In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. M. A., Child. ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-0297
In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. M. A., Child.
Filed August 3, 2015
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge
Anoka County District Court
File Nos. 02JV141049; 02JV141050;
02JV141051; 02JV141052; 02JV141053
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Jon C. Audette, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Larkin, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant A.M.A. challenges an order of the district court certifying him to stand
trial as an adult on felony charges of aggravated robbery and theft of a firearm. Because
the district court properly applied the statutory certification factors and appropriately
exercised its discretion in reaching its certification decision, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 28, 2014, Coon Rapids police officers were dispatched to a SuperAmerica
at around 4:00 a.m. after receiving a report that the gas station had been robbed. The gas
station employee, D.K., told police that a black male, who appeared to be in his 20s,
entered the store. The black male was wearing a dark baseball hat, dark clothing, and a
bandana over his face, and carrying a knife and a metal bar. The male ordered employees
to put money from the cash register into his backpack. Once the registers were cleared,
the male grabbed his backpack and ran out of the gas station.
On August 4, 2014, at around 2:00 a.m., Coon Rapids Police officers were
dispatched to the same SuperAmerica and a Walgreens after receiving reports that
robberies had occurred. J.M., a Walgreens employee, told officers that a black male, who
appeared to be between the ages of 16 and 20, entered the store wearing a ski mask and
dark clothing. The male pointed a handgun at J.M. and ordered him to empty the cash
registers into a backpack. The male then ran out of the store with approximately $600 in
cash.
D.K. was again working when SuperAmerica was robbed for the second time.
D.K. stated that, although the male was wearing a ski mask this time, she believed it was
the same person from the previous robbery because she recognized his eyes. The male
ordered the employees and customers in the gas station to the interior of the cash-register
station and instructed the employees to empty the money from the cash registers into a
backpack. The male took the backpack and fled the store.
2
The next day, Coon Rapids police detectives went to appellant’s residence after
they received a tip that he was involved in the robberies. Appellant spoke with the
detectives outside of his home and denied any involvement in the robberies. The
detectives asked appellant’s mother for permission to search appellant’s bedroom for
items in connection with the robberies. The detectives discovered a BB gun and a 4.5
millimeter Sig Sauer handgun in appellant’s room. They also recovered $500 in cash.
These items were seized.
On August 15, 2014, at 12:09 p.m., T.J. reported to Coon Rapids police officers
that two handguns, including a semiautomatic pistol, and some ammunition, had been
stolen from the trunk of his vehicle. At 10:54 p.m. that evening, officers were dispatched
to a residence in Coon Rapids upon a report that a carjacking had just occurred. K.M.
and her friends were having a bonfire in the backyard when she noticed a person
approaching the gathering. As the person approached the bonfire he pointed a small
handgun at K.M. and ordered her to give him her car keys. K.M. described the person as
a black male, around 18 years old, wearing dark clothing and a hooded sweatshirt with
his face covered.
The male pointed the gun at other people at the bonfire, stating he needed keys to
a car. Another guest, K.C., eventually gave him her car keys. The male pointed his gun
at K.C.’s back and ordered her to walk to the front of the house to show him her car.
Once K.C. pointed out her car, the male got into the vehicle and drove away.
The following day, Coon Rapids Police Officer Steve Beberg was driving to work
when he observed someone hiding behind a vehicle in a residential driveway. Officer
3
Beberg got out of his vehicle, identified himself, and displayed his police badge. The
person took off running. Officer Beberg recognized appellant and pursued him. Officer
Beberg and other uniformed officers who had arrived at the scene were eventually able to
stop and detain appellant. They later discovered one of T.J.’s handguns in the area where
appellant was running. A search of appellant’s home revealed the other stolen gun and
ammunition.
The state filed separate juvenile delinquency petitions charging appellant with four
counts of aggravated robbery in the first degree and one count of theft of a firearm. The
state moved to certify appellant to stand trial as an adult on all charges.
Pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.05, subd. 3(D), appellant waived his right
to have a probable-cause hearing and the district court determined that probable cause
was established. The matter proceeded to a three-day contested certification hearing.
