Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Keith Glenn Thompson , 732 N.W.2d 865 ( 2007 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 40 / 06-2046
Filed April 20, 2007
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
KEITH GLENN THOMPSON,
Respondent.
________________________________________________________________________
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
Grievance Commission reports that respondent has committed
ethical misconduct and recommends a suspension from the practice of
law. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Keith Glenn Thompson, George, respondent, pro se.
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CADY, Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board)
charged Keith G. Thompson with numerous violations of the Iowa Code
of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The Grievance Commission of
the Supreme Court of Iowa (Commission) found Thompson violated the
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. It recommended
Thompson be suspended from the practice of law for a period not less
than eighteen months. Upon our review, we find Thompson violated the
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, and we suspend his
license to practice law for an indefinite period of time, with no possibility
of reinstatement for nine months.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Keith G. Thompson is an Iowa lawyer. He has practiced law in
several communities in the state, and is currently located in George,
Iowa.
In 2004, Thompson served as an assistant county attorney in
O’Brien County. As a part of his duties, he prepared a juvenile
delinquency petition, motion for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and
order for hearing on the motion. He then signed the name of a district
court judge to the order for hearing, without knowledge or authorization
of the judge. Thompson filed the documents with the clerk of court, and
arranged to have copies served on the parties.
Within a short period of time, the fabricated signature on the order
was discovered. Thompson was instructed by the judge whose signature
was forged to report the matter to the attorney disciplinary board. He
notified the Board by letter thirty-nine days later.
Thompson has a history of prior discipline as an Iowa lawyer,
including prior conduct involving the alteration of a court document. In
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1989, he was admonished for correcting a typographical error on an
original document in a court file without authorization. In 1997, he
received a public reprimand for accepting employment involving a
conflict of interest. In that matter, Thompson agreed to represent a party
in an action to modify the visitation provisions of a dissolution decree
after he had met and conferred with the current spouse of the other
party about the dispute. In 2005, he was suspended from the practice of
law for failing to comply with the continuing legal education
requirements.
Thompson also has an unspecified history of depression. He has
taken antidepressant medication in the past.
II. Board’s Complaint.
The Board charged Thompson with violating DR 1-102(A)(1), (4),
(5), and (6). It alleged his conduct was dishonest and deceitful,
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and adversely reflected on his
fitness to practice law. Thompson eventually stipulated that his conduct
violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. He
also acknowledged in a stipulation that the violation should result in a
suspension of his license to practice law for three months.
The Commission found the Board established the violations. It
recommended Thompson be suspended from the practice of law for
eighteen months. It also recommended that any reinstatement be
conditioned on the submission of a mental health evaluation and the
successful completion of the ethics portion of the Iowa Bar Examination
(the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, or MPRE).
III. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary matters de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Bernard, 653 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Iowa
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2002). We give the findings of the Commission weight, but are not
bound by them. Id.
IV. Violation.
A lawyer who forges a signature on a court documents violates
DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Rylaarsdam, 636 N.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Iowa 2000) (finding the
lawyer’s “deceit and misrepresentation,” which included forging
signatures on court documents, violated these rules and others). Forging
a signature involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
See DR 1-102(A)(4). It is prejudicial to the administration of justice. See
DR 1-102(A)(5). Finally, it adversely reflects on the fitness of a lawyer to
practice law. See DR 1-102(A)(6). Honesty is a fundamental, base line
requirement to the practice of law. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Iowa 1990).
V. Discipline.
We focus on a variety of factors in determining the level of
discipline, including the nature of the underlying violation, need to deter,
public protection, protection of the reputation of the legal profession, and
the respondent’s fitness to practice law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 113–14 (Iowa 2002). We
consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. Prior
disciplinary history can be an aggravating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lemanski, 606 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa
2000). Ultimately, the particular facts in each case drive the resulting
discipline. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. McKittrick,
683 N.W.2d 554, 563 (Iowa 2004).
Other Iowa lawyers have been disciplined in the past for forging
court documents. While the facts and circumstances of each of these
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prior cases are unique and involve other violations, they reveal the
seriousness of the conduct and the general range of discipline. In
Rylaarsdam, an attorney forged the signature of an administrator of an
estate on several documents. 636 N.W.2d at 91. He was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of not less than six months. Id. at
