State v. Garcia , 2018 UT 3 ( 2018 )


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  •                  This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2018 UT 3
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Respondent,
    v.
    DENNIS J. GARCIA,
    Petitioner.
    No. 20160932
    Filed January 29, 2018
    On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
    Third District, Salt Lake
    The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
    No. 061901607
    Attorneys:
    Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Tyler R. Green, Solic. Gen.,
    Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent
    Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for petitioner
    ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in
    which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE PEARCE, and
    JUDGE JOHNSON joined.
    Due to her retirement, JUSTICE DURHAM did not participate herein;
    DISTRICT JUDGE CHRISTINE S. JOHNSON sat.
    JUSTICE PETERSEN became a member of the Court on November 17,
    2017, after oral argument in this matter, and accordingly did not
    participate.
    ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:
    ¶1    Dennis Garcia served a five-year sentence for automobile
    homicide. Following his release, the Board of Pardons and Parole
    ordered him to pay $7,000 of restitution toward his victim’s funeral
    expenses. Garcia filed various motions with the sentencing court
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Opinion of the Court
    challenging the restitution order as untimely and therefore legally
    invalid. The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction
    to adjudicate these motions, and the court of appeals affirmed.
    ¶2     We affirm the court of appeals under Utah Code section
    77-27-5(3). That provision states that restitution decisions of the
    board are “not subject to judicial review.” This statutory section was
    all but ignored by the courts below, but it is properly before us here.
    And it is decisive. It forecloses the judicial review sought by Garcia
    in this case.
    ¶3     Garcia offers no way around this conclusion under the
    language of the statute. Instead he alleges that section 77-27-5(3)
    infringes his constitutional rights under the Open Courts Clause of
    the Utah Constitution. This is an issue Garcia raised both in the
    district court and in the court of appeals. But he did not raise it in his
    opening brief in this court. We do not reach it here for that reason.
    I
    ¶4   In March 2006, Dennis Garcia crashed a car and killed his
    passenger. He was convicted of automobile homicide in April 2008,
    and he was sentenced to serve zero to five years in prison.
    ¶5     Garcia was released from prison in April 2013. Months
    later, the Board of Pardons and Parole issued an order of restitution
    that required Garcia to pay $7,000 to the Utah Office for Victims of
    Crime for funds paid to the victim’s mother for funeral expenses.
    The board sent the order to the district court per Utah Code section
    77-27-6(4), and the court entered the order into its docket.
    ¶6     Garcia moved the district court to set aside the restitution
    order on the ground that it was untimely.1 In opposing Garcia’s
    motion the Office of State Debt Collection asserted that the court
    lacked jurisdiction under Utah Code section 77-27-5(3). That section
    states that “[d]ecisions of the board in cases involving . . . restitution
    . . . are final and are not subject to judicial review.” The district court
    denied Garcia’s motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. It based
    _____________________________________________________________
    1The Parole Board must “make all orders of restitution within 60
    days after the termination or expiration of the defendant’s sentence.”
    UTAH CODE § 77-27-6(2)(c). Garcia contends that the board’s order
    was entered after that timeframe.
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                            Opinion of the Court
    its order not on section 77-27-5(3) but on other grounds.2 Garcia then
    filed three other motions requesting similar relief. He argued, among
    other things, that section 77-27-5(3) violated the Open Courts Clause.
    The court denied all three motions on the grounds stated in its
    previous order; it did not address Garcia’s constitutional argument.
    ¶7     Garcia appealed the denial of these three motions to the
    court of appeals. In his brief, he renewed his constitutional argument
    and made an additional statutory argument. The statutory argument
    was that the district court had jurisdiction over the restitution order
    because it entered the order on its docket pursuant to Utah Code
    section 77-27-6(4). That section states that:
    [I]f the board makes an order of restitution within 60 days after
    the termination or expiration of the defendant’s sentence, the
    matter shall be referred to the district court for civil collection
    remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall forward a
    restitution order to the sentencing court to be entered on the
    judgment docket. The entry shall constitute a lien and is subject
    to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil judgment.
    UTAH CODE § 77-27-6(4). Garcia asserted that this statute “reinvests”
    the district court with jurisdiction, at least to review a restitution
    order that it has entered.
    ¶8    The court of appeals affirmed, but it addressed only
    Garcia’s statutory argument. It held that section 77-27-6(4) did not
    reinvest the district court with jurisdiction “to rule upon challenges
    to the fact, amount, or validity of the judgment itself,” but only to
    “order such civil remedies to assist the claimant in collecting on the
    judgment . . . .” State v. Garcia, 
    2016 UT App 96
    , ¶ 17, 
    374 P.3d 1039
    .
    This conclusion was rooted in part in the notion that section
    77-27-6(4) refers to “order[s]” rather than “judgment[s]”—a
    distinction the court of appeals found significant. 
    Id. ¶ 16.
