Pavittar Singh v. Loretta E. Lynch , 802 F.3d 972 ( 2015 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PAVITTAR SINGH,                                   No. 08-74212
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                           A098-501-520
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
    General,                                            OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted October 7, 2014*
    San Francisco California
    Filed September 21, 2015
    Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.
    O’Scannlain and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain
    Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Chief Judge
    Thomas
    *
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2                         SINGH V. LYNCH
    SUMMARY**
    Immigration
    The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of
    removal and Convention Against Torture protection on
    adverse credibility grounds.
    The panel held that the REAL ID Act permits background
    documents to serve as the sole basis for an adverse credibility
    determination. The panel explained that the immigration
    judge permissibly relied on record evidence, including an
    Amnesty International report, indicating that the armed Sikh
    militancy in India ended in the 1990s, to conclude that
    petitioner’s claim of being attacked by Sikh militants in 2005
    and 2006 was not plausible.
    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Judge
    Thomas agreed with the majority that under the REAL ID
    Act, an IJ’s adverse credibility determination may be
    supported exclusively by background evidence in the record,
    but he dissented from the majority’s decision to uphold the
    agency’s adverse credibility determination, because the
    agency mischaracterized the background evidence and did not
    consider the totality of the circumstances.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    SINGH V. LYNCH                        3
    COUNSEL
    Monica Ganjoo, Ganjoo Law Offices, San Francisco, CA,
    filed the brief for petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
    Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, filed the brief for
    the respondent. With him on the brief were Stephen J. Flynn,
    Assistant Director, and Janette L. Allen, Attorney, U.S.
    Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    Washington, DC.
    OPINION
    O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
    We must decide, in this asylum case under the REAL ID
    Act, whether an Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility
    determination may be supported exclusively by background
    evidence in the record.
    I
    Pavittar Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the
    United States on or about January 4, 2007, as a nonimmigrant
    visitor, with authorization to remain in the United States for
    six months. However, on April 19, 2007, the Department of
    Homeland Security served Singh with a Notice to Appear,
    charging him as removable for failure to comply with the
    conditions of his nonimmigrant status. Specifically, Singh
    was charged as non-compliant because he was employed for
    wages at a convenience store without authorization of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Singh then
    4                     SINGH V. LYNCH
    sought relief from removal by applying for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”).
    A
    In due course, Singh appeared before an Immigration
    Judge (“IJ”) and testified that he had suffered persecution on
    account of his membership in the Nirankari sect of the Sikh
    faith. He asserted that on January 16, 1998, terrorists entered
    his family’s shop in India, derided his Nirankari beliefs, and
    demanded money. Additionally, Singh testified that after he
    reported this incident, the police refused to investigate and
    instead accused him of harboring Sikh separatists. Singh
    claimed he suffered additional police harassment when, on
    January 19, 2005, he was arrested, accused of harboring
    terrorists at his wedding, and beaten while in custody. Singh
    also claimed that on October 16, 2006, he was yet again
    accosted by “Sikh terrorists,” who took his property and
    threatened to kill him if he supported the Nirankari mission.
    He testified that a few days later the police again arrested
    him, accused him of supporting “Sikh terrorists,” and beat
    him.
    B
    However, the IJ found Singh’s testimony not credible and
    denied his applications for relief. While acknowledging that
    Singh testified consistently, the IJ relied on background
    evidence in the record to conclude that his testimony was
    implausible. The IJ noted that an Amnesty International
    report submitted by Singh not only failed to “support his
    claim that the armed opposition continues to operate,” but
    also, by showing that armed militants were no longer active,
    SINGH V. LYNCH                       5
    undermined his allegation that such militants recently
    attacked him. The IJ also found the reports submitted by the
    Government further suggested that militant activity had
    “ended years ago.” Thus, she found, Singh’s claim that he
    was attacked by Sikh militants in 2005 and 2006 was not
    plausible.
    The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed
    Singh’s appeal from the IJ’s decision, agreeing with her that
    his “account is implausible because the documentary
    evidence demonstrates that the armed opposition in Punjab
    ended in the 1990’s.” Noting that the BIA must defer to IJ
    credibility findings “unless they are clearly erroneous” and
    that “[i]mplausible testimony can support an adverse
    credibility finding,” the Board agreed with the IJ’s finding
    that Singh was not credible.
    II
    The only issue presented on appeal is whether the IJ’s
    adverse credibility determination was supported by
    substantial evidence.
    A
    The standard of review of BIA determinations is well
    settled. As we have explained, “[w]hen the BIA conducts its
    own review of the evidence and law rather than adopting the
    IJ’s decision, our review ‘is limited to the BIA’s decision,
    except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly
    adopted.’” Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039 (9th Cir.
    2010) (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzalez, 
    471 F.3d 953
    , 957 (9th
