Brett Rae v. State ( 2000 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED
AT KNOXVILLE
January 18, 2000
NOVEMBER SESSION, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
BRETT RAE, *
* C.C.A. No. 03C01-9901-CC-00029
Appellant, *
* SEVIER COUNTY
vs. *
* Hon. Rex H. Ogle, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, *
* (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Melinda Meador Paul G. Summers
Bass, Berry & Sims PLC Attorney General and Reporter
900 S. Gay Street, Suite 1700
Knoxville, TN 37902 Ellen H. Pollack
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
425 Fifth Avenue North
2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Alfred C. Schmutzer, Jr.
District Attorney General
Charles Atchley, Jr.
Asst. District Attorney General
Sevierville, TN 37862
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes, Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Brett Rae, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. In November 1994, the appellant and a co-defendant were
charged with premeditated first degree murder. Following a jury trial in the Criminal
Court of Sevier County, the appellant was found guilty of the indicted offense.
Immediately prior to the jury fixing his punishment,1 the appellant, pursuant to a
negotiated agreement, pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a sentence
of life with the possibility of parole. The appellant, proceeding pro se, subsequently
filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. The petition was amended following appointment of counsel. The trial
court denied the relief sought and this appeal follows.
After review of the record, we affirm.
Background
On November 6, 1994, park rangers discovered a jeep on the slope of an
embankment off Highway 441 inside the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.
The jeep was lodged against a tree approximately 100 feet from the highway. Inside
the jeep the rangers observed the body of the deceased, Kelly J. Lovera. The victim
was lying in the back floorboard in a pool of blood. It was immediately apparent,
based upon the extensive nature and location of the injuries and the position of the
body in the jeep, that death was not attributable to the jeep’s impact with the tree.
An investigation ensued, resulting in the arrest of the appellant and his lover,
Shayne Lovera, the wife of the victim.
1
The State did not seek the death penalty; however, it did give notice to the appellant of
its intent to seek life without parole.
2
Proof at trial established that the victim was bludgeoned to death in his
apartment, his body was placed in the jeep and then driven into the National Park by
the appellant, where the vehicle was pushed off the highway. Shortly after the
murder, the appellant confided to two of his friends that he had “. . . put [the victim]
over a hundred foot embankment.” In addition to the volunteered statements
discussing his involvement in the murder, he also discussed with his two friends his
relationship with the victim’s wife, his previous unsuccessful attempt to kill the victim,
and various other plots which he had devised to kill Lovera. Additionally, physical
evidence found at the victim’s apartment and in the National Park connected the
appellant to the crime.
The appellant and his co-defendant were tried jointly. A jury found both guilty
of first degree murder. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the appellant negotiated an
agreement with the State which provided that, in exchange for a guilty plea to first
degree murder, he would receive the minimum sentence of life with the possibility of
parole. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant waived his right to file either a
direct appeal or a collateral post-conviction attack of his conviction.
On March 10, 1997, the appellant filed the instant petition for post-conviction
relief. The petition may be summarized as alleging (1) trial counsel was ineffective
for encouraging appellant to accept the State’s offer of life with the possibility of
parole, failing to prepare for mitigating circumstances at the sentencing phase of the
trial, failing to properly conduct a pre-trial investigation, failing to adequately consult
with the appellant during critical stages of the proceedings, and failing to advise the
appellant of his rights to direct appeal and collateral attack of his conviction; (2)
deficient performance of counsel at trial; (3) his guilty plea was coerced and
involuntary; and (4) that his conviction is void as violating the protection against
3
double jeopardy. 2
A hearing was held on the petition on December 18, 1998. The appellant
provided testimony that, on the morning after the guilty verdict had been returned,
counsel approached him with information that “there was a plea made available . . .
to plead guilty to First Degree Murder and accept this sentence of life with a
possibility of parole.” Counsel informed him that in order to accept this plea, he
would have to agree “that part of the plea would be waiving my appeal.” The
appellant conceded that, before accepting his plea, the trial court had “extensively . .
