Petrova v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •      20-1941
    Petrova v. Garland
    BIA
    Conroy, IJ
    A202 042 704/05
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 24th day of January, two thousand twenty-
    5   three.
    6
    7   PRESENT:
    8            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    9            MYRNA PÉREZ,
    10            ALISON J. NATHAN,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   ANGELINA PETROVA, ILIA
    15   GURASPISHVILI,
    16            Petitioners,
    17
    18                        v.                                  20-1941
    19                                                            NAC
    20   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    21   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    22            Respondent.
    23   _____________________________________
    24
    25   FOR PETITIONERS:                     Alexander J. Segal, Esq., New
    26                                        York, NY.
    27
    28   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
    1                                     Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori,
    2                                     Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation
    3                                     Counsel, Office of Immigration
    4                                     Litigation, United States
    5                                     Department of Justice, Washington,
    6                                     DC.
    7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    8   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    9   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    10   is DENIED.
    11        Petitioners    Angelina       Petrova   and      Ilia   Guraspishvili,
    12   citizens of Georgia, seek review of a May 27, 2020 decision
    13   of   the   BIA   affirming    a    July   12,    2018    decision    of    an
    14   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Petrova’s application for
    15   asylum,    withholding   of       removal,      and    relief   under     the
    16   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 1 on which Guraspishvili
    17   was listed as a derivative asylum applicant.                 In re Angelina
    18   Petrova, Ilia Guraspishvili, Nos. A 202 042 704/05 (B.I.A. May
    19   27, 2020), aff’g Nos. A 202 042 704/05                (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C.
    20   July 12, 2018).     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    21   underlying facts and procedural history.
    1Petrova does not raise her CAT claim in this court or challenge
    the BIA’s denial of her motion to remand.
    2
    1                           Standard of Review
    2       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions
    3   “for the     sake of   completeness.”        Wangchuck v.   Dep’t   of
    4   Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).            We review
    5   factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of
    6   law de novo.    See Pan v. Holder, 
    777 F.3d 540
    , 543 (2d Cir.
    7   2015).        Under    the     substantial     evidence     standard,
    8   “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
    9   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    10   contrary.”    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    11                               Legal Standard
    12       To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must
    13   establish that he or she has suffered past persecution or has
    14   a well-founded fear of future persecution and that “race,
    15   religion,    nationality,    membership   in   a   particular   social
    16   group, or political opinion was or will be at least one
    17   central reason for persecuting the applicant.”              8 U.S.C.
    18   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b).            “To qualify as
    19   persecution[,] the conduct at issue must be attributable to
    20   the government [of the country of removal], whether directly
    21   because engaged in by government officials, or indirectly
    3
    1   because engaged in by private persons whom the government is
    2   unable or unwilling to control.”                Scarlett v. Barr, 
    957 F.3d 3
       316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4   “Under     the     unwilling-or-unable          standard,             a     finding     of
    5   persecution        ordinarily       requires          a        determination           that
    6   government authorities, if they did not actually perpetrate
    7   or   incite       the    persecution,         condoned          it     or    at     least
    8   demonstrated        a    complete     helplessness               to       protect       the
    9   victims.”        Singh v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 106
    , 114–15 (2d Cir.
    10   2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    11                                        Discussion
    12        Petrova       challenges two        findings          by    the      agency.       As
    13   relevant to past persecution, she challenges the finding that
    14   she failed to meet her burden of showing that the Georgian
    15   government was          unwilling   or       unable       to    protect      her.       As
    16   relevant to her well-founded fear of future persecution, she
    17   challenges the finding that her alleged persecutors were
    18   motivated by criminal desires rather than her ethnicity.                                We
    19   conclude    that     substantial     evidence             supports        both    of   the
    20   agency’s challenged findings, and accordingly, we deny the
    21   petition for review.         
