United States v. Sarrias-Boya , 322 F. App'x 743 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 3, 2009
No. 08-10699 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00334-CR-T-17-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID GALINDO-PEREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 08-11514
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00334-CR-T-17-TBM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAGOBERTO SARRIAS-BOYA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(April 3, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, David Galindo-Perez and Dagoberto Sarrias-
Boya appeal their 135-month sentences for drug trafficking offenses, in violation
of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a), (b) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B). No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
On appeal, both Defendants argue that the district court erred in denying
them minor role reductions because they were mere crew members on the drug
smuggling boat (which was carrying 720 kilograms of cocaine), had no ownership
interest in the drugs, and were not organizers of or participants in the larger drug
conspiracy. We review for clear error the district court’s determination about a
defendant’s role in an offense. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2002). “The defendant has the burden of establishing his role by a
preponderance of evidence.” Id. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), “[a] defendant
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warrants a two-level reduction for playing a minor role in an offense if he is less
culpable than most other participants, although his role could not be described as
minimal.” Id.
In United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999), we set out two
elements that inform the sentencing court’s determination about a defendant’s role
in an offense: (1) the defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which he has
been held accountable at sentencing; and (2) the defendant’s role as compared to
that of other participants in his relevant conduct. Id. at 940. About the first
element, De Varon explains that “[o]nly if the defendant can establish that [he]
played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [he] has already been held
accountable -- not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy -- should the
district court grant a downward adjustment for minor role in the offense.” Id. at
944. About the second element, De Varon counsels that this relative culpability
inquiry includes “only those participants who were involved in the relevant
conduct attributed to the defendant.” Id. The first element is the more important
and, in many cases, will be dispositive. See id. at 945.
The district court committed no clear error in denying Defendants minor role
reductions. About the first element, both Defendants’ sentences were based only
on the relevant conduct for which they were held accountable at sentencing: the
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720 kilograms of cocaine seized from the boat on which they were found. Id. at
942-43 (“when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited to [his] own act of
importation, a district court may legitimately conclude that the courier played an
important or essential role in the importation of those drugs”). Defendants cannot
meet their burdens of showing their entitlement to minor role reductions based on
their roles in the larger drug conspiracy. Id. at 944. Also, in the drug courier
context, a large amount of drugs is an important factor in determining the
availability of a minor role reduction. Id. at 943 (“the amount of drugs imported is
a material consideration in assessing a defendant’s role in [his] relevant conduct”).
About the second element, the district court was not permitted to evaluate
Defendants’ roles as compared to that of unidentified coconspirators. Id. at 944.
We see no error in the district court’s conclusion that Defendants failed to meet
their burdens in showing that they were less culpable than the other two crew
members aboard the drug smuggling boat.
Galindo-Perez also argues that his sentence procedurally is unreasonable
because the district court calculated incorrectly the guidelines and failed to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that Galindo-Perez referenced at his
sentencing hearing. When reviewing a sentence, we must ensure that no
procedural error occurred, such as the district court improperly calculating the
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guidelines, basing a sentence on clearly erroneous facts, failing to consider the
section 3553(a) factors, or failing to explain a variation from the guidelines.
United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1091 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court
must adequately explain the reasons for the sentence imposed so that we can
conduct meaningful appellate review, but this does not require the district court to
discuss each of the section 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1090.
We conclude that the district court committed no procedural error. As we
already noted, Galindo-Perez was unentitled to a minor role reduction and, thus,
the district court correctly calculated the guidelines. And the district court
considered Galindo-Perez’s request for a below-guidelines sentence and both his
and the government’s arguments about the section 3553(a) factors; but the court
determined that an in-range guideline sentence was appropriate based, in part, on
the seriousness of Galindo-Perez’s offense. The district court’s statement of
reasons was sufficient. See United States v. Rita, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007)
(a lengthy explanation is not necessarily required when a judge decides to follow
the guidelines in a particular case, especially where a sentencing judge has listened
to the arguments of the parties, considered the supporting evidence, and was aware
of the special conditions of the defendant).
AFFIRMED.
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