NORTH BRUNSWICK TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. KIMBERLY HARRINGTON (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3415-16T1
    NORTH BRUNSWICK TOWNSHIP
    BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEW
    BRUNSWICK BOARD OF EDUCATION,
    and PISCATAWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD
    OF EDUCATION,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    v.
    KIMBERLY HARRINGTON, ACTING
    COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION,
    NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF
    EDUCATION and CENTRAL JERSEY
    COLLEGE PREP CHARTER SCHOOL,
    Respondents-Respondents.
    ____________________________________
    Argued May 30, 2019 – Decided June 7, 2019
    Before Judges Haas, Sumners and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Education.
    David B. Rubin argued the cause for appellants (David
    B. Rubin, PC, and The Busch Law Group, LLC,
    attorneys; David B. Rubin and Douglas M. Silvestro,
    on the briefs).
    Brenda C. Liss argued the cause for respondent Central
    Jersey College Prep Charter School (Riker Danzig
    Scherer Hyland & Perretti, LLP, attorneys; Brenda C.
    Liss, of counsel and on the brief; Stephen M. Turner,
    on the brief).
    Geoffrey N. Stark, Deputy Attorney General, argued
    the cause for respondent Commissioner of Education
    (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa
    Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
    counsel; James M. Esposito, Deputy Attorney General,
    on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellants North Brunswick Township Board of Education (North
    Brunswick), New Brunswick Board of Education (New Brunswick), and
    Piscataway    Township    Board   of   Education   (Piscataway)   (collectively
    appellants), appeal from the February 28, 2017 final decision of the
    Commissioner of Education (Commissioner), approving an application by
    Central Jersey College Prep Charter School (CJCP) to amend its charter to
    increase its enrollment, add a satellite campus, and move its Somerset campus
    to a new facility.1 We affirm.
    1
    Calendared back-to-back with this appeal, Franklin Township Board of
    Education (Franklin) separately appealed from this same decision. In re
    Approval of Charter Amendment of Cent. Jersey Coll. Prep (Central Jersey),
    No. A-3074-16. Two other appeals from final decisions by the Commissioner
    A-3415-16T1
    2
    I.
    The procedural history and facts of this case are fully set forth in our
    decision today in Central Jersey and, to avoid repetition, we incorporate that
    discussion here. Therefore, we need only recite the most salient facts in this
    opinion.
    At the time of this appeal, there were five charter schools operating in
    Middlesex and Somerset Counties: CJCP and Thomas Edison EnergySmart
    Charter School (TEECS) in Franklin Township; Hatikvah International
    Academy Charter School (Hatikvah) in East Brunswick; Greater Brunswick
    Charter School in New Brunswick; and the Academy for Urban Leadership
    Charter School in Perth Amboy. A sixth school, Ailanthus Charter School, had
    received approval to begin operation in Franklin Township for the 2018 -2019
    school year. See In re Ailanthus Charter Sch., No. A-0945-16 (App. Div. May
    11, 2018). No charter schools were located in Piscataway.
    As discussed in detail in Central Jersey, on December 1, 2016, CJCP
    submitted a charter amendment application to the Department seeking to: 1)
    are also calendared back-to-back with this appeal. Highland Park Bd. of Educ.
    v. Harrington (Highland Park II), No. A-3455-16; Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of
    Piscataway v. N.J. Dep't of Educ. (Piscataway), No. A-5427-16. Because of this
    overlap, the reader is encouraged to review all four of our opinions in these
    cases, which are being released simultaneously.
    A-3415-16T1
    3
    expand its maximum enrollment from 624 to 1320 students by the 2019 -2020
    school year; 2) add a satellite campus in New Brunswick (within its region of
    residence) by the 2019-2020 school year; and 3) relocate its current facility to a
    new facility on Mettlers Road in Somerset.
    On January 13, 2017, Franklin Township Board of Education (Franklin)
    submitted a letter, also discussed in detail in Central Jersey, to the Commissioner
    asking her to deny CJCP's application. In January and February 2017, appellants
    North Brunswick and Piscataway passed almost identical resolutions for a
    general moratorium on new charter school seats in Middlesex and Somerset
    Counties. They asserted that the Charter School Program Act of 1995, N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-1 to -18 (Charter School Act or CSPA), "requires that the districts of
    residence pay the charter schools for each student from their respective
    communities enrolled in those schools, thereby draining funds and diminishing
    money available to serve students in the traditional public schools."
    Further, North Brunswick and Piscataway stated that the New Jersey
    Department of Education (Department or NJDOE) "has interpreted the Act to
    require all public schools statewide to pay charter schools for students enrolled
    in those schools regardless as to whether the charter serves that district's
    community as part of the charter's approved district or region of residence."
    A-3415-16T1
    4
    They also alleged that Hatikvah and TEECS, but not CJCP, enrolled a
    "significantly more segregated student body than any of the resident or non -
    resident sending districts with respect to race, socioeconomic status and need
    for special education."
    By letter dated February 21, 2017, appellant New Brunswick also asked
    the Commissioner to deny CJCP's, TEECS's and Hatikvah's applications to
    expand their enrollment. It maintained that in "direct contradiction to the letter
    and spirit" of the CSPA, "many charter schools are seeking to expand in order
    to enroll additional students from districts outside of the charter schools'
    approved districts or regions of residence due to a lack of interest from students
    who live in the very communities for which the charters were created to serve."