    Cir. 2006)). However, “when, as here, the BIA’s ‘phrasing
    seems in part to suggest that it did conduct an independent
    6                     SINGH V. LYNCH
    review of the record,’ but the BIA’s analysis on the relevant
    issues is confined to a ‘simple statement of a conclusion,’ we
    ‘also look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay
    behind the BIA’s conclusion.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Avetova-Elisseva
    v. I.N.S., 
    213 F.3d 1192
    , 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)).
    Credibility determinations are findings of fact, which are
    “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to conclude to the contrary.”             
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Rizk v. Holder, 
    629 F.3d 1083
    , 1087 (9th
    Cir. 2011); Singh-Kaur v. I.N.S., 
    183 F.3d 1147
    , 1149–50 (9th
    Cir. 1999). Under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , our task “is to determine
    whether there is substantial evidence to support the BIA’s
    finding, not to substitute an analysis of which side in the
    factual dispute we find more persuasive.” Molina-Morales v.
    I.N.S., 
    237 F.3d 1048
    , 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Marcu
    v. I.N.S., 
    147 F.3d 1078
    , 1082 (9th Cir. 1998)). Thus, a
    credibility determination will only be reversed if “the
    evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but
    compels it.” Rizk, 
    629 F.3d at 1087
     (quoting I.N.S. v.
    Elias–Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 n.1 (1992)) (alterations in
    original).
    Singh concedes that because he filed his application after
    May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act governs the determination
    of his credibility. See Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1039
    .
    B
    Singh asserts that the adverse credibility determination is
    not supported by substantial evidence, because under the
    REAL ID Act his specific testimony cannot be discredited
    solely by reliance on background documents. Whether the
    REAL ID Act permits such background documents to serve
    SINGH V. LYNCH                                   7
    as the sole basis for an adverse credibility finding appears to
    be a question of first impression. However, it is easily
    resolved by the clear language of the Act itself, which
    forecloses Singh’s argument.
    1
    The two cases Singh relies on for support—Zheng v.
    Ashcroft, 
    397 F.3d 1139
     (9th Cir. 2005), and Singh v.
    Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 1100
     (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other
    grounds by Maldonado v. Lynch, 
    786 F.3d 1155
    , 1163–64
    (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)—are pre-REAL ID Act cases that
    do not consider the Act’s significant restriction of appellate
    review of credibility determinations.1 See Bingxu Jin v.
    Holder, 
    748 F.3d 959
    , 964 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The REAL ID
    Act ‘significantly restricted’ appellate review of adverse
    credibility findings,” and “‘only the most extraordinary
    1
    Indeed, some of our cases hold that background evidence can support
    adverse credibility determinations even in pre-REAL ID Act cases.
    Admittedly, Singh is correct that Singh and Zheng hold that “[w]hile an IJ
    may use a Department of State Report to discredit a generalized statement
    about a country, it may not be used to discredit specific testimony
    regarding a petitioner’s experience.” Singh, 
    439 F.3d at
    1110 (citing
    Zheng, 
    397 F.3d at
    1143–44).
    However, other pre-REAL ID Act precedent has addressed this
    question and concluded that country reports are an acceptable basis for
    implausibility determinations. In Jibril v. Gonzales, we stated that “a
    finding made by an IJ that a petitioner’s testimony is implausible given the
    evidence in a Country Report or other objective evidence in the record is
    accorded deference.” 
    423 F.3d 1129
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
    added); see also Jie Cui v. Holder, 
    712 F.3d 1332
    , 1338 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (citing Jibril for the proposition that “testimony that is implausible in light
    of the background evidence can support an adverse credibility
    determination” (emphasis added)); Don v. Gonzales, 
    476 F.3d 738
    , 743
    (9th Cir. 2007) (same).
    8                     SINGH V. LYNCH
    circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility
    determination.’” (quoting Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1041
    ));
    Jibril, 
    423 F.3d at
    1138 n.1; Kaur v. Gonzales, 
    418 F.3d 1061
    , 1064 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Xiu Xia Lin v.
    Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165–68 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
    (explaining that the “REAL ID Act freed an IJ” from the
    various requirements courts of appeals imposed on credibility
    determinations).
    2
    Moreover, the REAL ID Act explicitly allows the BIA
    and IJ to base their credibility determinations on background
    evidence in the record. “Considering the totality of the
    circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may
    base a credibility determination on,” among other things, “the
    inherent plausibility of [Singh’s] account” and “the
    consistency of [Singh’s] statements with other evidence of
    record (including the reports of the Department of State on
    country conditions) . . . without regard to whether an
    inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
    [Singh’s] claim.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); cf. Angov v.
    Lynch, 
    788 F.3d 893
    , 904 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that this
    Court and the BIA permissibly rely upon State Department
    country reports “all the time” (citing 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii))).
    The IJ thus acted within the confines of the REAL ID Act
    by considering the totality of the circumstances and basing
    her credibility determination on the inherent implausibility of
    Singh’s account and its inconsistency with record evidence,
    including the Amnesty International report.           The IJ
    considered evidence submitted by Singh and the Government
    and found such evidence did “not support [Singh’s] claim that
