Santos v. Parks , 105 N.E.3d 1283 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as Santos v. Parks, 2018-Ohio-3111.]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    JENNIFER A. SANTOS                           :      JUDGES:
    :      Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    Plaintiff - Appellant                :      Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    :      Hon. Earle E. Wise, J.
    -vs-                                         :
    :
    AMANDA M. PARKS                              :      Case No. 17-COA-044
    :
    and                                          :
    :
    MICHAEL C. PARKS                             :
    :
    Defendants – Appellees               :      OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Ashland County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
    Division, Case No. 20174001
    JUDGMENT:                                           Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                   August 3, 2018
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellant                             For Defendants-Appellees
    DAVID R. PLUMB                                      RENEE J. JACKWOOD
    Weis + O'Connor LLC                                 3540 Burbank Road, #139
    22 E. Gay Street, Suite 401                         Wooster, Ohio 44691
    Columbus, Ohio 43215
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                2
    Baldwin, J.
    {¶1}    Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer A. Santos appeals from the November 29, 2017
    Opinion and Judgment Entry issued by the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas,
    Juvenile Division.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}    On January 3, 2017, appellant filed a Complaint for Grandparent’s Visitation
    rights, seeking temporary and permanent companionship/visitation rights with her
    grandchild pursuant to R.C. 3109.12. The minor child, R.P. who is the subject this case,
    was born on September 10, 2015 to appellee Amanda M. Parks, and appellant’s son,
    Michael C. Parks. At the time of his birth, the two were not married but later married on
    February 12, 2016.
    {¶3}    Appellees filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint on February 27, 2017,
    arguing that application of R.C. 3109.12 to them, an intact, married family unit, was
    unconstitutional. Appellees cited to this court’s Opinion in Rugola-Dye v. Dye, 5th Dist.
    Delaware No. 08 CAF 06 0038, 2009-Ohio-2471. A hearing for the limited purpose of
    determination of paternity was held on February 27, 2017. Appellees did not contest the
    issue of paternity. Pursuant to a Magistrate’s Decision and Judgment Entry filed on March
    2, 2017, the Magistrate found that appellee Michael C. Parks was the father of R.P. and
    that a parent-child relationship existed between the two. The Magistrate further found that
    appellee Amanda M. Parks and appellee Michael C. Parks were married on February 12,
    2016 and continued to be married, sharing a residence with their son. The trial court
    approved and adopted the Magistrate’s Decision.
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                 3
    {¶4}   Appellant, on March 16, 2017, filed a memorandum in opposition to the
    Motion to Dismiss and appellees filed a reply on March 20, 2017. As memorialized in a
    Magistrate’s Decision filed on March 22, 2017, the Magistrate recommended that the
    Motion to Dismiss be granted, applying this Court’s precedent in the Rugola-Dye case.
    Appellant filed objections to the Magistrate’s Decision on April 3, 2017 and appellees filed
    a response on April 26, 2017. The trial court, on November 29, 2017, issued an Opinion
    and Judgment Entry overruling the objections and ordering that the Motion to Dismiss the
    Complaint be granted.
    {¶5}   Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
    {¶6}   I. WHETHER THE CENTRAL HOLDING OF RUGOLA-DYE V. DYE, 5TH
    DIST. DELAWARE N0. 08 CAF 060038, 2009-OHIO-2471 SHOULD BE APPLIED AS A
    BRIGHT- LINE RULE, I.E. WHETHER R.C. 3109.12 (A) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
    APPLIED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS CASE UNDER THE EQUAL
    PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
    I
    {¶7}   Appellant, in her sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred
    in applying this Court’s decision in Rugola-Dye v. Dye, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 08 CAF 06
    0038, 2009-Ohio-2471 to the case sub judice. Appellant specifically asks that this Court
    reconsider our decision in such case arguing that this case presents a constitutional
    question of law.
    {¶8}   “Constitutional analysis is a question of law that we review de novo.” State
    v. Rayburn, Jackson App. No. 09CA6, 2010–Ohio–5693, at ¶ 25 (citations omitted).
