Jung v. Bank of America, N.A. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    GLORIA SUN JUNG,                              :
    :
    Plaintiff,                             :       Civil Action No.:      18-962 (RC)
    :
    v.                                     :
    :       Re Document Nos.:      19, 23, 29, 33, 37, 41
    :                              57
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,                :
    :
    Defendants.                            :
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS, SUA SPONTE DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS
    AGAINST ALL REMAINING DEFENDANTS, DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, AND DENYING
    ALL OTHER PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT
    I.    INTRODUCTION
    After over half a decade of litigation surrounding the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff
    Gloria Sun Jung brought this case in April 2018, alleging a wide range of civil and criminal acts
    by Defendants, all individuals and entities involved at some level in the loan and foreclosure
    process. Most defendants have now moved to dismiss Jung’s claims on a number of grounds,
    including, as relevant here, lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Several defendants have also
    moved for sanctions, while Jung has moved to strike multiple motions and for default judgment.
    Because this Court finds that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over any of Jung’s claims, it
    grants the motions to dismiss and sua sponte dismisses all claims against all remaining
    defendants. The Court denies the motion for sanctions because it finds that Jung’s first-time
    filing in this Court is not sufficient to warrant the imposition of sanctions. All other pending
    motions are denied as moot.
    1
    II.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    In February 2008, Plaintiff Gloria Sun Jung (“Jung”) obtained a $697,000 loan from
    Defendant Countrywide Bank FSB (“Countrywide”) and executed a promissory note and
    mortgage with Countrywide, identifying property located at 16 Rising Meadow Way, East
    Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania (the “East Stroudsburg property”) as the collateral securing the loan.
    See BANA’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 19; February 11, 2008 Note, Am. Compl.
    Ex. 1 at 23–24, ECF No. 6-1; February 11, 2008 Mortgage, BANA’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. B, ECF
    No. 19-2. Jung contends that she was “not aware that she was getting into the contract with
    ‘security’” by executing the note and mortgage with Countrywide. Am. Compl. at 10, ECF No.
    6. Following Countrywide’s bankruptcy in 2008, the note and mortgage were assigned to
    Defendant Bank of America (“BANA”). See 
    id. at 7.
    After Jung defaulted on her mortgage, BANA began a foreclosure action in June 2012.
    See BANA's Mem. Supp. at 2. Jung also contends she had no knowledge of what “foreclosure”
    meant at the time of signing the note. Am. Compl. at 10. On April 17, 2015, the Court of
    Common Pleas of Monroe County, Pennsylvania entered a Default Judgment in BANA’s favor.
    See BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2; Am. Compl. at 11. After Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund
    Society, FSB (“Wilmington”) substituted in as BANA’s successor in interest to the East
    Stroudsburg property, a Sheriff’s deed was recorded against the property in Wilmington’s favor
    on August 26, 2016. See BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2; Sheriff’s Deed, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27–30.
    Following the default judgment and Sheriff’s sale, but before Wilmington took
    possession of the property, Jung appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, asking
    for an injunction against her eviction. See Am. Compl. at 12; BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2. The
    Supreme Court denied the appeal and transferred the case to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
    2
    See Am. Compl. at 12; BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2–3. The Superior court denied the injunction
    and allowed the eviction proceedings to continue. See Am. Compl. at 12. On September 1,
    2017, the Court of Common Pleas issued a Writ of Possession in Wilmington’s favor. See
    BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2; Writ of Possession, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 36–38.
    Jung then declared bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
    District of Pennsylvania, and initiated an adversary proceeding to challenge the Default
    Judgment and Sheriff’s Sale. See Am. Compl. at 12; BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 3. The bankruptcy
    and related adversary proceeding were subsequently dismissed, see BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 3,
    with the Bankruptcy Court granting relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay on March 20,
    2018, see Bankruptcy Order, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 40.
    In parallel to the formal foreclosure and eviction process, Jung filed a number of
    proceedings challenging the foreclosure, both in state and in federal court. Between 2015 and
    2018, she initiated six lawsuits challenging the foreclosure in the U.S. District Court for the
    Middle District of Pennsylvania. See Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 3–5, ECF No.
    41-2 (listing cases). All federal lawsuits were dismissed or otherwise closed. See 
    id. 1 In
    2017,
    Jung also sued 10 defendants in state court in Pike County for wrongful foreclosure. See 
    id. And on
    April 19, 2018, Jung filed another complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe
    1
    Aside from Wilmington’s memorandum in support of its motion for sanctions, the Court
    is also free to take judicial notice of the dockets for Jung’s past lawsuits. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v.
    Panetta, 
    35 F. Supp. 3d 56
    , 67 (D.D.C. 2014) (“A court may take judicial notice of facts
    contained in public records of other proceedings[.]” (citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic
    Corp., 
    407 F.3d 1220
    , 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The dockets confirm that all prior cases have
    been terminated. See Docket, Yun v. Bank of Am., 3:18-cv-00649-RDM (M.D. Pa.); Docket, Yun
    v. Bank of Am., 3:17-cv-01690-RDM (M.D. Pa.); Docket, Yun v. Bank of Am., 3:16-cv-02416-
    MEM (M.D. Pa.); Docket, Yun v. Bank of Am., 3:16-mc-00469-MEM (M.D. Pa.); Docket, Yun v.
    Bank of Am., 3:16-cv-00704-RDM-KM (M.D. Pa.); Docket, Jung v. Bank of Am., 3:15-mc-
    00561-UN (M.D. Pa.).
    3
    County, seeking quiet title to the property and asking for the prior judgments to be voided. See
    Am. Compl. at 14; BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 3. That lawsuit was resolved on June 12, 2018 with
    Jung being barred from pursuing any further pro se litigation against related defendants and for
    related claims without first obtaining leave of court. See Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot.
    Sanctions at 2; June 12, 2018 Order, Wilmington Mot. Sanctions Ex. 1 at 332–33, ECF No. 41-1.
    On April 24, 2018, Jung was evicted. See Am. Compl. at 15. Just two days after the
    eviction on April 26, 2018, Jung filed the present case in this Court. See Compl., ECF No. 1.
    On May 2, 2018, Jung filed an amended complaint. See Am. Compl. In the amended complaint,
    Jung brings claims against Countrywide; BANA; Wilmington; the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania judges and judicial employees who presided over her legal
    proceedings; 2 the Sheriff’s office that conducted her eviction and several of its employees; 3 as
    well as multiple other Defendants who at one point or another were involved in the loan
    generation, loan servicing, or legal proceedings surrounding the East Stroudsburg property. 4 See
    
