Capital One, N.A. v. Aurora Estates Owners Assoc. ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 23 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CAPITAL ONE, N.A.,                              No.    19-16656
    21-15377
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                                             2:16-cv-02325-JAD-GWF
    AURORA ESTATES OWNERS
    ASSOCIATION, INC.; ATC                          MEMORANDUM*
    ASSESSMENT COLLECTION GROUP,
    LLC,
    Defendants,
    and
    SATICOY BAY LLC SERIES 1401
    MARBELLA RIDGE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 11, 2023**
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
    In May 2004, Mark Adair took out a $570,000 loan to purchase residential
    property in Las Vegas, Nevada. After a string of assignments, the deed of trust
    (DOT) securing the property was ultimately assigned to Capital One, N.A. (Capital
    One). Adair failed to pay dues to the Aurora Estates Owner’s Association, Inc.
    (HOA), and the HOA’s agent began foreclosure proceedings against him after
    obtaining a “superpriority lien” on the property. In response, the loan servicer at
    the time, Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) sought to cure the default and protect
    the DOT by tendering the superpriority lien amount, but the HOA’s agent rejected
    the tender. The HOA’s agent then foreclosed on the property, and sold it to
    Saticoy Bay for $60,500.
    On October 5, 2016, Capital One filed this action seeking injunctive relief
    and a declaratory judgment that the DOT was not extinguished by the HOA’s
    foreclosure sale. After a stay, Saticoy Bay filed an answer and counterclaim
    against Capital One seeking a declaration that Saticoy Bay owned the property free
    and clear of the DOT. On June 14, 2019, Capital One moved for partial summary
    on its declaratory judgment claim, as well as Saticoy Bay’s counterclaim. After a
    hearing, the district court granted Capital One’s motion. On August 10, 2020,
    Saticoy Bay filed a motion to alter or amend the final judgment under Federal Rule
    of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), citing the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in
    2
    Anthony S. Noonan, IRA v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n EE, 
    466 P.3d 1276
     (Nev. 2020).
    The district court denied Saticoy Bay’s motion on the merits. Saticoy Bay timely
    appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of relief under Rule
    60(b)(6).
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and reviewing the grant of
    summary judgment de novo, see Tschida v. Motl, 
    924 F.3d 1297
    , 1302–03 (9th Cir.
    2019), and the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief for abuse of discretion, see Riley v.
    Filson, 
    933 F.3d 1068
    , 1071 (9th Cir. 2019), we affirm.
    Saticoy Bay raises several arguments on appeal, but none has merit, as each
    has been foreclosed by binding authority from the Nevada Supreme Court.
    1. Saticoy Bay argues that the DOT was extinguished by the HOA’s
    foreclosure sale because the tender made by BANA’s counsel (Miles Bauer) was
    impermissibly conditional. Saticoy Bay fails to identify any condition on the
    tender beyond Miles Bauer’s statement that the HOA’s acceptance of the tender
    would satisfy the superpriority lien. But BANA had a right to insist on that
    condition, so it did not make the tender impermissibly conditional. See Bank of
    Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 
    427 P.3d 113
    , 118 (Nev. 2018) (Diamond
    Spur).1 And even more recently, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a
    1
    Diamond Spur generally governs the merits of these appeals through its central
    holding that a valid tender of the superpriority portion of a lien cures a default and
    preserves a senior DOT. See generally 
    id. at 121
    .
    3
    materially indistinguishable letter from Miles Bauer “was not improperly
    conditional” in Saticoy Bay LLC Series 133 McLaren v. Green Tree Servicing
    LLC, 
    478 P.3d 376
    , 379 (Nev. 2020).
    Saticoy Bay also argues that Capital One failed to demonstrate any excuse
    for failing to tender the superpriority lien amount. This argument fails because the
    record evidence, including the rejection letters from the HOA’s agent, indicates the
    tender was rejected. And in any event, formal tender is excused when the
    receiving party “had a known policy of rejecting such payments.” 7510 Perla Del
    Mar Ave. Tr. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
    458 P.3d 348
    , 349 (Nev. 2020).
    2. Saticoy Bay argues that the district court erred by (1) granting “equitable
    relief,” (2) failing to weigh various defenses such as unclean hands before doing
    so, and (3) failing to apply the “California Rule.” The Nevada Supreme Court has
    repeatedly rejected these arguments. See, e.g., Diamond Spur, 
    427 P.3d at 120
    (tender cures by operation of law, no other considerations required); Perla Del
    Mar, 458 P.3d at 350 n.1 (same); McLaren, 478 P.3d at 379 (same).
    3. Saticoy Bay argues that it takes the property free and clear because
    Capital One failed to record its tender in the public record and because Saticoy Bay
    is a bona fide purchaser. These arguments have likewise been rejected by the
    Nevada Supreme Court. See Diamond Spur, 
    427 P.3d at 119
     (recording of tender is
    not required); see also 
    id. at 121
     (“A party’s status as a BFP is irrelevant when a
    4
    defect in the foreclosure proceedings renders the sale void.”).
    4. Finally, Saticoy Bay argues that the district court abused its discretion by
    denying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). We disagree. The district court did not abuse
    its discretion in finding that the factors set forth in Phelps v. Alameida, 
    569 F.3d 1120
    , 1135–39 (9th Cir. 2009), did not counsel in favor of granting extraordinary
    relief, particularly in view of the lack of diligence in waiting over a year in
    bringing the motion. Moreover, Saticoy Bay’s basis for bringing the motion—the
    Nevada Supreme Court’s panel decision in Noonan has been vacated and
    superseded by an en banc opinion. See Anthony S. Noonan IRA, LLC v. U.S. Bank
    Nat’l Ass’n EE, 
    485 P.3d 206
    , 207 (Nev. 2021) (en banc) (holding that
    homeowners’ associations could not “accelerate” assessments such that the entire
    years’ worth of assessments would be due within the superpriority statute’s 9-
    month window).
    Because each of the arguments raised by Saticoy Bay have been squarely
    foreclosed by on-point Nevada Supreme Court authority, the district court’s
    judgment is AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-16656

Filed Date: 1/23/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/23/2023