Christopher Zeiss v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. ( 2007 )


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  • NO. 07-07-0015-CV


    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


    AT AMARILLO


    PANEL C


    MARCH 29, 2007

                                           ______________________________


    CHRISTOPHER ZEISS, APPELLANT


    V.


    CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) N.A., APPELLEE

    _________________________________


    FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 3 OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;


    NO. 2005-597553; HONORABLE PAULA LANEHART, JUDGE

    _______________________________


    Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

      MEMORANDUM OPINION

              Appellant, Christopher Zeiss, perfected an appeal from the trial court’s order granting Citibank’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal asserting that the parties have reached a settlement agreement. The joint motion requests that this court vacate the trial court’s judgment without regard to the merits and dismiss the appeal. This disposition is authorized by rules 42.1(a)(2)(A) and 43.2(e) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Finding the motion complies with the requirements of rules 6.6 and 42.1(a), we vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the appeal in conformity with the parties’ agreement.

              Having disposed of this appeal at the parties’ request, we will not entertain a motion for rehearing and our mandate shall issue forthwith.

     

     

                                                                    Per Curiam

    6667in">          Issue 2 - Sufficiency of the Evidence

              Next, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The standards by which we review the same are well established, and we refer the parties to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) for a review of them.

              A person commits aggravated sexual assault if he intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of another person by any means, without that person’s consent, and in the course of which he uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §22.021(a)(1)(A)(I) & (2)(A)(iv) (Vernon Supp. 2007). In this instance, the deadly weapon alleged in the indictment was a knife.

              At trial, the complainant testified that appellant had been visiting her and then became angry and stated that he was “going to teach this bitch a lesson.” Appellant took out a butterfly knife and a pocket knife that he had with him and held the knives up to her while striking her. He cut off her bra and underwear with one of the knives, made her sit in a chair, and forced her to perform oral sex while holding the knives and threatening to slit her throat. Appellant next penetrated the complainant’s vagina with his penis. The complainant was lacerated by the knives both before and after the rape.

              The complainant’s testimony alone, if believed, is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Benton v. State, 237 S.W.3d 400, 404 (Tex. App.–Waco 2007, pet. ref’d); Jensen v. State, 66 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime of aggravated sexual assault.

              Appellant complains that the evidence is insufficient because 1) the complainant stated she was attacked by a man who had tattoos on his wrists and forearms but appellant testified he had no tattoos on his wrist or hands, 2) there are purported inconsistencies in the testimony of Richard Gutierrez (who entered the house after the rape but while the general assault was still occurring) and Anthony LeCroy (who was waiting for Gutierrez outside in a vehicle), 3) the complainant failed to recite at trial that she had been raped when first describing the events of that evening, 4) the police officers did not find a cut bra or underwear, 5) there was a purported lack of clearly distinguishable blood on the knives found and 6) the knives were not subjected to any testing. At best, these matters created conflicts in the evidence and raised issues of witness credibility. As such, they were for the jury to address and resolve. Given the complainant’s testimony and physical wounds, her prior knowledge of appellant, her demeanor when the police arrived, and the corroboration by Gutierrez of some of the events after the rape, we cannot say that the evidence is too weak to support the verdict or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to undermine our confidence in it. In short, the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient.

              The judgment is affirmed.

     

                                                                               Brian Quinn

                                                                              Chief Justice

    Do not publish.        

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-07-00015-CV

Filed Date: 3/29/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/8/2015