    id. Jung reasserts
    claims previously litigated and brings various additional allegations for
    constitutional violations, fraud, criminal acts, and violations of several civil statutes. See 
    id. 2 Jung
    brings claims against Judges Arthur Zulick, David Williamson, Jennifer Sibum,
    Russell Shurtleff, and Gregory Chelak; Josephine Ferro, the Monroe County Recorder of Deeds;
    and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. See Am. Compl. at 8–9.
    3
    Jung includes claims against the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office; the Monroe County
    Sheriff, Todd Martin; Deputy Sheriff Darlene Lee; and Deputy Sheriff Herbert Heavener. See
    
    id. at 9.
           4
    In addition to the defendants previously mentioned, Jung has brought suit against
    Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the nominee on the mortgage; Selene Financial,
    L.P. and OCwen Loan Servicing, LLC, loan servicers for her loan; several law firms involved in
    the foreclosure process, Reed Smith, LLP, Stern & Eisenberg, P.C., and Phelan Hallinan
    Diamond & Jones, PLLC; the County of Monroe; Commonwealth Land Title Company, the
    company that reviewed title in the initial transaction; Shauna Morie Smith, a BANA employee;
    and Judge John J. Thomas, the bankruptcy judge who presided over her bankruptcy petition.
    4
    Defendants BANA, Shauna Morie Smith, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
    Inc., and Reed Smith LLP filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 24, 2018. See BANA’s Mot.
    Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 19. Wilmington, Selene Financial LP, and Stern & Eisenberg, P.C. (the
    “Wilmington Defendants”) filed their own Motion to Dismiss on May 25, 2018. See Wilmington
    Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 23. Most of the Pennsylvania judicial defendants moved to dismiss
    shortly thereafter, see Pennsylvania Judicial Defs. Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 29, followed by
    Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, see Ocwen Mot. Dismiss
    at 1, ECF No. 33; Commonwealth Mot. Dismiss at 1, EFC No. 37. On December 4, 2018, U.S.
    Bankruptcy Court Judge John Thomas moved to dismiss. See Thomas Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF
    No. 57. A number of defendants also moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and
    demanded the withdrawal of Jung’s complaint. See Wilmington Mot. Sanctions at 1, ECF No.
    41. Jung has moved for default judgment and has sought a variety of additional relief, including
    striking most of the Defendants’ briefs. See generally Docket, Jung v. Bank of America, No. 18-
    cv-962-RC (D.D.C.).
    On October 17, 2018, Jung filed a “Notice of Separate Claim” described as an “Affidavit
    for Stolen items by Defendants[.]” Pl’s Notice of Separate Claim, ECF No. 50. In the notice,
    Jung again relays the facts surrounding the seizure of the East Stroudsburg property and lists
    furniture and belongings that were inside of the property and that she alleges the Defendants
    stole from her upon the foreclosure and her eviction. See 
    id. at 8–16.
    Jung requests over
    $3,500,000 in supplemental relief, which she explicitly states is separate from the relief sought in
    her amended complaint. See 
    id. at 17.
    On October 22, 2018, the Notice of Separate Claim was
    followed by a “Notice of Joinders[,]” in which Jung purports to add additional defendants to the
    litigation. Pl.’s Amended Notice of Joinders, ECF No. 53.
    5
    III.    LEGAL STANDARD
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of an action for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and it is generally
    presumed that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
    Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377 (1994). Accordingly, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that
    the court has subject matter jurisdiction over his or her claims. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561 (1992). In determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, a court must
    accept “the allegations of the complaint as true,” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 
    798 F.3d 1119
    , 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and “construe the complaint liberally, granting the plaintiff the
    benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged[,]” Barr v. Clinton, 
    370 F.3d 1196
    , 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the plaintiff’s
    factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion
    than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal
    Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 
    185 F. Supp. 2d 9
    , 13-14 (D.D.C. 2001).
    If a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot reach the merits of the case,
    and must either dismiss it or transfer it to another court. Amerijet Int'l Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of
    Homeland Sec., 
    43 F. Supp. 3d 4
    , 20 (D.D.C. 2014). As a court of limited jurisdiction, it is
    imperative that this Court “begin, and end,” with an examination of its jurisdiction. Gen. Motors
