David Scot Lynd v. Northwood MHC, L.P. D/B/A Northwood and City of Lewisville/Lewisville Police Department ( 2008 )

                                      COURT OF APPEALS

                                       SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                                   FORT WORTH

                                        NO. 2-07-451-CV  

DAVID SCOT LYND                                                              APPELLANT

                                                   V.

NORTHWOOD MHC, L.P.,                                                      APPELLEES

D/B/A NORTHWOOD AND

CITY OF LEWISVILLE/LEWISVILLE

POLICE DEPARTMENT

                                              ------------

FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

                                              ------------

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION^[1]

                                              ------------

Appellant David Scot Lynd appeals from the trial court=s order severing his claims against appellees Northwood MHC., L.P., d/b/a Northwood, the City of Lewisville, and the Lewisville Police Department from his divorce proceeding involving Lea Ailene Cox.  Both causes of action were originally filed under Cause No. 2007-50902-367.

On January 14, 2008, this court sent a letter to appellant advising him that we may lack jurisdiction over his appeal because the trial court=s AOrder on Motion for Severance@ did not appear to be a final, appealable order or judgment and stating that unless appellant or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response on or before January 24, 2008, showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.^[2]  Appellant did not file a response. 

This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and certain interlocutory orders, if specifically authorized by statute.^[3]  The order from which appellant appeals is neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory order for which an appeal is authorized by statute.^[4]  Because we have no statutory authorization to review the trial court=s interlocutory order granting appellees= motion to sever, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.^[5] 

PER CURIAM

PANEL D: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DELIVERED: February 21, 2008                           

---

^[1]See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

^[2]See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

^[3]See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992).

^[4]See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007); Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 272 (AA final judgment is one which disposes of all legal issues between all parties.A).

^[5]See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).