United States v. Christopher Adalikwu ( 2018 )


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  •                 Case: 18-12591    Date Filed: 12/12/2018   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-12591
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-00316-KD-C-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CHRISTOPHER ADALIKWU,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (December 12, 2018)
    Before MARCUS, MARTIN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Christopher Adalikwu appeals from the district court’s dismissal of a motion
    he filed to expunge his criminal record. The appeal stems from a 2008 guilty plea,
    in which Adalikwu pled guilty to one count in an indictment that had charged him
    Case: 18-12591     Date Filed: 12/12/2018    Page: 2 of 6
    with knowingly transferring, possessing, and using without lawful authority the
    means of identification of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). While
    Adalikwu was appealing his conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court decided
    Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 646
     (2009), holding that § 1028A(a)(1)
    required the government to prove that a defendant knew the means of identification
    at issue belonged to another person. It was not enough simply to show the defendant
    knew the identification was not his own. Id. at 657. In light of Flores-Figueroa, the
    parties jointly moved us to vacate Adalikwu’s conviction and sentence. We granted
    the motion, and the district court subsequently released Adalikwu from custody.
    In 2018, Adalikwu filed the instant motion to expunge his record. The district
    court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to expunge a criminal
    record based on the equitable grounds Adalikwu had alleged. Adalikwu argues on
    appeal that the district court erred because it was empowered to exercise ancillary
    jurisdiction and grant him relief, pursuant to Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance
    Company of America, 
    511 U.S. 375
     (1994). After thorough review, we affirm.
    We review questions about a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction de
    novo. United States v. Al-Arian, 
    514 F.3d 1184
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
    “[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not
    only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.”
    Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 95 (1998) (quotations omitted).
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    As a court of limited jurisdiction, we only possess that power authorized by the
    Constitution and by statute. We may not expand our power by judicial decree.
    Kokkonen, 
    511 U.S. at 377
    . “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
    jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
    jurisdiction.” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Kokkonen established a two-part test to clarify
    the limits of a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction: “(1) to permit disposition by a
    single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
    interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage
    its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its degrees.” 
    Id. at 379-80
    (citations omitted).
    Here, the district court did not err in determining that it lacked subject-matter
    jurisdiction.    We begin with the obvious: Adalikwu bears the burden of
    demonstrating the district court’s jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 377
    . He concedes that federal
    law does not offer a specific statute authorizing the general expungement of a
    criminal record. Instead, he claims that, under Kokkonen, the district court may
    exercise its ancillary jurisdiction over his motion and expunge all publicly available
    records of his arrest, conviction, and sentence.
    We are unpersuaded. For starters, many of our sister Circuits have addressed
    this question and have held that the federal courts do not have subject-matter
    jurisdiction over these kinds of motions, whether directed towards judicial records
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    or the executive branch, because they fail to meet Kokkonen’s two-part test. See,
    e.g., United States v. Wahi, 
    850 F.3d 296
    , 298 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that “the
    district court lacks ancillary jurisdiction to hear requests for equitable expungement
    . . . [because] expungement authority is not inherent but instead must be grounded
    in a jurisdictional source found in the Constitution or statutes”) (citations omitted);
    Doe v. United States, 
    833 F.3d 192
    , 194, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    137 S. Ct. 2160
    (2017) (reversing a district court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over a convicted
    defendant’s motion seeking broadly to expunge all arrest and conviction records,
    predicated on her claim that “her conviction prevented her from getting or keeping
    a job . . . ,” because “the District Court’s exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in this case
    served neither of the goals identified in Kokkonen”); United States v. Mettetal, 714
    F. App’x 230, 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2017) (unpub.) (holding that where a defendant
    sought expungement “of convictions vacated long ago” due to lack of probable
    cause, in light of “adverse professional and personal consequences,” “Kokkonen
    delineates two circumstances in which federal courts can invoke ancillary
    jurisdiction [and n]either applies to petitions for equitable expungement”); United
    States v. Lucido, 
    612 F.3d 871
    , 875 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the federal courts
    lack ancillary jurisdiction to consider expungement motions directed to the executive
    branch”); United States v. Coloian, 
    480 F.3d 47
    , 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that
    where an acquitted defendant alleged that “his arrest and trial resulted in
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    impediments” to practicing his profession, “Kokkonen forecloses any ancillary
    jurisdiction to order expungement based on Coloian’s proffered equitable reasons”);
    United States v. Meyer, 
    439 F.3d 855
    , 860-62 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that where a
    convicted defendant sought expungement because his employer was subject to
    regulations that restricted the employment of individuals previously convicted of
    certain criminal offenses, “post-Kokkonen a motion to expunge a criminal record
    that is based solely on equitable grounds does not invoke the ancillary jurisdiction
    of the district court”); United States v. Dunegan, 
    251 F.3d 477
    , 479 (3d Cir. 2001)
    (holding that “in the absence of any applicable statute enacted by Congress, or an
    allegation that the criminal proceedings were invalid or illegal, a District Court does
    not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record, even when ending in an
    acquittal”); United States v. Sumner, 
    226 F.3d 1005
    , 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000)
    (holding that where a convicted defendant alleged that “the record of his arrest and
    conviction will preclude him from obtaining the requisite teaching credentials,”
    “courts [do not] have ‘the inherent power, under equitable principles, to order
    expungement of criminal records’ [because] . . . [t]he power of federal courts may
    not be expanded by judicial decree”). But see Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee,
    
    130 F.3d 695
    , 702 (5th Cir. 1997). 1
    1
    Adalikwu’s reliance on United States v. Flowers, 
    389 F.3d 737
     (7th Cir. 2004), is misplaced.
    That opinion was explicitly overruled by the Seventh Circuit in Wahi in order to bring the
    Seventh Circuit in line with Kokkonen. See Wahi, 850 F.3d at 298, 302.
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    We’re bound to delineate the district court’s ancillary jurisdiction using the
    Supreme Court’s formulation articulated in Kokkonen. Under the first part of that
    test, the grounds for Adalikwu’s request for expungement and the facts of his arrest
    and conviction are in no way interdependent. Kokkonen, 
    511 U.S. at 379-80
    .
    Everything Adalikwu complains of, including the damage to his reputation and the
    increased difficulty in finding work, arose after his arrest and conviction and are
    entirely external to the criminal case itself. Id.; see also Wahi, 850 F.3d at 302.
    As for Kokkonen’s second prong, “the power to expunge judicial records on
    equitable grounds is not incidental to the court’s ability to function successfully as a
    court.” Wahi, 850 F.3d at 302. This is because expungement, at least in this case,
    is not needed to enable the court to “manage its proceedings”; Adalikwu’s
    proceedings are over. Kokkonen, 
    511 U.S. at 379-80
    . He was arrested, he plead
    guilty, he appealed, and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The essential
    business of the court as it related to Adalikwu was completed after it vacated his
    conviction and sentence. Adalikwu’s request sounds in equity, and, pursuant to
    Kokkonen, he is not entitled to expungement of judicial records. 
    511 U.S. at
    379-
    80.   Quite simply, he has not met his burden of establishing subject-matter
    jurisdiction over his motion. The district court did not err in dismissing his case.
    AFFIRMED.
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