    Corp. v. EPA, 
    363 F.3d 442
    , 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Court has a continuing duty to examine
    its subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte when it comes into doubt. See
    Bronner v. Duggan, 
    324 F.R.D. 285
    , 294 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Henderson ex. rel. Henderson v.
    Shinseki, 
    562 U.S. 428
    , 434 (2011)).
    6
    IV.    ANALYSIS
    Multiple defendants have moved to dismiss Jung’s complaint on a number of grounds,
    including personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. The
    Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to all judicial defendants because of
    absolute immunity, and that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all other claims pursuant to
    the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the Court grants the motions to dismiss and sua
    sponte dismisses all remaining claims. The Court also denies all relief sought in Jung’s Notice
    of Separate Claim. Because this is Jung’s first filing in this district, the Court denies
    Wilmington’s motion for sanctions. All remaining pending motions are denied as moot.
    A. Absolute Immunity
    First, the Court finds that all claims against the Pennsylvania state judges and U.S.
    Bankruptcy Judge John Thomas must be dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity. “Because
    ‘the nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the
    most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have,’ judges are protected by absolute
    judicial immunity.” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of Mayor, 
    567 F.3d 672
    , 682 (D.C.
    Cir. 2009) (quoting Forrester v. White, 
    484 U.S. 219
    , 226 (1988)). Jung brings claims against
    the judicial defendants for actions they took in their judicial capacity, and her claims are
    therefore barred by absolute immunity.
    Judicial immunity applies to “suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge’s
    judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
    Sindram v. Suda, 
    986 F.2d 1459
    , 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Additionally, “in any action brought
    against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
    injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
    7
    was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed
    broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 
    435 U.S. 349
    , 356
    (1978). Further, a judicial act “does not become less judicial by virtue of an allegation of malice
    or a corruption of motive.” 
    Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227
    . Accordingly, “[a] judge’s decision to file
    or deny a party’s motions or requests is an action routinely performed by a judge in the course of
    litigation, and thus would constitute a judicial act immune from suit.” Thomas v. Wilkins, 61 F.
    Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2014) (listing cases).
    Jung brings claims for money damages against all judicial defendants, and seeks an
    injunction “order[ing] [all] Defendants to remove the mortgage lien” on her property. Am.
    Compl. at 36–37. Jung neither argues, nor do the acts alleged in the complaint suggest, that any
    of the judicial defendants engaged in non-judicial acts. Rather, the state and federal judges
    included in Jung’s complaint appear to merely have acted or ruled in a manner with which Jung
    disagreed as part of their official duties, sparking her “allegation of malice[.]” 
    Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227
    . Jung alleges that the named judges improperly ruled against her in her various
    lawsuits. See generally Am. Compl. at 11–15 , 22–25. As discussed above, these are judicial
    acts that trigger absolute immunity. Therefore, this Court dismisses Jung’s claims against
    Pennsylvania state Judges Arthur Zulick, David Wlliamson, Jennifer Sibum, Russell Shurtleff,
    and Gregory Chelak; and Bankruptcy Judge John Thomas.
    B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
    In their motions to dismiss, Defendants BANA, MERS, Reed Smith, LLP, and Shauna
    Morie Smith 5 argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Jung’s claims because
    5
    Defendants Wilmington, Christiana Trust, Selene Financial, L.P., and Stern & Eisenberg, P.C.
    also join the positions taken by BANA, MERS, Reed Smith, LLP, and Smith in their Motion to
    Dismiss. Wilmington Mot. Dismiss at 1.
    8
    of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. BANA's Mem. Supp. at 7. The Court agrees, and finds that all
    remaining claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman. 6
    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal courts from reviewing a plaintiff’s claims
    when the plaintiff previously filed the same claims in state court and lost. See D.C. Court of
    Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    (1923). In
    essence, it “prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
    ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court
    proceedings commenced.’” Bradley v. DeWine, 
    55 F. Supp. 3d 31
    , 41 (quoting Lance v. Dennis,
    
