Robert M. Nolan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                               Mar 31 2016, 8:58 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    CLERK
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Robert M. Nolan                                          Gregory F. Zoeller
    New Castle, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Chandra K. Hein
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Robert M. Nolan,                                         March 31, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    22A01-1503-CR-120
    v.                                               Appeal from the Floyd Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Maria D. Granger,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    22D03-0907-FB-1637
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1503-CR-120 | March 31, 2016          Page 1 of 5
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Robert Nolan appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for modification of
    his sentence following his convictions for rape, as a Class B felony; child
    molesting, as a Class C felony; and two counts of child seduction, Class D
    felonies. Nolan presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial
    court abused its discretion when it denied his petition for modification of his
    sentence. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On July 2, 2010, a jury found Nolan guilty of rape, as a Class B felony; child
    molesting, as a Class C felony; and two counts of child seduction, Class D
    felonies. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on all counts and
    sentenced Nolan to an aggregate term of thirty years with eight years suspended
    to probation. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal.
    Nolan v. State, No. 22A01-1007-CR-433, 
    2012 WL 456537
    (Ind. Ct. App.
    February 14, 2012).
    [3]   On June 17, 2014, Nolan filed a petition for modification of his sentence. At a
    hearing on the petition, the State objected to any modification of his sentence.
    Still, the trial court heard testimony from several character witnesses. The trial
    court took the matter under advisement, and on March 2, 2015, the trial court
    denied Nolan’s petition. This appeal ensued.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1503-CR-120 | March 31, 2016   Page 2 of 5
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   We review a trial court’s decision regarding modification of a sentence for an
    abuse of discretion. Gardiner v. State, 
    928 N.E.2d 194
    , 196 (Ind. 2010). An
    abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the
    logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or when the
    court misinterprets the law. Heaton v. State, 
    984 N.E.2d 614
    , 616 (Ind. 2013).
    [5]   A trial court generally has no authority over a defendant after sentencing. State
    v. Harper, 
    8 N.E.3d 694
    , 696 (Ind. 2014). A notable exception is Indiana Code
    Section 35-38-1-17, which gives trial courts authority under certain
    circumstances to modify a sentence after it is imposed. 
    Id. From 1991
    until
    June 30, 2014, the relevant section of the sentence modification statute read:
    (b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed
    since the convicted person began serving the sentence and after a
    hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may
    reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the
    prosecuting attorney. . . .
    Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(b) (2009) (emphasis added). Effective July 1, 2014, the
    criminal code was subject to a comprehensive revision pursuant to P.L. 158-
    2013 and P.L. 168-2014. The pertinent section of the sentence modification
    statute was amended to read:
    (c) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed
    since the convicted person began serving the sentence, the court
    may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1503-CR-120 | March 31, 2016   Page 3 of 5
    the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing.
    The court must incorporate its reasons in the record.
    Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(c) (2014). The legislature also included a specific
    savings clause as part of the 2014 revision of the criminal code, stating that:
    (a) A SECTION of P.L. 158-2013 or P.L. 168-2014 does not
    affect:
    (1) penalties incurred;
    (2) crimes committed; or
    (3) proceedings begun;
    before the effective date of that SECTION of P.L. 158-2013 or
    P.L. 168-2014. Those penalties, crimes, and proceedings
    continue and shall be imposed or enforced under prior law as if
    that SECTION of P.L. 158-2013 or P.L. 168-2014 had not been
    enacted.
    (b) The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of
    amelioration (see [Vicory] v. State [
    272 Ind. 683
    ], 
    400 N.E.2d 1380
                  (Ind. 1980)) to apply to any SECTION of P.L. 158-2013 or P.L.
    168-2014.
    I.C. § 1-1-5.5-21.
    [6]   This court has held that “the 2014 amendment to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-
    17 was neither remedial nor procedural” and “the savings clause evinces the
    intent of the legislature to apply the new criminal code only prospectively.”
    Johnson v. State, 
    36 N.E.2d 1130
    , 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Here,
    as the State points out, “every provision of the savings clause bars Nolan’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1503-CR-120 | March 31, 2016   Page 4 of 5
    petition: his crimes were committed, his penalties incurred, and these
    proceedings were begun before July 1, 2014.” Appellee’s Br. at 9. Because the
    prosecutor objected to Nolan’s petition for modification of his sentence, the trial
    court had no authority to modify his sentence under the applicable version of
    Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17(b), and the court did not abuse its discretion
    when it denied Nolan’s petition. See Carr v. State, 
    33 N.E.2d 358
    , 359 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2015) (holding pre-2014 version of sentence modification statute applied
    where defendant petitioned for modification after effective date of new version
    of statute but had committed crimes prior to 2000), trans. denied.
    [7]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1503-CR-120 | March 31, 2016   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22A01-1503-CR-120

Filed Date: 3/31/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/31/2016