Sharon Hatcher v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart ( 2004 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-3459
    ___________
    Sharon Hatcher,                        *
    *
    Appellant,                 *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                     * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Arkansas
    Jo Anne B. Barnhart,                   *
    Commissioner of Social                 *       [PUBLISHED]
    Security Administration,               *
    *
    Appellee.                  *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 16, 2004
    Filed: May 28, 2004
    ___________
    Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE, Circuit Judge, and MAGNUSON,1 District
    Judge.
    ___________
    MAGNUSON, District Judge.
    Appellant Sharon Hatcher appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Appellee Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security.
    We reverse and remand.
    1
    The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant Sharon Hatcher (“Hatcher”) claims a disability resulting primarily
    from fibromyalgia. She applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits in
    September 1998. Her application was denied both initially and on appeal. She then
    sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). At the time of the
    hearing, she was 46 years old. The ALJ determined that Hatcher could return to her
    past work as a telemarketer and denied her application. On the parties’ cross-motions
    for summary judgment, the District Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and this
    appeal followed.
    Hatcher has an extensive medical history, documented in a two-volume
    administrative record. She was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 1998. In addition to
    fibromyalgia, she suffers from degenerative disk disease in her back, carpal tunnel
    syndrome in both wrists, rheumatoid arthritis, and depression. She takes a wide
    variety of medication for these various complaints, and appears to visit either a
    medical doctor or a psychiatrist more than once per month.
    The ALJ determined that Hatcher’s complaints of pain were not entirely
    credible. Further, the ALJ discounted the opinion of one of Hatcher’s treating
    physicians, Dr. Williams, who opined that Hatcher was unable to work. According
    to the ALJ, this opinion usurped the ALJ’s role to determine disability and was in any
    event inconsistent with the medical record. The ALJ relied in part on the opinion of
    a one-time medical examiner, Dr. Leonard, who found that Hatcher “probably would
    be able to hold down gainful employment.” (Admin. Tr. at 24.)
    Hatcher contends that the ALJ erred in discounting her treating physician’s
    opinion. She argues that all of the medical evidence in the record, aside from that
    generated by the Social Security Administration, shows that she suffers from
    fibromyalgia and other complaints so severely that she is unable to work. Indeed, she
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    testified that she sleeps approximately five hours every day, that she is unable to do
    housework, that she does not take a shower unless her husband is at home because
    she is afraid of falling in the shower, and that she cannot concentrate or perform any
    substantial everyday living tasks.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court reviews the initial decision to deny benefits to determine whether
    substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports that decision. Bailey v. Apfel,
    
    230 F.3d 1063
    , 1065 (8th Cir. 2000).
    DISCUSSION
    In October 2003, a panel of this Court addressed a situation remarkably similar
    to the instant case. Cox v. Barnhart, 
    345 F.3d 606
    (8th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff in
    Cox applied for disability benefits on the basis of fibromyalgia and costochondritis.
    The ALJ disregarded the opinion of Cox’s treating physician, who, like Hatcher’s
    physician, opined that Cox was unable to work. The ALJ instead relied on the
    opinion of a one-time medical examiner, the same Dr. Leonard on whose opinion the
    ALJ in the instant matter relies. The panel ultimately found that the ALJ improperly
    disregarded the opinion of Cox’s treating physician. 
    Id. at 609.
    Further, the panel
    determined that the opinion of Dr. Leonard could not constitute substantial evidence
    supporting the ALJ’s decision. 
    Id. at 610
    (citing Jenkins v. Apfel, 
    196 F.2d 922
    , 925
    (8th Cir. 1999)). The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the
    Commissioner, and remanded the case for a determination of whether Cox could find
    employment in a competitive national economy, pursuant to McCoy v. Schweiker,
    
    683 F.2d 1138
    , 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that residual functional capacity of
    claimant “is the ability to perform the requisite physical acts day in and day out, in
    the sometimes competitive and stressful conditions in which real people work in the
    real world”).
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    The instant matter is almost indistinguishable from Cox. Here, as in Cox, the
    treating physician opined that Hatcher was unable to work. As in Cox, all of the
    treatment notes support Hatcher’s complaints and her claimed limitations. As in Cox,
    there is nothing in the record that contradicts Hatcher’s physician’s opinion aside
    from the opinion of the ALJ-appointed expert.
    Both the ALJ’s determination and the decision on the motions for summary
    judgment were issued long before this Court decided Cox. Thus, neither the ALJ nor
    the District Court had the benefit of this Court’s analysis in Cox. The ALJ and the
    District Court should have the opportunity to review their respective decisions in
    light of Cox. The proper remedy is therefore to reverse the decision below and to
    remand for consideration of our decision in Cox.
    Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in conformity with
    this opinion and with the decision in Cox v. Barnhart, 
    345 F.3d 606
    (8th Cir. 2003).
    LOKEN, Chief Judge, dissenting.
    Like the district court, I conclude that substantial evidence on the
    administrative record as a whole supports the Commissioner’s decision to deny
    Sharon Hatcher’s application for Social Security disability benefits. In my view, it
    is inherently contrary to our obligation to apply the substantial evidence standard of
    review to reverse because this case is “remarkably similar” to our decision in Cox v.
    Barnhart, 
    345 F.3d 606
    (8th Cir. 2003), when the administrative record in that case
    is not before us. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    ______________________________
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