    546 U.S. 459
    , 460 (2006)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when three criteria are met.
    See 
    id. First, “[t]he
    party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party
    to the prior state-court judgment.” 
    Lance, 546 U.S. at 462
    . Second, the federal suit must raise
    claims that “have been actually raised” in, or are “inextricably intertwined with[,]” the state court
    judgment. 
    Id. A claim
    is “inextricably intertwined” with a prior state-court judgment unless its
    “core” is “independent” of that judgment. 
    Bradley, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 41
    (citing Stanton v. D.C.
    Court of Appeals, 
    127 F.3d 72
    , 76 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Third, “the federal claim must not be
    parallel to the state-court claim.” 
    Lance, 546 U.S. at 462
    . “A federal claim is parallel to a state-
    court claim if it is filed after the state-court claim, but before the state court enters judgment.”
    
    Bradley, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 42
    (citing Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 289–91
    (2005)). The Court briefly reviews the first and third factors, before considering whether Jung’s
    claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a prior state court judgment.
    6
    For defendants who did not raise subject matter jurisdiction as a ground for dismissing Jung’s
    case, this Court may, and does, raise it sua sponte. See Henderson ex rel. 
    Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434
    (“[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the
    scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that
    the parties either overlook or elect not to press.”).
    9
    The first and third elements required for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply are
    clearly met. The doctrine has been invoked against Jung, who was a party to the prior state court
    proceedings relating to the East Stroudsburg property, namely the prior foreclosure and eviction
    actions and Jung’s parallel state suits seeking to stop the foreclosure. See Am. Compl. at 11–12.
    And the prior state actions have concluded because final judgment has been entered in all these
    proceedings. The foreclosure proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
    resulted in a default judgment being issued in BANA’s favor in April 2015, and in a Sheriff’s
    Deed being recorded against the property in Wilmington’s favor on August 26, 2016. See
    BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2; Sheriff’s Deed, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 27–31. Jung’s appeal from the
    Court of Common Pleas’ judgment was denied. See Am. Compl. at 12; BANA’s Mem. Supp. at
    2. The eviction proceedings were concluded when a Writ of Possession was issued in
    Wilmington’s favor on September 1, 2017. See BANA’s Mem. Supp. at 2; Writ of Possession,
    Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at 36–38. And Jung’s two subsequent state suits were dismissed. See
    Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 5.
    Because Jung is the party against whom the Rooker-Feldman defense is being asserted,
    and the prior state actions are all concluded, the Court must review whether the claims raised by
    Jung in this federal suit were “actually litigated” in, or are “inextricably intertwined with[,]” the
    prior state suits. 
    Lance, 546 U.S. at 462
    . The Court finds this factor met as to all of Jung’s
    claims against the remaining defendants because all are inextricably intertwined with prior state
    court judgments.
    Jung first brings claims for violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
    Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Jung’s constitutional claims all arise out of an alleged
    deprivation of Jung’s constitutional rights during the foreclosure and eviction process or during
    10
    subsequent state litigation. Jung’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims contain allegations
    that all Defendants deprived her of her home without due process (and compensation, in the case
    of the Fifth Amendment claim), see Am. Compl. at 21–22, and presuppose that the foreclosure
    and eviction were wrongfully conducted, which goes to the core of the prior state court
    foreclosure and eviction judgments. Jung asserts in her Seventh Amendment claim that her right
    to trial by jury was violated by all defendants because state courts reviewing her multiple
    complaints relating to the foreclosure and eviction refused to allow a trial by jury. See Am.
    Compl. at 21. Such a claim essentially asks the Court to reverse those prior state court decisions
    dismissing her claims. 7 And Jung’s remaining constitutional claims, rooted in the Fourth, Sixth,
    Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendments, similarly involve alleged violations of Jung’s constitutional
    rights through the foreclosure and eviction process, which resulted in the alleged trespass on, and
    theft of, her property. See 
    id. at 20–22.
    Through these claims, Jung asks the Court to find the
    underlying foreclosure and eviction judgments, or the state court judgments dismissing her
    multiple related lawsuits, improper.
    Because all the constitutional violations Jung alleges rely on the invalidity of the prior
    state court proceedings, her claims “fall[] squarely within the ambit of the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine.” Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 
    698 F. Supp. 2d 94
    , 99 (D.D.C. 2010). In Hunter,
    the defendant lost a foreclosure action in state court and brought claims in federal court to
    7
    Jung mentions that her Seventh Amendment rights were also violated when the “federal district
    court of Scranton . . . refused to give trial by jury[.]” Am. Compl. at 21. To the extent Jung
    seeks to challenge the validity of any federal district court judgment, this Court lacks subject
    matter jurisdiction because federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to reconsider decisions
    of other federal district courts. See, e.g., Atchison v. U.S. District Courts, 
    190 F. Supp. 3d 78
    , 88
    (D.D.C. 2016); Fleming v. United States, 
    847 F. Supp. 170
    , 172 (D.D.C. 1994). “To the extent
    [Jung] objects to the decision of the [Bankruptcy] court . . . , her proper remedy was an appeal of
    that decision.” 
    Atchison, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 88
    .
    11
    contest the validity of the judgment and obtain damages for injuries suffered as a result of the
    foreclosure. See 
    id. at 99–100.
    The court explained that “[a]lthough Hunter’s . . . claim is not
    styled as an appeal from the foreclosure action, it is clear from the Complaint that . . . [it] is
    based entirely on the alleged impropriety of the foreclosure[,]” because the alleged injuries
    stemmed from the foreclosure and Hunter asked the court to modify the foreclosure judgment.
    
