People of Michigan v. Ronnie Ron Echols ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                          STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                     UNPUBLISHED
    February 13, 2018
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                    No. 335067
    Wayne Circuit Court
    RONNIE RON ECHOLS,                                   LC No. 16-003011-01-FC
    Defendant-Appellant.
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                    No. 335069
    Wayne Circuit Court
    RONNIE RON ECHOLS,                                   LC No. 16-003012-01-FC
    Defendant-Appellant.
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v                                                    No. 335178
    Wayne Circuit Court
    RONNIE RON ECHOLS,                                   LC No. 16-003010-01-FC
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SAWYER, P.J., and MURRAY and STEPHENS, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    -1-
    These consolidated appeals1 involve three cases joined for trial in the lower court.2 In
    Docket No. 335067, defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of carjacking, MCL
    750.529a, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and receiving or concealing stolen property – motor
    vehicle, MCL 750.535(7). He was sentenced to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the carjacking
    conviction, to be served consecutively to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery
    conviction, and 2 ½ to 50 years’ imprisonment for the concealing stolen property conviction. In
    Docket No. 335069, defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of armed robbery. He
    was sentenced on August 23, 2016, to 20 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the conviction. Finally,
    in Docket No. 335178, defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of armed robbery.
    He was sentenced to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment for the conviction. For the reasons stated
    herein, we affirm.
    ANALYSIS
    Appellate counsel for defendant filed a brief on appeal, and defendant filed a Standard 4
    brief raising a number of issues on his own behalf. We address all arguments below.
    I. JOINDER
    Defendant first asserts that the trial court improperly joined the three cases for trial
    because the offenses in each were not sufficiently related to justify joinder under MCR 6.120.
    Further, he argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting other-acts
    evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b).
    Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and
    decided by the trial court. People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 
    276 Mich. App. 376
    , 382; 741
    NW2d 61 (2007). And to preserve a claim of evidentiary error specifically, “a party opposing
    the admission of evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it
    asserts on appeal.” People v Aldrich, 
    246 Mich. App. 101
    , 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), citing
    MRE 103(a)(1).
    Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence for all three
    cases at each of defendant’s trials pursuant to MRE 404(b). The record contains no response
    from defendant, and at the final conference during which the trial court joined the cases for trial
    and concluded that evidence for each case would have also been admitted pursuant to MRE
    1
    People v Echols, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 19, 2016 (Docket
    Nos. 335067; 335069; 335178).
    2
    The three lower court cases against defendant arose from the robberies of three individuals in
    Detroit. Defendant was charged in separate informations for each. Prior to trial, the prosecution
    filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of all three robberies at all three trials pursuant to
    MRE 404(b). Ultimately, the trial court granted the prosecution’s request and joined the cases
    for trial.
    -2-
    404(b), defense counsel failed to object on joinder or evidentiary grounds.             Accordingly,
    defendant failed to preserve these issues for appellate review.
    When preserved for appellate review:
    Whether joinder is appropriate is a mixed question of fact and law. To determine
    whether joinder is permissible, a trial court must first find the relevant facts and
    then must decide whether those facts constitute related offenses for which joinder
    is appropriate. This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings for clear error
    and its interpretation of a court rule, which is a question of law, de novo.
    However, the ultimate decision on permissive joinder of related charges lies
    firmly within the discretion of the trial courts. [People v Gaines, 
    306 Mich. App. 289
    , 304; 856 NW2d 222 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
    And for preserved evidentiary issues, we review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for
    an abuse of discretion, and review de novo “preliminary questions of law, such as whether a rule
    of evidence precludes admissibility.” People v Chelmicki, 
    305 Mich. App. 58
    , 62; 850 NW2d 612
    (2014).
    However, unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id.;
    MRE 103(d); People v Carines, 
    460 Mich. 750
    , 763-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). A plain error
    affects substantial rights if it would have altered the outcome of the lower-court proceedings.
    People v Jones, 
    468 Mich. 345
    , 356; 662 NW2d 376 (2003). Reversal is not warranted unless
    “the plain, unpreserved error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant” or
    “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings
    independent of the defendant’s innocence.” 
    Id. at 355.
