In Re: J.A.A., a Minor, Appeal of: L.A. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S30029-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: J.A.A., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: L.A., BIRTH MOTHER                :   No. 47 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Decree December 8, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans' Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000187-2016
    IN RE: W.A., A MINOR                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: L.A., BIRTH MOTHER                :   No. 48 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Decree December 8, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans' Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000186-2016
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED JUNE 11, 2018
    L.A. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered December 8, 2017, in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated
    involuntarily her parental rights to her minor sons, W.A., born in December
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S30029-18
    2006, and J.A.A., born in December 2013 (collectively, “the Children”).1 After
    careful review, we affirm.
    The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) has
    a lengthy history of involvement with this family dating back to September
    2011.     N.T., 12/8/17, at 57.         CYF received its most recent referral on
    November 28, 2014, which alleged housing issues, medical neglect, and poor
    parenting skills on the part of Mother.          Id. at 60-61.   CYF conducted an
    investigation, which revealed that Mother was intellectually limited and
    appeared to be hoarding food.            Id. at 61.   In addition, J.A.A. had been
    hospitalized several times for reactive airway disease, and Mother was failing
    to administer his medication properly. Id. at 61, 112. CYF referred Mother
    for in-home services. Id. at 62.
    CYF obtained an emergency custody authorization for the Children on
    June 26, 2015, after J.A.A. “fell down and cut his lip open and chipped his
    tooth.” Id. at 63. CYF directed Mother to take J.A.A. to hospital, but she
    failed to do so. Id. CYF was also concerned that Mother’s home was cluttered
    and dirty, and that she was failing to provide appropriate supervision for the
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    1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of W.A.’s father, J.P.; of
    two potential fathers for J.A.A., D.D. and S.R.; and of any unknown father
    that J.A.A. may have. J.P. appealed the termination of his parental rights at
    Superior Court docket number 67 WDA 2018. We address his appeal in a
    separate memorandum. No father appealed the termination of his parental
    rights to J.A.A.
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    Children and ensure their safety. Id. at 63-64. The Children were adjudicated
    dependent on August 15, 2015. Id. at 66.
    On October 20, 2016, CYF filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental
    rights to the Children involuntarily. CYF filed an amended petition as to J.A.A.
    on August 8, 2017. The trial court conducted a hearing on December 8, 2017,
    after which it entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights.2 Mother
    timely filed a notice of appeal on January 4, 2018, along with a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal.
    Mother now raises the following question for our review: “Did the trial
    court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that CYF
    met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination
    of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
    [C]hildren pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(b)?” Mother’s Brief at 9.
    We review Mother’s issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
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    2The Children had the benefit of separate legal counsel during the hearing.
    They remain represented on appeal.
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    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
    analysis:
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
    termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
    to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provides as follows:
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    ***
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
    neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
    to be without essential parental care, control or
    subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
    being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
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    abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
    remedied by the parent.
    ***
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of
    the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
    not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
    period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
    available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of
    the child within a reasonable period of time and
    termination of the parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child.
    ***
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
    the date of removal or placement, the conditions
    which led to the removal or placement of the child
    continue to exist and termination of parental rights
    would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
    ***
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
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    In her brief on appeal, Mother makes no effort to argue that the trial
    court abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights pursuant to
    Section 2511(a). Mother also failed to include Section 2511(a) in her concise
    statement and statement of questions involved. Therefore, Mother waived
    any challenge to Section 2511(a), and we focus our attention on Section
    2511(b). See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 
    163 A.3d 462
    , 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (holding that the appellant waived Section 2511(a) by failing to develop it in
    her brief, and that she waived Section 2511(b) by failing to include it in her
    concise statements and statement of questions involved).          The requisite
    analysis is as follows:
    Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
    would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
    needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
    Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
    the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
    however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
    between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
    our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
    is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
    it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
    court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
    [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
    equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
    should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
    comfort, security, and stability the child might have
    with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
    that the trial court should consider the importance of
    continuity of relationships and whether any existing
    parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
    effects on the child.
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    In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
    In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    , 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    Here, Mother argues that CYF failed to present clear and convincing
    evidence with respect to Section 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 14-19. Mother
    contends that the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of psychologist,
    Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., who evaluated the Children and recommended that
    they be adopted by their foster parents. Id. at 14. Mother insists that Dr.
    Rosenblum made his recommendation contingent “on the hope or expectation
    that Mother will be allowed to have ongoing contact with [the Children.]” Id.
    at 14, 18. However, ongoing contact cannot be assured if her parental rights
    are terminated.       Id.   Mother directs our attention to Dr. Rosenblum’s
    conclusion that the Children love Mother, and would derive a benefit from
    maintaining contact with her and with their other maternal relatives. Id. at
    14-15, 18-19.