    Id. at 100.
    Jung’s claims are similar to those in Hunter: while styled as claims for constitutional
    violations by the defendants, they all rest on alleged improprieties that occurred as part of the
    foreclosure and eviction process or of subsequent state suits challenging that process. Jung
    similarly also requests that the Court void the foreclosure and eviction judgments against her.
    See Am. Compl. at 34, 37. Her claims thus all “involve . . . issues that are inextricably
    intertwined with a state court judgment,” 
    Hunter, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 100
    , and must be dismissed
    under Rooker-Feldman. See also Toth v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    82 F. Supp. 3d 373
    , 376–77
    (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied where plaintiff sought to attack
    state court judgment through complaint that, “although incomprehensible in many respects,”
    alleged constitutional due process violations stemming from foreclosure and eviction and
    demanded reversal of state court judgment upholding eviction).
    Jung’s next set of claims, for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 241-42, 287, 472–75, 504,
    1001, 1005, 1341-43, 1621, 1951, 1961, 1962, 1964, and 2071, are criminal charges that Jung
    purports to brings against some or all defendants. She asserts that the defendants committed
    criminal acts by allegedly violating her rights and stealing her property as part of the foreclosure
    and eviction process. For example, Jung asserts mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-43 because
    the defendants used the United States Postal Service to communicate with her about her debt as it
    related to the East Stroudsburg property. Am. Compl. at 27. She also alleges that all defendants
    12
    committed extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 by forcing her to allow them to obtain her property
    through ”duress, threat, and coercion[.]” 
    Id. at 31–32.
    Because the common ground giving rise
    to all of Jung’s criminal claims is the wrongfulness of the prior state foreclosure and eviction
    judgments, and finding in her favor on those claims would essentially nullify those prior
    judgments, the criminal claims are also barred by Rooker-Feldman. 8
    Jung’s remaining set of claims are similar to her constitutional and criminal claims in that
    she accuses the non-judicial defendants of impropriety in the debt collection, foreclosure, or
    eviction processes relating to her home. These claims include alleged violations of 12 U.S.C. §
    24, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and 31 U.S.C. § 3729; common law trespass; violations of the Brady Rule,
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963); and an unspecified claim that all defendants, together
    with the Bankruptcy Judge assigned to Jung’s case, “used [the Judge’s] unconstitutional order to
    evict [Jung].” Am. Compl. at 31. 9 Jung again presupposes that the foreclosure and eviction
    were wrongfully conducted and seeks to rectify the alleged mishandling of the prior state court
    8
    Separately from the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction
    over Jung’s claims based on criminal statutes because she does not have standing to bring
    criminal charges. “‘It is well-settled that ‘a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the
    prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution,’
    and ‘a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
    of another.’” Ahuruonye v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
    312 F. Supp. 3d 1
    , 12 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting
    Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
    410 U.S. 614
    , 619 (1973); see also Masoud v. Suliman, 
    816 F. Supp. 2d
    77, 80 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing criminal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
    noting that such statutes cannot provide the basis for a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331);
    Hunter v. District of Columbia, 
    384 F. Supp. 2d 257
    , 260 n.1 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing claims
    based on criminal statutes because they did not provide a cause of action).
    9
    Several of these claims, like “violating the Brady rule,” are difficult to make sense of.
    Nevertheless, even those claims that do not appear to be linked to a valid cause of action are still
    alleged to arise out of the foreclosure and eviction proceedings in connection with the East
    Stroudsburg property. And to the extent Jung’s claim for impropriety in connection with her
    bankruptcy case purports to challenge the outcome of that case rather than the underlying
    eviction proceeding, as discussed above the Court does not have jurisdiction to reconsider
    decisions of other federal courts. See, e.g., 
    Atchison, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 88
    .
    13
    proceedings. For example, Jung alleges that BANA and Wilmington conspired against her by
    not disclosing all of the information necessary for her to properly contract with them, in a
    fraudulent scheme designed to make her lose her home. See Compl. at 30. She alleges violation
    of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, insofar as there was an “[i]llegal
    debt collection practice without validation of contract” with respect to the East Stroudsburg
    property. Compl. at 30. These claims again are premised on the notion that the foreclosure and
    eviction were wrongfully conducted, and finding for Jung would necessarily mean invalidating
    the state courts’ prior foreclosure and eviction judgments. As such, the claims are also barred by
