Com. v. Kiefer, B. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S56045-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    BENJAMIN KIEFER                            :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 637 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 6, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-64-CR-0000199-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2019
    Appellant Benjamin Kiefer appeals from the order dismissing the Post
    Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition he filed pro se following the affirmance
    of his conviction in a direct appeal nunc pro tunc. Because Appellant was
    deprived of his right to counsel for a first PCRA petition, we vacate the order
    and remand for further proceedings.
    A prior panel of this Court summarized the facts of Appellant’s conviction
    as follows: “After a night of drinking, fighting, and crashing a car, Appellant,
    Benjamin Kiefer, shot his brother, Kenneth, five times, resulting in Kenneth’s
    death. At trial, Kiefer conceded that he had shot Kenneth to death, but argued
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S56045-19
    that he did so in self-defense.” Commonwealth v. Kiefer, 2925 EDA 2016,
    
    2017 WL 3976371
    , *1 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 11, 2017) (unpublished mem.).
    A jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder2 on September 18, 2014.
    On December 4, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen to thirty
    years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
    On December 17, 2015, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a PCRA petition.
    The PCRA court appointed counsel, and on August 10, 2016, the PCRA court
    granted relief and reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc.
    Order, 8/11/16.        Appellant subsequently appealed to this Court, which
    affirmed on September 11, 2017.                See Kiefer, 
    2017 WL 3976371
     at *2.
    Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court.
    On August 21, 2018, the PCRA court docketed Appellant’s pro se PCRA
    petition, which requested appointment of PCRA counsel.3 The PCRA court did
    not appoint counsel.        On December 27, 2018, the PCRA court issued a
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss. The PCRA court concluded that
    Appellant’s PCRA petition was timely filed but lacked merit. Rule 907 Notice,
    12/27/18, at 2. On January 17, 2019, the PCRA court docketed Appellant’s
    ____________________________________________
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).
    3 The certified record did not include a postmarked envelope. See generally
    Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 
    146 A.3d 266
    , 268 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (stating that under the “prisoner mailbox rule,” a document is deemed filed
    when placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing).
    -2-
    J-S56045-19
    pro se response. On February 6, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s
    petition.   Appellant, still pro se, timely appealed and timely filed a court-
    ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
    On July 16, 2019, Appellant, pro se, filed an application for relief with
    this Court, requesting, among other things, appointment of counsel.          On
    August 12, 2019, this Court ordered that the PCRA court appoint counsel for
    Appellant. Order, 8/12/19. The PCRA court subsequently appointed appellate
    counsel, who did not take any action. On August 15, 2019, the PCRA court
    requested clarification of this Court’s August 12, 2019 order because it
    believed that Appellant was not entitled to appointed counsel because the
    underlying petition was Appellant’s second, and not his first, petition.4
    Initially, before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note that
    “where an indigent, first-time PCRA petitioner was denied his right to
    counsel—or failed to properly waive that right—this Court is required to raise
    this error sua sponte and remand for the PCRA court to correct that mistake.”
    Commonwealth v. Stossel, 
    17 A.3d 1286
    , 1290 (Pa. Super. 2011). For
    example, in Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d 940
     (Pa. Super.
    2003), the Court addressed whether a defendant’s second PCRA petition
    ____________________________________________
    4 Although appellate counsel was appointed, Appellant filed a pro se
    application for relief on October 7, 2019, which requested that this Court
    remand the matter to the PCRA court because he had a rule-based right to
    counsel.
    -3-
    J-S56045-19
    should be considered timely filed. Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d at 942
    . In resolving
    that question, the Karanicolas Court held that the defendant’s “present PCRA
    should be considered [the defendant’s] first for timeliness purposes, where
    his earlier PCRA petition served only to reinstate [the defendant’s] rights to a
    direct appeal with this Court nunc pro tunc.” 
    Id.
    The Karanicolas Court then addressed whether the defendant was
    deprived of his right to PCRA counsel for his first PCRA petition:
    Pennsylvania courts have recognized expressly that every post-
    conviction litigant is entitled to at least one meaningful
    opportunity to have issues reviewed, at least in the context of an
    ineffectiveness claim. This Court has admonished, accordingly,
    that the point in time at which a trial court may determine that a
    PCRA petitioner’s claims are frivolous or meritless is after the
    petitioner has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to present
    those claims. Our Supreme Court has recognized that such an
    opportunity is best assured where the petitioner is provided
    representation by competent counsel whose ability to frame the
    issues in a legally meaningful fashion insures the trial court that
    all relevant considerations will be brought to its attention. The
    Supreme Court has mandated accordingly, that counsel be
    appointed in every case in which a defendant has filed a motion
    for post-conviction collateral review for the first time and is unable
    to afford counsel. Thus, before the trial court disposes of a post
    conviction petition, it must first make a determination as to the
    petitioner’s indigence and if the petitioner is indigent, the court
    must appoint counsel to assist in the preparation of said petition.
    The indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be honored
    regardless of the merits of his underlying claims, even where
    those claims were previously addressed on direct appeal, so long
    as the petition on question is his first.
    
    Id. at 945
     (citations omitted, emphases in original, and some formatting
    altered).   Therefore, the Karanicolas Court remanded for appointment of
    counsel.     
    Id. at 948
    ; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (“[W]hen an
    -4-
    J-S56045-19
    unrepresented defendant satisfies to the judge that the defendant is unable
    to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to
    represent the defendant on the defendant's first petition for post-conviction
    relief.” (emphasis added)).
    Instantly, the underlying PCRA petition is technically Appellant’s first
    petition because Appellant’s prior PCRA petition reinstated Appellant’s direct
    appeal rights nunc pro tunc. See Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d at 942
    . It follows
    that the PCRA court should have appointed PCRA counsel after Appellant,
    acting pro se, filed his first PCRA petition in August 2018. See id.; see also
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C). Appellant, therefore, was not afforded a full and fair
    opportunity to present his claims via appointed counsel. See Karanicolas,
    
    836 A.2d at 945
    . On remand, appointed counsel must either file an amended
    PCRA petition or comply with Turner/Finley5 and seek leave to withdraw as
    counsel. See 
    id. at 946
    .
    Order vacated.      Appellant’s pro se application for relief forwarded to
    counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Jette, 
    23 A.3d 1032
     (Pa. 2011).
    Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    ____________________________________________
    5Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -5-
    J-S56045-19
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/8/19
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 637 EDA 2019

Filed Date: 11/8/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/8/2019