Olmos v. Holder , 780 F.3d 1313 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 24, 2015
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
MANUEL OLMOS,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v. No. 14-1085
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent-Appellant.
ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING
JUSTICE; ASIAN AMERICANS
ADVANCING JUSTICE-ASIAN LAW
CAUCUS; DETENTION WATCH
NETWORK; FAMILIES FOR
FREEDOM; IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
CLINIC; IMMIGRATION
EQUALITY; THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN IMMIGRANT
ADVOCACY NETWORK; THE
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
BOULDER LAW SCHOOL
CRIMINAL/IMMIGRATION
DEFENSE CLINIC; THE
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM
COLLEGE OF LAW HYBRID
IMMIGRATION PROGRAM,
Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-03158-RM)
Hans H. Chen, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office
of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C. (Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Colin A. Kisor, Acting
Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, District Court Section, Jeffrey S.
Robins, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C.,
with him on the briefs), for Respondent-Appellant.
Michael K. T. Tan, American Civil Liberties Foundation Immigrants’ Rights
Project, San Francisco, California (Eunice Lee, American Civil Liberties
Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project, San Francisco, California, Judy
Rabinovitz, American Civil Liberties Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project,
New York, New York, and Mark Silverstein, ACLU of Colorado, Denver,
Colorado, with him on the brief), for Petitioner-Appellee.
Jon Streeter, Stacy Chen, and Theresa H. Nguyen, Keker & Van Nest LLP, San
Francisco, California, filed an Amici Curiae brief for Asian Americans Advancing
Justice and AAJC and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus.
Alina Das, Washington Square Legal Services, Inc., Immigrant Rights Clinic,
New York, New York, filed an Amici Curiae brief for Detention Watch Network,
Families for Freedom, Immigrant Rights Clinic, Immigration Equality, The Rocky
Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network, The University of Colorado Boulder
Law School Criminal/Immigration Defense Clinic, and the University of Denver
Sturm College of Law Hybrid Immigration Program.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, HOLMES, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
2
For aliens, a criminal conviction can often result in removal (deportation).
When an alien is convicted and the federal government seeks removal, an
immigration judge can ordinarily conduct a bond hearing to decide whether the
alien should be released or detained while he waits for his removal hearing. But,
in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), Congress has required detention (without a bond hearing)
for some categories of aliens. These aliens must be taken into custody by the
United States Attorney General when they are released in their criminal cases.
Against the backdrop of this statutory framework, Mr. Manuel Olmos (a
citizen of Mexico) was convicted in state court on charges involving identity
theft, providing false information to a pawnbroker, and forgery of a government
document. Mr. Olmos obtained probation, but was taken into federal custody six
days later on the ground that his conviction triggered mandatory detention.
Mr. Olmos sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was entitled to a
bond hearing, where he could seek release while his removal hearing was
pending. The district court agreed with Mr. Olmos and granted a writ of habeas
corpus, holding that he was entitled to a bond hearing. At the eventual bond
hearing, Mr. Olmos was released on a $12,000 bond.
The government contends that the Attorney General had a statutory duty to
detain Mr. Olmos (without a bond hearing) notwithstanding his six-day gap in
custody. We agree with the government based on (1) deference to the way the
3
Board of Immigration Appeals has interpreted § 1226(c) and (2) the continued
duty to impose mandatory detention even if the Attorney General had waited too
long to take custody of Mr. Olmos. For both reasons, we reverse.
I. Jurisdiction
Though Mr. Olmos does not challenge jurisdiction, we must address the
issue sua sponte. Weber v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d 1002, 1009
(10th Cir. 2008).
We would lack jurisdiction if the Attorney General had discretion in
applying 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012). But, Mr. Olmos is not
challenging a discretionary decision, for the Attorney General has disclaimed any
discretion in mandatory detention. Thus, we have jurisdiction over the
government’s appeal. See Sylvain v. Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.
2013) (“Nothing in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) prevents us from deciding whether the
immigration officials had statutory authority to impose mandatory detention.”).