The district court heard testimony from five people, including appellant’s father, a
clinical psychologist, and a juvenile probation officer.
Appellant’s father described appellant as a “good boy” growing up, and stated that
he performed well in school. According to appellant’s father, appellant “went off” after
he turned 16 years old. Appellant became depressed, performed poorly in school, started
using marijuana, and hung out with new friends, of whom his parents did not approve.
Appellant’s parents encouraged appellant to get counseling or to attend therapy, but he
refused. Appellant’s father stated that he would allow appellant to live at home, support
him, and hold him accountable if appellant was allowed to proceed on extended-
jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) status.
4
The psychologist recommended that appellant be certified to stand trial as an adult
on the basis of the seriousness of the offenses, appellant’s culpability, and his
programming history. The probation officer also recommended that appellant be certified
to stand trial as an adult.
In an order evaluating the evidence presented at the certification hearing and
applying the six statutory certification factors, the district court determined that five
factors favored adult certification. With respect to appellant’s programming history, the
district court found that appellant “had one prior placement outside of the home prior to
his current court detention status” and determined that this factor was neutral. The
district court then concluded that “all factors favor certification,” noting that two of the
certification factors were to be given greater weight. Because it found that the state had
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the
juvenile court would not serve public safety, the district court ordered that appellant be
certified for prosecution as an adult. This appeal followed.
DECISION
On review of a district court’s decision to certify a juvenile to adult court, we will
affirm unless the district court abused its discretion. In re Welfare of J.H., 844 N.W.2d
28, 34 (Minn. 2014); see In re Welfare of S.J.T., 736 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Minn. App. 2007)
(“A district court has considerable latitude in deciding whether to certify, and this court
will not upset its decision unless its findings are clearly erroneous so as to constitute an
abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)), review denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2007). We
apply a clearly erroneous standard to review factual findings and a de novo standard to
5
review questions of law. J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 34-35. “We will not disturb a finding
about whether public safety would be served by retaining the proceeding in juvenile court
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 35.
I.
With respect to the aggravated robbery offenses, under Minn. Stat. § 260B.125,
subd. 3 (2012), certification is presumptive because appellant was 17 years old at the time
of the offenses, the charged offenses carry a presumptive prison sentence under the
sentencing guidelines and applicable statutes,1 and probable cause existed to believe that
appellant committed the offenses. Appellant may rebut the presumption of certification
“by demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in the
juvenile court serves public safety.” See Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. If he does so,
the juvenile court retains the case as an EJJ proceeding. See id., subd. 8(b) (2012). But if
appellant fails to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the matter must be
certified. See id., subd. 3.
The district court must consider the following six factors in determining whether
public safety would be served by certification:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any
aggravating factors recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the
alleged offense, including the level of the child’s participation
1
Under Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines, the presumptive sentence for first-degree
aggravated robbery for someone with zero criminal history points is 48 months executed.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2012).
6
in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of
any mitigating factors recognized by the Sentencing
Guidelines;
(3) the child’s prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child’s programming history, including the
child’s past willingness to participate meaningfully in
available programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.
Id., subd. 4 (2012). Of these factors, the district court must “give greater weight to the
seriousness of the alleged offense and the child’s prior record of delinquency than to the
other factors listed.” Id. The district court examined each of the factors in reaching its
certification decision and found that “all factors favor[ed] [adult] certification.”2 On
appeal, appellant concedes factors one and two but argues that he rebutted the
presumption that the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth factors favored certification. We will
address each disputed factor in turn.
A. Third factor: the child’s prior criminal history
Appellant argues that the district court incorrectly assessed the third factor, his
prior criminal history, by improperly considering his “uncharged behavior cited in school
records.” We agree.
A “prior record of delinquency” includes “records of petitions to juvenile court
and the adjudication of alleged violations of the law by minors.” In re Welfare of N.J.S.,
753 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 2008). Thus, it was error for the district court to consider
uncharged behavior reflected in school records when evaluating this factor. While the
2
We note that the district court found the fourth factor—the child’s programming
history—to be neutral.
