United States v. Bernardo Ruiz ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-3360
    ___________
    United States of America,             *
    *
    Plaintiff - Appellee,      *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                              * District Court for the
    * Western District of Arkansas.
    Bernardo Antonio Ruiz,                *
    * [PUBLISHED]
    Defendant - Appellant.     *
    ___________
    Submitted: June 8, 2009
    Filed: June 18, 2009
    ___________
    Before BYE, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Bernardo Ruiz pleaded conditionally guilty to possession of marijuana with
    intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841, and was sentenced to sixty months
    imprisonment. He appeals the district court's1 denial of his motion to suppress. We
    affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Harry F. Barnes, United States District Judge for the Western
    District of Arkansas.
    On June 7, 2007, Ruiz was driving a commercial truck in Arkansas on
    eastbound Interstate 30 when he entered a weigh station displaying a lighted sign
    directing all trucks to exit the Interstate and proceed to the weigh station for
    inspection. Upon entry into the weigh station, Arkansas Highway Police Corporal
    Tim Choate noticed the cab of Ruiz's truck was not displaying the required United
    States Department of Transportation registration number. Pursuant to the Arkansas
    Motor Carrier Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-13-201–23-13-265, Corporal Choate
    inspected Ruiz's log book, driver's license, shipping papers, insurance, and
    registration. See 
    id. § 23-13-217(c)(1)(A).
    He then opened the trailer to inspect the
    cargo, see 
    id. at (c)(1)(B),
    and immediately recognized a strong marijuana odor
    coming from the trailer's cargo. When he opened one of the pallets of collapsible
    plastic trays in the cargo area, Corporal Choate found marijuana. Ruiz was arrested
    for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress the
    marijuana seized from his commercial truck, arguing the search was unconstitutional.
    After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Ruiz pleaded conditionally
    guilty.
    We review the district court's factual conclusions on a motion to suppress for
    clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Guzman-Tlaseca, 
    546 F.3d 571
    , 576 (8th Cir. 2008).
    In New York v. Burger, 
    482 U.S. 691
    (1987), the Supreme Court held a
    warrantless search of a closely-regulated industry is constitutional if the three-part test
    delineated in Court's opinion is met. 
    Id. at 702.
    We have held "[c]ommercial trucking
    is a closely-regulated industry within the meaning of Burger." United States v.
    Mendoza-Gonzalez, 
    363 F.3d 788
    , 794 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus, the Arkansas Motor
    Carrier Act is constitutional if: (1) the regulatory scheme advances a substantial
    government interest; (2) warrantless inspections are necessary to further the regulatory
    scheme; and (3) the rules governing the inspections must be a constitutionally
    adequate substitute to a warrant, i.e. provide notice of a potential search and limit the
    -2-
    time, place, and scope of the search. See 
    Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03
    ; W. States Cattle
    Co. v. Edwards, 
    895 F.2d 438
    , 441 (8th Cir. 1990).
    Our sister circuits that have considered the issue have all held warrantless
    inspections of commercial trucks advance a substantial governmental interest and are
    necessary, see United States v. Delgado, 
    545 F.3d 1195
    , 1202 (9th Cir. 2008), United
    States v. Maldonado, 
    356 F.3d 130
    , 135-36 (1st Cir. 2004), United States v. Fort, 
    248 F.3d 479
    , 481 (5th Cir. 2001), United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 
    258 F.3d 1207
    , 1211
    (10th Cir. 2001), United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 
    923 F.2d 464
    , 468-69 (6th Cir.
    1991), and we have implicitly so held, see United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 
    363 F.3d 788
    , 793-94 (8th Cir. 2004), United States v. Knight, 
    306 F.3d 534
    , 535 (8th Cir.
    2002). We are thus persuaded that warrantless inspections of commercial trucks
    advance a substantial governmental interest and are necessary.
    We next find the Arkansas Motor Carrier Act provides a permissible warrant
    substitute. Its reach is limited to certain commercial vehicles. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-
    13-203, -204, and -206; see also Dominguez v. State, 
    720 S.W.2d 703
    , 705-06 (Ark.
    1986). It provides notice to commercial truck drivers of the possibility of a roadside
    inspection by a designated enforcement officer. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 23-13-217. And
    it limits the scope of the enforcement officers' inspections to an examination solely for
    regulatory compliance. 
    Id. at (c)(1)
    & (c)(1)(B) (enforcement officer may "[i]nspect
    the contents of the vehicle for the purpose of comparing the contents with bills of
    lading, waybills, invoices, or other evidence of ownership or of transportation for
    compensation"). Finally, although the Arkansas Motor Carrier Act does not designate
    specific times when the enforcement officers may conduct inspections, as the Sixth
    Circuit held, "[s]uch a limitation would, of course, render the entire inspection scheme
    unworkable and meaningless. Trucks operate twenty-four hours a day and the officers
    must, necessarily, have the authority to conduct these administrative inspections at any
    time." 
    Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d at 470
    ; see also 
    Delgado, 545 F.3d at 1203
    n.6
    (quoting the same).
    -3-
    We thus conclude Corporal Choate's search of the cargo of Ruiz's commercial
    truck pursuant to the Arkansas Motor Carrier Act did not violate the Fourth
    Amendment.
    Ruiz also argues that any consent by him to search the truck was involuntary,
    and that some of his statements were obtained involuntarily. As the judgment is based
    on findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, we reject these arguments. See 8th
    Cir. R. 47B.
    For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-