    The trial court’s decision to join for trial defendant’s three cases did not amount to plain
    error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. MCR 6.120 permits the joinder of offenses
    charged in two or more informations against a single defendant when the offenses are
    sufficiently related. MCR 6.120(B)(1). Offenses are related if they are based on the same
    conduct or transaction, a series of connected acts, or a series of acts constituting parts of a single
    scheme or plan. Id.; 
    Gaines, 306 Mich. App. at 304-305
    . “Other relevant factors include the
    timeliness of the motion, the drain on the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or
    prejudice stemming from either the number of charges or the complexity or nature of the
    evidence, the potential for harassment, the convenience of witnesses, and the parties’ readiness
    for trial.” MCR 6.120(B)(2); 
    Gaines, 306 Mich. App. at 304-305
    .
    The record supports the trial court’s determination that the offenses charged were
    sufficiently related to justify joinder because they were based on a “series of connected acts
    constituting parts of the same, single scheme.” Defendant and Clay engaged in a scheme to
    make money by robbing individuals of their belongings using weapons and the threat of
    violence, and each of the actions they took furthered this goal. From Dorel Gavrilovici, they
    stole a car which they then used to corner two more individuals over the span of a few hours in
    Detroit. They also used a weapon, either a gun or a hammer, in each of the robberies to threaten
    or inflict injury, and all of the victims reported the theft of personal items including cash, cell
    phones, and insurance cards. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s argument that joinder of the
    -3-
    offenses likely confused the jury, the evidence presented at trial cannot be considered at all
    complex. Each of the three victims testified clearly regarding the robberies committed against
    them, and in chronological order. And the jury was instructed to consider each offense
    separately, in light of all of the evidence admitted at trial. Thus, joinder was appropriate.
    However, even if the trial court did err by joining defendant’s cases for trial, the error did
    not affect the outcome of the lower court proceedings. First, as the trial court correctly
    determined, evidence of each incident would have been admissible in the other trials pursuant to
    MRE 404(b), as evidence from all three crimes demonstrated a common plan or scheme.3 See
    People v Williams, 
    483 Mich. 226
    , 243; 769 NW2d 605 (2009) (reasoning that any joinder error
    was harmless because “the evidence of each charged offense could have been introduced in the
    other trial under MRE 404(b)”). Second, any joinder error did not affect the outcome of trial
    because each victim clearly described the perpetrators’ actions, and confidently identified
    defendant. And, as mentioned above, defendant admitted to being present at each robbery.
    II. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
    Defendant next argues that the trial court violated his right of confrontation by admitting
    Detective Christopher Staton and Officer Shawn Schmelter’s testimony regarding anonymous
    tips they received after gas station surveillance video was supplied to the media.
    Again, “[t]o preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing the admission of
    evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal.”
    
    Aldrich, 246 Mich. App. at 113
    , citing MRE 103(a)(1); People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich
    App 127, 152; 854 NW2d 114 (2014). Although defendant fails to identify the specific
    testimony with which he takes issue, defense counsel did not object to either policeman’s
    testimony regarding anonymous tips.
    Generally, “[w]hether [a] defendant was denied his right of confrontation involves a
    question of constitutional law that we review de novo.” 
    Henry, 305 Mich. App. at 152
    . However,
    this Court reviews “unpreserved evidentiary error, including alleged constitutional error, for
    plain error.” People v Coy, 
    258 Mich. App. 1
    , 12; 669 NW2d 831 (2003).
    3
    The prosecution’s notice of intent to introduce other-acts evidence stated that evidence of all
    three offenses should be admitted to demonstrate a common plan and intent. And although, as
    defendant asserts, the trial court appeared to simply list, with no explanation, several of the
    proper purposes provided in MRE 404(b) when it concluded that other-acts evidence would have
    been admissible had the offenses not been joined for trial, it did state its reasoning with regard to
    common plan. Specifically, it said: “All three of these alleged incidents involved the same
    defendants, occurred within a six-hour period, occurred within miles of each other, involved a
    red Ford Mustang or what’s been described as a red sports car. All involved armed robberies for
    money and cell phones, and all involved threats to shoot or harm the victims with guns or a
    hammer.”
    -4-
    The testimony from Detective Staton and Officer Schmelter regarding anonymous tips
    did not violate defendant’s right of confrontation. Thus, defense counsel was not ineffective for
    failing to object.
    “A defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.”
    People v Chambers, 
    277 Mich. App. 1
    , 10; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), citing US Const, Am VI,
    Const 1963, art 1, § 20, and Crawford v Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 42; 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    ; 
    158 L. Ed. 2d
    177 (2004).