II. Statutory Interpretation (the Statutory Reference to “Paragraph (1)”)
We must exercise this jurisdiction by deciding the extent of the Attorney
General’s authority. This authority is governed by two parts of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c), which are entitled “Custody” and “Release.” The first part (entitled
“Custody”) states that the Attorney General must take custody of certain aliens
“when . . . released.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). The second part (entitled
4
“Release”) restricts the Attorney General’s authority to release aliens described in
the first part. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012).
We must decide whether this restriction applies when there is a gap
between expiration of the criminal sentence and confinement by the Attorney
General. Mr. Olmos states that the restriction does not apply when there is a gap
in custody; the government states that the restriction applies regardless of when
the Attorney General takes the alien into custody.
A. Chevron Analysis
The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the government’s
interpretation, concluding that the statutory restriction on release applies even
when there is a gap in custody. In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 125 (B.I.A.
2001). To decide whether we should defer to the Board, we engage in a two-part
inquiry under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). The first step is to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken”
on the issue. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress has directly
spoken, we do not accord any deference to the Board’s interpretation. Id. at 842-
43. But, if Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, we must decide if the
Board’s interpretation is permissible. Id. at 843.
5
B. The First Step of Chevron: Whether Congress Has Directly
Spoken
To determine whether Congress has directly spoken, we consider the
statutory text and other clues regarding Congress’s meaning.
1. The Statutory Text
We begin with the statutory language:
(1) Custody
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who–
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense
covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered
in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the
basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence [sic] to
a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or
deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is
released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard
to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same
offense.
(2) Release
The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1)
only if the Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18
that release of the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection
to a witness, a potential witness, a person cooperating with an
investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family
6
member or close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person
cooperating with such an investigation, and the alien satisfies the
Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of
other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled
proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall take place in
accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense
committed by the alien.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
The text makes clear that the Attorney General must take custody of aliens
in four categories (“A” through “D” of Paragraph “1”) when they are released.
Mr. Olmos argues that the Attorney General must exercise this statutory
obligation immediately upon release from confinement in the criminal case. For
the sake of argument, we may assume that Mr. Olmos is correct.
If Mr. Olmos is correct, he should have been kept in continuous custody,
with the Attorney General taking custody immediately upon release in the state
criminal case. That did not happen, for Mr. Olmos had six days of freedom before
being taken into the Attorney General’s custody. Thus, we must ask: Did the
Attorney General lose this power through his six-day delay?
To answer this question, we turn to the statutory text. It provides the
Attorney General with limited power to release aliens, stating: “The Attorney
General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if” certain
conditions are met. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012). What does it mean to be “an
alien described in paragraph (1)”? Mr. Olmos states that this phrase refers to
7
aliens in Paragraphs “A” through “D” only if they are taken into custody
immediately upon release in their criminal cases; the government states that the
phrase refers to aliens in Paragraphs “A” through “D” regardless of when they are
taken into the Attorney General’s custody.
Both interpretations are plausible because the statutory text is ambiguous in
its reference to “an alien described in paragraph (1).” Id. This phrase may refer
solely to aliens in Paragraphs “A” through “D,” as the government says. Or, the
phrase may refer to these aliens only when they are taken into immediate custody,
as Mr. Olmos says. The answer lies in what it means to be “an alien described in
paragraph (1).” Id. To interpret this phrase, we must go beyond the statutory text.
2. Other Clues Regarding the Correct Interpretation
To do so, we use “traditional tools of statutory construction.” Anderson v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 422 F.3d 1155, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005). In this case, the
parties point to tools of statutory construction involving grammatical structure,
legislative history, generality of the statutory cross-reference to “paragraph (1),”
and case law on the interpretation of “flush language.” These tools do not remove
the existing ambiguity in the statute, for none definitively answer whether the
reference to “paragraph (1)” incorporates the taking of custody “when the alien is
released.”
8
a. Grammatical Structure
The government points to the grammatical structure of § 1226(c), requiring
us to interpret two phrases:
1. “when the alien is released,” and
2. “an alien described in paragraph (1).”