. [gone] into the appeal process.” He also conceded that he admitted his guilt at the
guilty plea hearing and that he stated that his “attorneys did the best they could do.”
However, the appellant explained that he made these admissions only because his
attorneys instructed him to do so. Moreover, although he agreed that he believed
himself to be guilty of first degree murder at the time of his plea, he now retracts that
admission. Additionally, the appellant testified that he agreed to the plea offer
because his co-defendant “asked [him] to take it and [he] said okay, well, let’s do it.”
On re-direct examination, the appellant stated that his attorneys never “discussed”
any possible defenses with them. He also stated that counsel only consulted with
him a “few” times prior to trial.
Robert Ritchie, a Knoxville attorney, testified that he was retained by the
appellant’s father to represent the appellant immediately following his arrest on the
murder charge. Richie’s representation extended over a period of two to three
months. Ritchie testified that he met with the appellant and initiated an investigation
which included obtaining voluntary discovery from the District Attorney General’s
Office. Ritchie admitted that, considering the circumstances of this case, it became
2
Inclu ded within the o rigina l pro se petition and two subsequent am endmen ts are
numerous claims of error, including but not limited to (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) being
shackled before the jury; (3) trial counsel “handed” the State their case; (4) unconsitutional jury
instructions, including range of punishment; (5) counsel’s failure to move to exclude evidence at
trial; (6) counsel’s failure to adequately voir dire the jury; (7) counsel’s failure to present evidence
in defense of appellant; and (8) counsel’s breach of attorney-client privilege.
4
evident “that there was not a defense based upon many of the defenses that
become apparent in a homicide case.” He particularly noted that the appellant was
“obsessed” with his co-defendant and that the relationship had totally dominated the
appellant’s life. In early January, Ritchie was informed that other counsel, Robert
Ogle, had been retained to represent the appellant.
Alan Feltes, a Sevier County attorney, testified that he was appointed to
represent the appellant “about two months before the actual trial date.” During a
portion of this period, both Feltes and Ogle jointly represented the appellant. He
related that he met at least twice a week with the appellant not including telephone
conversations. Feltes testified that he discussed with the appellant the potential
punishment that he faced if he was found guilty. Through his conversations with the
appellant, Feltes learned that the appellant “didn’t want to present an actual
defense” because he did not want to “hurt” his co-defendant’s case.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s position, Feltes was of the opinion that no defense
could rationally be presented on behalf of the appellant, based upon the
overwhelmingly incriminating evidence possessed by the State.
Feltes explained that, the morning after the verdict was returned, he was
approached by co-defendant’s counsel concerning the possibility of a plea
arrangement. Co-defendant’s counsel advised Feltes that Ms. Lovera was prepared
to enter a plea of guilty, waiving her right to a direct appeal and post-conviction relief
in exchange for a life sentence. Co-defendant’s counsel added that the plea could
not be accepted by the co-defendant unless “it was a package deal with [the
appellant.]” Feltes conveyed this offer to the appellant. In doing so, Feltes informed
the appellant that there was a good possibility that the appellant would receive a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole. He also explained that the plea
would guarantee the appellant a life sentence “which . . .at the time . . . was
somewhere around twenty-five years.” Counsel also believed that there was not
5
“any major error in the trial that would have . . . warranted any kind of reversal.” The
appellant agreed to accept the plea offer. Feltes did advise the appellant that “[he]
didn’t think [the appellant] could waive his post-conviction rights.” Rather, he
advised him to “go through the motions like we’re going to do that as part of this
deal.” Mr. Feltes opined that “in the course of representing [the appellant] [he]
never had any problem with him being coherent and understanding.”
After considering the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and the
transcript of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the record:
. . . I’ve already ruled that it was not double jeopardy. . . .
. . . I asked Mr. Rae those statements about the . . . Plea Agreement . .
. and he acknowledged making those and he said that’s the way he felt
that day. That testimony is very consistent with the testimony of Mr.
Alan Feltes, that he was told not to do anything to hurt Mrs. Lovera. It
was obvious throughout the trial of this case that was sort of the plan. .