    SINGH V. LYNCH                                9
    the armed opposition continues to operate.” She noted that
    the Amnesty International report affirmatively indicated that
    the armed Sikh militancy ended in the 1990s. Ultimately,
    based on Singh’s testimony and the documents submitted by
    both Singh and the Government, the IJ found implausible
    Singh’s account that he was attacked by Sikh militants. The
    BIA similarly concluded that Singh’s account was rendered
    implausible by the documentary evidence that “demonstrates
    that the armed opposition in Punjab ended in the 1990’s.”2
    Given the language of the REAL ID Act, the IJ’s finding
    and the BIA’s conclusion of implausibility based on record
    evidence is permissible.3
    2
    The BIA based its plausibility finding on two separate factors: (1) the
    lack of militant activity in the Punjab region after the mid-1990s; and
    (2) the Indian government’s focus on high-level activists, as opposed to
    lower-profile or inactive Sikh members such as Singh. The dissent
    focuses on the second factor.
    We offer two points in response. First, because record evidence
    supported the IJ and BIA on the first finding, the second factor is not
    dispositive. See Rizk, 
    629 F.3d at 1087
     (quoting Wang v. I.N.S., 
    352 F.3d 1250
    , 1259 (9th Cir. 2003)). Second, while the dissent cites experts who
    indicated that even low-level activists were in danger, other background
    evidence indicated that “several experts have suggested that only those
    considered by police to be high-profile militants are at risk.” Because
    there is evidence to support either conclusion, we cannot say that the
    record compels the conclusion that inactive Sikh members were under
    police threat. See 
    id.
     (quoting Elias–Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at
    481 n.1).
    3
    Though unmentioned by the parties, the Eleventh Circuit has
    considered the question of whether adverse credibility determinations can
    be based solely on background evidence and determined that they cannot,
    contrary to our conclusion here. In Xiu Ying Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    712 F.3d 486
     (11th Cir. 2013), a case interpreting the REAL ID Act, the
    court concluded that an IJ cannot rely solely on country reports in making
    10                         SINGH V. LYNCH
    C
    Our precedent also forecloses Singh’s argument that the
    BIA’s decision was based on speculation.
    Though Singh is correct that an adverse credibility
    determination cannot be based on complete speculation and
    conjecture, here the IJ and BIA supported the determination
    with specific citations to record evidence. See Part II.A.,
    supra; see also Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1042
     (requiring “that
    the IJ state explicitly the factors supporting his or her adverse
    credibility determination” and avoid “[b]oilerplate opinions”
    that “are devoid of statements that evidence an individualized
    review of the petitioner’s contentions and circumstances”
    a credibility determination, absent a finding as to “demeanor, the
    consistency of [the petitioner’s] statements, or some other individualized
    reason for questioning her credibility.” Id at 496.
    However, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is unpersuasive because
    it fails to account for the specific language of the REAL ID Act. The Xiu
    Ying Wu panel concluded it could not give State Department reports
    “dispositive power” because doing so would “vitiate the individualized
    determination” required in adverse credibility decisions. 
    Id.
     Yet, as noted
    above, the REAL ID Act indeed gives such reports “dispositive power”;
    that is the unavoidable effect of allowing a “trier of fact” to “base a
    credibility determination” on the consistency of an applicant’s claims
    “with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of
    State on country conditions) . . . without regard to whether [such]
    inconsistency . . . goes to the heart of the applicants claim.” 
    8 U.S.C. §1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    Further, while Xiu Ying Wu claims that using record evidence as
    grounds for finding lack of credibility “would vitiate the individualized
    determination” of petitioners’ claims, 712 F.3d at 496, such concern is
    unfounded in light of our decision in Shrestha. See Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1042
    .
    SINGH V. LYNCH                        11
    (quoting Castillo v. I.N.S., 
    951 F.2d 1117
    , 1121 (9th Cir.
    1991)); cf. Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey, 
    537 F.3d 1034
    , 1039–40
    (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an IJ’s implausibility
    determination was impermissible when based on the IJ’s pure
    speculation, rather than any record evidence).
    Further, the BIA did not violate our command that its
    “analysis must be reasonable as a whole,” that its decision
    must be based on more than “utterly ‘trivial inconsistencies,’”
    and that it “give ‘specific and cogent reasons supporting [its]
    adverse credibility determination.’” Bingxu Jin, 748 F.3d at
    965 (quoting Shrestha, 748 F.3d at 1042).
    Here, the BIA explicitly discussed Singh’s testimony
    regarding the alleged attacks by terrorists and harassment by
    the police and explained why it found that such specific
    testimony was undermined by the evidence in the record.
    Thus, it sufficiently noted the factors supporting the IJ’s
    finding, and evidenced its individualized review of Singh’s
    case.
    Pursuant to our precedent, we are satisfied that the
    adverse credibility determination was properly explained and
    supported by substantial evidence.
    III
    The BIA correctly concluded that because Singh failed to
    qualify for asylum, he necessarily fails to satisfy the more
    stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Alvarez-
    Santos v. I.N.S., 
    332 F.3d 1245
    , 1255 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion
    that it was not “more likely than not” that Singh would be
    12                    SINGH V. LYNCH
    tortured if he were removed to India. We do not permit an IJ
    to use “a negative credibility determination in the asylum
    context to wash over the [CAT] claim[,] especially when the
    prior adverse credibility determination is not necessarily
    significant” to the torture claim. Kamalthas v. I.N.S.,
    