The government states that the first phrase (“when the alien is released”) is an
adverbial phrase, which must modify a verb rather than a noun. Thus, according
to the government, a grammarian could reasonably conclude that the noun phrase
(“an alien described in paragraph (1)”) could not be modified by an adverbial
clause (“when the alien is released”). But, this argument begs the question: The
phrase “when the alien is released” can be adjectival or adverbial, depending on
its function in the sentence. As a result, the grammar does not remove the
inherent ambiguity in § 1226(c)(1).
This section contains three parts:
1. the opening phrase (“The Attorney General shall take into custody
any alien who–”)
2. the middle part (“A” through “D,” referring to the reasons that a
given alien might be considered “inadmissible” or “deportable”)
3. the end phrase (“when the alien is released” without regard to the
form of release or potential reincarceration for the same offense).
9
The end phrase can modify (1) the opening phrase (by describing the aliens who
are to be taken into custody), or (2) the middle part (by describing the aliens
considered inadmissible or deportable).
If the end phrase simply modifies the opening phrase, the government’s
interpretation would be correct. But, this is not the only possible reading: The end
phrase can also be read as modifying the middle part (by clarifying the aliens who
are identified in Paragraphs “A” through “D”). Under this interpretation, Mr.
Olmos would prevail because aliens would be described in Paragraph “1” only if
they were immediately taken into custody upon release in their criminal cases.
Because either interpretation is plausible from the text alone, the government’s
grammatical characterization does not remove the ambiguity.
b. Legislative History
The government relies not only on the grammar, but also on the legislative
history. In adopting § 1226(c), Congress sought to reduce the risk of
nonappearance for aliens who had committed crimes. See S. Rep. No. 104-48, at
23 (1995) (“Many criminal aliens who are released pending their deportation
never appear for their deportation proceedings.”). Thus, the government argues
that Congress would have preferred reincarceration to ensure appearance at the
removal hearing — regardless of whether there had been a gap in custody.
10
But, again, the government’s reliance on congressional intent does not
remove the ambiguity. Congress did not impose mandatory detention for all aliens
guilty of crimes. Instead, Congress drew lines, imposing mandatory detention for
some aliens and not for others. Congress could conceivably have been less
concerned about the appearance of aliens who had been released and had not
taken the opportunity to flee. Thus, the government’s reliance on congressional
intent does not remove the inherent ambiguity: Congress might or might not have
wanted bond hearings for aliens like Mr. Olmos who had not fled after obtaining
release.
c. Generality in the Statutory Cross-Reference to “Paragraph (1)”
Mr. Olmos points to other statutory clues. For example, he emphasizes that
Congress referred to aliens “described in paragraph (1)” and that this paragraph
went beyond identifying aliens considered “inadmissible” or “deportable.” The
paragraph also directed the Attorney General to take custody of these aliens (the
opening phrase) and told him when to do that (“when the alien is released”). Mr.
Olmos argues that when Congress referred to aliens “described in paragraph (1),”
Congress had to be referring to the entirety of Paragraph “1.” And, the entirety of
Paragraph “1” contemplated continuous confinement of aliens identified in “A”
through “D.”
11
To Mr. Olmos, the meaning is clear: If Congress wanted to focus
exclusively on aliens identified in Paragraphs “A” through “D,” the statute would
have referred to aliens “described in paragraph (1)(A)-(D)” instead of aliens
“described in paragraph (1).” In fact, Congress elsewhere used this kind of
specific citation form when it intended to refer to a specific subsection. For
example, in § 1226(d)(2), Congress referred to “[t]he record under paragraph
(1)(C).” Mr. Olmos points out that Congress could easily have used the same
specific form of citation (referring to aliens “described in paragraph (1)(A)-(D)”)
if the intent was to focus on “A” through “D” regardless of when the aliens had
been released.