. . [H]e had to talk to her, they had to have some private time together
before they accepted the plea agreement that was offered by the
State.
. . .There was no evidence in this record that Mr. Rae suffered from
any mental disease or defect that would have kept him from
understanding the nature of the charges against him, from being able
to exercise his own free will.
[T]he Court feels like that the evidence is totally and completely
overwhelming that Mr. Rae knew what he was doing on the day that he
entered the plea and accepted the sentencing agreement.
...
In order to set aside everything that’s been done here the Court would
have to find prejudice on your part. Well, if you instructed your
attorney to put on no defense that would affect Mrs. Lovera and if the
State had all of this evidence against you then I don’t see any
prejudice from anything that took place in this trial and certainly, and
certainly the plea agreement and the sentencing agreement. I mean I
don’t know what more I could have done except tattooed it on your
head. Certainly you had been advised and advised as to what you
were doing and you sat right here this morning and said you knew that.
...
[F]rom the totality of the circumstances the Court is satisfied that the
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be denied and is hereby so
ordered.
6
Analysis
I. Waiver of Right to Post-Conviction Remedies
Under the terms of the plea agreement, the appellant agreed to waive his
right to both a direct appeal of his conviction and his right to pursue post-conviction
remedies. Obviously from the posture of this case, this waiver provision was not
enforced against the defendant as he did seek post-conviction relief. Thus, the
initial inquiry before this court is whether this proceeding was properly entertained by
the trial court and, subsequently, whether this cause is properly before this court.
After consideration of constitutional principles, we conclude that this case is properly
before this court.
Although a criminal defendant may waive the right to a direct appeal as part
of a plea agreement,3 we conclude today that a defendant may not waive his or her
right to post-conviction remedies as part of a plea agreement. But see State v.
John Joseph Villaneuva, C.C.A. No. 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 30,
1991), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1992) (upholding waiver of right to
raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim in post-conviction proceeding). Post-
conviction proceedings are significantly different from a direct appeal. Unlike a
direct appeal, a post-conviction proceeding provides a means of collaterally
attacking the constitutional validity of a conviction. See generally Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30-203 (1997). And, although, generally, a guilty plea entered on the
competent advice of counsel will be held to waive the majority of the fundamental
3
Plea bargains are contractual in nature and therefore, the “negotiated plea represents a
bargained for quid pro quo.” See Unite d Sta tes v. Esc am illa, 975 F.2d 568, 571 (9 th Cir. 1992 ).
Thu s, a p rovis ion in th e plea agre em ent w aiving the d efen dan t’s righ t to pu rsue a dire ct ap pea l is
a barga ined for ele men t of the agr eem ent. See United States v. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d 1037 (9 th Cir.
1992). T his provisio n is enfor ceable a s long as the waive r is know ing and vo luntary. See State
v. McKissack, 917 S.W .2d 714, 715 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1995) (footnote omitted). See, e.g., United
State s v. M arin , 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4 th Cir. 1992 ); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480
(9 th Cir. 1991).
7
protections afforded by the Constitution,4 a guilty plea cannot waive jurisdictional
defects. Additionally, a guilty plea cannot waive those constitutional challenges to
the resulting conviction if the plea itself was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
upon competent advice of counsel. If post-conviction remedies could be waived, a
defendant would be precluded from challenging an involuntary guilty plea or one
entered upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. It would be unconscionable and
against the public policy of this state to insulate a conviction from such challenges.
Notwithstanding, this court will not vacate a conviction due to an invalid waiver
provision where the guilty plea is voluntary in all other aspects and the invalid
provision did not prevent the appellant from seeking relief. However, we do hold
that the portion of the judgment in the case sub judice waiving the appellant’s right
to make application for post-conviction relief is void and unenforceable. See, e.g.,
Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-1068 (Ind. Ct. Ap. 1991); Hood v. State,
890 P.2d 797, 798 (Nev. 1995). Cf. United States v. Astacio, 14 F. Supp. 2d 816,
818-819 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding, even where a defendant has waived his statutory
right to bring a § 2255 motion, he may nonetheless raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and the voluntariness of the guilty plea) (citing United States
v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 652- 653 (5 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,
432-433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9 th Cir. ),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 979, 113 S. Ct. 2980 (1993)).
