELIJAH TRAILER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (June 30, 2016)
    Before HULL, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-14583     Date Filed: 06/30/2016    Page: 2 of 9
    Defendant William Trailer appeals his 18-month sentence and life term of
    supervised release, imposed for violating the terms of supervised release that were
    part of his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. Defendant argues that
    the life term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. After careful
    review, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In 2011, Defendant was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment and a life
    term of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of failing to register as
    a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. As a special condition of his
    supervised release, Defendant was prohibited from having contact with children
    under the age of 18.
    Defendant’s supervised release commenced in August 2014. Just a few
    months later, on February 26, 2015, Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition
    seeking revocation of his supervised release. The petition stated that Defendant
    had violated the conditions of his supervised release by (1) living with his now-
    wife’s four minor children, (2) failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions
    to have no contact with these children, (3) committing another crime by violating
    Alabama’s Community Notification Act, and (4) failing to answer truthfully
    inquiries by his probation officer related to whether he was having contact and
    residing with the children.
    2
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    At the revocation hearing, Defendant admitted to the violations set forth in
    the petition, and the district court revoked his supervised release. The district court
    calculated a guideline range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment based on a Class B
    violation and a criminal history category of V. Defendant requested a lenient
    sentence because the offense that led to his status as a sex offender had occurred
    decades earlier. He explained that he had violated the conditions of his supervised
    release out of a desire to do what was right for his wife and her children. He
    further asserted that a life term of supervised release was not appropriate given that
    he has to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.
    Emphasizing that this was not a hearing about the severity of the sex
    offender laws, but was instead a hearing for Defendant’s violations of supervised
    release, the district court stated that Defendant had ignored the terms of his
    supervised release and lied about it to his probation officer. After considering the
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Defendant to 18 months’
    imprisonment, to be followed by a life term of supervised release with many of the
    same conditions of supervised release as his original sentence. Defendant objected
    to the life term of supervised release as excessive, and the district court responded
    that it was merely continuing the term of supervised release that was previously
    imposed on Defendant.
    3
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    II. DISCUSSION
    Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court’s imposition of
    a life term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable because it is greater
    than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing and is not reasonably related
    to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.1
    Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a district court’s
    sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 
    754 F.3d 888
    , 892 (11th
    Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 764
    (2014); United States v. Sweeting, 
    437 F.3d 1105
    , 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of
    supervised release for reasonableness). We first look to whether the district court
    committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory
    guideline range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
    consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, 2 selecting a sentence based on clearly
    erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Cubero, 754
    1
    To the extent Defendant also attempts to challenge the severity of the sex offender laws and the
    restrictions placed upon him for being a sex offender, this argument is not properly before this
    Court.
    2
    The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
    and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
    promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
    deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
    education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
    Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
    (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
    to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
    4
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    of 9 F.3d at 892
    . Then, we examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in
    light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. 
    Id. The party
    challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
    unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). We
    will only vacate a defendant’s sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm
    conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
    the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
    reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
    If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release, the district court
    may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C.
    § 3583(e)(3). The district court may also impose a new term of supervised release
    which “shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the
    offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of
    imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” 
    Id. § 3583(h).
    In the present case, Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the
    district court abused its discretion by imposing a life term of supervised release.
    The statutorily-authorized term of supervised release for failing to register as a sex
    offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is five years to life. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Thus,
    5
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    Defendant’s life term of supervised release is within the statutory range.3 See 18
    U.S.C. § 3583(h), (k).
    The district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release is also
    supported by the § 3553(a) factors. In particular, the offense that led to
    Defendant’s status as a sex offender involved sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s
    eight-year-old daughter. With respect to the nature of the present violations,
    Defendant was not only living with four children between the ages of two and nine,
    but he was also going to the children’s elementary school on a regular basis. By
    doing so, he blatantly disregarded the terms of supervised release that were meant
    to protect against the same conduct that was the basis for his original sex-offense
    conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). What’s more, Defendant then repeatedly
    lied to his probation officer about violating the terms of his supervised release. As
    emphasized by the district court, a serious term of supervised release was also
    necessary to promote respect for the law and to deter the future crimes of other
    defendants because not doing so would send a message that defendants can
    3
    Although not mentioned by the parties, at the time of Defendant’s original sentencing for the
    failure to register offense, the Guidelines recommended the statutory maximum term of
    supervised release for a “sex offense,” but were ambiguous as to whether failure to register
    qualified as a sex offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b) & comment. (n.1) (2010). Since then, the
    Guidelines have been amended and now explicitly state that failure to register is not a sex
    offense under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b). See 
    id. § 5D1.2(b)
    & comment. (n.1) (2014); U.S.S.G. App.