But, the government points out that Congress has not always been
consistent in how it refers to other subsections in the same statute. For example,
in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(B)(i), Congress referred broadly to “subparagraph (A)”
even though the context showed that Congress was referring to only two subparts
of “subparagraph (A)”: (i) and (ii). Thus, Congress’s reference to “paragraph
(1)”—rather than “paragraph (1)(A)-(D)”—might not have reflected an intent to
incorporate the end phrase (“when the alien is released”).
d. The Interpretation of “Flush Language”
Mr. Olmos also points to case law on how to interpret “flush language.” As
noted above, § 1226(c)(1) consists of three parts: an opening phrase (directing the
12
Attorney General to take custody of aliens), the middle part (identifying the aliens
who are to be taken into custody), and the end phrase (“when the alien is
released”). The first and third parts of § 1226(c)(1) are considered “flush,”
meaning they begin at the left margin on the page. The middle part (Paragraphs
“A” through “D”) consists of “inset clauses,” meaning they are indented. As Mr.
Olmos points out, some courts state that “flush” language is intended to refer to
the entire section. See Snowa v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 123 F.3d 190, 196
n.10 (4th Cir. 1997); Reser v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 112 F.3d 1258, 1262
n.10 (5th Cir. 1997); Sherwin-Williams Co. Emp. Health Plan Trust v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 330 F.3d 449, 454 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003).
But, these cases do not remove the ambiguity in whether the flush language
(“when the alien is released”) was intended to qualify the list of aliens identified
in “A” through “D.” As noted above, there are two flush clauses in § 1226(c)(1).
Mr. Olmos has focused on the second flush clause (“when the alien is released”).
But, there is also another “flush clause”: “The Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien who–.” No one suggests that this clause could be used to
describe the aliens listed in “A” through “D.”
The two “flush” clauses might simply be read as two parts of a cohesive
sentence. The sentence would read: “The Attorney General shall take into custody
any alien who–[is identified in ‘A’ through ‘D’] when the alien is released . . . .”
13
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). Thus, case law on the use of “flush language” does
not remove the inherent ambiguity in the reference to aliens “described in
paragraph (1).”
e. Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
Mr. Olmos argues that § 1226(c) is unambiguous because the Board’s
interpretation would create serious constitutional questions. This argument does
not advance the inquiry at step one of Chevron.
The problem with the argument is that it reflects a misapplication of the
canon of constitutional avoidance. This canon provides that when a particular
construction would raise serious constitutional problems, the court will avoid that
construction unless doing so would plainly conflict with Congress’s intent.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). As Mr. Olmos states, this canon provides “‘a tool for
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text.’” Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005), quoted in Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 34.
But, at the first step of Chevron, we examine solely “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Thus, the canon of
constitutional avoidance does not bear on our inquiry at step one. See Warger v.
14
Shauers, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (stating that the canon of
constitutional avoidance applies only if the statute is ambiguous).
f. Rule of Lenity
According to Mr. Olmos, the rule of lenity suggests that the statute is
unambiguous. We disagree.
Mr. Olmos invokes lenity at step one, where we are determining only
whether Congress has directly spoken. See Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 33-37. But, the
rule of lenity applies only if the statute is grievously ambiguous. Robers v. United
States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1859 (2014). Section 1226(c) can be
grievously ambiguous only if Congress failed to directly speak on the issue. Thus,
Mr. Olmos’s invocation of lenity at step one is self-defeating: Lenity can apply
only if the government has satisfied Chevron’s first step by showing ambiguity in
the statute.
g. Interplay Between Paragraphs “1” & “2”
Mr. Olmos also points to the structure of Paragraphs “1” and “2” in
§ 1226(c). Paragraph “1” is entitled “Custody”; Paragraph “2” is entitled
“Release.” Based on these titles, Mr. Olmos argues that it would be odd if the
rules of custody were to be found in Paragraph “2,” where one would expect to
find the rules governing release. Mr. Olmos adds that this oddity is heightened by
the language in Paragraph “2,” which addresses limitations on the Attorney
15
General’s power to “release an alien described in paragraph (1).” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(2) (2012). An alien can be released only if he is already in custody.
Thus, Mr. Olmos argues that Paragraph “2” cannot serve as the sole provision
authorizing the Attorney General to take an alien into custody. But, it isn’t.