    The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial
    statements unless the declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a
    prior opportunity for cross-examination. A statement by a confidential informant
    to the authorities generally constitutes a testimonial statement. However, the
    Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of out-of-court testimonial statements
    for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.[4] Thus, a
    statement offered to show the effect of the out-of-court statement on the hearer
    does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, a statement offered to
    show why police officers acted as they did is not hearsay. [Id. at 10-11 (citations
    omitted).]
    In Chambers, the police released still photographs from a surveillance video to the local
    television stations, and at trial, the lead detective testified that he received a call from an FBI
    agent whose confidential informant saw the photographs and recognized the man as the
    defendant. 
    Id. at 4,
    10. But the Court held “that there was no Confrontation Clause violation
    because the out-of-court testimonial statement by the confidential informant was not admitted to
    establish or prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 
    Id. at 2-3.
    Instead, as the Court reasoned, the
    statement was offered to establish why the police conducted surveillance at the defendant’s home
    and how they effectuated the defendant’s arrest. 
    Id. at 11.
    The same is true here. On direct examination, Detective Station testified as follows:
    Q. And, Detective, did you have an opportunity or in the course of your
    investigation to determine who those two men were in that red Mustang we saw
    the video of?
    A. Yes. We aired some of the footage on local media.
    Q. In the course of your investigation?
    A. Yes.
    4
    See MRE 801(c), which provides: “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
    declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
    matter asserted.”
    -5-
    Q. Okay. And what were the identities of those two men?
    A. We received some tips it was -- the names that we were given?
    Q. Yeah.
    A. Oh, one subject was, I believe, Charles Clay. The other subject was
    Ronnie Echols.
    Officer Schmelter testified that the gas station surveillance video was released to the media, and
    that the police created photographic lineups as a result of the tips they received identifying
    defendant and Clay. Considered in context the testimony did not violate defendant’s right of
    confrontation because it was not offered to establish that defendant was one of the men in the
    video or that he committed the robberies. Rather, the testimony was offered to explain why the
    police investigation led to defendant, and why they included photographs of defendant and Clay
    in the lineups shown to Gavrilovici, Elgina Hughes, and Ronda McCalip.
    Additionally, even if the testimony violated defendant’s right of confrontation, no plain
    error occurred. All three victims identified defendant in court, and denied seeing the surveillance
    video before choosing defendant from photographic lineups. The jury viewed the video itself,
    and defendant admitted to being at all three robberies and at the gas station in the red Mustang.
    Thus, any error does not require reversal, and any objection by defense counsel would have been
    futile. People v Ericksen, 
    288 Mich. App. 192
    , 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).
    III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    In his Standard 4 brief, defense counsel raises a number of ineffective assistance of
    counsel arguments. Each argument lacks merit.
    To preserve an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, a defendant must file a motion
    for a new trial or Ginther5 hearing in the trial court to establish evidence supporting the
    argument. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 
    242 Mich. App. 656
    , 658-659; 620 NW2d 19
    (2000). Despite listing his grievances against defense counsel at sentencing, defendant failed to
    request a new trial or a Ginther hearing in the trial court. And although he raised some of these
    arguments in his motion to remand, this Court denied that motion.6 Accordingly, defendant
    failed to preserve these arguments for appellate review.
    Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact. People v
    Trakhtenberg, 
    493 Mich. 38
    , 47; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). We review a trial court’s findings of
    fact for clear error, and questions of constitutional law de novo. 
    Id. 5 People
    v Ginther, 
    390 Mich. 436
    ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
    6
    People v Echols, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 10, 2017 (Docket
    Nos. 335067; 335069; 335178).
    -6-
    A defendant must establish a factual predicate for his arguments. People v Hoag, 
    460 Mich. 1
    , 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). But when a defendant fails to preserve his arguments, our
    review is limited to the facts available in the appellate record. See 
    Sabin, 242 Mich. App. at 658
    -
    659. “If the appellate record does not support [his] assertions, he has waived the issue.” 
    Id. at 659.
    To evaluate the effective assistance of counsel, we use the standard established in
    Strickland v Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687; 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    ; 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984). 
    Hoag, 460 Mich. at 5-6
    . For a successful ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the defendant must
    show: “(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but
    for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would
    have been different.” 
    Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. at 51
    . The effective assistance of counsel is
    presumed. People v Roscoe, 
    303 Mich. App. 633
    , 644; 846 NW2d 402 (2014). Further, a
    defendant must overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s alleged actions were simply
    sound trial strategy. 
    Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. at 52
    .
    Defendant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel argument focuses on defense counsel’s
    alleged failure to properly investigate evidence he believes would have benefitted his case. But
    he fails to establish a factual predicate in support. With regard to his assertion that defense
    counsel performed deficiently by failing to file a discovery motion, defendant does not identify
    what newly-discovered evidence would have been uncovered through such a motion, or how he
    was prejudiced as a result. And the record is devoid of any support for his contention that with
    adequate investigation, defense counsel would have learned of a phone call in which one of the
    victims admitted to police interference with the victims’ identification of defendant. To the
    contrary, at trial, Gavrilovici, Hughes, and McCalip all denied that police officers influenced
    their photographic lineup choices. Further, defendant admitted to being at each of the robberies,
    so his identification was not at issue in any way.
    Defendant’s second and third ineffective assistance of counsel arguments fail for similar
    reasons. Defendant asserts that defense counsel should have called Kimberly Murry to testify
    because she heard Clay admit that, although defendant was present, he committed the robberies
    himself, and Ronald Smith because he received a phone call from Hughes “asking him for
    money for a stolen cellphone that she claimed was stolen from her by his sons friend and she’ll
    drop the fake robbery charges.” Further, he asserts that conflict with defense counsel prejudiced
    his defense. But, as plagued his first ineffective assistance argument, the record is devoid of any
    evidence regarding what Murry and Smith would have testified to, see People v Putman, 
    309 Mich. App. 240
    , 248-249; 870 NW2d 593 (2015), or any serious conflict with defense counsel.
    And defendant failed to provide record citations in support.
    Moreover, “[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or
    question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy[.]” People v Dixon, 263 Mich
    App 393, 398; 688 NW2d 308 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted; first alteration in
    original). Failing to call a witness to testify only amounts to ineffective assistance if it deprives a
    defendant of a substantial defense. 
    Id. “A substantial
    defense is one that might have made a
    difference in the outcome of trial.” People v Kelly, 
    186 Mich. App. 524
    , 526-527; 465 NW2d 569
    (1990). We fail to see how the purported testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial.
    The victims testified to defendant’s sometimes limited role in the robberies, but the jury, with
    -7-
    instructions on aiding and abetting, still voted to convict. Further, part of defense counsel’s
    strategy was to assert that defendant played a limited role in the robberies, which this Court
    should not “second-guess with the benefit of hindsight.” 
    Dixon, 263 Mich. App. at 398
    .
    For his fourth ineffective assistance argument, defendant contends that defense counsel
    attempted to sabotage his defense by deliberately, over his objections, releasing information to
    the jury that he was present at the crime scenes. However, the record directly contradicts this
    account. Defendant’s written statement, in which he admitted to being present at each robbery,
    was read into the record by the prosecution. Further, defendant explicitly endorsed defense
    counsel’s request that the court publish to the jury the entire recording of his interview with
    police. Thus, defense counsel did not perform deficiently.
    Finally, we reject defendant’s assertion that defense counsel performed deficiently by
    failing to properly impeach witnesses. The challenged questioning occurred during defense
    counsel’s cross-examination of Gavrilovici. Gavrilovici admitted that when he spoke with the
    police on March 17, he said he did not get a good look at the second perpetrator. But when
    defense counsel began to ask about his testimony at the preliminary examination, the prosecutor
    objected, arguing that the questioning amounted to improper impeachment. Following a bench
    conference to discuss the objection, defense counsel continued the questioning as follows:
    Q. Are you sure today that [defendant] is the person that you saw back on
    the day of the incident?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Okay. And each time you have been in court on -- have you been sure
    about --
    A. Yes.
    Q. -- your identification?
    A. Yes.
    Even if defense counsel performed deficiently by discontinuing her attempt to impeach
    Gavrilovici’s testimony, defendant makes no argument regarding how defense counsel’s
    deficient performance prejudiced his case. Nor does the record demonstrate that but for defense
    counsel’s performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have
    been different. 
    Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. at 51
    .
    IV. SCORING ERROR
    Next, defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly scored the guidelines. As a result,
    he argues, he is entitled to resentencing. However, defendant has failed to adequately brief this
    issue for appellate review. He only cursorily asserts that the trial court incorrectly scored the
    guidelines, with no further explanation or argument. A defendant cannot announce a position
    and leave it to this Court to rationalize the basis for his claim. People v Harris, 
    261 Mich. App. 44
    , 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). Accordingly, defendant forfeits this issue on appeal.