    It claimed that "[a]ny increase in charter school seats will have a negative impact
    on public school district funding, with the proposed 128% increase in such seats
    in Middlesex and Somerset Counties likely to lead to drastic and debilitating
    cuts throughout the public school districts in those counties."
    New Brunswick also noted that other entities had filed civil rights
    complaints against two charter schools in Franklin Township (presumably
    referring to CJCP and TEECS) alleging that the demographics of the charter
    schools did not reflect the demographics of the local school district. It similarly
    A-3415-16T1
    5
    alleged that Hatikvah and TEECS, but not CJCP, enrolled a "significantly more
    segregated student body than any of the resident or non-resident sending districts
    with respect to race, socioeconomic status and need for special education ."
    On February 28, 2017, the Commissioner granted CJCP's application to
    amend its charter based on her review of the record. In her written decision, the
    Commissioner noted that the Department had "completed a comprehensive
    review including, but not limited to, student performance on statewide
    assessments, operational stability, fiscal viability, public comment, fiscal impact
    on sending districts, and other information in order to make a decision regarding
    the school's amendment request." The Commissioner confirmed the school's
    maximum enrollment for the "approved region of residence of Franklin, New
    and North Brunswick," as follows:
    Grade          2017-2018        2018-2019       2019-2020
    Kindergarten         72               96               96
    Grade 1            72               96               96
    Grade 2            72               96               96
    Grade 3            48               72               96
    Grade 4                             48               72
    Grade 5                                              48
    Grade 6             72             168              168
    Grade 7             48             144              168
    Grade 8             48              48              144
    Grade 9             48             120              120
    Grade 10             48              48              120
    Grade 11             48              48               48
    Grade 12             48              48               48
    Total             624             1032            1320
    A-3415-16T1
    6
    The Commissioner also confirmed the new site location at Mettlers Road,
    and directed CJCP to "provide all facility related documents to the Office of
    Charter and Renaissance Schools and the Somerset County Office of
    Education." Further, the Commissioner directed that once CJCP had identified
    the final site of the satellite campus, it should provide the Department with the
    required amended documentation pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6. This appeal
    followed.
    On appeal, appellants raise the following contentions:
    POINT I
    The Commissioner Failed To Analyze CJCP's
    Application Or To Disclose The Basis For Her
    Approval.
    POINT II
    The Commissioner Failed To Consider The Segregative
    Impact of CJCP's Charter Amendment.
    POINT III
    Other Significant Deficiencies [I]n CJCP's Application
    Render The Commissioner's Approval Arbitrary,
    Capricious And Unreasonable.
    POINT IV
    There Is No Authority To Compel Piscataway To Fund
    Students' Attendance [A]t CJCP.
    A-3415-16T1
    7
    II.
    In Point I, appellants argue that the Commissioner's decision approving
    CJCP's application for an amendment of its charter was arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable because she failed to analyze CJCP's application to amend , or
    provide any reason for the approval. We disagree.
    As a threshold matter, CJCP argues that the appeal filed by Piscataway
    (but not New Brunswick's and North Brunswick's appeals) must be dismissed
    because Piscataway, as a non-resident district, lacks standing to pursue it.
    However, in our decision today in Highland Park II, we held that Piscataway
    had standing to challenge the Commissioner's decision to grant Hatikvah's
    application for an amendment to its charter. We discern no basis for reaching a
    different conclusion in this case where Piscataway seeks to challenge CJCP's
    similar application in the same county. Because we reject CJCP's standing
    argument for the reasons expressed in Highland II, we do not discuss this
    contention further here. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Turning to the merits of appellants' contentions concerning the sufficiency
    of the Commissioner's decision, charter schools are public schools that operate
    under a charter granted by the Commissioner, operate independently of a local
    board of education, and are managed by a board of trustees. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-
    A-3415-16T1
    8
    3(a).2 Applications to establish a charter school are governed by N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-4 and -5, and the implementing regulation, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1. The
    Commissioner has final authority to grant or reject a charter. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-
    4(c). "The notification to eligible applicants not approved as charter schools
    shall include reasons for the denials." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(f) (emphasis added).
    Applications to renew a charter are governed by N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-17,
    and the implementing regulation, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.3. The Commissioner shall
    grant or deny the renewal of a charter based upon a comprehensive review of
    the school, including, among other things, the annual reports, recommendation
    of the district board of education or school superintendent, and student
    performance on statewide tests. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.3(b). "The notification to a
    charter school that is not granted a renewal shall include reasons for the denial."
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.3(d) (emphasis added).
    At issue here, a charter school can also apply to the Commissioner for an
    amendment to its charter. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6. A charter school can seek, as in
    this case, an expansion of enrollment and the establishment of a satellite campus.
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(a)(1)(i), (iv). Similar to the initial approval process, boards
    of education in the district of residence can submit comments in response to the
    2
    We discuss the CSPA in more detail in our decision in Highland Park II.
    A-3415-16T1
    9
    application for amendment. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(c).
    "The Commissioner may approve or deny amendment requests of charter
    schools and shall notify charter schools of decisions.         If approved, the
    amendment becomes effective immediately unless a different effective date is
    established by the Commissioner." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(d). In determining
    whether the amendments are eligible for approval, the Department "shall
    evaluate the amendments" based on the CSPA and the implementing regulations,
    and the Commissioner "shall review a charter school's performance data. . . ."