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                   4
    {¶9}   Appellant filed her complaint for grandparent visitation pursuant to R.C.
    3109.12. R.C. 3109.12(A) governs the issue of the grandmother's right of visitation with
    the minor child in this case. That section provides as follows:
    {¶10} [i]f a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the woman and
    any relative of the woman may file a complaint requesting the court of common pleas of
    the county in which the child resides to grant them reasonable companionship or visitation
    rights with the child. If a child is born to an unmarried woman and if the father of the child
    has acknowledged the child and that acknowledgment has become final pursuant to
    section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 3111.821 of the Revised Code or has been determined in
    an action under Chapter 3111. of the Revised Code to be the father of the child, the father
    may file a complaint requesting that the court of appropriate jurisdiction of the county in
    which the child resides grant him reasonable parenting time rights with the child and the
    parents of the father and any relative of the father may file a complaint requesting that the
    court grant them reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the childI
    {¶11} R.C. 3109.12(B) provides that [t]he marriage or remarriage of the mother or
    father of a child does not affect the authority of the court under this section to grant * * *
    the parents or relatives of the natural father or the parents or relatives of the mother of
    the child reasonable companionship or visitation rights with respect to the child.
    {¶12} In the Rugola-Dye case cited above, the appellants, Michael C. and Jessica
    L. Dye, fka Ward, appealed the decision of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas,
    Juvenile Division, which granted a complaint for grandparent visitation in favor of appellee
    Mary C. Rugola. Appellants were the parents of a son, “H.D.”, born in 2005. Appellants
    were not married to each other at the time H.D. was born. Appellant Michael had legally
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                     5
    acknowledged paternity of the child. Appellants did marry about eighteen months after
    H.D.'s birth.
    {¶13} Appellee, H.D.'s paternal grandmother, filed a complaint in the trial court on
    May 22, 2006 seeking grandparent visitation under R.C. 3109.12. Following a hearing,
    the trial court, issued a Judgment Entry granting appellee Grandmother Mary C. Rugola-
    ‘reasonable’ Companionship time with her grandson. The appellants then appealed to
    this Court arguing, in part, that the trial court's decision was an unconstitutional application
    of R.C. 3109.12. We agreed. In our Opinion, this Court stated, in relevant part, as follows
    at paragraphs 18-23:
    In Troxel v. Granville (2000), 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 64, 
    120 S. Ct. 2054
    , 2059,
    the United States Supreme Court stated: “Because grandparents and other
    relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States
    have sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the
    relationships those children form with such third parties. The States'
    nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a recognition, which
    varies from State to State, that children should have the opportunity to
    benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons-for example,
    their grandparents. * * *.”1 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court
    also recognized in the Troxel opinion that the parents' interest in the care,
    custody and control of their children “is perhaps the oldest of the
    fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court.” 
    Id. at 65.
    The Ohio
    Supreme Court has stated that grandparents have no constitutional right of
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                   6
    association with their grandchildren. See In re Schmidt (1986), 25 Ohio
    St.3d 331, 336, 
    496 N.E.2d 952
    .
    The Ohio Revised Code contains at least three main subsections
    governing non-parent visitation with minor children. See In re C.C.,
    Montgomery App.No. 21707, 2007-Ohio-3696, ¶ 5, citing In re E.H., Lorain
    App. No. 04CA008585, 2005-Ohio-1952. The statute at issue in the case
    sub judice is R.C. 3109.12(A), which authorizes a visitation complaint by a
    relative if the minor child was born to an unmarried woman. R.C. 3109.12(A)
    reads in pertinent part:
    * * * If a child is born to an unmarried woman and if the father of the
    child has acknowledged the child and that acknowledgment has become
    final pursuant to section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 3111.821 of the Revised
    Code or has been determined in an action under Chapter 3111. of the
    Revised Code to be the father of the child, the father may file a complaint
    requesting that the court of appropriate jurisdiction of the county in which
    the child resides grant him reasonable parenting time rights with the child
    and the parents of the father and any relative of the father may file a
    complaint requesting that the court grant them reasonable companionship
    or visitation rights with the child.