That authority also arises in Paragraph “1.” There the statute requires the
Attorney General to take aliens into custody if they are covered by categories “A”
through “D.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). As Mr. Olmos points out, the
Attorney General must exercise this responsibility “when the alien is released.”
Id. But, what happens when the Attorney General fails to take aliens into custody
when they are released? The government argues that apart from § 1226(c)(2), the
Attorney General had an ongoing duty to take custody.
That interpretation is plausible, 1 making Mr. Olmos’s argument irrelevant
because the authority for mandatory detention would arise under § 1226(c)(1), not
§ 1226(c)(2). With the alien in the Attorney General’s custody under his delayed
enforcement of § 1226(c)(1), there would be nothing odd about § 1226(c)(2)’s
restrictions on when the alien can be released. Thus, Mr. Olmos’s reliance on the
structure and titles in § 1226(c) does not remove the ambiguity on whether the
reference to Paragraph “1” incorporates the phrase “when the alien is released.”
1
E.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158-59 (2003); Brock v.
Pierce Cnty. 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986).
16
h. Summary
The text, the statutory clues, and canons of interpretation do not
definitively clarify the meaning of § 1226(c). Even with the statutory text, clues,
and canons, a reader cannot tell from the text alone whether aliens remain subject
to mandatory detention after a gap in custody.
C. The Second Step of Chevron: Whether the Board’s Statutory
Interpretation Was Permissible
Because Congress has not directly spoken on the issue, we consider how
the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted the statute and decide whether this
interpretation was permissible. See p. 5, above. The Board’s interpretation is
permissible unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to”
§ 1226(c). Berneike v. Citimortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141, 1148 (10th Cir. 2013).
As noted above, the Board held in In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 125
(B.I.A. 2001) that § 1226(c) required mandatory detention of aliens listed in “A”
through “D” regardless of gaps in confinement. This interpretation is permissible.
1. The Alleged Irrationality of Rojas
Mr. Olmos and amici curiae contend that Rojas leads to unjust, irrational
results, uprooting aliens from the community when they are the family’s sole
source of income, eligible for relief from removal, and tied to family in the
United States. This contention overlooks Congress’s policy determination that
aliens in certain categories (Paragraphs “A” through “D”) must be detained
17
without a bond hearing even when they are the family’s sole source of income,
are eligible for relief from removal, and have family ties in the United States. The
Board of Immigration Appeals is not free to second-guess Congress’s policy
judgment; the Board’s sole task was to determine whether Congress had intended
to exempt aliens from mandatory detention when the Attorney General was slow
to act. The alleged hardships flow from Congress’s policy judgment, not from the
Board’s interpretation of the statute in Rojas.
2. The Rule of Lenity and Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
As discussed above, Mr. Olmos argued at step one of Chevron that § 1226
is unambiguous based on the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional
avoidance. These arguments are misguided because lenity and constitutional
avoidance come into play only if the statute is ambiguous. Though Mr. Olmos
does not address lenity or constitutional avoidance at step two of Chevron, we do
so to ensure the Board’s interpretation would not run afoul of well accepted
principles of statutory interpretation. They wouldn’t.
a. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
The canon of constitutional avoidance would not preclude the Board’s
interpretation of § 1226. As noted above, this canon provides a method of
choosing between otherwise plausible interpretations of a statute. See p. 14,
above. At step two of Chevron, we are simply determining whether an agency’s
18
interpretation is permissible. See p. 5, above. An agency’s interpretation may be
permissible even if it would create constitutional issues. See Morales-Izquierdo v.
Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 2
“[W]e do not abandon Chevron deference at the mere mention of a possible
constitutional problem,” 3 and the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of mandatory detention in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). Amici Asian
Americans Groups argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore does not
apply because there the alien’s confinement was continuous. This argument is not
correct. The Supreme Court did not state whether there had been a gap in custody.
But, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did, noting that the Attorney General had
taken the alien into custody one day after his release. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523,
526 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The day after his release from state custody, the
2
There the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
When Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to
fill, and the agency has filled it, we have no authority to re-construe the
statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems; we can only
decide whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a plausible reading
of the statutory text . . . . [T]he constitutional avoidance doctrine . . .
plays no role in the second Chevron inquiry.
Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(internal citation omitted).
3
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
19
Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . detained Kim pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(B) . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
Mr. Olmos had six days of freedom, rather than one, after being released on
probation in his criminal case. 4 But, there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s
decision that would cast doubt on the constitutionality of mandatory detention for
someone who had enjoyed six days (rather than one day) of freedom.
According to Mr. Olmos, Demore does not apply because it “involved a
constitutional challenge brought by a noncitizen who conceded § 1226(c)’s
applicability to him.” Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 32 n.13 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 522 (2003)). But, this fact does not distinguish Demore. There the alien
did not deny that he was “deportable” under § 1226(c). Demore, 538 U.S. at 522(“Nor did he argue that he himself was not ‘deportable’ within the meaning of
4
Mr. Olmos contends that the gap in custody was four months rather than six
days. This contention is incorrect.
The parties apparently agree that physical custody is required to trigger
§ 1226(c): Otherwise, how could the alien be “released”? Mr. Olmos argues that
the physical custody must be ordered as part of the sentence; the government
contends that the physical custody can take place when the alien is arrested. We
need not decide this issue because it was forfeited in district court. See pp. 26-29,
below. But, both parties acknowledge that the Attorney General could not have
taken custody until Mr. Olmos was sentenced to probation in his state criminal
cases. That sentence was imposed six days before the Attorney General took
custody of Mr. Olmos. Thus, the Attorney General’s delay spanned six days—not
four months.
20
§ 1226(c).”). But, that is also true here, for Mr. Olmos has not denied that he is
“deportable” for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Mr. Olmos also tries to narrow the scope of the holding in Demore based
on Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence. The Court split 5-4 on the
constitutionality of mandatory detention. Justice Kennedy, who was among the
five justices in the majority, noted that due process concerns could arise if
deportation proceedings took too long or continued detention became
“unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). But, Justice Kennedy did not suggest that a short gap
in custody could render detention unreasonable or unjustified. And, he ultimately
joined the majority opinion, which upheld the constitutionality of mandatory
detention even though the Ninth Circuit had acknowledged a one-day gap in
custody.
In light of Demore, the canon of constitutional avoidance would not suggest
congressional intent to excuse mandatory detention for a six-day gap in custody. 5
b. Rule of Lenity
Mr. Olmos has not suggested that we apply lenity at step two. But, if we
were to do so, we would be applying lenity only to decide whether the Board
engaged in a permissible interpretation of § 1226. See p. 5, above. For this
5
Constitutional considerations could become greater when the gap in
custody is considerably longer than six days.
21
purpose, lenity would provide little help. See Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 F.3d
147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that the rule of lenity “does not trump Chevron’s
requirement of deference to reasonable interpretations by administrative agencies
of statutes for which they are responsible”); Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412
F.3d 526, 535 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Rather than apply a presumption of lenity to
resolve the ambiguity, Chevron requires that we defer to the agency’s reasonable
construction of the statute.”); Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir.
2005) (“[T]he rule of lenity does not foreclose deference to an administrative
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute.”); see also Amador-Palomares v.
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the rule of lenity “does
not supplant Chevron deference merely because a seemingly harsh outcome may
result from the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] interpretation”).
3. Summary
The Board of Immigration Appeals provided a permissible interpretation of
§ 1226(c)(2), concluding that the reference to Paragraph “1” did not incorporate
the phrase “when the alien is released.” Deferring to this interpretation, we draw
the same conclusion: In § 1226(c)(2), Congress limited the Attorney General’s
power to allow release of aliens identified in “A” through “D” even when there
had been a six-day gap in custody. Thus, Mr. Olmos was not entitled to a bond
22
hearing and the district court erred when it declined to authorize mandatory
detention.