II. Effect of Guilty Plea
Preliminary to our review of the voluntariness of the guilty plea, we first
address the appellant’s argument that his conviction violates the protections against
double jeopardy because he entered a guilty plea after the jury found him guilty of
the same offense. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
4
A guilty plea made voluntarily, understandingly, and knowingly effectively constitutes a
waive r of th e con stitutio nal rig hts a gains t com puls ory se lf-inc rim inatio n, the right to conf ront o ne’s
accusers, and the right to trial by jury, and, except under limited exceptions, the right to direct
appea l. See gene rally Tenn. R. Crim . P. 11(c); 37(b)(2).
8
Article 1, Section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution protect one accused of a crime
(1) against a second prosecution after an acquittal; (2) against a second prosecution
after conviction; and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v.
Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996). Double jeopardy becomes a factor only
when the defendant faces retrial or multiple punishments for the same crime.
Accordingly, the appellant’s argument based on the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is without merit.
There are no limitations under the Tennessee Constitution, Criminal Code,
Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure or Rules of Court which would per se
prohibit the entry of a guilty plea after a jury verdict had been returned.5 A guilty
plea is in itself a conviction and is conclusive as to the defendant’s guilt. Thus, in
the circumstance before this court, we construe the appellant’s subsequent entry of
a guilty plea to effectively set aside the jury verdict of first degree premeditated
murder. Cf. Haskins v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 407, 4308, 409 (Ky. App.
1973). But see Dave v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 287, 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1996)
(entry of guilty plea after jury verdict is moot). The effect of the guilty plea is to
nullify, for all practical purposes, the guilt phase of the proceeding. Thus, when
examining the appellant’s conviction for constitutional infirmities, the reviewing court
places him in the same posture as if he had not proceeded to trial but only entered a
guilty plea.
III. Post-Conviction Claims
Based upon our ruling that the appellant’s conviction for first degree murder
5
The provision in Rule 11 requiring notice to the court of the existences of a plea
agreement prior to trial is not a bar to entering a guilty plea after the verdict but rather, “subsection
(e)(5 ) . . . per mits the tria l judg e to im pos e rea son able p retria l time limits on th e cou rt’s
consideration of plea agreements, a practice which will allow maximum efficiency in the docketing
of cases proceed ing to trial on pleas of not guilty.” See Advisory Comm ission Comments, Tenn.
R. Crim. P. 11.
9
stems from his plea of guilty to that offense rather than from a jury verdict, our
review is limited to the voluntary nature of the plea and the ineffective assistance of
counsel regarding the plea. In his petition, the appellant alleges that his guilty plea
was involuntarily and unknowingly entered, that trial counsel was ineffective in
negotiating a plea arrangement that foreclosed a direct appeal and post-conviction
review, that counsel failed to consult with the appellant at critical stages of the
proceedings, that counsel failed to raise the issue of appellant’s competency, that
counsel failed to properly conduct a pre-trial investigation and that counsel was
deficient in his performance at trial and in preparation for the sentencing hearing.
Once a guilty plea has been entered, effectiveness of counsel is relevant only
to the extent that it affects the voluntariness of the plea. In this respect, such claims
of ineffective assistance necessarily implicate the principle that guilty pleas be
voluntarily and intelligently made. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91
S. Ct. 160, 164 (1970).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of alleged involuntary guilty pleas resulting from
erroneous or negligent advice by trial counsel. The result reached was the
formulation of a merger of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance and the
traditional requirements for a valid guilty plea. The Strickland test provides that, to
prevail on a claim of ineffective counsel, the defendant must establish that (1) the
services rendered by counsel were deficient and (2) he/she was prejudiced by the
deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064 (1984); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tenn. 1993). As
applied to guilty pleas, the first prong, deficient performance remains the same, i.e.,
counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that reasonably
competent counsel would provide under similar circumstances. See Baxter v. Rose,
523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975); Walton v. State, 966 S.W.2d 54, 54-55 (Tenn.