    -8-
    V. SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
    Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel when it refused to substitute defense counsel. Specifically, he
    asserts that he sought substitution multiple times, but the court only addressed his request once at
    sidebar, and denied substitution. But, as with his scoring error argument, defendant forfeits this
    issue for appellate review. Specifically, defendant fails to provide a record citation for his
    substitution request or the trial court’s denial, and we could find no record support for his
    assertions. An appellant “may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to sustain or
    reject his position.” People v Traylor, 
    245 Mich. App. 460
    , 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    VI. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR
    Defendant next argues that by telling the jury, during closing arguments, to do its job and
    return with a guilty verdict, the prosecutor made an impermissible civic duty argument.
    Accordingly, he contends, he is entitled to a new trial.
    To preserve a claim of prosecutorial error,7 a defendant must contemporaneously object
    to the alleged misconduct and ask for a curative instruction. People v Bennett, 
    290 Mich. App. 465
    , 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). If a defendant fails to timely and specifically object below,
    review is generally precluded “ ‘except when an objection could not have cured the error, or a
    failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” People v Unger, 278 Mich
    App 210, 234-235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), quoting People v Callon, 
    256 Mich. App. 312
    , 329;
    662 NW2d 501 (2003). Defendant failed to object to the statement during closing argument that
    he now challenges on appeal. Thus, defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
    “[T]he test for prosecutorial [error] is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial
    trial.” People v Dobek, 
    274 Mich. App. 58
    , 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). This Court “consider[s]
    issues of prosecutorial [error] on a case-by-case basis by examining the record and evaluating the
    remarks in context, and in light of defendant’s arguments.” People v Thomas, 
    260 Mich. App. 450
    , 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
    During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “I’m asking you now to do your job and
    to apply all of the evidence, everything that has been admitted. I want you to remember your
    collective memory as to the testimony that was given and how they testified and the way that
    they testified. I want you to apply all of that, all of these exhibits, all of the evidence to the
    charges filed, and I’m asking, do your job and come back with a verdict of guilty as charged on
    all these counts.” Prosecutorial error occurs “when [the prosecutor] invites jurors to suspend
    their powers of judgment and decide the case on the basis of sympathy or civic duty.” People v
    7
    We note that in People v Cooper, 
    309 Mich. App. 74
    , 87-88; 867 NW2d 452 (2015), this Court
    explained that the accurate label for most prosecutorial misconduct claims is prosecutorial error,
    because only the most extreme cases rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.
    -9-
    Lane, 
    308 Mich. App. 38
    , 66; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). Considering the prosecutor’s statement in
    context, defendant has not established that it amounted to plain error affecting his substantial
    rights, because the prosecutor asked the jury to decide the case on the basis of the evidence
    presented against defendant, not sympathy or civic duty.
    Moreover, curative instructions will cure most inappropriate prosecutorial statements,
    and the trial court instructed the jury that it must decide the case based on the evidence, and that
    the lawyer’s closing arguments do not constitute evidence.
    VII. RETALIATORY SENTENCING
    Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court and prosecutor engaged in retaliatory
    sentencing because he did not take the plea deal offered before trial.
    “A sentencing court cannot base its sentence on a defendant's decision to exercise his
    constitutional right to a jury trial.” People v Brown, 
    294 Mich. App. 377
    , 389; 811 NW2d 531
    (2011). We review constitutional issues de novo. People v Duenaz, 
    306 Mich. App. 85
    , 90; 854
    NW2d 531 (2014).
    We conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court engaged in
    retaliatory sentencing. “[N]o accused person should face the dilemma of either waiving trial or
    facing retaliatory sentencing as a consequence of insisting on a trial. This Court has previously
    held that when a court determines a defendant’s sentence, it may not properly consider the
    latter’s refusal to plead guilty[.]” People v Atkinson, 
    125 Mich. App. 516
    , 518; 336 NW2d 41
    (1983) (citation omitted). There is no indication in the record that the court held defendant’s
    refusal to take a plea and decision to proceed to trial against him. In fact, at sentencing, when the
    court spoke with the parties about the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for habitual
    offenders, defendant agreed that defense counsel explained it to him prior to trial and during plea
    negotiations.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ David H. Sawyer
    /s/ Christopher M. Murray
    /s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
    -10-