    In its opinion, the trial court found that there is no possibility that the
    Children will ever return to Mother’s care, due to her significant intellectual
    limitations and inability to live independently, among other things. Trial Court
    Opinion, 2/6/18, at 10-11. The court further found that the Children have “a
    ‘relationship’ of sorts with Mother,” but that this relationship is not so
    substantial that severing it will subject the Children to a negative psychological
    impact. Id. at 11. The court reasoned that the Children had been in care for
    more than two and a half years, and that Mother has had only sporadic contact
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    with them during that time. Id. at 9. In addition, the Children are benefiting
    from the care of their pre-adoptive foster parents, who can provide the
    Children with the loving and stable environment they need. Id. at 11-12.
    After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion. During the termination hearing,
    Dr. Rosenblum testified that he conducted a series of psychological
    evaluations involving Mother, the Children, and Children’s foster parents
    between August 2016 and November 2017. N.T., 12/8/17, at 8-9, 11, 18.
    Based on these evaluations, Dr. Rosenblum opined that Mother lacks the
    capacity to parent the Children. Id. at 17. Dr. Rosenblum explained that he
    diagnosed Mother with a mild intellectual disability. Id. at 12. Mother has
    never maintained consistent employment or her own housing. Id. Moreover,
    Mother has limited capabilities in terms of being able to shop, cook, and travel
    to different places in the community. Id. at 13. Dr. Rosenblum explained
    that Mother’s limitations make it “challenging for her to function independently
    as an adult let alone assuming the responsibility to care for two children.” Id.
    at 18.
    Concerning Mother’s relationship with the Children, Dr. Rosenblum
    testified that Mother is far more responsive to J.A.A. than W.A. Id. at 14.
    Mother “largely ignored” W.A. during the evaluations unless Dr. Rosenblum
    prompted her to interact with him.       Id.   W.A. “was totally fine with not
    interacting with his mother at all, and he openly has said to me I believe on
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    more than one occasion that he wants to stay where he is . . . .” Id. at 16.
    Meanwhile, J.A.A. became disruptive and aggressive while in Mother’s
    presence. Id. at 14-15. Dr. Rosenblum testified that J.A.A. “senses that she’s
    not going to set any limits and he starts to throw things, hit people on
    occasion, and it’s very difficult for [Mother] to give him any direction or
    promote learning activities or more age-appropriate expectations unless
    specifically guided or requested by me during these two evaluations.” Id. at
    15.
    Dr. Rosenblum concluded that the Children share a bond with Mother,
    but that this bond is not a healthy or appropriate parent/child bond. Id. He
    recommended that Mother be allowed to have contact with the Children going
    forward, but did not believe that severing the Children’s relationship with
    Mother would cause them severe trauma. Id. at 25-27. He explained:
    As far as the bond though, I mean, yes, the children know
    their mom. I think they love her, but they don’t look to her as an
    authority figure. They don’t look to her as someone whom they
    rely on for any kind of parental direction or support.
    She’s a caring person. She’s an affectionate person, but not
    able to promote or provide the children with appropriate
    supervision, which is, you know, a large reason why they were
    removed from her care in the first place.
    ***
    They don’t look to her as the parent figure who they are --
    who is going to help them[,] support them, meet their needs.
    They look to her as somebody who is pleasant, loving, particularly,
    you know, in regard to [J.A.A.], and someone who has always
    been in their life, but it’s not a relationship where they look to her
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    as someone who is going to carry out necessary parental
    responsibilities or direction for them.
    Id. at 15-16.3
    Dr. Rosenblum also praised the Children’s foster parents. Id. at 18, 25.
    He testified that the foster parents “are very focused, very responsible and
    likely to be highly successful in providing long term, very productive care and
    a stable environment for the boys that will help guide them in the right
    direction and allow them to achieve an optimal level of functioning.” Id. at
    25. Dr. Rosenblum recommended that adoption by the foster parents would
    be consistent with the Children’s needs and welfare. Id.
    Thus, the record supports the trial court’s findings pursuant to Section
    2511(b). Mother’s intellectual limitations and inability to live independently
    render her incapable of parenting the Children. Moreover, while the Children
    have a relationship with Mother, they do not have a necessary and beneficial
    parent/child bond. The Children are now in a pre-adoptive foster home. The
    Children’s foster parents are supportive of their needs, and can provide them
    with a safe and stable environment.
    Importantly, the record supports the trial court’s findings even though
    there is no guarantee that the Children will be able to maintain ongoing
    ____________________________________________
    3The record indicates that Mother missed many of her visits with the Children.
    CYF caseworker, Vickie Naccarato, testified that Mother attended only forty-
    two out of one hundred and eight possible visits between January 12, 2016,
    and December 4, 2017. N.T., 12/8/17, at 90.
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    contact with Mother. Contrary to Mother’s argument on appeal, our review of
    the record reveals that Dr. Rosenblum did not make his recommendation
    contingent on ongoing contact.        Mother’s counsel cross-examined Dr.
    Rosenblum on this specific issue, and he testified that his recommendation
    would stand even if no contact takes place. Id. at 36.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s December 8, 2017
    decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children involuntarily.
    Decrees affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/11/2018
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Document Info

Docket Number: 47 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 6/11/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021