III. The Attorney General’s Continued Duty to Impose Mandatory
Detention
We also reverse for a second reason: Congress required the Attorney
General to impose mandatory detention for aliens like Mr. Olmos who were
convicted of certain crimes; even if the Attorney General failed to fulfill this
requirement in a timely manner (as Mr. Olmos argues), the statutory requirement
would not have disappeared. The requirement would have remained, and the
Attorney General would eventually have had to detain Mr. Olmos under
§ 1226(c).
As noted above, § 1226(c)(1) states: “The Attorney General shall take into
custody any alien who–[fits into Paragraphs “A” through “D”] when the alien is
released . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). The parties disagree on the meaning
of “when the alien is released.” According to Mr. Olmos, this phrase refers to the
instant in which the alien is released from criminal confinement. For the sake of
argument, we may assume that Mr. Olmos is correct. If he is, the Attorney
General would have had a statutory duty to take custody of Mr. Olmos as soon as
he was released on probation in his criminal case. The Attorney General did not
do that. Instead, he waited six days to take Mr. Olmos into custody. The question
is what happened to the Attorney General’s statutory duty: Did it vanish?
23
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a statute requires a
governmental actor (like the Attorney General) to do something within a deadline
and he fails to do it, the requirement continues. E.g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158-59 (2003); Brock v. Pierce Cnty. 476 U.S. 253, 260
(1986); see also p. 16 & note 1, above.
Mr. Olmos does not quarrel with this principle. Instead, he argues that a
bond hearing would not strip the Attorney General of the ability to obtain
detention, for he could still pursue detention through a bond hearing. This
argument mischaracterizes the requirement imposed on the Attorney General in
§ 1226(c)(1): The Attorney General must detain aliens in Paragraphs “A” through
“D” without a bond hearing. If an immigration judge orders release after a bond
hearing, the Attorney General would no longer be carrying out the statutory
requirement to take the alien into custody.
The Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation in United States v.
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990). There the Bail Reform Act required the
district court to conduct a detention hearing immediately upon the individual’s
initial appearance before a judge. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 714. The district
court failed to timely conduct the detention hearing, ruling later that the
government had lost its ability to order detention. Id. at 716.
24
Strict enforcement of the court’s deadline would not have left the district
court powerless. Without a detention hearing, the prosecutor could have sought
“any conditions of release that [were] ‘reasonably necessary to assure the
appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person
and the community.’” Id. at 727 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv)). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court had retained its duty to conduct a detention hearing even if the court had
waited too long. Id. at 717-22.
The Supreme Court’s rationale is equally applicable here. The duty here
involves mandatory detention rather than the holding of a detention hearing (as in
Montalvo-Murillo). The governmental actor here (the Attorney General) is
similarly situated to the governmental actor in Montalvo-Murillo (the district
court). There the governmental actor’s delay did not vitiate the statutory duty, for
the district court retained the duty to hold a detention hearing. Thus, the delay
here by the governmental actor (the Attorney General) would not have vitiated his
statutory duty to impose detention without a bond hearing even though the
immigration judge might order detention after considering the options.
Mr. Olmos points out that even without mandatory detention, immigration
judges might order detention. But, they might not. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1)
(2013). For example, here the immigration judge released Mr. Olmos on bond. By
25
doing so, the immigration judge prevented the Attorney General from doing what
Congress required of him: to detain Mr. Olmos without a bond hearing.
According to Mr. Olmos, § 1226(c)(1) describes the aliens subject to
mandatory detention. For the sake of argument, we may assume that Mr. Olmos is
correct. But, even if he is, § 1226(c)(1) would constitute an unambiguous
requirement imposed on the Attorney General. The section states: “The Attorney
General shall take into custody any alien who—[falls under ‘A’ through ‘D’]
when the alien is released . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2012). Regardless of
whether the section serves a second purpose (describing the aliens subject to
mandatory detention), it unambiguously required the Attorney General to take
custody of Mr. Olmos once he was released in his criminal case.