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(b). A school's performance data is reflected in the school's
    Academic Performance Framework report.              N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2.       The
    Performance Framework consists of three sections: academic, financial , and
    organizational. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2. A charter school’s performance on the
    academic section carries the most weight. That component includes measures
    of student growth, achievement, graduation rate, and attendance.         N.J.A.C.
    6A:11-1.2.
    On appeal, this court may reverse the Commissioner's decision on a
    charter school application only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."
    In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 
    216 N.J. 370
    , 385 (2013). In making that determination, our review is generally restricted
    A-3415-16T1
    10
    to three inquiries:
    (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
    implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
    follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
    substantial evidence to support the findings on which
    the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
    the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
    erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
    have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
    [Id. at 385-86 (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 
    143 N.J. 22
    , 25 (1995)).]
    "[T]he arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard . . . subsumes the
    need to find sufficient support in the record to sustain the decision reached by
    the Commissioner." Id. at 386. "[A] failure to consider all the evidence in a
    record would perforce lead to arbitrary decision making." Ibid. However, in
    cases where "the Commissioner is not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity," and
    is instead acting in [her] legislative capacity, as [s]he was doing here, [s]he
    "need not provide the kind of formalized findings and conclusions necessary in
    the traditional contested case." TEAM Acad., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at
    30) (quoting In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on the
    Palisades Charter Sch., 
    320 N.J. Super. 174
    , 217 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd as
    modified, 
    164 N.J. 316
     (2000)).
    Thus, although the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard
    A-3415-16T1
    11
    demands "that the reasons for the decision be discernible, the reasons need not
    be as detailed or formalized as an agency adjudication of disputed facts; they
    need only be inferable from the record considered by the agency." Englewood,
    
    320 N.J. Super. at 217
    . See Red Bank, 367 N.J. Super. at 476 (reasons need not
    be detailed or formalized, but must be discernible from the record); Bd. of Educ.
    of E. Windsor Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 
    172 N.J. Super. 547
    , 552
    (App. Div. 1980) (detailed findings of fact not required by Commissioner in
    reducing amount school board sought to increase its budget).
    There is also no statutory or regulatory provision requiring the
    Commissioner to include reasons for granting an application to amend. The
    regulations provide only that the notification "shall include reasons for the
    denial[]" of an initial charter school application, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(f), and an
    application for renewal, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.3(d).       The Commissioner does
    however, take comments regarding the amendment into consideration when
    rendering a final decision. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(c).
    To that end, Quest Academy, 216 N.J. at 390, as cited by appellants, is
    distinguishable. In that case, the operator of a proposed charter school appealed
    from the Commissioner's decision denying the charter.          Id. at 373.   The
    Commissioner's initial decision was "short on detail with respect to the
    A-3415-16T1
    12
    application's deficiencies." Ibid. However, after the appeal was filed, the
    Commissioner submitted a written amplification of his reasons for denying the
    application. Id. at 374. The Court affirmed, finding in relevant part that:
    Although the letter of denial did not detail the
    deficiencies found in the application, it offered instead
    a face-to-face meeting to review in detail the
    shortcomings in the application that Quest Academy
    submitted. According to the Commissioner, the large
    number of applicants (forty-five) who were reviewed in
    the batch with Quest Academy rendered lengthy written
    responses difficult and taxing of precious departmental
    resources. While it would be naturally preferable from
    the applicant's perspective to receive initially more than
    a generic form letter denying an application, here Quest
    Academy received a bit more than that. Some
    information about the application's shortcomings was
    provided in the denial letter, and the subsequent
    amplification fully detailed those issues. In reviewing
    as complex a proposal as that required for a newly
    proposed charter school, there is a benefit to offering a
    discussion, instead of a written cataloguing, of mistakes
    or deficiencies in the application that has been rejected.
    We do not fault the Commissioner for choosing a
    dialogue involving constructive criticism as her
    preferred approach for producing approvable
    applications when resubmitted.
    [Id. at 390.]
    As we discussed in our decisions in Highland Park II and Central Jersey,
    Quest Academy is distinguishable because there is no requirement that the
    Commissioner detail her findings in approving an amendment. See also TEAM
    A-3415-16T1
    13
    Acad., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 40). Instead, the focus on review is
    whether the reasons for the Commissioner's decision are clearly discernible from
    the record. Red Bank, 367 N.J. Super. at 476.
    Here, the record supports the Commissioner's decision approving CJCP's
    request to amend its charter.     Most notably, it is undisputed that CJCP's
    performance data, a significant factor in assessing a request to amend a charter,
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(b), was, as represented by its students' PARCC scores,
    significantly higher than the State average. It was also undisputed that CJCP is
    a high-performing, Tier 1 school, a ranking it received from the Department's
    assessment of its academic performance based on the metrics set forth in the
    State's Academic Performance Framework governing charter schools. N.J.A.C.
    6A:11-1.2; N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.3(b).
    Further, the record shows that CJCP, which has been submitting detailed
    annual reports to the Commissioner since it was approved to operate in 2006,
    and had submitted financial audits prior to having its charter renewed, was
    organizationally sound and fiscally viable. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-16(b); N.J.A.C.