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mansour v.
    I.N.S., 
    230 F.3d 902
    , 908 (7th Cir. 2000)). However, when a
    petitioner’s “claims under the [CAT] are based on the same
    statements . . . that the BIA determined to be not credible” in
    the asylum context, the agency may rely upon the same
    credibility determination in denying both the asylum and
    CAT claims. Farah v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    , 1157 (9th
    Cir. 2003).
    In this case, Singh’s claim under the CAT is based on the
    same statements he made regarding his claims for asylum and
    withholding of removal. Thus, it was proper for the IJ and
    the BIA to rely on the same adverse credibility determination
    in denying all of his claims.
    IV
    Accordingly, Singh’s petition for review is DENIED.
    THOMAS, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
    part:
    I agree with the majority that under the REAL ID Act, an
    Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination may
    be supported exclusively by background evidence in the
    record. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
    decision to uphold the agency’s adverse credibility
    SINGH V. LYNCH                          13
    determination. The IJ and BIA mischaracterized the
    background evidence and did not “consider the totality of the
    circumstances” as required by 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    I would grant Singh’s petition for review.
    I
    I agree with the majority that under the Real ID Act, a
    petitioner’s specific testimony may be discredited solely by
    background evidence in the record. However, an IJ is still
    required to consider the totality of the circumstances and to
    make an individualized credibility determination that rests on
    “specific and cogent reasons.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii);
    Shrestha, 
    590 F.3d at 1042
     (“The REAL ID Act did not strip
    us of our ability to rely on the institutional tools that we have
    developed, such as the requirement that an agency provide
    specific and cogent reasons supporting an adverse credibility
    determination, to aid our review.”). As a result, it is a rare
    case that an IJ is able to rest an adverse credibility
    determination on background evidence alone without
    violating the other requirements imposed by
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) and by controlling precedent. Indeed,
    this case offers a useful illustration of the perils of relying too
    heavily on broad generalizations contained in static country
    reports when refuting an asylum applicant’s specific
    testimony.
    II
    Turning to the specifics of this case, substantial evidence
    does not support the agency’s adverse credibility
    determination. The background evidence in the record does
    not discredit Singh’s testimony that he was detained and
    14                    SINGH V. LYNCH
    beaten by the police in 2005 and 2006 and targeted by four
    men dressed as Sikh militants in 2006.
    The IJ and BIA suggest that Singh’s testimony that he
    was detained and interrogated by the Punjab police is not
    credible because this background evidence indicates the
    Indian government is concerned only with arresting
    high-level Sikh militants.       This is not an accurate
    characterization of the record. A 2003 Bureau of Citizenship
    and Immigration Services report submitted into evidence by
    the government provides that while some experts believe the
    Punjab police will track down only high-profile suspects who
    have relocated to another province in India, others believe
    that “any Sikh who has been implicated in political militancy
    would be at risk anywhere in India.” This report indicates
    that it remains an open question whether the police in Punjab
    are concerned only with high-profile suspects.
    Moreover, the same report corroborates Singh’s
    testimony. It cites an expert on religious militancy who noted
    that while “Punjab police no longer systematically persecute
    Sikhs simply for holding [pro-Sikh independence] views . . .
    individual Sikhs are ‘probably targeted’ at times by local
    police because of their actual or suspected [pro-Sikh
    independence] advocacy, even though high-level officials no
    longer see such views as a threat.” The expert further noted
    that “[t]here is still widespread harassment of anyone who
    expresses separatist sympathies” and that reports of police
    detention and physical abuse “seemed plausible given
    conditions in Punjab.”
    The IJ and BIA further suggest that Singh’s testimony
    that he was harassed by Sikh militants in 2006 is not credible
    because the background evidence in the record indicates that
    SINGH V. LYNCH                          15
    Sikh militant activity ended in the 1990s. The background
    evidence does indicate that widespread, organized activity by
    militant Sikhs ended in the 1990s. But it is still plausible that
    Singh was harassed by former Sikh militants who
    independently engage in criminal activity and who continue
    to rob and terrorize the population. Singh testified that he
    was robbed by four men dressed like Sikh terrorists who
    warned him to stop supporting the Nirankari sect. This
    testimony is not necessarily inconsistent with reports that the
    majority of armed opposition groups in Punjab are no longer
    active.
    Even if armed resistance is no longer widespread and pro-
    independence Sikhs are no longer the primary targets of
    police brutality in Punjab, it is not implausible that at least
    some former militants continue to engage in violent criminal
    behavior and at least some Sikhs continue to be harassed by
    the police for their perceived affiliation with the resistance
    movement. Indeed, it is arguably more implausible
    that—after more than a decade of conflict—the militants
    would suddenly cease all criminal activity and the police
    would cease all persecution of Sikh activists.
    The IJ and BIA “cherry-pick[ed] solely facts favoring an
    adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that
    undermine[d] that result.” Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 2010). As a result, the IJ’s adverse
    credibility determination is not supported by substantial
    evidence.
    For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-74212