    C, Amend. 786 (2014). As such, the Guidelines’ advisory supervised release range for failure to
    register is now five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a), (c) & comment. (n.6)
    (2014).
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    disregard the terms of their supervised release and then lie about it with impunity.
    See 
    id. § 3553(a)(2)(A),
    (B).
    Defendant asserts that a life term of supervised release ignores the fact that
    he has been a law-abiding citizen for over seven years and that he chose to violate
    the terms of his supervised release in order to live with and take care of his wife’s
    children. Whatever Defendant’s motivation, it does not change the fact that having
    molested his then girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter, he was thereafter prohibited
    from having contact with children under the age of 18. Nor does it change the fact
    that Defendant’s probation officer warned him several times not to have contact
    with his wife’s minor children, and yet he continued to do so, all the while lying to
    the officer about his conduct.
    In support of his argument, Defendant also relies on a state investigation that
    did not find any evidence that his wife’s children had been sexually abused. The
    investigation also revealed, however, that the children had been coached on what
    to say. In fact, investigators eventually asked the children’s mother to encourage
    the children to speak truthfully. And without getting into specifics as to what
    investigators learned, the investigation indicated that Defendant was involved in
    the children’s lives in a way, and to a degree, that could give cause for concern.
    We are also not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that because he is
    already required to register as a sex offender for life, a life term of supervised
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    release is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Again, a
    life term of supervised release is authorized by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).
    Moreover, Defendant’s argument also completely ignores the fact that he was on
    supervised release in the first place because he had failed to register as a sex
    offender. Defendant then compounded this act of disregard for the law by
    choosing to live with and care for four minor children, in clear and willful violation
    of the terms of supervised release.
    Defendant points to research showing that “sex offenders, as a group,
    reoffend less than other criminal offenders,” as additional support for his argument
    that his life term of supervised release is grossly unreasonable. This research,
    however, does not lend credence to his argument because it does not show that
    Defendant is less likely to re-offend. Nor does it have any bearing on whether a
    life term of supervised release is reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances
    in this particular case.
    As a final matter, we note that Defendant’s life term of supervised release
    can be shortened in the future by the district court. Indeed, Defendant can petition
    that court for modification of the conditions of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.
    § 3583(e)(2). He may also seek early termination of his supervised release after he
    has served at least one year of the term. See 
    id. § 3583(e)(1).
    The district court
    may shorten the term of supervised release “if it is satisfied that such action is
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    warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 
    Id. In fact,
    the district court acknowledged that if Defendant demonstrated a
    willingness to comply with the terms of supervised release, he could petition the
    court in the future for modification or early termination of his supervised release.
    Further, a defendant is not without recourse if a district court denies a
    motion to terminate early (or shorten) supervised release because a defendant may
    appeal the district court’s denial of such a motion. See United States v. Mathis-
    Gardner, 
    783 F.3d 1286
    , 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (entertaining, under an abuse of
    discretion standard, an appeal of the district court’s denial of an offender’s motion
    to shorten his term of supervised release); United States v. Gammarano, 
    321 F.3d 311
    , 315 (2d Cir. 2003) (the same); United States v. Pregent, 
    190 F.3d 279
    , 282
    (4th Cir. 1999) (the same).
    Thus, given the totality of the circumstances in this case, considered in light
    of the § 3553(a) factors, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction” that
    Defendant’s life term of supervised release lies outside the range of reasonable
    sentences. See 
    Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190
    . In short, Defendant has failed to
    demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life term
    of supervised release.
    For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
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