    6A:11-2.2. As discussed more fully in Central Jersey, there was also a need for
    the increase in enrollment because there were 628 students on its waiting list
    and there was a "heavy demand from the community" to enroll in the charter
    A-3415-16T1
    14
    school. Adding a satellite campus in New Brunswick would further allow for
    the "accessibility and replication" of CJCP's existing model to service that high-
    needs community.      Lastly, the Commissioner approved CJCP's request to
    expand enrollment with the understanding that facilities would need to be
    identified, secured, and potentially improved to comply with the charter
    regulations.
    Therefore, we again conclude that the Commissioner's decision to
    approve CJCP's application was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
    because it promoted the legislative policy of developing charter schools and was
    supported by the record. Therefore, we reject appellants' contentions on this
    point.
    III.
    In Point II, appellants argue that the Commissioner's decision was
    arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because she failed to consider the alleged
    segregative impact of CJCP's charter amendment on the district. Franklin raised
    this identical issue in Central Jersey, in its appeal from the same February 28,
    2017 decision involved in the present appeal. For the reasons set forth in our
    decision in Central Jersey, we reject appellants' similar contention in this
    companion appeal, and add the following comments addressing appellants'
    A-3415-16T1
    15
    specific arguments concerning this issue. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Appellants argue that CJCP's demographics do not reflect a cross section
    of the community's school age population. They contend that CJCP over-
    enrolled Asian students and under-enrolled Hispanic students, economically
    disadvantaged students (defined as students receiving free or reduced cost
    lunch), ELL students, and special needs students, when compared to the
    populations in the Franklin, North Brunswick, and New Brunswick school
    districts.
    Before the Commissioner, however, appellants only asserted that
    Hatikvah and TEECS, but not CJCP, enrolled a "significantly more segregated
    student body than any of the resident or non-resident sending districts with
    respect to race, socioeconomic status and need for special education." Further,
    Franklin only asserted that CJCP had a "poor track record" with ELL students,
    and presented no evidence to the Commissioner regarding the racial and
    economic segregative effects of CJCP's increased enrollment.
    Appellants argue that the Commissioner's decision granting the expansion
    of enrollment is arbitrary and capricious because "there is nothing discernable"
    in either her decision or the record to suggest that she considered its assertions
    that CJCP enrolled a significantly more segregated student body than any of the
    A-3415-16T1
    16
    resident or non-resident school districts. However, as set forth above and in our
    decision in Central Jersey, the Commissioner was not required to include
    reasons for granting the application to amend the charter. See Red Bank, 367
    N.J. Super. at 476 (Commissioner did not specifically address the segregation
    argument in his letter approving the Charter School's renewal and expansion).
    Nor did appellants present to the Commissioner sufficient evidence of a
    segregative effect to warrant more in-depth scrutiny. Id. at 472-85.
    Further, appellants' unsubstantiated generalized protests regarding the
    segregative effect of CJCP's application to increase enrollment did not provide
    a basis to deny the application.    Ibid. It is undisputed that CJCP accepts
    applications from all interested students and operates a publicly held random
    lottery process that blindly accepts a certain number of applicants to fill
    available seats per grade. CJCP does not collect any information at the time of
    the application from the applicants regarding students' socioeconomic and ethnic
    background, disability status, and English language skills.
    Nonetheless, on appeal, appellants submitted school enrollment and
    census data for Franklin, North Brunswick, and New Brunswick school districts,
    which it contends for the first time shows that CJCP is becoming increasingly
    segregated and does not reflect the demographics of the local community:
    A-3415-16T1
    17
    Asian Students                School Year 2010-2011    School Year 2016-2017
    Franklin Township                     20%                      16%
    New Brunswick                         ≤1%                      ≤1%
    North Brunswick                       28%                      25%
    CJCP                                   3%                      38%
    District      or Hispanic        Free        or LEP3 Students   Students with
    School           Students        Reduced        2016-2017       Special Needs
    2016-2017       Lunch                          2016-2017
    Students
    2016-2017
    Franklin            31%          48%             8%             19%
    New Brunswick       89%          60%             19%            17%
    North Brunswick     32%          41%             4%             15%
    CJCP                18%          24%             0%             7%
    Appellants argue that the "collective weight of this data is prima facie proof that
    CJCP does not reflect 'a cross section of the community's school age population
    including racial and academic factors'" (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8).
    However, on appeal, the Commissioner stated that she had analyzed the
    potential impact CJCP's expansion would have on racial demographics within
    the District by reviewing enrollment trends in New Brunswick and North
    Brunswick, and determined that the student demographics have stayed relatively
    static over the past few years:
    Students          North          North           New            New
    Pre-K to 12       Brunswick      Brunswick       Brunswick      Brunswick
    2010-2011      2016-2017       2010-2011      2016-2017
    White             26.8%          18.8%           1.1%           0.8%
    Black             20.0%          21.3%           15.1%          9.7%
    Asian             28.7%          25.1%           0.8%           0.4%
    Hispanic          24.0%          32.5%           82.6%          88.8%
    3
    Limited English proficiency students.
    A-3415-16T1
    18
    LEP             3.9%            4.4%             16.3%           18.7%
    Special needs   14.4%           15%              9.3%            16.8%
    Free or reduced 29.4%           41.1%            79.5%           59.7%
    lunch
    Thus, even if appellants had presented the information about student
    enrollment and district demographics to the Commissioner prior to her February
    28, 2017 decision, it would not have provided a basis to reject the application.
    The data provided above shows some disparity between the enrollment of Asian,
    Hispanic, LEP, special needs, and economically disadvantaged students and the
    students in the population in North Brunswick and New Brunswick.