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    4
    1          I.     Past Persecution
    2          Petrova claimed that Guraspishvili’s ethnically Georgian
    3   family abused her on account of her Russian ethnicity, and
    4   that such abuse was indirectly attributable to the Georgian
    5   government because it was unable or unwilling to protect her.
    6   The agency found that Petrova did not establish that Georgian
    7   authorities were unwilling or unable to protect her, citing
    8   (1)    the    fact   that   she   had   never     reported    the   abuse    by
    9   Guraspishvili’s         family    to        the   police     and    (2)     the
    10   insufficiency of evidence substantiating Petrova’s belief
    11   that    the    police   would     be    unwilling    to    intervene.       An
    12   applicant’s failure to report mistreatment is not fatal to
    13   her application, but absent such reporting, there must be
    14   other evidence establishing the government’s unwillingness or
    15   inability to protect.         See Pan, 
    777 F.3d at
    544–45.           Petrova
    16   did not produce country-conditions evidence addressing police
    17   responses to reports of violence, much less evidence that the
    18   police treat ethnic Russians differently than other victims.
    19   Therefore, we are not “compelled to conclude to the contrary”
    20   of the agency’s determination.              
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    5
    1       II.          Future Persecution
    2       Petrova argues that the agency failed to consider the
    3   harm her    father    had   experienced   at    the   hands   of   Shalva
    4   Obgaidze and Georgian government officials as evidence that
    5   the authorities would be unwilling to protect her from future
    6   persecution.      The agency did consider this evidence, but
    7   expressly found that Obgaidze’s threats to Petrova’s family
    8   were not indicative of Georgian authorities’ unwillingness or
    9   inability   to   protect    Petrova   from     persecution    of   ethnic
    10   Russians.      Indeed, Obgaidze himself appears to have been
    11   motivated by his desire to take over Petrova’s father’s
    12   business, rather than any animus related to her family’s
    13   membership in a group of “highly successful ethnic Russians.”
    14   Certified    Admin.    Record    at 100–01;       see,   e.g.,     Pucha
    15   Quituizaca v. Garland, 
    52 F.4th 103
    , 115 (2d Cir. 2022)
    16   (upholding agency’s finding that, when asylum applicant was
    17   robbed by gang members of a different ethnicity, there was a
    18   “greater probability that the gang was motivated to harm him
    19   based on [the pecuniary] incentives presented to ordinary
    20   criminals[,] rather than [ethnically motivated] persecution”
    21   (internal quotation marks omitted)).           Letters from Petrova’s
    6
    1   father and brother describe Obgaidze’s actions against them
    2   as part of his effort to take over their businesses.               The
    3   only evidence that Obgaidze was motivated by the family’s
    4   Russian ethnicity is the testimony from Petrova and her
    5   brother.    But neither provided a reason why they believed the
    6   harm was on account of their ethnicity, and Petrova did not
    7   submit any evidence to corroborate that belief.             See INS v.
    8   Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 483 (1992) (requiring “some
    9   evidence” of motive, either “direct or circumstantial”).
    10       The record further supports the agency’s conclusion that
    11   Petrova failed to establish that the Georgian police – either
    12   due to Obgaidze’s influence or otherwise – would be unwilling
    13   or unable to protect her.              In fact, Petrova offered no
    14   evidence that the police persecute ethnic Russians or stand
    15   by while they are abused by others. To be sure, the evidence
    16   includes    reports   of     anti-Russian   sentiment   in    Georgian
    17   society at large, but those reports nowhere indicate that
    18   police     are   targeting    individuals    on   account    of   their
    19   ethnicity or refusing to aid ethnic Russians who seek police
    20   protection.      Accordingly, we do not disturb the agency’s
    21   finding that Petrova did not establish past persecution or a
    7
    1   well-founded fear of future persecution.   See Singh, 
    11 F.4th 2
       at 114–15.
    3       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    4   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    5   stays VACATED.
    6                               FOR THE COURT:
    7                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    8                               Clerk of Court
    9
    8