    The court
    of appeals also noted that “the legislature’s use of the term ‘district
    _____________________________________________________________
    2 The district court relied on the principle that “[o]nce a court
    imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the
    case.” State v. Montoya, 
    825 P.2d 676
    , 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It
    noted that while the court does have one year following sentencing
    to make restitution determinations, that year had expired, leaving
    the court without jurisdiction. UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i)
    (2005) (“[T]he court shall determine complete restitution . . . within
    one year after sentencing.”).
    3
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Opinion of the Court
    court’ as opposed to ‘sentencing court’ . . . indicates that any
    jurisdiction is vested in the district court system rather than the
    specific trial court that tried and sentenced a defendant.” 
    Id. ¶ 17.
    The court’s opinion does not mention Garcia’s open courts challenge.
    ¶9    We granted certiorari to consider whether the court of
    appeals erred in affirming the district court’s determination that it
    lacked jurisdiction. We review the court of appeals’ decision de
    novo. State v. Levin, 
    2006 UT 50
    , ¶ 15, 
    144 P.3d 1096
    (“On certiorari,
    we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals . . . .”).
    II
    ¶10 The question presented is whether the district court had
    jurisdiction to review the Parole Board’s order of restitution. Utah
    Code section 77-27-5(3) provides the answer. It says that the board’s
    restitution decisions are “not subject to judicial review.”
    ¶11 That clear and simple directive controls the disposition of
    this case. The legislature has said that our courts are foreclosed from
    “judicial review” of the legality or merits of a restitution order
    entered by the Parole Board. And Garcia’s motions were improper
    because they sought such review—by challenging the order in
    question as untimely and thus illegal.
    ¶12 We affirm on this basis. We conclude that the district court
    lacked jurisdiction to consider the legality of the Parole Board’s
    restitution order on Garcia’s motions because the district court’s
    “judicial review” of the order was foreclosed by Utah Code section
    77-27-5(3). In so holding we adopt a basis for decision that departs to
    some degree from the path taken by the court of appeals. And we
    reject Garcia’s grounds for challenging this approach.
    A
    ¶13 Garcia challenges the court of appeals’ conclusion that the
    district judge in this case had jurisdiction only to “order such civil
    remedies to assist the claimant in collecting on the judgment,” and
    not “to rule upon challenges to the fact, amount, or validity of the
    judgment itself.” State v. Garcia, 
    2016 UT App 96
    , ¶ 17, 
    374 P.3d 1039
    .
    Garcia notes that Utah Code section 77-27-6(4) directs the
    “sentencing court” in a criminal case to “enter[]” the Parole Board’s
    restitution order “on the judgment docket.” See UTAH CODE
    § 77-27-6(4). And he suggests that the power to enter the judgment
    on the docket must encompass the power to consider the legal basis
    for the judgment.
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                             Opinion of the Court
    ¶14 Garcia may have a small point here. To the extent the court
    of appeals was saying that district judges are not exercising
    “jurisdiction” in entering a Parole Board restitution order on the
    judgment docket we disagree. The entry of the order on the docket is
    mandated by statute. And the exercise of that authority by a judge is
    the exercise of jurisdiction.
    ¶15 That said, this is not a basis for reversing the court of
    appeals. The jurisdiction exercised by the sentencing court in a case
    like this one is limited. The judge is directed only to perform a
    ministerial act—to enter the restitution order on the judgment
    docket. And the judicial power to perform that ministerial act does
    not encompass the power to review the legality or merits of the
    underlying restitution order. Thus, the court of appeals may have
    overstated matters in asserting that the district judge has no
    jurisdiction except over supplemental (civil enforcement) remedies.
    But the district judge’s jurisdiction is limited; it does not extend to
    reviewing the merits or legal basis for the underlying restitution
    order.
    ¶16 Any question on that matter is resolved by Utah Code
    section 77-27-5(3). That provision, again, states clearly and
    unequivocally that “[d]ecisions of the board in cases involving . . .
    restitution . . . are final and are not subject to judicial review.” UTAH
    CODE § 77-27-5(3). That confirms that a judge that is directed to enter
    the Parole Board’s order on the judgment docket is not authorized to
    “review” the merits or legality of the underlying order. We affirm on
    the basis of this provision. We hold that, outside of civil collection
    remedies, the district court’s jurisdiction is limited to the ministerial
    act of entering the judgment adopted by the Parole Board, and that
    decisions of the board are “final and are not subject to judicial
    review.”3
    B
    ¶17 Garcia makes little or no effort to sustain his position under
    the plain language of Utah Code section 77-27-5(3). Instead he asserts
    (1) that the clear import of the statute is somehow overridden by
    precedent and (2) that the statute as written infringes his rights
    _____________________________________________________________
    3 In so holding we are not foreclosing Garcia’s right to challenge
    the Parole Board’s order through a petition for extraordinary writ.
    The viability of that avenue of review is not before us.