    Significantly, however, appellants do not argue that the school districts are
    becoming more segregated and in fact, the data submitted by the Commissioner
    indicates that they have not. See Bd. of Educ. of Hoboken v. N.J. State Dep't of
    Educ., No. A-3690-14 (App. Div. June 29, 2017) (slip op. at 15) (affirmed
    charter renewal where there were no allegations that the charter school's
    practices after the enrollment of students by an impartial lottery exacerbated the
    racial or ethnic balance).
    A comparison of the demographic data indicates that CJCP enrolled a
    diverse student population. Moreover, CJCP maintained that the expansion and
    the operation of a satellite campus in New Brunswick would allow it to develop
    an even more diverse student population. To that end, appellants have not
    A-3415-16T1
    19
    presented any evidence that the District was becoming more segregated, or that
    CJCP's existence has worsened the existing racial imbalance. See ibid.4
    Finally, we note, as we did in our decision in Central Jersey, that it is
    undisputed that the Commissioner considered the segregative effect of the
    charter school in approving CJCP's charter in 2006, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(j), in
    renewing its application, N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.3(b)(8), and on an annual basis,
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.2(c). There is no indication in this record that there was any
    challenge based on the segregative effect, nor was there any indication in this
    record that the Commissioner found a segregative effect during the annual
    review. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.2(c).
    Because appellants did not provide sufficient evidence of a segregative
    effect to warrant either more detailed scrutiny or the denial of the application,
    we reject their contention that the Commissioner's decision was arbitrary,
    capricious, and unreasonable.
    4
    As discussed in our decision today in Central Jersey, this matter is
    distinguishable from Red Bank, 367 N.J. Super. at 462, and two other cases
    specifically cited by appellants, In re Petition for Authorization to Conduct a
    Referendum on Withdrawal of N. Haledon Sch. Dist. from Passaic Cty.
    Manchester Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 
    181 N.J. 161
    , 183 (2004), Bd. of Educ. of
    Englewood Cliffs v. Bd. of Educ. of Englewood, 
    257 N.J. Super. 413
    , 459-65
    (App. Div. 1992), aff'd, 
    132 N.J. 327
    , cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 991
     (1993).
    Because we discuss these cases in detail in Central Jersey, we need not repeat
    that discussion again here. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    A-3415-16T1
    20
    IV.
    Turning to Point III, appellants argue that the Commissioner's decision
    approving the amendment was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because
    she failed to consider "significant deficiencies in CJCP's application."
    Specifically they argue that the Commissioner failed to consider:         1) the
    financial burden of the expansion on the sending districts; 2) the lack of
    sufficient demand for the increased enrollment in the region of residence; 3) the
    lack of interest for a satellite campus; 4) that CJCP's staffing plan was
    unrealistic; and 5) that the proposed location of the Somerset campus was
    unsuitable for a school. Franklin raised some of these same arguments in Central
    Jersey, and we rejected them. We reach the same conclusion here and also
    address appellants' slightly different presentations on these issues.
    First, appellants argue that the Commissioner failed to consider the
    financial burden of the expansion on the sending districts.         However, the
    Commissioner relied on the Department's "comprehensive review," which
    included the "fiscal impact on sending districts." Moreover, appellants did not
    "demonstrate[] with some specificity that the constitutional requirements of a
    thorough and efficient education would be jeopardized by [the district's] loss"
    of the funds to be allocated to a charter school. Quest Acad., 216 N.J. at 377-
    A-3415-16T1
    21
    78 (quoting Englewood, 
    164 N.J. at 334-35
    ). Nor did they account for the fact
    that although appellants have to pay CJCP 90% of certain student funding
    categories, they retain 10%—an amount designed to respond to concerns about
    the loss of funding to the District. Englewood, 
    164 N.J. at 333
    ; N.J.S.A. 18:36A-
    12(b). Thus, the Commissioner was not "obligated to evaluate carefully the
    impact that loss of funds would have on the ability of the district of residence to
    deliver a thorough and efficient education." 
    Ibid.
    Second, appellants contend that the Commissioner failed to consider the
    lack of demand in the region of residence for the increased enrollment, as
    represented by its acceptance of non-resident students. However, as set forth in
    our decision in Central Jersey, CJCP had 628 students on its waiting list at the
    time of the application, and anticipated that approximately 94% of its students
    would reside in its region of residence in the 2017-2018 school year, and 100%
    by the 2018-2019 school year. Therefore, we reject appellants' contention.
    Third, appellants contend that CJCP's "justification for opening a satellite
    campus in New Brunswick is baffling." However, a charter school can seek an
    amendment to open a new satellite campus. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(a)(1)(iv). See
    Educ. Law Ctr. ex rel. Burke v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 
    438 N.J. Super. 108
    ,
    112 (App. Div. 2014) (affirmed State Board's action in adopting regulations
    A-3415-16T1
    22
    allowing satellite campuses). A satellite campus is defined as "a school facility
    operated by a charter school that is in addition to the facility identified in the
    charter school application or charter, if subsequently amended."         N.J.A.C.
    6A:11-1.2. "A charter school may operate more than one satellite campus in its
    district or region of residence, subject to charter amendment approval, pursuant
    to N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-4.15(b).