    the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
    C. Jung’s Notice of Separate Claim
    The Court denies all relief sought in Jung’s Notice of Separate Claim because it
    constitutes an improper filing under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the notice, Jung
    purports to bring a separate claim for money damages against both the defendants in the
    amended complaint and additional defendants, for “equity in the [p]roperty” and “stolen items”
    as a result of the foreclosure. Pl.’s Notice of Separate Claim at 17. Jung notes that this claim for
    over $3.5M is “not include[d] in the original complaint[.]” 
    Id. The Court
    gathers that Jung’s
    intent is to litigate this new claim, including against the new defendants, in parallel to the claims
    in her complaint. The notice therefore essentially functions as an amendment to Jung’s
    Amended Complaint that adds a new claim against various defendants. Because this amendment
    does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot consider the claim
    and denies all relief sought.
    Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties can amend their pleadings
    once as a matter of right within 21 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Jung has already done so. A
    14
    party who wishes to amend her complaint for a second time may do so “only with the opposing
    party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
    requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Jung has not requested leave to amend her complaint, and the
    Court accordingly cannot consider the additional claims brought in the notice. Even construing
    the notice as a request for leave to include the additional claims in an amendment to Jung’s
    complaint, the Court does not find that justice so requires because all proposed additional claims
    are barred under Rooker-Feldman, and, thus, amendment would be futile. See, e.g., BEG Invs.,
    LLC v. Alberti, 
    85 F. Supp. 3d 13
    , 23 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that amendment is futile and thus
    motion to amend should be denied “if it . . . fails to state a legal theory or could not withstand a
    motion to dismiss” (quoting Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 
    211 F. Supp. 2d 101
    , 114 (D.D.C.
    2002))). Moreover, given that the property is not located in this district and the alleged injuries
    did not occur here, venue would also not be appropriate. See, e.g., Dehaemers v. Wynne, 522 F.
    Supp. 2d 240, 247 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding amendment futile where District of Columbia was
    improper venue for plaintiff’s Title VII claims). 10
    D. Motion for Sanctions
    Finally, the Wilmington Defendants move for sanctions against Jung. 11 While the motion
    does not identify any specific relief sought beyond striking Jung’s complaint, it appears to
    10
    As discussed above, the additional claims brought in Jung’s Notice of Separate Claims are of
    the same nature as many of the claims in the Amended Complaint, in that they arise directly out
    of the alleged improper taking of the East Stroudsburg property through an invalid foreclosure
    and eviction. Jung lost the prior state proceedings and is essentially attempting to re-litigate
    them through her additional claims. Even if the complaint were amended properly, the claims
    would still be barred by Rooker-Feldman.
    11
    On November 26, 2018, Jung also filed a motion to strike Ocwen’s opposition to her Notice of
    Separate Claim. See Pl.’s Mot. Strike at 1, ECF No. 55. The motion notes that Blank Rome,
    LLC, Ocwen’s counsel, “is sanctioned under rule 11[,]” 
    id. at 1,
    because it allegedly submitted
    false statements in the opposition, see 
    id. at 4.
    To the extent Jung’s motion can be construed as a
    motion for sanctions under Rule 11, the motion must be denied because it does not comply with
    15
    suggest that the Court should impose further monetary or non-monetary sanctions. 12 See
    Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 8–9. The Court need not strike Jung’s complaint
    because it has already found that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. And as
    discussed below, the Court declines to issue any sanctions against Jung, whether monetary or
    non-monetary.
    First, the Court does not believe that any monetary sanctions are warranted here. “Rule
    11 provides certain bases for the imposition of sanctions, including that a party’s legal
    contentions are frivolous or unwarranted under existing law, or that the claims have been
    presented for an improper purpose such as harassment.” Smith v. Scalia, 
    44 F. Supp. 3d 28
    , 45
    (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)). And such sanctions can be imposed on pro se
    litigants. See, e.g., id.; Kurtz v. United States, 
    779 F. Supp. 2d 50
    , 51 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011).
    However, as the Wilmington Defendants recognize, see Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions
    at 8, the imposition of monetary sanctions is solely at the Court’s discretion. Because this is the
    first suit Jung has filed in this jurisdiction, and because it believes that imposing monetary
    penalties would be disproportionate to Jung’s actions, the Court declines to impose any monetary
    sanctions.
    the requirements of Rule 11. “A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other
    motion[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). In addition, “[t]he allegedly offending party must be served
    twenty-one days before a motion for sanctions is filed with the Court, allowing an opportunity
    for that party to rectify its behavior before the judicial imposition of sanctions.” Brown v. F.B.I.,
    
