Trapani v. Greatwide Logistics Services, LLC , 487 F. App'x 21 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________
    No. 11-3628
    _________
    MARY TRAPANI,
    Appellant
    v.
    GREATWIDE LOGISTICS SERVICES, LLC;
    JOSEPH CHANDLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND
    IN HIS PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT,
    GREATWIDE TRUCKLOAD MANAGEMENT;
    JOHN HOVE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS PROFESSIONAL
    CAPACITY AS GENERAL COUNSEL,
    GREATWIDE LOGISTICS SERVICES;
    GWTM LLC, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
    GREATWIDE TRUCKLOAD MANAGEMENT
    ________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-10-cv-00334)
    District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
    _______
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 29, 2012
    Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: June 29, 2012)
    ______
    OPINION
    ______
    SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
    Mary Trapani appeals the District Court’s entry of summary judgment on her
    claim that GWTM, LLC discriminated against her because of her gender in violation of
    Title VII. We will affirm.1
    I.
    Because we write primarily for the parties, we will discuss briefly only the facts
    and procedural history. GWTM is a Pennsylvania based trucking company and a
    subsidiary of Greatwide Logistics Services, LLC (“GWLS”). GWTM’s predecessor,
    Greatwide Truckload Management, LLC (“Truckload Management”), hired Trapani in
    December 2008 as the company’s Vice President of Organizational Development.
    Later in 2008, GWLS and its subsidiaries ran into serious financial difficulties and
    filed for bankruptcy. To help with the crisis, Truckload Management created a
    “downsizing taskforce,” which implemented four cost saving proposals. One of the
    taskforce’s proposals recommended “Executive Consolidation,” which entailed the
    termination of Trapani and three other senior staff officials.
    Trapani brought suit alleging that she was terminated because of her gender, in
    violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2), and the Pennsylvania Human
    Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. C.S. § 955(a). Trapani also asserted unlawful
    1
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
     and 1367. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review of the District
    Court’s grant of summary judgment, and we apply the same standard applicable in the
    District Court found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot.
    Plus, Inc., 
    527 F.3d 358
    , 362 (3d Cir. 2008).
    2
    retaliation. The District Court entered summary judgment on Trapani’s action, and
    Trapani timely appealed.2
    II.
    To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII, a
    plaintiff must show that: “(1) s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified
    for the position s/he sought to attain or retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment
    action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an
    inference of intentional discrimination.” Makky v. Chertoff, 
    541 F.3d 205
    , 214 (3d Cir.
    2008). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then “the burden shifts to the
    defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
    employment action.” 
    Id.
     If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff may still prevail
    by showing that “the defendant’s proffered reason is merely pretext for intentional
    discrimination.” 
    Id.
    Trapani argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment
    because there is a genuine dispute as to whether her action could give rise to an inference
    of intentional discrimination. More precisely, Trapani claims that the Court erroneously
    concluded that she was not similarly situated to two Truckload Management vice
    presidents—John Rosch and Eric Madison.3 However, the District Court determined that
    2
    Trapani does not challenge the District Court’s dismissal of her retaliation
    claims.
    3
    A plaintiff may establish an inference of discrimination by, inter alia, showing
    that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class were treated more
    3
    Trapani was similarly situated to Rosch but was not treated differently. See App. at 23-
    24. Similarly, the Court concluded that Madison’s treatment did not support an inference
    of discrimination even if he was similarly situated to Trapani.
    Trapani also argues that complaints about her “style” give rise to an inference of
    discrimination. Before Trapani’s termination, four regional vice presidents complained
    to the company’s president, Joseph Chandler, “about the way that [Trapani] talked to
    them during [a] conference call.” App. at 411. However, there is no evidence supporting
    Trapani’s claim that the complaints were motivated by Trapani’s gender. Moreover, even
    if we assumed that a rational jury could conclude that the complaints were related to
    Trapani’s gender, such evidence alone is insufficient to survive summary judgment. See
    Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 
    891 F.2d 458
    , 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A]
    nonmoving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor . . . .”).4
    Finally, Trapani argues that the District Court erred by concluding that: (1)
    GWTM presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination and (2)
    there is insufficient evidence to show pretext. Before Trapani’s termination, GWLS and
    favorably. Cf. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Service, 
    352 F.3d 789
    , 798 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2003)
    (per curiam).
    4
    Trapani also argues that the District Court ignored evidence that Rob Newell—a
    vice president at Greatwide Dedicated Transport—stated that Chandler hated her because
    Chandler “is a Texan and [Trapani is] a woman,” and described a general anti-female
    animus held by employees from Texas. However, the District Court considered that
    evidence and correctly held that Newell’s comments “cannot raise an inference of
    unlawful discrimination” because: (1) “Newell . . . had no influence over decisions with
    respect to the plaintiff’s employment” and (2) “after the plaintiff reported the comment to
    Chandler, Chandler acted on the comment and reported it to [GWLS’s general counsel].”
    App. at 26.
    4
    its subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy and experienced a substantial drop in revenue.
    Although Trapani claims that “[t]he bankruptcy was little more than a debt-equity swap,”
    Appellant’s Br. at 39, there is ample evidence that Trapani’s employer experienced true
    financial difficulty.
    With respect to pretext, Trapani relies on the evidence of discrimination rejected
    above and further asserts that: (1) Chandler considered Trapani’s work adequate and (2)
    after Trapani’s termination, another female was hired as supervisor of human resources.
    The District Court, however, properly determined that “the fact that Chandler considered
    the plaintiff’s work to be adequate is consistent with the defendants’ proffered rationale
    that the plaintiff was terminated for economic reasons . . . .”. App. at 29. Moreover, not
    only did the supervisor hired after Trapani have different responsibilities, but her female
    status undermines Trapani’s gender discrimination claim.5
    III.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.6
    5
    Trapani contends that Chandler lured her into working for GWTM “by telling
    her that he wanted her to be part of the Company’s growth.” Appellant’s Br. at 42.
    However, no rational jury could conclude that such evidence shows that the company’s
    subsequent financial difficulties are merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.
    Trapani further argues that the District Court entered summary judgment by
    impermissibly weighing evidence, but overall the record does not support Trapani’s
    gender discrimination claim.
    6
    Although Trapani originally brought gender discrimination claims against
    GWLS, she does not contest the District Court’s dismissal of those claims. See App. at
    30-31. Such claims are therefore waived. See Simmons v. City of Phila., 
    947 F.2d 1042
    ,
    1065-66 (3d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, Appellant’s PHRA claims fail for the reasons set
    forth in this opinion. See Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 
    460 F.3d 447
    , 454 n.6 (3d Cir.
    2006) (“Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title VII claims.”).
    5