    The Department evaluates whether amendments are eligible for approval
    based on the CSPA. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(b). Under the CSPA, a school must
    include information showing a "[d]emonstration of need" in its initial
    application for a charter. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(b)(2)(vi). As addressed in Central
    Jersey, CJCP presented a detailed rationale for the addition of a satellite
    campus—a record that amply supports the Commissioner's decision. Notably,
    CJCP set forth that New Brunswick's high percentage of economically
    disadvantaged students (86% (high school) and 93% (middle school)), would
    benefit from easier access to CJCP. It also cited to a study that "emphasize[d]
    the importance of residential proximity for charter schools to be a real option
    for all parents."
    CJCP further demonstrated need because even though CJCP received
    fewer applications than expected from New Brunswick students in 2016-2017,
    A-3415-16T1
    23
    it still received double the number of applications from 2015-2016, and seventy-
    seven of the ninety-three students were placed on the waiting list. It also
    represented that the total number of applications had dramatically increased over
    the past few years (465 for the 2014-2015 school year and 956 for the 2016-
    2017 school year), and that at the time of the application, there were 628 students
    on its waiting list. Therefore, appellants' contrary contention lacks merit.
    Fourth, appellants argue that the Commissioner failed to address its
    concern as to the insufficiency of its staffing budget. However, as set forth in
    Central Jersey, there is no indication in this record that CJCP proposed to pay
    its teachers less than the amount required under the CSPA. In this regard,
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-14(b) provides that "[a] charter school shall not set a teacher
    salary lower than the minimum teacher salary specified pursuant to section 7 of
    P.L.1985, c.321 (C.18A:29-5.6) nor higher than the highest step in the salary
    guide in the collective bargaining agreement which is in effect in the district in
    which the charter school is located." See also 34 N.J.R. 2920(a) (Aug. 19, 2002)
    ("Charter schools pay their teachers and professional staff not less than the State
    minimum salary nor more than the salaries of the district boards of education in
    which the charter schools are located.").
    Lastly, appellants argue that the Commissioner ignored serious safety
    A-3415-16T1
    24
    concerns about the Mettlers Road location. However, prior to opening the new
    campus, CJCP must submit to the NJDOE the new lease, mortgage, or title to
    the facility, a valid certificate of occupancy for educational use issued by the
    local municipal enforcing official, a sanitary inspection report with a
    satisfactory rating, and a fire inspection certificate with an "Ae" (education)
    code life hazard. N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.1(i)(6)-(9). The regulations are designed to
    ensure that facilities are safe for students.
    Thus, none of the issues raised by appellants in this section of their brief
    present a basis for disturbing the Commissioner's decision.
    V.
    Finally, appellants argue in Point IV, as the challengers unsuccessfully
    did with respect to Hatikvah in Highland Park II and Piscataway, that there is
    no statutory authority under the CSPA to obligate Piscataway to fund its
    students' attendance at CJCP and thus, the Commissioner's decision was
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable because it violated express or implied
    legislative policies. They contend that N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b) explicitly limits
    financial responsibility for students' attendance at charter schools to the "school
    district of residence," which they interpret to mean the district where the charter
    school is located, or at most, the contiguous districts identified in the school's
    A-3415-16T1
    25
    approved "region of residence."
    Unlike New Brunswick and North Brunswick, Piscataway is not included
    in CJCP's district or region of residence. Thus, appellants argue that since the
    Commissioner's approval of the expansion was based in part on the presumed
    ongoing flow of revenue from Piscataway, it was inherently arbitrary and should
    be vacated. This contention continues to lack merit. Nevertheless, we fully
    address it here.
    Appellants in their resolutions calling for a moratorium on all new charter
    school seats in Middlesex and Somerset Counties only generally claimed that
    the Department had interpreted the CSPA "to require all public school districts
    statewide to pay charter schools for students enrolled in those schools regardless
    as to whether the charter serves the district's community as part of the charter's
    approved district or region of residence." Thus, the Commissioner did not
    address this issue in approving CJCP's application to amend its charter.
    The scope of judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner is
    limited. Quest Acad., 216 N.J. at 385. Although the Appellate Division is not
    bound by an agency's determination on a question of law, Hargrove v. Sleepy's,
    LLC, 
    220 N.J. 289
    , 301 (2015), "[c]ourts afford an agency 'great deference' in
    reviewing its 'interpretation of statutes within its scope of authority and its
    A-3415-16T1
    26
    adoption of rules implementing' the laws for which it is responsible." N.J. Ass'n
    of Sch. Adm'rs v. Schundler, 
    211 N.J. 535
    , 549 (2012) (quoting N.J. Soc'y for
    Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 
    196 N.J. 366
    , 385
    (2008)).
    "[T]he goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the
    Legislature's intent." Cashin v. Bello, 
    223 N.J. 328
    , 335 (2015). "[T]he best
    indicator of that intent is the statutory language." DiProspero v. Penn, 
    183 N.J. 477
    , 492 (2005).        "Accordingly, '[t]he starting point of all statutory
    interpretation must be the language used in the enactment.'" Spade v. Select
    Comfort Corp., 
    232 N.J. 504
    , 515 (2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
    Permanency v. Y.N., 
    220 N.J. 165
    , 178 (2014)). Courts "construe the words of
    a statute 'in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation
    as a whole.'" Spade, 232 N.J. at 515 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp.
    of Lyndhurst, 
    229 N.J. 541
    , 570 (2017)). If the plain language leads to a clear
    and unambiguous result, then the court's "interpretative process is over."
    Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 
    226 N.J. 370
    , 386 (2016). Courts "turn to
    extrinsic tools to discern legislative intent . . . only when the statute is
    ambiguous, the plain language leads to a result inconsistent with any legitimate
    public policy objective, or it is at odds with a general statutory scheme." Shelton
    A-3415-16T1
    27
    v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 
    214 N.J. 419
    , 429 (2013).
    At issue here, as it was in Highland Park II, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b)
    provides that:
    The school district of residence shall pay directly to the
    charter school for each student enrolled in the charter
    school who resides in the district an amount equal to
    90% of the sum of the budget year equalization aid per
    pupil, the prebudget year general fund tax levy per
    pupil inflated by the CPI rate most recent to the
    calculation, and the employer payroll tax per pupil that
    is transferred to the school district pursuant to
    subsection d. of section 1 of P.L.2018, c.68. In
    addition, the school district of residence shall pay
    directly to the charter school the security categorical
    aid attributable to the student and a percentage of the
    district’s special education categorical aid equal to the
    percentage of the district’s special education students
    enrolled in the charter school and, if applicable, 100%
    of preschool education aid. The district of residence
    shall also pay directly to the charter school any federal
    funds attributable to the student.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    The term "school district of residence" is not defined in the CSPA or the
    implementing regulations. The term "district of residence" is defined in the
    regulations as "the school district in which a charter school facility is physically
    located; if a charter school is approved with a region of residence comprised of
    contiguous school districts, that region is the charter school's district of
    A-3415-16T1
    28
    residence." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2; N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1.5 A school district does
    not, however, reside in a district, it is located in a district. Moreover, the district
    of residence where the charter school is located does not receive equalization
    aid, security categorical aid, or federal funds "attributable" to a charter student
    who is not a resident of that district. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -63 (SFRA).
    Thus, it would make no sense to interpret "school district of residence" to mean
    the "district of residence." N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b).
    In fact, the State Board of Education promulgated N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2
    and -15.3, which as discussed in more detail in our decision in Piscataway,
    require both a "district of residence" and a "non-resident district" to fund its
    students' attendance at a charter school. However, appellants argue that under
    N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 and -15.3, a "non-resident district" should be interpreted
    to mean only those "non-resident districts" that are within a charter school's
    region of residence because those districts would be entitled to the same
    5
    A "region of residence" is defined as the "contiguous school districts in which
    a charter school operates and is the charter school's district of residence."
    N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2. See In re Charter Sch. Appeal of Greater Brunswick
    Charter Sch., 
    332 N.J. Super. 409
    , 424 (App. Div. 1999) ("[R]egulations
    allowing regional charter schools are a legitimate means of effectuating the Act's
    purpose of encouraging the establishment of charter schools."). A non-resident
    school district is defined as "a school district outside the district of residence of
    the charter school." N.J.A.C. 6A:11-1.2.
    A-3415-16T1
    29
    opportunity for input as the district where the charter school is located. N.J.A.C.
    6A:11-2.1; N.J.A.C. 6A:11.2.6.          They contend that the Department's
    interpretation of the CSPA to require all non-resident districts to fund their
    students' attendance at charter schools is inconsistent with that Act because non-
    resident districts located outside the approved region of residence are not
    entitled to receive notice or input as to the approval or amendment process.
    Significantly, after the parties filed briefs in this case, we rejected this
    identical argument in Highland Park I.6 In that case, Highland Park appealed
    from the Commissioner's March 19, 2015 final decision approving Hatikvah's
    second application to amend its charter to expand its grades. Highland Park I,
    (slip op. at 2).
    In Highland Park I, the Appellate Division initially noted that Highland
    Park had not raised this issue in March 2014 when Hatikvah sought to renew its
    charter, or in November 2014 when Hatikvah sought to expand its enrollment.
    Id. at 14. Highland Park had never challenged the regulations requiring resident
    and non-resident school districts to fund their students' attendance at a charter
    6
    Although the case is unpublished, it involved most of the same parties and the
    identical issue raised here, and thus even if not binding under the doctrine of
    collateral estoppel, the legal analysis is persuasive and may constitute secondary
    authority. R. 1:36-3.
    A-3415-16T1
    30
    school, and had "paid tuition for its students to attend the school for at least six
    years." Id. at 15. Nonetheless, because it involved "an issue of law," the court
    decided to exercise its discretion and address the argument even though it was
    raised for the first time on appeal. Ibid.
    Turning to the merits, this court found that the plain language of N.J.S.A.
    18A:36A-12(b) "expressly provides that the 'school district of residence' must
    pay the charter school for 'each student' enrolled in the school." Id. at 16. Thus,
    the court held that "as used in N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), the term 'school district
    of residence' refers to the district where the student resides, not the district where
    the charter school is located." Ibid. The court found that the CSPA
    expressly envisions that students may enroll in a charter
    school, even though they reside in a district other than
    the district where the charter school is located. See
    N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a) (requiring charter schools to
    give preference for enrollment to students who reside
    "in the school district in which the charter school is
    located"). There is nothing in the Act that would allow
    these students to attend a charter school without a
    financial contribution from the school districts in which
    they reside. Thus, under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b),
    obligation of a school district to attend a charter school
    is not limited to the charter school's "district of
    residence."
    [Id. at 16-17.]