    5
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Opinion of the Court
    under the Open Courts Clause. The first point is unpersuasive,
    however, and the second is not properly presented for our review.
    1
    ¶18 Nothing in our case law runs counter to the plain language
    of section 77-27-5(3). Garcia invokes State v. Laycock, 
    2009 UT 53
    , 
    214 P.3d 104
    , in support of an asserted right of judicial review of the
    exercise of “post-sentence jurisdiction” to review a restitution order.
    But Laycock has no bearing here. It involved the entry of a restitution
    order by the district court and review by a petition for extraordinary
    writ. See Laycock, 
    2009 UT 53
    , ¶ 1. That is significant. Our decision
    here is dictated by Utah Code section 77-27-5(3)—a provision barring
    judicial review of “[d]ecisions of the [parole] board in cases involving
    . . . restitution.” UTAH CODE § 77-27-5(3) (emphasis added). That
    provision has nothing to say about review of restitution orders
    entered by a district court. So our decision here is in no way
    inconsistent with the framework of our Laycock opinion.
    ¶19 Garcia also invokes State v. Schultz, 
    2002 UT App 297
    , 
    56 P.3d 974
    . The Schultz case is admittedly more difficult to reconcile
    with our analysis here. The Schultz court announced a holding in line
    with that sought by Garcia—it reversed a restitution order initially
    entered by the Parole Board and subsequently placed on the
    judgment docket by the sentencing court on the ground that the
    board had entered its order at a time when it “no longer had
    jurisdiction” to do so. Schultz, 
    2002 UT App 297
    , ¶ 14. And it
    reversed the judgment entered by the sentencing court on the
    ground that “the sentencing court’s entry of the order on its
    judgment docket is equally invalid.” 
    Id. ¶ 19.
    For that reason we take
    Garcia’s point that the holding in Schultz seems incompatible with
    that endorsed by the court of appeals in this case.
    ¶20 That said, we cannot take Garcia up on his request that we
    give stare decisis effect to the Schultz opinion. For one thing Schultz is
    a court of appeals decision; as such it has no binding effect here. That
    is not to say that we ignore decisions from our court of appeals. We
    scrutinize them carefully, and follow them when we are persuaded
    by their analysis (as we often are). Here, however, we find no basis
    for following Schultz. That decision was handed down in apparent
    ignorance of the provision we find controlling here: Utah Code
    section 77-27-5(3) is nowhere discussed or even cited in Schultz.
    ¶21 Perhaps that is because this provision was not cited in the
    briefing in that case. Sometimes that happens—through oversight or
    otherwise, a controlling statutory provision is not brought to the
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                             Opinion of the Court
    attention of the court. And when that happens, the persuasive power
    of a prior decision is sharply diminished. That is the case here. For
    reasons noted above we find Utah Code section 77-27-5(3) to be
    controlling here, and we repudiate Schultz (and any other cases
    along similar lines) to the extent it runs contrary to the clear terms of
    the statute.
    2
    ¶22 Garcia’s more direct challenge to the clear terms of Utah
    Code section 77-27-5(3) is his assertion that it runs afoul of the Open
    Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. Garcia raised this challenge
    in the district court and in court of appeals. And both courts
    inexplicably failed to address this constitutional question.
    ¶23 Garcia could have raised this as a basis for challenging the
    court of appeals’ decision. He could have asserted that the court of
    appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Garcia’s motions not only
    under the governing statutory framework but also because that
    framework infringes his constitutional rights. Yet he failed to raise
    this constitutional ground in his opening brief on appeal. It was not
    until his reply brief that Garcia raised the constitutional question.
    And that was too late. See Pinder v. State, 
    2015 UT 56
    , ¶ 58, 
    367 P.3d 968
    (noting that “we typically do not consider issues raised for the
    first time in a reply brief”).
    ¶24 By waiting until the reply brief to raise the constitutional
    question Garcia failed to carry his burden of identifying grounds for
    challenging the decision before us on review.4 And he likewise
    deprived the State of the opportunity to address this question in its
    briefing on appeal. That was fatal to his attempt to raise this issue for
    our consideration.
    III
    ¶25 A sentencing court has limited jurisdiction to perform the
    ministerial act of entering a restitution order of the Parole Board on
    the judgment docket and to facilitate civil collection remedies related
    to that order. UTAH CODE § 77-27-6(4). But that jurisdiction does not
    encompass judicial review of the legality or merits of the board’s
    _____________________________________________________________
    4 The court of appeals seems to have fallen short in neglecting to
    address Garcia’s constitutional arguments. But it is Garcia’s burden
    to identify alleged errors of the court of appeals.
    7
    STATE v. GARCIA
    Opinion of the Court
    order. Such review, in fact, is expressly foreclosed by statute. UTAH
    CODE § 77-27-5(3). We affirm on the basis of that statute.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case No. 20160932

Citation Numbers: 2018 UT 3

Filed Date: 1/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2020