10
Crim. App. 1997). However, the prejudice requirement focuses on whether
counsel’s ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. In other words, in order to satisfy the
prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial. Id.; See also Walton, 966 S.W.2d at 55.
Generally, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in
by courts reviewing ineffective assistance challenges to convictions obtained
through a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Indeed, the focus
is not only upon the actual “error” committed by counsel, but whether had counsel
acted competently (1) would counsel have changed his recommendation as to the
plea or (2) would the competent performance have been likely to change the
outcome of a trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370-371.
In the present case, the post-conviction court concluded that the appellant
received the competent assistance of counsel and, consequently, entered his plea
knowingly and voluntarily. A trial court’s findings of fact in a post-conviction hearing
are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence in the record preponderates against
those findings. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997); Clenny
v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947, 99
S. Ct. 2170 (1979).6 The transcript of the guilty plea hearing reveals that the trial
court thoroughly advised the appellant regarding his right to appeal. The court
further explained to the appellant that by entering a plea of guilty he was effectively
6
Notwithstanding this general rule, in State v. Brenda Anne Burns, No. W1996-00004-SC-
R11-CD (T enn. at Jackson, No v. 8, 1999) (for publication), our supreme court held that “[c]ases
that involve mixed questions of law and fact are subject to de novo review.” (citing Harries v.
State , 958 S.W .2d 799, 802 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1997)). Specifically, the supreme court
determined that issues involving alleged deficient performance of counsel and possible prejudice
to the defe nse are mixed question s of law an d fact. See State v. Brenda Anne Burns, No.
W1996-00004-SC-R11-CD. Although we perform a de novo review of the issue, the appellant
mus t still establish his o r her allega tions by clea r and co nvincing e vidence . See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-30-210(f) (1997).
11
waiving a myriad of constitutional rights. When questioned by the court regarding
the performance of his trial counsel at the guilty plea hearing, the appellant
responded:
I would just like to say that Mr. Feltes and all of my previous attorneys
did the best they could do. There’s no doubt that I’m guilty. I didn’t
deny I was guilty. The day after it happened I went and confided in my
friends. I lied to the law enforcement officials that came and
questioned me that day. I ran to Mexico because I was guilty and I
came back to the United States to face the punishment. I sat there, I
shut up and I did not offer a defense. There is not a defense for a
man who is guilty. That’s all I have to say, sir.
Finally, the court informed the appellant that by entering a guilty plea in exchange
for a sentence of life imprisonment “means that [he] will have to serve at least
twenty-five years of [his] sentence before [he] is eligible for parole.” The court, then,
after more than thoroughly advising the appellant of his rights, accepted the
appellant’s plea of guilty to the offense of first degree murder.
In evaluating the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea, the United
States Supreme Court held, “[t]he standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. at 164. In
making this determination, the reviewing court must look to the totality of the
circumstances. State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995),
perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1996). See also Chamberlain v. State, 815 S.W.2d
534, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1991). Indeed, a
“court charged with determining whether . . . pleas were ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent’
must look to various circumstantial factors, such as the relative intelligence of the
defendant; the degree of his familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether he was
represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel
about the options available to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court
concerning the charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead guilty,
including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might result from a jury trial.”
12
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993).
With these criteria considered, we conclude that the record amply supports
the trial court’s finding that counsel informed the appellant of his right to appeal in
addition to providing other relevant sentencing information at the time of entry of his
plea. Moreover, our review of the entire record establishes that the appellant’s plea
of guilty was entered voluntarily and knowingly and with full awareness of his
constitutional rights.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny post-conviction relief and affirm the
judgment of the Criminal Court of Sevier County.
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____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
__________________________________
ALAN E. GLENN, Judge
___________________________________
JOE H. WALKER, III, Special Judge
14