    873 F. Supp. 2d 388
    , 408 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)). “This procedural rule
    must be satisfied before the Court considers the substantive aspects of plaintiff’s motion.” 
    Id. Here, Jung’s
    motion is filed together with a motion to strike and appears to have been served just
    three days before filing. See Pl.’s Mot. Strike at 6. Accordingly, the motion is denied.
    12
    The memorandum in support for the motion mentions the availability of monetary and non-
    monetary sanctions, Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 8–9, and notes that “Defendants
    respectfully request that the Court . . . award other appropriate relief detailed in the proposed
    form of order[,]” 
    id. at 12,
    but no proposed order is attached to the motion.
    16
    Second, to the extent the Wilmington Defendants can be construed as requesting a pre-
    filing injunction, the Court also declines to impose one here because it does not believe that the
    motion has sufficiently put Jung on notice of the possibility that an injunction may issue against
    her. While Jung, like every American, has a constitutional right of access to the courts, that right
    ‘“is neither absolute nor unconditional.’” In re Yelverton, 
    526 B.R. 429
    , 432 (D.D.C. 2014)
    (quoting In re Green, 
    669 F.2d 779
    , 785 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). “Federal courts ‘have both the
    inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which
    impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions[,]’” Crumpacker v. Ciraolo-Klepper, 
    288 F. Supp. 3d 201
    , 204 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. D.C. Public Defender Serv., 881 F.
    Supp. 663, 666 (D.D.C. 1995)), and accordingly have the authority to issue pre-filing injunctions
    against vexatious litigants, see, e.g., 
    id. at 204;
    Smith, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 46
    .
    However, the D.C. Circuit has emphasized that pre-filing injunctions ‘“remain very much
    the exception to the general rule of free access to the courts,’ and ‘the use of such measures
    against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with particular caution.’” In re Powell, 
    851 F.2d 427
    , 431 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Pavilonis v. King, 
    626 F.2d 1075
    , 1079 (1st Cir. 1980)).
    Accordingly, courts in this district follow a three-step process before issuing such an injunction:
    “first, notice and the opportunity to be heard are provided; second, the court develops a record
    for review that considers both the number and content of the plaintiff’s filings; and third, the
    court makes substantive findings as to the harassing nature of the litigant’s actions.” Dougherty
    v. United States, 
    156 F. Supp. 3d 222
    , 236 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting 
    Smith, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 46
    ).
    The Court finds that Jung was not given the appropriate notice and opportunity to be
    heard. “[T]he requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard can be satisfied without a
    hearing in court, so long as the affected litigants have an opportunity to contest the injunction in
    17
    briefing.” 
    Crumpacker, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 204
    . But here, the Wilmington Defendants’ motion
    for sanctions mentions the term “pre-filing injunction” exactly twice, in two succinct paragraphs
    explaining the standard for imposing non-monetary sanctions under Rule 11 in the Fourth
    Circuit. See Wilmington Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions at 9. The Wilmington Defendants never
    elaborate on that standard—which, the Court notes, appears different from the standard courts
    use in this Circuit—or actually make any argument for the imposition of a pre-filing injunction.
    See generally 
    id. Instead, the
    motion simply restates the Wilmington Defendants’ prior
    arguments for dismissal of the complaint. See 
    id. at 9–12.
    The Court accordingly finds that Jung
    was not afforded the required notice and opportunity to be heard, and that the imposition of a
    pre-filing injunction is unwarranted at this time. Because this is Jung’s first filing in this district,
    and in light of this opinion dismissing all of her claims, the Court declines to unnecessarily
    prolong this case by asking the parties to submit additional briefs on this issue. Instead, the
    Court “will caution [Jung] that any future filings in this Court relating to the subject matter of the
    instant complaint may subject [her] to sanctions or a future pre-filing injunction.” 
    Dougherty, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 236
    .
    V.    CONCLUSION AND ORDER
    For the foregoing reasons, all filed motions to dismiss are GRANTED. All remaining
    claims against all other defendants are DENIED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    Wilmington’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 41) is DENIED. And because this case has been
    dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the remainder of the pending motions are
    DENIED AS MOOT. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
    contemporaneously issued.
    Dated: December 19, 2018                                              RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
    United States District Judge
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2018-0962