Citation Numbers: 802 F.3d 972

Filed Date: 9/21/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (21)

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162 ( 2008 )

Samer Mansour v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 230 F.3d 902 ( 2000 )

Rajinder Singh v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 439 F.3d 1100 ( 2006 )

Mustafe Muse Jibril v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 423 F.3d 1129 ( 2005 )

Xiao Lan Zheng v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General , 397 F.3d 1139 ( 2005 )

Preet Kaur v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 418 F.3d 1061 ( 2005 )

Jiamu Wang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 352 F.3d 1250 ( 2003 )

Edgar E. Castillo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 951 F.2d 1117 ( 1991 )

Masoud Hosseini v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 471 F.3d 953 ( 2006 )

Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey , 537 F.3d 1034 ( 2008 )

Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034 ( 2010 )

Satnam Singh-Kaur, AKA Hari Singh v. Immigration and ... , 183 F.3d 1147 ( 1999 )

Jamal Ali Farah v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General , 348 F.3d 1153 ( 2003 )

Navaratwam Kamalthas v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 251 F.3d 1279 ( 2001 )

Sahajeewa Rathnakumara Loku Kankanamge Don, Shiyamalie ... , 476 F.3d 738 ( 2007 )

Miron Florin MARCU, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND ... , 147 F.3d 1078 ( 1998 )

Carlos Molina-Morales v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 237 F.3d 1048 ( 2001 )

Lucio Ricardo Alvarez-Santos, AKA Luciano Ricardo Alvarez ... , 332 F.3d 1245 ( 2003 )

Maya Avetova-Elisseva v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 213 F.3d 1192 ( 2000 )

Rizk v. Holder , 629 F.3d 1083 ( 2011 )

View All Authorities »