    We generally afford a presumption of constitutionality to legislative
    enactments. See, e.g., State v. Anderson (1991), 
    57 Ohio St. 3d 168
    , 171,
    
    566 N.E.2d 1224
    . Appellants herein direct us to Nicoson v. Hacker, Lake
    App.No.2000-L-213, 2001-Ohio-8718, wherein the Eleventh District Court
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                      7
    of Appeals found that R.C. 
    3109.12, supra
    , violates the Equal Protection
    Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to the facts of that case,
    concluding “[t]here is no rational basis for distinguishing between a child
    born prior to the marriage of the natural parents and a child born to the same
    parents after their marriage.” 
    Id. at 3.
    Appellants further contend that their
    marriage has created an intact family unit subsequent to appellee's
    visitation complaint, and the allowance of appellee's involvement in the
    child's life by judicial process violates their right to parental care, custody,
    and control pursuant to 
    Troxel, supra
    .
    We find the constitutional question before us under these facts is
    whether there is an Equal Protection violation in the statute's differentiation
    of married parents who were unmarried at the time of the complaint's filing
    from those who were married at the time of such a complaint. “The
    constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires that laws operate
    equally upon persons who are alike in all relevant respects.” State v.
    Williams, 
    179 Ohio App. 3d 584
    , 598, 2008-Ohio-6245, citing McCrone v.
    Bank One Corp., 
    107 Ohio St. 3d 272
    , 2005-Ohio-6505, 
    839 N.E.2d 1
    , ¶ 20.
    “When suspect classes are not involved, the equal-protection clause
    permits class distinctions in legislation if the distinctions bear some rational
    relationship to a legitimate government objective.” 
    Id., citing State
    ex rel.
    Vana v. Maple Hts. City Council (1990), 
    54 Ohio St. 3d 91
    , 92, 
    561 N.E.2d 909
    . Under the rational basis test, the legislation must be upheld unless the
    classification is totally unrelated or irrelevant to the state's goals or purpose
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                                    8
    for enacting the legislation. Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio
    St .3d 27, 29, 
    550 N.E.2d 181
    . We find that under R.C. 3109.12, the General
    Assembly has provided a means for extended family members of children
    born to unwed parents to involve themselves in the lives of such children,
    who do not benefit from a marital two-parent nuclear home environment.
    However, where, as in this case, the parents of the child indeed marry each
    other during the pendency of the relative's visitation complaint, we find no
    rational basis for differentiating married parents who were unmarried at the
    time of the complaint's filing from those who were married at that time.
    We therefore hold R.C. 3109.12 is unconstitutional as applied to the
    particular facts and circumstances of this case.
    {¶14} As noted by the trial court in its November 29, 2017 Decision and Judgment
    Entry, the facts in the Rugola-Dye case are nearly identical to the facts in the case sub
    judice. In both cases, the parents were not married at the time of the child’s birth, but later
    married. In the case sub judice, the parties married approximately five months after the
    child’s birth and almost a year prior to the filing of appellant’s complaint for companionship
    time. Based on the Rugola-Dye case, because the parents of the child married each other
    during the pendency of the relative’s visitation complaint, “we find no rational basis for
    differentiating married parents who were unmarried at the time of the complaint's filing
    from those who were married at that time”. Rugola–Dye v. Dye, 5th Dist. Delaware No.
    08 CAF 06 0038, 2009-Ohio-2471, 
    2009 WL 1485035
    , ¶ 22.
    {¶15} We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in applying in this court’s
    Opinion in Rugola-Dye v. Dye        and finding that R. C. 3109.12 is unconstitutional as
    Ashland County, Case No. 17-COA-044                                             9
    applied to the particular facts and circumstances of this case. We choose to follow our
    prior precedent and see no reason for our Court to reconsider the matter.
    {¶16} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    {¶17} Accordingly, the judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas,
    Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
    By: Baldwin, J.
    Hoffman, P.J. and
    Earle Wise, J. concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-COA-044

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 3111, 105 N.E.3d 1283

Judges: Baldwin

Filed Date: 8/3/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023