93. In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v.
Lesyshen, 585 N.W.2d 281, 286, 288 (Iowa 1998), an attorney who
falsely notarized a signature was suspended for a period not less than six
months. In In re Rickabaugh, 661 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 2003), a
reciprocal disciplinary action, an attorney was suspended for three years
for conduct that included forgery of a judge’s signature on a fictitious
document. In a later case, the same attorney’s license was revoked after
committing forgery and other violations again. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa
2007). Numerous other cases demonstrate the seriousness of forging a
person’s signature. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Lyzenga, 619 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Iowa 2000) (“[W]e note that
Lyzenga’s felony forgery conviction . . . [is] alone sufficient reason to
suspend or revoke her license.”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Hansel, 558 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Iowa 1997) (suspending
lawyer’s license for three years for conduct that included knowledge of a
forgery); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Clauss, 530
N.W.2d 453, 454 (Iowa 1995) (suspending lawyer’s license for three years
for conduct that included forging a signature and notarizing it). Clearly,
all forms of dishonesty and misrepresentation are serious violations, and
impact many of the factors used in determining the appropriateness of
discipline. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Iowa 2002) (“Considering the
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importance of honesty to our profession, we have stated that
misrepresentation by a lawyer ‘constitutes a grave and serious breach of
professional ethics’ and generally results in ‘a lengthy suspension.’ ”
(Citation omitted.)).
In this case, we identify two aggravating factors that impact the
imposition of discipline. First, the forgery was a bold, clear and
calculated act of dishonesty. Unlike cases involving the forged signature
of a client where a lawyer may feel a false sense of justification as a
representative agent, it is hard to imagine how a lawyer could ever
possess even a momentary sense of justification in forging the signature
of a judge on a court order. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary
Bd. v. Hall, 728 N.W.2d 383, ___ (Iowa 2007) (signing client’s name to a
bankruptcy petition). Second, the history of discipline in this case
involves similar conduct. See Lemanski, 606 N.W.2d at 14 (noting the
similarity between a lawyer’s previous disciplined conduct and current
charge, and stating it “is a factor we consider in fixing the appropriate
discipline”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Gill, 479 N.W.2d 303,
305–06 (Iowa 1991) (suspending a lawyer’s license for three months and
noting the lawyer had been publicly reprimanded for similar conduct in
the past).
On the other hand, we find only one mitigating circumstance.
Generally, depression can be a mitigating factor in the imposition of
discipline. However, depression cannot be fully understood as a
mitigating factor without evidence of the relationship between the
depression and the unethical conduct. See Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at
295 (“[T]he full extent of depression as a mitigating circumstance in the
imposition of discipline necessarily relates to the relationship between
the unethical conduct and the depression.”). In this case there was no
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evidence to establish a relationship between the depression and the
unethical conduct, or that the depression was otherwise a mitigating
factor. Id. at 297 (finding a relationship between lawyer’s depression and
his unethical conduct). However, “[a] mitigating factor is the attorney’s
recognition of some wrongdoing.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004). Thompson self-
reported his conduct to the Board and stipulated to the Commission that
he violated our disciplinary rules.
Under all the circumstances, we conclude Thompson should be
suspended from the practice of law for an indefinite period of time, with
no possibility of reinstatement for nine months. His conduct was serious
and fraudulent. With his prior history of a similar violation, this
discipline comports with our prior cases. This rationale supports the
recommendation of the Commission to condition any application for
reinstatement upon successful completion of the MPRE.
VI. Conclusion.
We suspend Thompson’s license to practice law in Iowa
indefinitely, with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of nine
months from the filing of this opinion. In addition, Thompson must
successfully complete the MPRE prior to reinstatement. See Iowa Ct. R.
31.3(2) (requiring a scaled score of at least 80 for admission to the bar).
The suspension imposed applies to all facets of the practice of law as
provided by Iowa Court Rule 35.12(3), and requires notification to clients
as provided in Iowa Court Rule 35.21. The costs of these proceedings are
taxed against Thompson pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.25(1).
LICENSE SUSPENDED.
All justices concur except Streit, J., who takes no part.