Judges: Judge Rudolph Contreras

Filed Date: 12/19/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2018

Authorities (24)

Anne M. Pavilonis v. Edward J. King , 626 F.2d 1075 ( 1980 )

General Motors Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency , 363 F.3d 442 ( 2004 )

The Honorable Bob Barr v. William Jefferson Clinton , 370 F.3d 1196 ( 2004 )

In Re Thomas D. Powell, in Re Brian Brown , 851 F.2d 427 ( 1988 )

Michael Sindram v. John H. Suda Paul R. Webber, III Oliver ... , 986 F.2d 1459 ( 1993 )

John Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals , 127 F.3d 72 ( 1997 )

In Re Reverend Clovis Carl Green, Jr , 669 F.2d 779 ( 1981 )

Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor , 567 F.3d 672 ( 2009 )

Kurtz v. United States , 779 F. Supp. 2d 50 ( 2011 )

Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc. , 211 F. Supp. 2d 101 ( 2002 )

Fleming v. United States , 847 F. Supp. 170 ( 1994 )

Hunter v. US BANK NAT. ASS'N , 698 F. Supp. 2d 94 ( 2010 )

Hunter v. District of Columbia , 384 F. Supp. 2d 257 ( 2005 )

Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft , 185 F. Supp. 2d 9 ( 2001 )

Linda RS v. Richard D. , 93 S. Ct. 1146 ( 1973 )

Brady v. Maryland , 83 S. Ct. 1194 ( 1963 )

Stump v. Sparkman , 98 S. Ct. 1099 ( 1978 )

Forrester v. White , 108 S. Ct. 538 ( 1988 )

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 112 S. Ct. 2130 ( 1992 )

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America , 114 S. Ct. 1673 ( 1994 )

View All Authorities »