7
district court did note that appellant had prior offenses consisting of theft, possession of a
weapon, and disorderly conduct, these offenses were adjudicated as petty offenses. And
appellant was referred to diversion programs for those offenses. Because there is clear
and convincing evidence that appellant’s prior history does not consist of “deeply
ingrained, escalating criminal behavior,” see In re Welfare of H.S.H., 609 N.W.2d 259,
263 (Minn. App. 2000), this factor does not support certification and this finding by the
district court was erroneous.
B. Fourth factor: the child’s programming history
Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 4(4), directs the district court to consider “the
child’s programming history, including the child’s past willingness to participate
meaningfully in available programming.” “Available programming” includes “the
child’s attendance at programming events, completion of the events, and demonstrated
behavioral changes correlated with the programming.” In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823
N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). This factor is
not limited to consideration of only formal programming in the juvenile justice system.
J.H., 844 N.W.2d at 39. Instead, “a specialized program provided either through the
juvenile justice system, or through a non-juvenile justice system setting, that is designed
to address a relevant behavioral or social need of the child may be considered by the
court in assessing a child’s programming history.” Id. Appellant argues that the district
court “abused its discretion when it failed to assign this factor any weight and then went
on to conclude that ‘all factors favor certification.”
8
Appellant is correct in pointing out that the district court erroneously concluded
that all factors favored certification when in fact it determined that this factor was
neutral. However, there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding
that this factor is neutral. Appellant’s limited programming history makes it difficult to
determine whether appellant meaningfully participated in available programming. On the
one hand, there is evidence that appellant attended two diversion hearings for his
previous adjudications of petty offenses and that he completed community work service
and sent letters of apology. On the other hand, appellant demonstrated defiant and
uncooperative behavior during his detention in the juvenile center. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that this factor is neutral.
C. Fifth and sixth factors: the adequacy of the programming available
and the dispositional options available for the child
The fifth public-safety factor involves “the adequacy of the punishment or
programming available in the juvenile justice system,” Minn. Stat. § 260B.125,
subd. 4(5), and the sixth public-safety factor considers the dispositional options available
for the child, id., subd. 4(6). The district court analyzed these two factors together3 and
concluded that they weighed in favor of certification. In doing so, the district court relied
on the psychologist’s evaluation. Because this finding is supported by the record and is
not clearly erroneous, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
these factors weigh in favor of certification.
3
These two factors are often considered together. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572
N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998).
9
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that appellant did not rebut the presumption in favor of certification by
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that public safety would be served by
retaining the proceeding in juvenile court. See id., subd. 3. The district court completed
an analysis and made written findings with respect to each factor, and expressly stated
that it gave greater weight to the seriousness of the offense. See Vang v. State, 788
N.W.2d 111, 116 (Minn. 2010) (stating that when certification is ordered, the district
court “is not required to make specific findings on each factor” and is only required to
demonstrate that it “fully investigated the matter and carefully considered its decision”).
While the district court erred by including appellant’s uncharged conduct from his
school records in its consideration of appellant’s prior criminal history, this error does not
warrant a reversal as there remain other statutory factors that weigh in favor of
certification. See N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d at 710-11 (affirming certification even though
district court erred by including juvenile’s uncharged incidents from school and
institutional records in consideration of juvenile’s prior record of delinquency). Because
the district court’s findings on four of the public-safety factors, including the seriousness
of the offense, are not clearly erroneous and favor certification, the district court properly
exercised its discretion when it certified appellant to be tried as an adult for the
aggravated robbery offenses.
II.
The parties agree that certification on the theft charge is nonpresumptive. See
Minn. Stat. § 260B.125, subd. 3. For nonpresumptive offenses, the state has the burden
10
of proving “by clear and convincing evidence that retaining the proceeding in juvenile
court does not serve public safety.” Id., subd. 2(6)(ii) (2012). Because the district court’s
determination that four of the six factors weigh in favor of certification is supported by
the record, as discussed above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it also certified appellant to be tried as an adult on the theft charge.
Affirmed.
11