    Further, we found that the regulations adopted pursuant to the CSPA were
    A-3415-16T1
    31
    "consistent with this interpretation of N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b). Indeed, the
    regulations expressly provide that both a charter school's 'district of residence'
    and the 'non-resident school districts' must pay for their students to attend a
    charter school. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.3(g)(2), (3)." Id. at 17. See also N.J.A.C.
    6A:23A-15.2 (resident and non-resident school districts shall use projected
    charter school aid).
    The court in Highland Park I also found support for this interpretation in
    the legislative history, explaining that in its fiscal estimate for S. 1796 (1995),
    which, combined with A. 592 (1995), became the CSPA, the Office of
    Legislative Services, included the following statement:
    In regard to the funding of charter schools, the bill
    provides that the school district of residence would pay
    directly to the charter school for each student enrolled
    who resides in the district an amount equal to the local
    levy budget per pupil in the district for the specific
    grade level. . . . The cost for out of district pupils would
    be paid by the district of residence of the pupil. . . .
    [Id. at 17-18 (quoting Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S.
    1796 1 (Sept. 14, 1995) (emphasis added)).]
    That statement "makes clear that all school districts of residence must pay f or
    students to attend a charter school, and the financial obligation is not limited to
    the charter school's 'district of residence.'" Id. at 18.
    In so ruling, we found unpersuasive Highland Park's citation to other
    A-3415-16T1
    32
    provisions of the Charter School Act that pertain to a charter school's "district
    of residence." Id. at 18. For example, the court found that
    Highland Park cites N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(c), which
    requires a proposed charter school to provide a copy of
    its application to the "local board of education."
    However, the statute does not support Highland Park's
    argument. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-4(c) also requires the
    Commissioner to provide notice to "members of the
    State Legislature, school superintendents, and mayors
    and governing bodies of all legislative districts, school
    districts, or municipalities in which there are students
    who will be eligible for enrollment in the charter
    school."
    Highland Park also cites N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-14(b), a
    statute that limits a charter school's salaries to the
    salaries of the highest step in the district where the
    school is located; and N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-16(b), which
    requires a charter school to serve a copy of its annual
    report on the local board of education in the district
    where the school is located. However, these statutes
    have no direct bearing on whether a student's "school
    district of residence" must pay for students from that
    district to attend at a charter school.
    [Id. at 18-19.]
    Thus, we concluded that
    under N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b), the term "school
    district of residence" means the school district where
    the student resides, and each "school district of
    residence" must pay the charter school for its student to
    attend the school, in the amounts required by the Act
    and the regulations. We therefore reject Highland
    Park's contention that only the charter school's "district
    A-3415-16T1
    33
    of residence" is obligated to pay for its students to
    attend the school.
    [Id. at 19.]
    Similarly, as addressed in Piscataway, the Commissioner issued a final
    decision in which she interpreted the CSPA and the regulatory provisions,
    N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.1 to -15.4, to require school districts to "provide funding
    for its students enrolled in charter schools located in other school districts." Bd.
    of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway v. NJ Dep't of Educ., EDU 10995-16, final
    decision, (July 27, 2017) (the Piscataway Board of Education was obligated to
    pay for its resident students to attend a number of out-of-district charter
    schools).
    Appellants argue that under that interpretation, non-resident school
    districts will be deprived of due process because non-resident districts are not
    entitled to receive formal notice of a charter school's application to amend its
    charter, or input into the amendment process. See N.J.A.C. 6A:11-2.6(a)(b).
    They argue that "the net effect of these regulations as applied by the Department
    is to render every New Jersey district the 'district of residence' of every charter
    school in the state."
    However, because preference for enrollment in a charter school is given
    to students who reside in the school district in which the charter school is
    A-3415-16T1
    34
    located, N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-8(a), it is likely that the majority of students will
    reside in that district, and thus it makes sense that the district of residence should
    receive formal notice and an opportunity for input. Moreover, it was undisputed
    that appellants in this case, and in the back-to-back companion appeals, were
    aware of the amendment and had an opportunity to submit comments on the
    amendment request.       In fact, the Commissioner received, and considered,
    comments from several school districts, individuals, an educational service
    commission, and even several legislators. Thus, the notice provisions simply do
    not relieve non-resident districts from bearing financial responsibility for its
    students' attendance at charter schools.
    As noted in our decisions today in Highland Park II and Piscataway, we
    are persuaded by the reasoning expressed in Highland Park I, and by the
    Commissioner in her final decision in Piscataway. The plain language of the
    statute requires each student's district of residence to pay for the student to
    attend a charter school. N.J.S.A. 18A:36A-12(b). That interpretation is entirely
    consistent with the CSPA and the policy expressed by the Legislature. Charter
    schools are open to all students, both resident and non-resident students, and
    there is no indication in the CSPA that the Legislature intended to exclude non-
    resident districts from funding their students' attendance at a charter scho ol. It
    A-3415-16T1
    35
    is also consistent with the legislative history and the implementing regulations,
    which require a non-resident district to fund its students' attendance at a charter
    school. N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-15.2 and -15.3. Thus, Piscataway is obligated to
    provide funding for its students enrolled in CJCP.
    VI.
    In sum, we affirm the Commissioner's decision approving CJCP's
    application to amend its charter, and compelling Piscataway to fund its students'
    attendance at that school.     The decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable, promoted the legislative policy of the CSPA, and was fully
    supported by the record.
    Affirmed.
    A-3415-16T1
    36