The Attorney General waited too long to carry out that requirement. Thus,
Mr. Olmos argues that the statutory requirement would have disappeared. But,
Congress’s statutory command did not vanish as a result of the Attorney
General’s delay. That command was for the Attorney General to detain aliens in
certain categories (Paragraphs “A” through “D” of § 1226(c)(1)) without a bond
hearing.
IV. The Petitioner’s Alternative Argument (the Necessity of Confinement
in the Criminal Case)
Mr. Olmos argues in the alternative that § 1226(c) applies only to someone
who has already been subject to incarceration as part of a criminal sentence. If
26
this interpretation is correct, Mr. Olmos would not be subject to § 1226(c)
because he was sentenced to probation rather than criminal confinement.
Mr. Olmos forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in his habeas
petition. We interpret the petition liberally because Mr. Olmos was pro se at the
time. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir.
2005). Even with a liberal construction, however, we cannot fairly interpret the
habeas petition to include this claim.
In the habeas petition, Mr. Olmos included the phrase “from incarceration”
in a single sentence:
As more fully explained in the accompanying memorandum of law, the
plain text, context, and structure of the statute make clear that the
clause “when the alien is released” applies to aliens who are being
released from incarceration on the underlying offense, not from any
offense, and in close temporal proximity to the release for that
underlying offense.
Appellant’s App. at 13. But, Mr. Olmos never made any argument about the fact
that he had not been incarcerated as part of his sentence. Instead, he argued that
§ 1226(c) did not apply because of the Attorney General’s delay in invoking
mandatory detention. Id. at 14.
Mr. Olmos also points to his oral argument in the district court. There Mr.
Olmos began his argument: “I have been looking at this law, 8 U.S.C., but, you
know, I haven’t really spent time in jail, and I do have a possibility of staying in
this country, because my wife is a U.S. citizen, my children are U.S. citizens.”
27
Appellee’s Supp. App. at 29. Through this comment, Mr. Olmos apparently was
trying to tell the district court he had not been in serious trouble in his criminal
cases. Whatever Mr. Olmos intended, however, his comment (“I haven’t really
spent time in jail”) could not have alerted either the district court or the
respondent to an argument that § 1226(c) applies only when an alien has been
incarcerated as part of the sentence. Thus, neither the district court nor the
respondent ever addressed the argument.
Because Mr. Olmos failed to present this argument in district court, it is
forfeited. See United States v. Burke, 571 F.3d 1048, 1057 (10th Cir. 2009). If
Mr. Olmos had urged plain error, we could consider it. Id. But, he has not. As a
result, we decline to consider the argument. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634
F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its
application . . . surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not
first presented to the district court.”).
Mr. Olmos argues that we can entertain the argument because it is a central
issue and important to the public interest. But, our discretion is limited. We can
entertain new arguments only when they involve a matter of law and the proper
resolution is certain. Geddes v. United Staffing Alliance Emp. Med. Plan, 469
F.3d 919, 931 (10th Cir. 2006).
28
For the sake of argument, we can assume that this issue involves solely a
matter of law. But, the outcome is uncertain. The Board of Immigration Appeals
has held in precedential decisions that “release” under § 1226(c) can refer to
physical custody following arrest. In re West, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405, 1410 (B.I.A.
2000); In re Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 125 (B.I.A. 2007). Based in part on
these administrative decisions, one federal appellate court has decided that release
from an arrest had “fulfilled the release requirement” in § 1226(c). Sylvain v.
Attorney Gen., 714 F.3d 150, 161 (3d Cir. 2013). In light of the decisions by the
Board and the federal appeals court, we cannot regard a contrary outcome as
certain. In the absence of this certainty, we decline to address Mr. Olmos’s
interpretation of the term “release.” We defer consideration of that issue to a
future case, when the petitioner has preserved the issue in district court or urged
plain error.
V. Conclusion
Mr. Olmos was not entitled to a bond hearing because (1) we must defer to
the Board’s interpretation of § 1226(c)(2) and (2) the Attorney General would
have had to keep Mr. Olmos in detention even if there had been a gap in custody.
For both reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to deny the petition for
review.
29